German Bomber design rational

[stona]

They would have been surprised that along with the capture of various machines and other rotor settings tables etc. the British placed procedural failures and operator mistakes as the principle reasons that they could break the codes.
The machines themselves were fiendishly good encryption devices, as ever it was human failings that contributed to an enemy's ability to decrypt the resulting messages.
Cheers
Steve

 

[stona]

The fingers are working well, so I thought I would reproduce some more of Sub Lieutenant David Balme's report. This is the part in which he gives his impressions of the U-boat, on which he spent several hours.

"Here are some of my impressions of the U-boat: she was new and a fine ship, both in strength of the hull, in the fittings and instruments and in the general interior construction. Absolutely nothing 'Ersatz' about her. Excellent anti-aircraft armament abaft the conning tower, consisting of a Bofors and Oerlikon-type gun. Deck around the forward deck was wood. Spotlessly clean throughout. The wardroom was finished off in light varnished woodwork and all cupboards were numbered with corresponding key to fit. There was no sign of a safe and there was only one cupboard for which I could not find the key; this cupboard was over the Captain's desk so I broke into it and it revealed a medicine chest. In the Ward Room there were several sets of writing paper and envelopes, well printed and illustrated reading books, cards, dice and the usual art studies. Bunks were one on top of another both in the officers' and crew's spaces. A very compact receiver was in the W/T office with the names of about 200 stations printed on its dial.
Plenty of tinned ham, corned beef and three sacks of potatoes in the control room; also luxuries such as beer, cigars, Player's cigarettes (German printing on the packets), and a plate of shrimps were all found in the wireless room. A magnificent galley was forward of the wireless room.
There were no signs of voice pipes, but I think loudspeakers and telephones were used - definitely a telephone in the conning tower.
One Tommy-gun was found in officers' clothes drawer; another was found in the lower control tower with an anti-tank type of rifle. Officer gear consisted of very good clothing, including anti-weather garments.
In the engine room I noticed a plate of mashed potatoes as if ;'Action Stations' had been sounded suddenly while dinner was being taken from the galley to the after crew's space. The escape chamber was in the control room just abaft the upper hatch.
My original whaler's crew worked splendidly throughout the time. They comprised of:-
S. Pearce AB, C. Dolley AB, R.Roe AB, K. Wileman AB, A. Hargreaves Ordinary Seaman, J. Trotter Ordinary Seaman, A.Long Telegraphist, C. Lee Stoker.
I submit that service revolvers are far too cumbersome and dangerous for boarding and that small Police model automatics should be supplied to all boarding officers.
Possibly, in addition to ransacking the wardroom, the crew's quarters should have been thoroughly searched, but owing to frequent depth charge attacks continuing in the vicinity, I considered it safer to keep these water-tight doors closed.
The reason why no attempt to destroy any books or material was made is obviously because they thought the U-boat was certain to sink at once.The necessary demolition switches or other devices had been set; this was corroborated by statements from prisoners who had no idea that their U-boat had been boarded. But then again: why were both control tower hatches closed?
I have Sir the Honour etc. etc."

The British were keen to keep the boarding and capture of valuable intelligence secret. Lieutenant Seymour, Anti-Submarine Officer on HMS Nigella recalled.

"I was assisting with the decyphering of signals, and, in the afternoon following the midday attack by U-110, a signal (I don't remember whether from C-in-C Western Approaches or Admiralty) arrived to say that this incident was to be known as Operation 'Primrose' and that no ships having any knowledge of Operation 'Primrose' were to enter harbour until further orders!
We had visions of a permanent life on the ocean wave!"

Cheers

Steve

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[stona]

There was one life lost in this entire engagement. It started when, at 1201 hours, the merchantmen Edmond was torpedoed, followed 'a few seconds later' by Bengore Head.
All of Edmond's crew were saved, picked up by Aubretia.
Bengore Head was a small ship of 2,609 tons and her back was broken. She sank rapidly but 44 survivors were taken aboard St Apollo and the Norwegian Borgfred. It was one of Bengore Head's crew that was lost.
Cheers
Steve

 

[parsifal]

Most of what you see are based on the official admiralty report on the incident, which for the most part appears to be an accurate account of the events that transpired. however there are inconsistencies and gaps in these accounts that have never been satisfactorily addressed. it is probably too involved and controversial to tackle in a forum such as this....

The second point to raise is the german response to these security threats. There were strong suspicions that security had been breached, either by cryptoanalysis or by some form of treason. both turned out to be true actually, and the report by vice admiral Maertens in November was fairly strong in voicing its concerns. however OKM managed to convince BDU that such concerns were not insurmountable. Changes were made to the uboat communications security that led to the slaughter of 1942 as RN escort Command was again blinded for the best part of a year. The americans were so far behind this issue that they managed almost single handedly to lose the war in 1942 from their ineptitude. only the amazing replacement capabilities of the US shipyards managed to just save them, though the ability to undertake a cross channel assault was yet again delayed by the abysmal performance of King and the forces he commanded, which were woefully prepared for this. The US was so fixated on wreaking revenge on the Japanese that they were almost prepared to lose in the Atlantic to do it. Lucky the president intervened and gave King a direct order to take the situation in the Atlantic seriously since about 60% of US outputs depended on keeping the Atlantic sea communications open

The following is an extract from an article that deals with DKMs response to the secuity issues. its only a part of the report, as you have to pay to see the article.

The German Navy Evaluates Its Cryptographic Security, October 1941 on JSTOR

 

[stona]

Most of what you see are based on the official admiralty report on the incident, which for the most part appears to be an accurate account of the events that transpired. however there are inconsistencies and gaps in these accounts that have never been satisfactorily addressed.

They are the reports submitted to the Admiralty by the officers involved (on Bulldog and others) the day after the incident.

Since there is no way these could have been influenced at the time, though officers on the same ship might collude to get their stories straight, particularly regarding the machine gunning of the men allegedly attempting to man the U-boat's forward gun, making a point that there was never a formal indication that the submarine had surrendered, they could hardly have concocted a story to suit the Admiralty. Is there a suggestion that the reports, which incidentally were classified 'Top Secret', were somehow 'edited' by the Admiralty? I have never seen or heard any evidence that any of the officers involved has made any suggestion that their submitted reports were altered in any way.

I'm just interested to know why on earth a 'Top Secret' report would need to be edited in such a way. The over riding priority was to keep the knowledge of the capture of the machine and other intelligence from the Germans, but this is all included in black and white in the reports. What was supposedly being concealed?

Both Baker-Cresswell and Balme were decorated for their actions that day, receiving the DSO and DSC respectively. The King, according to Balme, told him that they would have received honours more appropriate to their deed, if it were not for the risk of tipping off the enemy, and that this would be put right after the war. It wasn't, the Cold War saw to that.
The telegraphist, Long, was awarded the DSM and all the rest of the boarding party were Mentioned in Dispatches.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Elmas]

Two coincidences are a clue and two clues are a test, so Agatha Christie used to say said. Already in 1941 Supermarina started to suspect that there was something strange in the slaughter of the convoys to Libya. The British Secret Services circulated a voice saying that within Supermarina there were some spies, a voice that was quite plausible because the Italian Navy always had been against the war with Nazi Germany. This story of the spies circulated for years after the war, until the Bletchley Park activities were unveiled. The culprits were the Luftwaffe codes, by far more easily broken than those of the Kriegsmarine.

 

[stona]

The culprits were the Luftwaffe codes, by far more easily broken than those of the Kriegsmarine.

This was also largely due to poor procedural discipline. Luftwaffe operators, for what ever reason, maybe just laziness, repeatedly encrypted using the same rotor settings. Repetition in any form gives an advantage to those seeking to decrypt the resulting signals. If the operator encrypts the same or similar information (like meteorological reports) using the same settings it at the very least gives the would be decryptors something to start with.
Cheers
Steve

 

[pbehn]

True Stona but two days ago there was a report issued which said that the most popular 8 digit passwords today are 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H.

 

[stona]

True Stona but two days ago there was a report issued which said that the most popular 8 digit passwords today are 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 and A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H.

Along with 'password' and 'qwertyui', by any chance?

Cheers

Steve

 

[stona]

For information. This covers the period of the attacks. Operation 'Primrose' was the attempt to salvage and tow U-110 to Iceland.

Note that Aubretia only closed with the boats containing Esmond's survivors after she had made her two full pattern (10 depth charges) attacks on U-110.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Old Wizard]

 

[MiTasol]

I know that it sounds simplistic but at the end of the day the German economy and its limited raw materials, meant that the Luftwaffe didn't have the choice. They could either have the tactical airforce they had, or they could have the heavy four engined bomber airforce, not both.
The Luftwaffe grew from nothing to being a formidable force in a very short space of time, to grow even further would be asking too much.

AND Hitlers requirement that domestic goods must remain a top production priority (for propaganda/civil morale reasons) also severely reduced the ability of the LW to obtain not just existing types of aircraft and components
To have many of the country's top design engineers purely engaged in civil production will have significantly restricted the LW's ability to get the qualified engineers develop airframes, engines and components which used the same technology as used in domestic goods ranging from cars/trucks to electric appliances and to have those civil items given greater priority for materials than the LW will have significantly multiplied the actual material shortages.
Likewise having production tooling that could be used to make aircraft parts being used to make household appliances and personal vehicles was a massive handbrake on aircraft development and production.
Had domestic manufacturing been almost abolished as in Britain the LW may well have been able to design and produce not just better existing designs but a successful long range heavy bomber force. Fortunately for us that never happened.

 

[Fighterguy]

Much has to do with the early application of airpower theory versus doctrine/dogma. The Germans learned a lesson from the Allies in WWI, the Air Battle of St. Mihiel, the brain child of Billy Mitchell, was a formative example of what air power was capable of. The Germans later used these methods in Blitzkrieg campaigns. Lightning war does not require strategic bombing. They remained focused on the immediate needs of operational and tactical spheres. Allied thinkers, on the other hand, had already taken the theoretical concepts of Giulio Douhet and Mitchell to the next level. Considering the quantities, 12,700 B-17's, 19,200 B-24's, and 7,300 Avro Lancaster's, the allies remained committed to the concept of a sustained strategic bombing campaign. Prior to U.S. entry into WWII, a study was commissioned to estimate the number of aerial bombs required to destroy Germany's war production capabilities. (Sadly, I am unable to find reference to this study. It was pointed out in the U.S.A.F. Enlisted Promotion Study Guide years ago.) The numbers were quite accurate. The Germans, as has been pointed out earlier, had little chance of being able to reach and target allied war production facilities even if they had an equivalent platform.

 

[Shortround6]

The Germans, as has been pointed out earlier, had little chance of being able to reach and target allied war production facilities even if they had an equivalent platform.

This varied considerably depending on year and intended target.
From 1935-1939 the Luftwaffe was certainly able to reach and target most of the war production of it's intimidate potential enemies, which were pretty much it's neighbors, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland and the low countries (declared neutrals). In 1938-39 large parts of Britain could be added to the target list even without taking French territory. The Luftwaffe's reach also extended further into the Balkans should it have been needed. Hitting Russian targets was pretty much out of the question. Only a few bombers in the world could hit Russian industrial targets from German territory in in 1938-39. It is about 680 miles from the German Border to Keiv and a mere 580 miles from the German border to Minsk. It is about 940 miles from the Border to Moscow. Or roughly the distance from London to Warsaw.

German Ability to hit US targets was zero and vice versa for the entire war (American bombers operating from North America)

In 1940 The Germans could hit Northern Ireland from the low countries or Northern France. Keiv was around 400-440miles from Hungarian, Romanian or captured Polish territory. The German 2nd Generation bombers (or 3rd depending on how you count the Do-11,13,23 and Ju 52) pretty much fell on their faces and left the He 111 and JU 88 to carry the load with some help from the Do 217 (sort a generation and 1/2 aircraft).
With the relocation of some of the Russian industry to beyond the Urals ( and pre-war construction of some industry there) the Germans would have needed the equivalent of B-29s to mount an effective bombing campaign. it is around 830-850miles from Stalingrad to Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) so the use of lesser bombers would require quite the crystal ball to predict how far the German Army could penetrate into Russia and when. It is about 1100 miles from Kharkiv to Chelyabinsk for instance.
The Germans could call a program the "Ural bomber" and write all the specifications they wanted, it wasn't going to be practical.

That doesn't mean the Germans couldn't attack allied (Mostly British) War Production. They certainly did and with surprisingly good results at times given the numbers of aircraft involved. They failed to follow up very well, German target damage assessment seems to have been little different than the British target damage assessment in 1940/41 (bad to nonexistent)

 

[Robert Porter]

Depends on how you look at. Somebody once said in regards to artillery. "the shell is the weapon, the artillery piece (tube) is just the delivery system."
Improvements in Torpedoes could make a substantial difference in a submarine fleet's effectiveness. As could improved sonars, snorkels, passive radar receivers, improved diving depth (stronger hull not only increases dive depth, it slightly reduces the lethal radius of depth charges.) I would note that the US built essentially the same submarine from about 1939/40 to 1951. And kept the wartime design of diesel engine (although uprated) till the last of the diesel boats were built after a new design turned out to be a dud.
Granted the Japanese never had the anti-sub capability of the RN and US Navy in late WW II.

Our own experience in the pacific with flawed torpedoes shows the necessity and efficacy of improving weapons systems and components on a continuous basis. The US sink rate went up dramatically when newer torpedoes were introduced. As far as our submarines, I agree the Fleet Boat standard was only incrementally changed during WW2 all the way until 51. After that we built and launched numerous new classes. I seem to recall someone describing US WW2 subs as shoddy surface ships that could occasionally sink themselves and refloat themselves. Not knocking our sub mariner force at all, but part of the problem was the role that the BB Admirals wanted to constrain the boats to.

 

[Robert Porter]

We can argue all day about how close a thing the Battle of the Atlantic was. By your estimates, a 5 million ton buffer by the end of 1941 would support the contention I made earlier that the KM had its best chance in 1940/41. After that it had lost the Battle because, at the risk of sounding like a broken record, it could not sink enough ships, consistently enough, to prevent a steady increase in the tonnage available to the Allies.
Cheers
Steve

The US produced 2,710 Liberty ships during the war. And there were other classes and types built all over so I would have to say unless U-Boat production ramped up incredibly the chance of Germany starving Britain of supplies and men was unlikely. Up until 1942 the Germans certainly caused a great deal of concern. But the advent of mass production of ships, escort carriers, convoy systems, land based bombers with increased range, radar etc. The U-Boat was doomed to failure by the sheer weight of production and advancement in our ability to both defend ships and target the wolf packs, greatly helped by cracking their communications as well. So I would have to agree with you that while the losses were horrific initially, the end result was that Germany could not effectively attack shipping on the scale necessary to win the war by denying material and man power to England.

 

[Shortround6]

Parts of the "problem" is the distances the US had to operate over. While the BB Admirals may have desired subs that could operate with the Battle Fleet ( a requirement that became ludicrous with the advent of the North Carolina class in 1936-37) you need large subs to operate at 10,000-11,000 mile ranges and running 75 day patrols. Big boats take a while to submerge and offer bigger targets to anti-sub weapons. However if you can't reach operational areas or can only stay for a few days it doesn't matter how advanced your submarine is.

 

[Fighterguy]

This varied considerably depending on year and intended target.
From 1935-1939 the Luftwaffe was certainly able to reach and target most of the war production of it's intimidate potential enemies, which were pretty much it's neighbors, Czechoslovakia, France, Poland and the low countries (declared neutrals). In 1938-39 large parts of Britain could be added to the target list even without taking French territory. The Luftwaffe's reach also extended further into the Balkans should it have been needed. Hitting Russian targets was pretty much out of the question. Only a few bombers in the world could hit Russian industrial targets from German territory in in 1938-39. It is about 680 miles from the German Border to Keiv and a mere 580 miles from the German border to Minsk. It is about 940 miles from the Border to Moscow. Or roughly the distance from London to Warsaw.

German Ability to hit US targets was zero and vice versa for the entire war (American bombers operating from North America)

In 1940 The Germans could hit Northern Ireland from the low countries or Northern France. Keiv was around 400-440miles from Hungarian, Romanian or captured Polish territory. The German 2nd Generation bombers (or 3rd depending on how you count the Do-11,13,23 and Ju 52) pretty much fell on their faces and left the He 111 and JU 88 to carry the load with some help from the Do 217 (sort a generation and 1/2 aircraft).
With the relocation of some of the Russian industry to beyond the Urals ( and pre-war construction of some industry there) the Germans would have needed the equivalent of B-29s to mount an effective bombing campaign. it is around 830-850miles from Stalingrad to Chelyabinsk (Tankograd) so the use of lesser bombers would require quite the crystal ball to predict how far the German Army could penetrate into Russia and when. It is about 1100 miles from Kharkiv to Chelyabinsk for instance.
The Germans could call a program the "Ural bomber" and write all the specifications they wanted, it wasn't going to be practical.

That doesn't mean the Germans couldn't attack allied (Mostly British) War Production. They certainly did and with surprisingly good results at times given the numbers of aircraft involved. They failed to follow up very well, German target damage assessment seems to have been little different than the British target damage assessment in 1940/41 (bad to nonexistent)

Agreed! You clarified my point perfectly. Allied bombing of German industrial targets (spurred on by American airpower advocates) was a sustained, long term, and unrelenting operation. German bombing efforts seem concerned with immediate outcomes, based on short term operational and tactical needs. The resource requirements that sustained the Allied bombing campaign were enormous, as were the casualties. I get the impression, German leaders weren't willing to risk resources in this manner.