German Bomber design rational

pbehn said:

Below is from the Pe 8 article in wiki, Its strategic raid on Berlin 4 reached Berlin and only two returned, this was a symbolic gesture which almost certainly cost more in terms of Russian men and machines than German. Only 93 Pe 8s were built and front line strength was rarely above 20 from what I can see.

On the evening of 10 August, eight M-40-engined Pe-8s of the 432nd TBAP, accompanied by Yermolaev Yer-2s of the 420th Long-Range Bomber Aviation Regiment (DBAP), attempted to bomb Berlin from Pushkino Airfield near Leningrad. One heavily loaded Pe-8 crashed immediately upon take off, after it lost an engine. Only four managed to reach Berlin, or its outskirts, and of those, only two returned to their base. The others landed elsewhere or crash-landed in Finland and Estonia. The aircraft of the commander of the 81st Long-Range Bomber Division, Combrig Mikhail Vodopianov, to which both regiments belonged, was attacked mistakenly by Polikarpov I-16s from Soviet Naval Aviation over the Baltic Sea and lost an engine; later, before he could reach Berlin, German flak punctured a fuel tank. He crash-landed his aircraft in southern Estonia.[20] Five more Pe-8s were lost during the operation, largely due to the unreliability of the M-40s.[21] Seven Pe-8s were lost during the month of August alone, rendering the regiment ineffective.

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Yes, they had manufactured 93 airframes (including the early TB-7 designation) and they had less than a great performance record.

But the point is, that the Soviets were striking Berlin (and other key targets) well within German proper from the early stages of the war. Along with the Pe-8, there was also the DB-3 (including the Torpedo carrying version, dropping conventional ordnance), IL-4, Yer-2, etc.

Their lessons learned in daylight attacks over Germany were comparable to what Bomber Command and the U.S. learned during the early days and their losses were comparable, percentage-wise.

IMHO when you ask about doctrine in Nazi Germany you have to start by reading Mein Kampf. It's also hard to apply logic to the planning within Hitler's regime. Hitler intended his conflicts to be over quickly, with Blitzkrieg attacks overrunning the defender. He never planned or wanted a protracted War. He did not need a strategic arm to Luftwaffe, wars would be over before 4 engine bombers could come into play. Germany had the technology to design and build 4 engine strategic bombers, but not the resources to do so on a scale that the Western Allies did, and still produce the other weapons to fight the War. Also there simply wasn't a motivation to do from Hitler and Nazi command. In Korda's With Wings like Eagles, he quotes Goering stating "The Führer will never ask me how big our bombers are, only how many we have." Goering wanted to keep his neck and was more politically motivated to build two or three Stukas or Heinkels over one 4 engine bomber.

stona said:

The Battle of the Atlantic was never as close as has sometimes been claimed in any case.



Cheers

Steve

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You provocative patronising ass hole, my father was in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Arctic convoys and the Pacific. He was not a hero he did his bit, now let me see you tell Dragondog that the air war over Europe was not close, how would his father have done in a P40. The Battle of the Atlantic was won by massive investment on both sides of the Atlantic in planes ships, men, weapons, technology and intelligence. The Battle of the Atlantic was the one which troubled Churchill the most, it was the obsession of Bletchley Park and its code breakers. Your idiotic graph hides the fact that shipping losses in 1942 equalled (almost) the losses of the previous 3 years and there was no way the USA/Canada/UK relationship could survive 700,000 tons of US produce going to the bottom of the sea EVERY MONTH.


I have had it with this forum you are an educated idiot trolling for an argument.


Cheers guys.

stona said:

Group Captain Arthur Harris. In December 1936 Harris wrote.

"It would be an unnecessary, a serious and perhaps even fatal subtraction from our total offensive strength to keep any ponderable number of aircraft either employed on, or standing by for, reconnaissance operations in connection with a trade defence war that might not happen."

Harris argued that it was more cost effective to "nip in the bud" an enemy's war waging potential by attacking his war industries. He was concerned, in his words, with "sources" rather than "fringes". The best place to attack a U-boat was in its factory or dockyard where you knew where it was, not to go gallivanting around the North Atlantic in the hope of finding one. This is the raison d'etre of any strategic bombing force. He was right at the time, before the advent of workable radar. The 'Channel dash' was a salutary lesson to the RAF, including Coastal Command.
His argument was supported by many at the Air Ministry (hardly surprising as the Admiralty was still trying to seize control of Coastal Command) as well as Churchill and essentially prevailed. Bomber Command received a preferential supply of aircraft.

The Battle of the Atlantic was never as close as has sometimes been claimed in any case.

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And Harris did a very good job with argument, Unfortunately he was arguing a false position. It was NOT the job of Coastal Command (or whatever group was tasked with long range air support to "go gallivanting around the North Atlantic in the hope of finding one."
The job was NOT sinking U-boats but to KEEP U-Boats from sinking the merchantmen. An important distinction.
A submarine a hundred miles from a convoy was little or no threat unless almost directly in the path of the convoy. The submarines detection range was very limited, that is the range at which it could detect a target. At night or underwater it's detection range was even less. Basically U-boats gallivanted around the North Atlantic in the hope of finding a convoy. It seemed to work for them (sarcasm). It actuality they concentrated on choke points or known convoy routes. Convoys not taking huge detours due to cost of time and fuel although zig-zagging did cost both.
Likewise air patrols could be concentrated in certain areas or zones. Just keeping the U-boat underwater limited it's ability to detect targets and it's ability to get into a firing/attack position. This was well known in WW I but seems to have been conveniently forgotten in some of the arguments before and in early WW II.
And even a decent spotting report on a U-boat could allow a convoy to alter course and avoid it if the report was in time.
U-boats depended on air reconnaissance (spotty and limited in range) their own visual lookouts (dependent on weather but visual horizon plus smoke trail of target.) radio reports from other U-boats and luck. Visual horizon from a periscope is limited, worse than a row-boat. Ability to follow convoy while submerged was also very limited. Batteries, if fully charged could allow for ranges of 60-90 miles at 4 knots vs a convey speed of 7 knots. However due to power needed and the discharge characteristics of lead acid batteries a full battery was only good for less than 2 hours at full underwater speed of 7.6-8knots. With less than full battery??? U-boats had to run on the surface in order to get in attack/firing position much more often than not.

The part " in connection with a trade defence war that might not happen." really laughable given the experience of WW I. Any potential enemy that had studied WW I knew that a trade war against England was a very good option. Even it it didn't defeat England outright (small chance) the resources expended in conducting such a war would require a much greater expenditure by England to fight back (protect trade) in manpower, fuel, ships, aircraft and so on. The country attacking England in the trade war could pick and choose points/times of attack (to some extent) while the British had to defend everywhere all the time. You can't escort 40% of the convoys for example.
For the British the defense of a trade war should have been what was the most effective in terms of resources. A squadron of planes searching the ocean or a dozen slow, small ships (pickets if you will) with crews measured in dozens per ship and using tons of fuel oil per day? What was the cost of XX number of 4 engine patrol planes vs the cost of a single 1400ton destroyer.

The value of air patrols or air escorts for convoys/shipping had been proved in WW I which is well before radar. Radar helped extend air coverage to 24 hours a day, just as radar on the escort ships extended search radius and search times. Before radar on the ships anti-sub actions often worked from what was called the "flaming datum" They looked for the U-boat in a search pattern based on the last burning/sinking ship as the center of the pattern. Even after radar at times.

Unfortunately this seems to be one of those cases where the RAF defeating the Royal Navy or the Royal Army was more important than defeating the enemy that was actually shooting at Great Britain.

pbehn said:

You provocative patronising ass hole, my father was in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Arctic convoys and the Pacific. He was not a hero he did his bit, .

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Well thanks for that.

That the Battle of the Atlantic did not come as close to defeating Britain as has sometimes been claimed post war is a statement of fact, not trolling. The Battle of Britain never came close to defeating Fighter Command, the Germans never came close to being able to mount an invasion, both facts and neither detract from the determination, effort and occasional heroism of the men and women of Fighter Command.

The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and the British landings at Port Said were probably illegal, definitely unjustified and a political and military disaster, but that doesn't reflect on my father and his colleagues flying in from HMS Theseus, under fire, to land the RM Commandos and returning, several times, to evacuate casualties. Like your father he just did his job.


This has absolutely nothing to do with your father's service, you are being an over sensitive arse hole. Would you care to discuss the figures quoted?

Cheers

Steve
.

Shortround6 said:

And Harris did a very good job with argument, Unfortunately he was arguing a false position. It was NOT the job of Coastal Command (or whatever group was tasked with long range air support to "go gallivanting around the North Atlantic in the hope of finding one."
The job was NOT sinking U-boats but to KEEP U-Boats from sinking the merchantmen.

Unfortunately this seems to be one of those cases where the RAF defeating the Royal Navy or the Royal Army was more important than defeating the enemy that was actually shooting at Great Britain.

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This strikes at the whole concept of strategic aerial warfare and the reason for Bomber Command's existence. A Trenchardist like Harris would argue that the best was of preventing a U-boat from sinking British shipping was to destroy it before it ever put to sea or prevent it from ever being built by striking at the means of producing it.
The RAF would also argue that it was the job of the Royal Navy to protect Britain's maritime trade as this was the reason for its existence. In fact, throughout the war navies sank slightly more U-Boats than were sunk by aircraft.
I have at no point said that I agree with this argument, I am well aware of the precedents, but this is the essence of the argument that won the day in the mid 1930s. If people don't want to hear the contemporary arguments because they don't like them, then I will happily stop contributing to the discussion.
To paraphrase Harris, nobody knew if an all out strategic bombing campaign would work, because nobody had tried it. We know with hindsight not afforded to the decision makers of the mid 1930s, that it would not.

It was important to the RAF to win these political battles at this time. It saw itself as fighting for its survival as an independent service. Both the Army and Admiralty were making strenuous attempts to either bend the RAF to its will or to take control of certain aspects of military aviation, both were fiercely resisted by the Air Ministry/RAF.

Cheers

Steve

The historically perspective is good to have and I thank you for providing it. That doesn't mean we can't criticize the perspective or those that held certain views at the time. Especially if the views didn't take into account information available at the time. No retrospectroscope needed in the 1930s to use WW I experience.

In the context of this thread it helps show that perhaps the Germans were not wrong in failing to pursue a bombing force like bomber command. Given Bomber commands rather notable lack of results in the first few years of the war, the lack of support to other forces (the RN and RA) that concentration on Bomber Command made necessary and it took many times the number of bombers originally thought necessary to achieve significant results (and numbers well in excess of Germany's ability to produce) and the lack of a dedicated strategic component may not have been such a bad decision.

This boils down to a similar argument to that between the Army and RAF regarding Army cooperation and what we now call close air support.
Simplistically, in the opinion of the RAF, it was the Army's job to destroy enemy assets on the battlefield and the Navy's to destroy them on the ocean. The RAF saw its role as reducing or stopping the flow of those assets from the factories to the battlefields and oceans of the world. This was the fundamental role of any strategic air force (before we advance into nuclear age and mutually assured destruction).
Any hint of subjugation of the RAF to the Army or Admiralty was fiercely resisted, and this was not always to the larger good.

In the context of this thread the raison d'etre of the Luftwaffe and its bomber force was quite different and this is why its rationale for bomber design was fundamentally different.

The recognition of Germany as a potential enemy caused a reappraisal of British bomber design requirements. These were entirely strategic in nature. A map was produced for the Committee for Imperial Defence's Sub-committee on Air Parity (set up precisely because of fears aroused by reported increases in the strength of the Luftwaffe) which showed that to attack Berlin from bases in Britain required a radius of action of 550 miles, to attack industrial areas in East Germany, 700 miles. It was noted that none of the RAF's current bombers could attack Berlin with a full bomb load.
The design conflict between speed and armament dominated the discussion of operational requirements for bombers. Though some favoured speed as a primary defence, the dominant issue was one of bomber weight. It was supposed that the heavier the bomber the more possible it would be to have both speed and, what was regarded at the time, as adequate armament. These technical issues were at the core of discussions about new heavy and medium bombers in 1936 and the quest for the 'ideal' (standard) bomber in 1937-39. There was no change in bombing policy, and no predeliction for heavy bombers (as Webster and Frankland contend). The bombers were to attack Germany, targets were at a long distance, common sense, not any predeliction, dictated that much heavier bombers than those to attack Paris would be required to get the range and particularly speed required.
It was this strategic requirement that led to the British building bigger and heavier bombers, and the lack of such meant that the Germans did not.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

The RAF would also argue that it was the job of the Royal Navy to protect Britain's maritime trade as this was the reason for its existence.

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The Royal Navy would agree that its their job to protect maritime trade. They would also argue that Coastal Command should belong to the Navy in order to accomplish this mission.

stona said:

The RAF saw its role as reducing or stopping the flow of those assets from the factories to the battlefields and oceans of the world.

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The problem with this argument is that you can't begin this job until a conflict has started and then escalated. Somebody has to destroy the assets that have already been produced at the start of a conflict.

Your first point is why the Admiralty was trying to regain control of 'shore based aviation', meaning Coastal Command. The fact that at the outbreak of the war its own carrier based assets were borderline obsolete probably had something to do with this as well.

Second point, a strategic air force would argue that destroying those assets already produced, on or near the battlefield, was the job of the other services. It's, job in line with Trenchardian doctrine, was to attack the enemy's means of waging war.

The lessons of WW1 were either willfully ignored or misunderstood. The single most important work regarding the application of air power during WW1 was 'War in the Air' by Raleigh and Jones, seven volumes produced between 1922 and shortly before the war. It's hard going and not recommended reading! In the political climate of the day (the newly independent RAF was reduced by 1920 to just 14% of its size on Armistice Day) the RAF was competing for a proportion of an ever decreasing defence budget and had to find roles independent of the support of ground forces and naval aviation. A failure to do so was bound to result in its dismemberment. This is why the Raleigh and Jones work was so disingenuously complimentary about the WW1 attempts at 'strategic' bombing. Great emphasis was also placed on the success and cheapness of Imperial policing by air, and this had indeed proven successful. The difference between scaring a few hundred tribesmen who might never have seen an aircraft, or bombing the occasional African chief's kraal, and launching a full scale bombing offensive against another industrialised nation seems to have been conveniently overlooked.
We have seen that planning and procurement for Bomber Command in the 1930s was underpinned by Trenchardian doctrine, and 'War in the Air' reinforced this in the minds of the decision makers. Lessons were learned from WW1, its just that to a large extent they were the wrong ones.
John Slessor (much later, as Chief of the Air Staff) would write,
"Our belief in the bomber was intuitive...a matter of faith."
It was. Strategic bombing doctrine became orthodoxy, and any dissenting view was difficult to hold in any senior capacity in the RAF or Air Ministry. It took two years of war to demonstrate that the British had defined air power FAR too narrowly, some of the reasons have been cited by others above. The lack of any suitable aircraft for maritime trade protection, or blockading the Norwegian iron ore trade were early examples. The RAF had actively opposed the adoption of any kind of air support doctrine, and this was reflected in the failures in Norway and France. Much worse was the failure to prepare properly for the one job that the adoption of Trenchardian strategic bombing doctrine as the new orthodoxy should have demanded. Bomber Command was not capable in 1939, and would not be for several years, of mounting the sort of campaign for which it was supposedly designed.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Well thanks for that.

That the Battle of the Atlantic did not come as close to defeating Britain as has sometimes been claimed post war is a statement of fact, not trolling. The Battle of Britain never came close to defeating Fighter Command, the Germans never came close to being able to mount an invasion, both facts and neither detract from the determination, effort and occasional heroism of the men and women of Fighter Command.

Would you care to discuss the figures quoted?

Cheers

Steve
.

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Your view of history is religious not factual. Historically Park and the RAF fought the Battle of Britain to a draw, you argue therefore that no other outcome was possible,. At any time before August 1940 the RAF could have lost the Battle of Britain simply by appointing Leigh Mallory in place of Park. His conduct during the BoB showed he hadn't a clue what he was doing, later, wargaming the battle he took part in winning, he lost the war game, so no, I do not accept the Battle of Britain never came close to a Fighter command defeat.. Leigh Mallory could have lost it as quickly and spectacularly as the Battle of France was lost. Using this logic any pilot who lands never came close to death, Of course Ted Briggs and Robert Tilburn were never in danger of dying when the Hood was sunk by the Bismark while the other 1,418 crewmen aboard had no chance of survival and were doomed as soon as they signed up.


The Battle of the Atlantic was being lost in 1942 with 700,000 tons lost in a month, that is not open to debate the Allies could not stand it. An exchange rate of 40 freighters for each submarine is unsustainable and that is in goods. For the Allies to invade Europe 10s of thousands of men had to cross the Atlantic. With troopships carrying 500 to 6000 troops the USA could have faced losses like Omaha beach on a daily basis. Throughout 1942 and into 1943 the allies introduced new ships and tactics to hunt submarines, new escort carriers, developed ASW with centimetric RADAR and leigh lights. This changed the course of the battle,, However the Germans were developing acoustic torpedoes, If they had them in large numbers and developed sensors for Centrimetric radar the battle would have run much differently. It is not a fantasy "what if" to see the Battle of the Atlantic being lost by the Allies, one simple development on the German side would be to use the correct procedures when operating enigma and consider that it could be broken.

Here are Battle of Atlantic losses.
Losses during the Battle of the Atlantic - Wikipedia

Your graph shows the number of UBoats operating continuously increasing until early 1943.
It also shows cumulative losses increasing with the biggest increase in 1942.

The turn in the battle due to new Allied equipment and tactics is a historical fact, it is not a fact that the Germans were incapable of developing new weapons and counter measures, they just didnt. By 1943 Germany was embarking on losing the Battle of Kursk and while Germany was lead by an infantry corporal the UK was lead by a former Lord of the British Admiralty.

Robert, the thread meandered from your original question why Nazi Germany didn't have a four engine bomber force. IMHO the Nazi's had the technology. The political leadership never supported a four engine bomber program. Hitler knew the economics of Germany, he relied on Blitzkrieg Warfare to end conflicts quickly. Germany did not have the capacity to produce 4 engine bombers by the thousands as the West did, production in other areas of the economy would have had to be reduced. A good book is Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy spends a lot of pages on the economy of Nazi Germany and gives insight into why Hitler needed Blitzkrieg type wars for its economic survival.

Sorry for putting this here but couldn't create a thread for this.

1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823
Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)
British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1
Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310
Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0
Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.

1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan41 23/129,711
Feb41 47/254,118
Mar41 41/236,549
Apr41 41/239,719
May41 63/362,268
Jun41 66/325,817
Jul41 26/112,624
Aug41 27/85,603
Sep41 57/212,237
Oct41 28/170,786
Nov41 15/76,056
Dec41 23/93,226
Tot41 457 (38.08/month)/2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
US merchant ship construction 1941 0.804 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan41 10/0
Feb41 18/3/2
Mar41 15/3/3
Apr41 14/2/2
May41 21/0/2
Jun41 22/2/3
Jul41 24/1/9
Aug41 42/5/9
Sep41 38/0/2
Oct41 37/0/6
Nov 41 27/5/5
Dec41 49/4/6
Tot 41 287/25/49 (an average of 23.9 patrols sailing per month and 8.7% lost)

Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.

1942:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan42 56/310,224
Feb42 72/429,255
Mar42 93/507,514
Apr42 81/418,161
May42 129/616,835
Jun42 136/636,926
Jul42 96/467,051
Aug42 117/587,245
Sep42 96/461,794
Oct42 89/583,690
Nov42 126/802,160
Dec42 64/337,618
Tot42 1,155 (96.25/month)/6,158,473 (513,206.08/month)
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan42 50/2/5
Feb42 29/3/2
Mar42 32/2
Apr42 37/2/2
May42 23/3
Jun42 39/9/5
Jul42 45/7/3
Aug42 58/10/4
Sep42 52/8/8
Oct42 62/6/10
Nov42 54/8/6
Dec42 59/8/7
Tot42 540/68/57 (an average of 45 patrols sailing per month and 12.6% lost)

Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.

1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan43 44/307,196
Feb43 67/362,081
Mar43 110/633,731
Apr43 50/287,137
May43 46/237,182
Jun43 17/76,090
Jul43 46/237,777
Aug43 20/92,443
Sep43 16/98,852
Oct43 20/91,295
Nov43 9/30,726
Dec43 8/55,794
Tot43 452 (37.67/month)/2,510,304 (209,192/month)
US merchant ship construction 1943 13.081 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan43 61/13/11
Feb43 72/8/9
Mar43 59/16/10
Apr43 95/35/18
May43 55/23/9
Jun43 46/23/9
Jul43 39/27/7 (49 total patrols of all types)
Aug43 33/12/6
Sep43 32/11/10
Oct43 62/23/9
Nov43 36/9/4
Dec43 31/10/2
Tot43 621/210/104 (an average of 51.75 patrols sailing per month and 33.8% lost)

Thus for 1943, an average of 0.73 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 2.15 ships sunk.

So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 125/663,308
Tot45 63/284,476

US merchant ship construction for 1944 was 12.257 million GRT
US merchant ship construction for 1945 (through 1 May) was 3.548 million GRT

U-Boat Fleet to 1Sep42
On 19Aug39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission, 20 sea-going U-Boats and 18 'ducks' were fully ready to put to sea
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1Sep42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171

U-Boat Fleet 1Sep42 to 1May45
Total number deployed 1Sep42 to 1May45 531
Total number lost 1Sep42 to 1May45 568

British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (number/in thousands of gross tons)
3Sep39 2,999/17,784
30Sep40 3,75721,373
30Sep41 3,608/20,552
31Dec41 3,616/20,693

Thus, despite the 'success' of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)
1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The operational U-Boat force from 1943-1945 never approached a "steady 400-500 boat." Rather, during 1942 the peak strength of boats assigned to combat flotillas (including those under repair for combat-damage and breakdowns, but excluding those assigned to school flotillas, experimental projects, or otherwise retired from combat) was 202, during November. The low in 1942 was 89 in January. The average monthly strength during 1942 was 143.83. The strength of the force peaked in May 1943 at 237. It had declined to a low of 159 by November. Average monthly strength during 1943 was 197.58. The peak strength during 1944 was 168 in February, the low was 146 in November. Average monthly strength in 1944 was 157.83. The peak strength in 1945 was April with 165, the low was May with 134, prior to the surrender. <http://www.onwar.com/ubb/smile.gif>

At that, these were much better than 1939 (average of 19.5 monthly), 1940 (average of 18.75 monthly) and 1941 (average of 47.5 monthly). OTOH, the 'bang for their buck' was probably highest in 1940, which was also arguably the U-Boats most 'successful' year in terms of ships sunk per patrol and U-Boats lost per ship sunk (see my previous reply).

I wrote.

"The Battle of Britain never came close to defeating Fighter Command"

And it didn't. It didn't even come close to forcing 11 Group north of the Thames. There were shortages of trained pilots, the stabilisation system is a clear demonstration of this, but despite the fears expressed by the commanders of Fighter Command at the time ('we are going downhill'), we, with the benefit of hindsight know that the Germans were suffering more and never came close to their objective of "subjugating the English air force." Had the Luftwaffe been in a position to maintain or increase the pressure on Fighter Command, which was creaking, in September and October, then who knows what might have happened, but it could not. This was probably just as well for the Heer and KM, but that's another story.

If you feel the graph is idiotic, then take it up with Williamson Murray, from whom it comes. The problem is that the Germans could not consistently inflict the losses on Allied shipping which would have enabled them to win the Battle. Average monthly losses to U-boats throughout 1942 are closer to 500,000 tons than 700,000, a better measure, and nearly 30% lower. The figures for 1942, particularly the first half of the year are weighted in favour of the U-boats by the inept tactics of the recently arrived Americans, allowing the U-boat arm a second 'happy time'. New GRT became available at a rate that never seriously fell below losses and eventually largely exceeded them, largely thanks to those same Americans who proved to be quick learners, and ship builders. Again, hindsight affords us a luxury not afforded to people at the time. Whilst it is understandable that this Battle would cause Churchill sleepless nights, the outcome was in doubt until at least late 1942 or early 1943, and the graph shows that. We now know that the Germans were not capable of the sustained effort required to win. The Allies also won the technological battle. Both are parallels with the BoB.

As for the Germans developing new weapons and tactics, the fact that Type VII U-boats were still being commissioned in January 1945 (U 1308 is the latest I've found with a perfunctory search of my files) tells us all we need to know.

Cheers

Steve

Looking at Mr Murray's graph - should the line depicting tonnage lost due to U-Boats be tapering down?



I base that on this graph from my bookshelf...

stona said:

As for the Germans developing new weapons and tactics, the fact that Type VII U-boats were still being commissioned in January 1945 (U 1308 is the latest I've found with a perfunctory search of my files) tells us all we need to know.

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Depends on how you look at. Somebody once said in regards to artillery. "the shell is the weapon, the artillery piece (tube) is just the delivery system."
Improvements in Torpedoes could make a substantial difference in a submarine fleet's effectiveness. As could improved sonars, snorkels, passive radar receivers, improved diving depth (stronger hull not only increases dive depth, it slightly reduces the lethal radius of depth charges.) I would note that the US built essentially the same submarine from about 1939/40 to 1951. And kept the wartime design of diesel engine (although uprated) till the last of the diesel boats were built after a new design turned out to be a dud.
Granted the Japanese never had the anti-sub capability of the RN and US Navy in late WW II.

Shortround6 said:

Depends on how you look at. Somebody once said in regards to artillery. "the shell is the weapon, the artillery piece (tube) is just the delivery system."
Improvements in Torpedoes could make a substantial difference in a submarine fleet's effectiveness. As could improved sonars, snorkels, passive radar receivers, improved diving depth (stronger hull not only increases dive depth, it slightly reduces the lethal radius of depth charges.) I would note that the US built essentially the same submarine from about 1939/40 to 1951. And kept the wartime design of diesel engine (although uprated) till the last of the diesel boats were built after a new design

.

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Shortround6: I didnt write what you quoted, maybe there's a bug in the forum, if you wouldnt mind, try reposting. . If one of the moderators is reading. The quote is from a post by STONA. Your post 56 quotes post 54, and has me as the author.

pinehilljoe said:

Robert, the thread meandered from your original question why Nazi Germany didn't have a four engine bomber force. IMHO the Nazi's had the technology. The political leadership never supported a four engine bomber program. Hitler knew the economics of Germany, he relied on Blitzkrieg Warfare to end conflicts quickly. Germany did not have the capacity to produce 4 engine bombers by the thousands as the West did, production in other areas of the economy would have had to be reduced. A good book is Paul Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Kennedy spends a lot of pages on the economy of Nazi Germany and gives insight into why Hitler needed Blitzkrieg type wars for its economic survival.

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In part it is also due to timing.
First flights and start of service for the 3 main German bombers in use at the start of the war were

Do.17.............11/34................11/36
He 111............2/35..................1/37
JU-88.............12/36.................9/39

For the British it goes
Whitley............3/36.................3/37
Hampden........6/36.................9/38
Wellington.......6/36................10-38

However the First production Whitley with a Merlin engine doesn't fly until 5/39 and soon the Tiger powered versions (MK I, II, III) are banned from over water flights.

The Germans build two 4 engine prototypes early on, The DO 19 flies 10/36 and the JU 89 flies 4-37 but neither are very good. While long ranged they are no faster than the He 111 and don't carry a much heavier bomb load.

Round 2 has the British coming up with.
Stirling................5/39..................1940???
Manchester........7/39...................11/40
Warwick..............8/39...................?????
Halifax.................10/39................11/40

Stirling doesn't actually fly in combat until 1941 after a German tactical raid that missed the beach defenses in Brighton blew up Stirlings on the production line and parked outside factory ( since we know the Germans didn't strategic bomb) . Production is set back from months to a year depending on source.
Warwick used up to 85% of the structural components of the Wellington but even so, lack of assembly space and lack of suitable engines delayed use for a considerable time. Please note it often took 4-6 months from a squadron getting it's first aircraft to the squadron flying a combat mission.

Round 2 for the Germans comes up with.
Do-217.............10-38..............?/40 or 3/41
He 177..............11/39...............1942
JU-288..............11/40........................
FW 191...............early 1942....................

German side show.
FW 200.............7/37....................6/40?

Germans have a notable lack of suitable engines to make the big twin engine planes work. Do-217 is used for recon in late 1940 but first bomber squadron doesn't get any till March 41. FW 200s in use in 1940 had engines of under 900hp each and and bombload of around 2200lbs. In 1941 they got a different 9 cylinder radial with 1000hp (1200 for take-off with water methanol/injection) max bomb load (never actually used) was two 1100lbs in recesses in outer engine nacelles, two 550lb bombs on under wing racks and twelve 110lb bombs in the ventral gondola.

Please note that NOBODY had 4 engine bombers in service in 1940 in any numbers. The 54th B-17 was flown on July 21st 1940.

Chances of the Germans being able to build a plane in 1940 in large numbers comparable to the Allied bombers of 1942/43 is about nil. The engines don't exist. The Halifax I wasn't exactly a ball of fire (until hit) using Merlin X engines with a FTL of 17750ft. The Jumo 211D used in many of the JU-88A-1s and and A-5s gave a max of 1080hp at 12,000ft. The J version ran late. The 1940 DB engines don't have much different FTLs. Trying to build 4 engine bombers of similar size/weight to the MK I Halifax would have meant an even lower service ceiling.

The Germans tried to get too clever with fancy engines and lowest possible drag and wound up with long, complicated and down right painful development cycles. The Do-217 was the least ambitious and was the most successful but it was closest to an American B-25/B-26 in capability. (engine power, max weight, wing size)

pinehilljoe said:

Shortround6: I didnt write what you quoted, maybe there's a bug in the forum, if you wouldnt mind, try reposting. . If one of the moderators is reading. The quote is from a post by STONA. Your post 56 quotes post 54, and has me as the author.

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Don't know how it happened, I think it is fixed. My apologies .

Graeme said:

Looking at Mr Murray's graph - should the line depicting tonnage lost due to U-Boats be tapering down?

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No. It represents cumulative losses (and gains). It can never go down, only flatten off.

The difference between cumulative losses and gains represents the increase in tonnage available to the Allies at any given time. Despite the U boat efforts, there was a net increase in tonnage available of more than 10 million tons by early 1943. This is why I said that the U boats never consistently sank enough shipping to come close to winning the Battle. They had the best chance in 1940/41, before the huge expansion in ship building. By 1943, the Americans alone were producing three 14,000 ton 'Liberty ships' a day. This represents a potential building capacity of more than 1.25 million tons per month. The U boats never sank close to that, even in their best months.

Edit (I've had time to dig out some figures), US yards built 8 million tons of merchant shipping in 1942 (average 666,666 tons/month), 12 million tons in 1943 (average 1 million tons/month). They were not the only ones building shipping, but US production alone far outstripped losses.
If we accept the figure of 14,915,000 tons for the total tonnage, merchant and naval, sunk by ALL U boats in ALL theatres between 1939 and 1945 we can clearly see it adds up to little more than one year's (1943) US production. Herein lies the fundamental problem for the KM, it simply couldn't sink enough shipping consistently for a long enough period.

Cheers

Steve