German Bomber design rational

[Shortround6]

Well, "How was NW Europe going to be invaded before the Luftwaffe was reduced or destroyed for example."

The single engine fighters, a fair proportion of the twin engine bombers, the fuel, the ammo, the bombs, the ground crews, the food for the ground crews for all types of aircraft (4 engine bombers included) all came by ship.

Just going to the convoy system caused a drop in the amount of cargo that could be moved per month per 100,000 tons of shipping and every time the U-Boats showed up in a New area in large enough numbers to force the adoption of the convoy system in those areas the cargo moved per month/100,000 tons dropped again.
Going to large convoys instead of multiple small ones delayed sailings and tended to overwhelm port facilities on the receiving end. Slowing down or reducing the tonnage of cargo per month per 100,000 tons of shipping. Ships at anchor aren't moving anything.
A simple tons built vs tons sunk may not be detailed enough to give a true picture. What was important was tons moved vs tons needed to be moved. Granted at some point things did stabilize, as in 100,000 tons of shipping can move XXXXXX tons cargo per month or close to it.

 

[stona]

Timelines are being conflated here.
Even without a single U-boat in the Atlantic Ocean it is difficult to see the USAAF commencing the operations that led to the destruction of the Luftwaffe, and this does not mean bombing French dockyards, significantly earlier.
I have never seen any evidence that the RAF or Bomber Command were ever short of fuel. There were occasional shortages of parts, usually small but essential components, sometimes from the US, but production was not seriously effected and serviceability was generally good.
The final build up for the D-Day landings was undertaken at a time when the U-boat threat had been largely neutralised. This didn't stop men being moved in relative safety earlier.More than three quarters of a million came on one ship, Queen Mary, which the U-boats could hardly trouble. Her sister ship didn't even move to the Atlantic until later, serving at first in the Far East.
The invasion in 1944 also allowed the Wermacht to be bled for another year by the Red Army, maybe not so good for the Russians, but good for the Anglo-Americans.
Is Dimbleby seriously suggesting that with an even greater tonnage of merchant shipping available the invasion of NW Europe may have been possible in 1943? With this I do not agree.
Cheers
Steve.

 

[Zipper730]

Out of curiosity I have always wondered why the Germans did not build and operate heavy bombers such as the B-17 and B-24?

Actually, they built a whole bunch of them: The Dornier Do P (1930), Do Y (1930 or 1931), and Do 11 (1932); then the Dornier Do 19 (1936), the Junkers Ju 89 (1937), the Heinkel He 177 (1939), the Messerschmitt Me 264 (1942), all being examples.

There also technically was the Dornier Do 217, though it was sort of a mix of heavy and medium bomber: It's range was that of a medium, it's load that of a heavy, and it was classified as both.

I have read several places that this was a decision made early in the war not to do so, but have never heard an explanation of the rational.

Actually General Walter Wever was a huge proponent of a large bomber force with the range to hit targets past the Ural mountains: His views weren't popular among all those in the Luftwaffe, but it wasn't such a big deal as he was the Chief of Staff.

He died in 1936, and his few supporters were basically drowned out by officers who favored dive-bombers and smaller aircraft on the grounds that

1. They were cheaper to build and consumed less resources
2. While they did believe in strategic bombing; they also believed that air-superiority, and battlefield support were vital

early in the Battle of Britain when heavy bombers could conceivably have caused a great deal more damage?

You sure you aren't confusing the Blitz with the Battle of Britain?

am I incorrect and they did operate such bombers?

The Do-217 saw extensive service, the He-177 was used extensively against the Soviet Union since it entered service (1942), and was used during Operation Steinbock (1944).

It would seem the Luftwaffe was used in a role very much like the Army had wanted the Air Corps used for initially.

The US Army originally wanted artillery direction planes, and from there fighters and bombers. Even by 1917 or 1918, the Signal Corps was told that they were not to engage in 'wanton and promiscuous' attacks on populations (the RFC/RNAS, and later RAF were already carrying out these raids in retaliation for the Zeppelin raids, which started over England in January, 1915), and when the RAF was created Mitchell had penis envy.

For most intents and purposes from 1918-1919, the US Army Air Service wanted to be an independent Air Force.

The Germans did have heavy bombers such as the He177 and the Do217 but they lacked a cohesive strategic heavy bombing strategy.

The Luftwaffe definitely had a coherent strategic-bombing strategy; they just didn't have many heavy-bombers to flatten as much as they'd have liked.

There was a fixation by the RLM that nearly everything should be dive-bomb capable.

Yeah, particularly when it came to the He-177.

The He177 . . . evaporative cooling tests

I didn't know they pursued the evaporative cooling requirements into the flight-stage?

While it does seem that the effectiveness of conventional bombs was over-estimated before the war

They miscalculated the effects of both high explosives and incendiaries actually. They had made estimates based on the Zeppelin raids and scaled things up a bit.

one thing most academics were planning on was a no-holds-barred conflict where a good proportion of bombs loaded with some pretty horrifying chemical agents were very much on the table.

Yes, chemical warfare was actually expected: In the UK every family had masks for that reason. Ironically, they didn't focus as much on fire-fighting efforts as dealing with poison gas attacks.

Well, to point "A" on my list, most German bombers were rigged to hold large numbers of 110lb bombs (He 111 could hold 32) and the British seemed to favor 250lb bombs in most 1930s designs even of 4 engine bombers. It was found that 500lb bombs were about the minimum effective against large buildings.

It would seem that the RAF and Luftwaffe had a predilection for carrying a large number of small bombs rather than a few large ones.

Point B, Few, if any, city populations ever rioted in the streets after a bomb raid or even series of raids in any country. There may have been thousands of refugees fleeing a city but not uprisings against the government.

What about the nuclear bombings in 1945?

Wever, responsible for the development of Luftwaffe doctrine, was certainly not an out an out follower of the doctrines developed on the similar theories of Douhet, Mitchell or Trenchard.

Luftwaffendienstvorschrift 16: Luftkriegsführung (Luftwaffe Service Regulation l6: Conduct of the Air War) on which Luftwaffe doctrine up to WW2 was based laid down three points:

1) subjugation of the enemy air force in order to achieve and maintain air superiority.

2) support of the army and navy (neither of which operated any aircraft independently).

3) attack against the enemy industry.

And in that order. Practically the 'subjugation of the enemy air force' was best achieved whilst it was on the ground.

Pretty much any air-arm will try and destroy the enemy while on the ground.

The third point did not imply a huge strategic campaign of the type launched in 1943 by the Allies. It was closer to that launched by the Luftwaffe against, for example, British ports in 1940/41 or that launched less successfully by the British at the same time against oil and industrial targets in the Ruhr.

Yes, though there are inherent advantages in range.

There was plenty of similarities in British and German approach to the designing of bombers, with important exception that LW have had Ju-87 for pin-point attacks on mostly the frontline targets, while RAF was trying to bulk up the numbers with single engined strategic bomber, the Fairey Battle.

Actually, the RAF had considered dive-bombing in the 1930's.

 

[GrauGeist]

Actually, they built a whole bunch of them: The Dornier Do P (1930), Do Y (1930 or 1931), and Do 11 (1932); then the Dornier Do 19 (1936), the Junkers Ju 89 (1937), the Heinkel He 177 (1939), the Messerschmitt Me 264 (1942), all being examples.

These:
Do P had two airframes made, one being an unarmed trainer. It was capable of a max. speed of 130 mph at sea level and had a max. bombload of 3,306 pounds.

Do Y had 4 units built before being cancelled. Max. bombload was 2,640 pounds.

Do11 saw production numbers totalling about 372 units. It was painfully slow (max. speed 162 mph) and it's max. bombload was 2,205 pounds.

The Do19 was a cancelled project, only 3 examples being built. It's max. bombload was 3,520 pounds.

The Ju89 was also a cancelled project, 2 examples being built. It's max. bombload was 3,520 pounds.

- hardly comprise a strategic bomber program and none of them were of any use.

As I had pointed out earlier, the only mass produced and deployed "heavy" bombers that Germany used with any consistency and success, were the Do217 and He177.

There were several other more modern and promising prototypes (Me264 being one of them) that were cancelled for one reason or another..

Actually General Walter Wever was a huge proponent of a large bomber force with the range to hit targets past the Ural mountains: His views weren't popular among all those in the Luftwaffe, but it wasn't such a big deal as he was the Chief of Staff.

Regardless of Wever being chief-of-staff, it was a huge deal because the infighting within the RLM was a costly, counter-productive struggle that detracted from their war-planning focus. Once Wever was killed, there was no longer a voice of reason within the upper heirarchy and we see how that turned out.

The Do-217 saw extensive service, the He-177 was used extensively against the Soviet Union since it entered service (1942), and was used during Operation Steinbock (1944).

He177 also flew missions against western Allied positions on a regular basis. KG units that operated the He177 were: KG1, KG4, KG40 and KG50

The Luftwaffe definitely had a coherent strategic-bombing strategy; they just didn't have many heavy-bombers to flatten as much as they'd have liked.

No, the Luftwaffe did not have a strategic bombing plan...this has been discussed many times. The Battle of Britain is a prime example of the faltering, flip-flopping and lack of doctrine that led to a great deal of losses for little gain.

I didn't know they pursued the evaporative cooling requirements into the flight-stage?

The evaporative cooling was part of the original design of the He177 but the excessive heat build-up of the DB engines forced the installation of the large annular radiators that imposed a performance penalty both in additional weight and drag. Many Heinkel projects tried evaptorative cooling at one point or another and while it's a great theory (and worked well on record setting specialty aircraft), it never performed as expected on any types that entered service.

Actually, the RAF had considered dive-bombing in the 1930's.

Dive-bombing was a common denominator in many inter-war airforces, including the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps.
Types like:
Curtiss A-3/F8C (1925) and F11C (1932)
Great Lakes BG (1933)
Northrop BT (1935)
Vought SBU (1933)

 

[stona]

The He 177 was not operational in any meaningful sense in 1942. Throughout the year, and later, it was still in an experimental and proving stage of development
.
It's contribution to Stalingrad was just 13 missions (for 8 losses).

The Steinbock attempts were equally meaningless. The attack on London involved just 14 He 177s, only 4 made it to London for a variety of reasons, and one of those was shot down by a Mosquito night fighter. It was utterly irrelevant at a time when Bomber Command was sending 400-500 heavy bombers the other way whenever the weather was suitable.

You can argue that the type enjoyed some limited success in the east, where the Russians were not equipped to do much about it, but again so few were operational and flew so few missions that it made no difference at all.

All of this is because the Germans did not, for reasons I have already explained, prioritise a strategic bombing programme in the 1930s. The fruits of those efforts by the British were the Stirling-Halifax-Lancaster types which were available in large numbers by the mid war period, when the Germans had nothing comparable.

As far as flirtation with dive-bombing, that's what it was for the RAF. It started the war with no front line dive bomber.
Bomber Command had no front line bomber of any type designed to support the Army (I'm not counting the Lysander Army co-operation aircraft). They tried to use the Battle in a role we might now call interdiction with disastrous results. It was not designed for this, it was like trying to hammer in a nail with a screwdriver.
Fighter Command didn't have a front line fighter capable of carrying bombs, they were both developed with speed and fire power as preemminent requirements, meaning even the fighter bomber was in the future.
I'm sure you don't need me to compare this situation with that of the Luftwaffe. The difference is entirely due to the very different doctrine underpinning the development of the two air forces.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

...
Fighter Command didn't have a front line fighter capable of carrying bombs, they were both developed with speed and fire power as preemminent requirements, meaning even the fighter bomber was in the future.
...

'Capable' as "not fitted with bomb racks" or as "not capable to take off if a bomb is attached"?

 

[stona]

Not fitted with racks.
Just about any late 1930s fighter had the power, intrinsic strength and other properties that could enable it to lift some kind of bomb load with some relatively minor modification. This is about doctrine and intent. The British had no intention of using its fighters to carry bombs in 1939, or 1940, they did fit racks to a few Hurricanes in 1941, and No.607 Squadron was the first to use them operationally, against an electrical transformer at Tingry on 30th October 1941. There were a few Whirlwinds (requiring not so minimal modification) looking for a job to suit their performance and these were also converted. Fighter Command was prepared to give up a few of one type verging on obscolescence, and another with which it didn't have a role.
None of this should be confused with any form of close air support, to which most senior RAF figures were still implacably opposed.

It was not until mid 1942, in North Africa, that anything approaching what might be described as close air support started to develop, and for this a US aircraft (P-40/Kittyhawk) was used.
In North Africa the first good example of really significant and well organised close air support is probably the concerted attacks by a large number of Allied squadrons (18 contributed aircraft) in support of New Zealand troops at the Tebaga Gap. This was on 26th March 1943.

The first really significant example of close air support by the RAF in Europe was probably the bombing and strafing of German positions by Nos. 174 (who bombed) and 3 and 43 Squadrons (who strafed) in support of the Dieppe landings on 19th August 1942. 174 Squadron alone lost 5 aircraft leading to a lot of 'I told you so' from some RAF officers. The losses seemed to justify the core argument which had underpinned RAF opposition to this sort of operation since WW1.

Cheers

Steve

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You provocative patronising ass hole, my father was in the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Arctic convoys and the Pacific. He was not a hero he did his bit, now let me see you tell Dragondog that the air war over Europe was not close, how would his father have done in a P40. The Battle of the Atlantic was won by massive investment on both sides of the Atlantic in planes ships, men, weapons, technology and intelligence. The Battle of the Atlantic was the one which troubled Churchill the most, it was the obsession of Bletchley Park and its code breakers. Your idiotic graph hides the fact that shipping losses in 1942 equalled (almost) the losses of the previous 3 years and there was no way the USA/Canada/UK relationship could survive 700,000 tons of US produce going to the bottom of the sea EVERY MONTH.


I have had it with this forum you are an educated idiot trolling for an argument.


Cheers guys.

Just saw this post, or I would have responded sooner!

You can get your post across without being a provative patronizing asshole yourself.

Insulting other members will not be tolerated. Knock it off.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Well thanks for that.

That the Battle of the Atlantic did not come as close to defeating Britain as has sometimes been claimed post war is a statement of fact, not trolling. The Battle of Britain never came close to defeating Fighter Command, the Germans never came close to being able to mount an invasion, both facts and neither detract from the determination, effort and occasional heroism of the men and women of Fighter Command.

The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and the British landings at Port Said were probably illegal, definitely unjustified and a political and military disaster, but that doesn't reflect on my father and his colleagues flying in from HMS Theseus, under fire, to land the RM Commandos and returning, several times, to evacuate casualties. Like your father he just did his job.


This has absolutely nothing to do with your father's service, you are being an over sensitive arse hole. Would you care to discuss the figures quoted?

Cheers

Steve
.

Goes for you too. Let's keep it peaceful.

 

[Zipper730]

Do P had two airframes made, one being an unarmed trainer. It was capable of a max. speed of 130 mph at sea level and had a max. bombload of 3,306 pounds.

Do Y had 4 units built before being cancelled. Max. bombload was 2,640 pounds.

Do11 saw production numbers totalling about 372 units. It was painfully slow (max. speed 162 mph) and it's max. bombload was 2,205 pounds.

The Do19 was a cancelled project, only 3 examples being built. It's max. bombload was 3,520 pounds.

My point wasn't the numbers or capability (they sucked), my point was that they did create aircraft that were deemed heavy-bombers by the standards of the time.

The Ju89 was also a cancelled project, 2 examples being built. It's max. bombload was 3,520 pounds.

Actually, that's what's interesting: Some sources listed 3520 or so, others stated that it was able to haul over 11,000 pounds. I'm not sure how far it could fly while carrying this much, but the speed of the aircraft was comparable tot he Vickers Wellington

As I had pointed out earlier, the only mass produced and deployed "heavy" bombers that Germany used with any consistency and success, were the Do217 and He177.

The question revolved around why the Germans didn't build and operate heavy-bombers. They built many, they operated few.

There were several other more modern and promising prototypes (Me264 being one of them) that were cancelled for one reason or another..

Didn't the factory get bombed?

Regardless of Wever being chief-of-staff, it was a huge deal because the infighting within the RLM was a costly, counter-productive struggle that detracted from their war-planning focus.

There might have been infighting, but with Wever as the boss, he was able to dictate his policy. After his death, the decisions made were based on the remaining officers. Some ideas were good, others not so much.

The He 177 was a heavy-bomber, I should point out: Had it been built around more level-headed design criteria (level-bombing, shallow-angle attacks only), it'd probably been fine. The dive-bombing requirement doomed it.

He177 also flew missions against western Allied positions on a regular basis.

I didn't know that.

No, the Luftwaffe did not have a strategic bombing plan...this has been discussed many times. The Battle of Britain is a prime example of the faltering, flip-flopping and lack of doctrine that led to a great deal of losses for little gain.

Actually, one could easily argue that Hitler's dictates fucked things up as much as anything else.

The Luftwaffe's doctrine called for subduing enemy air-forces, destruction of industry (aircraft-factories in particular), support of army and naval forces. One could argue that an excessively stiff doctrine is foolish as it cannot adopt to a changing environment (SAC as a fine example).

The evaporative cooling was part of the original design of the He177 but the excessive heat build-up of the DB engines forced the installation of the large annular radiators that imposed a performance penalty both in additional weight and drag.

Okay, so it was removed before the first design flew?

Many Heinkel projects tried evaptorative cooling at one point or another and while it's a great theory (and worked well on record setting specialty aircraft), it never performed as expected on any types that entered service.

I know they used it in some designs, and the reason was straight-forward: No cooling drag.

Dive-bombing was a common denominator in many inter-war airforces, including the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps.

The US Navy seemed to take the idea more seriously than the USAAC.

 

[Shortround6]

My point wasn't the numbers or capability (they sucked), my point was that they did create aircraft that were deemed heavy-bombers by the standards of the time.

Actually, that's what's interesting: Some sources listed 3520 or so, others stated that it was able to haul over 11,000 pounds. I'm not sure how far it could fly while carrying this much, but the speed of the aircraft was comparable tot he Vickers Wellington

The question revolved around why the Germans didn't build and operate heavy-bombers. They built many, they operated few.

Part of the problem was timing. The early "heavy" bombers sucked, doesn't matter who built them, American XB-15, Russian PE-8 (early power set up), The Do 19 and and the JU 89.
ALL heavy bombers (and most mediums) could trade bomb load for range. At least to some extent, Depended on both the bomb bay and the size of the fuel tanks.
The "Ural bomber" was a slick name but had little or no basis in fact. Unless they were planning on one way trips the published "range" of the JU 89 was sufficient only for a round trip from Moscow to the Urals with little or no reserve. Planning to capture 750-900 miles of enemy territory in order to establish and air base for use by heavy bombers seems to be more than just a bit optimistic.
The JU 89 had a wing almost 40% bigger in wing area than B-17. The DO 19 was almost 23% bigger. If you want to carry heavy loads with low power engines you needed a big wing. Problem comes in when you get more powerful engines you are stuck with the large/HIGH DRAG wing. Yes the more powerful version could lift more but speed wasn't going to change much and any attempt to increase cruise speed was going to burn up the extra fuel pretty quick. a 10% increase in cruising speed needs about 31% more power according to the cube rule. The designers were also learning a LOT about aircraft structures at the time and even airfoils which rendered even 3-4 year old designs obsolete. Shorts got the contract for the Stirling, in part, because they were the ONLY company in England to have ANY experience with large (4 engine) all metal monoplane aircraft.
It may be possible that the Do 19 and Ju 89 were never really intended to be production aircraft but rather proof of concept or "training" aircraft in the sense of giving German designers experience with large aircraft.

There might have been infighting, but with Wever as the boss, he was able to dictate his policy. After his death, the decisions made were based on the remaining officers. Some ideas were good, others not so much.
The He 177 was a heavy-bomber, I should point out: Had it been built around more level-headed design criteria (level-bombing, shallow-angle attacks only), it'd probably been fine. The dive-bombing requirement doomed it.

The dive bombing requirement certainly screwed it up but an early version which many people seem to advocate for would have had problems of it's own. The He 119 was the first plane to use the DB606 coupled engine (surface radiators and all) but those engines were 2350hp each and not the 2700hp engines used in early production He 177s. Splitting the power plant would have given four 1175 hp engines.
The He 177 was designed with a number of innovative features and as some of the innovations turned to crap the design kept having to be tweaked in order to keep as close as possible to the original requirement. The original surface cooling had to be changed from surface cooling only (or with small radiators) to a more even split between surface cooling and radiators and finally to radiators only. The increase in drag affected not only top speed but cruising speed and thus range. to restore range extra fuel tankage needed to be added which required some structural beefing up which added weight which decreased performance. They had also planned to use remote controlled gun installations but the progress of these fell behind the airframe construction and manned turrets/positions had to be used which further added drag. The initial prototypes quickly added about 20% to the vertical tail surfaces and in the A-3 versions and later 5ft 3 in was added to the fuselage length behind the bomb bay in part to reduce instability in flight.
These had nothing to do with the dive bomber requirement and would have been required to be fixed on any version (4 separate engines included).

Please look at the Halifax I (with Merlin X engines) the YB-17A (without turbos) and the early B-24s (also without turbos) to get benchmarks for a possible German 4 engine bomber in 1940 or early 1941. Throw in the German's rather lousy defensive armament of the time (basically night bomber only) and any "practical" German heavy bomber program seems more than a bit suspect.

The Luftwaffe's doctrine called for subduing enemy air-forces, destruction of industry (aircraft-factories in particular), support of army and naval forces. One could argue that an excessively stiff doctrine is foolish as it cannot adopt to a changing environment (SAC as a fine example).

Having strategic bombing as the 3rd priority in not the same as ignoring it completely. The Germans had a bit of an advantage in the strategic bombing game in that Berlin was around 280-300 miles from the western border. Granted the Ruhr was in easy reach of the Western Allies but in the bomb the Capital game the Germans had a big advantage in radius. Think of the British Capitol being Dublin instead of London. Germans might very well have tried to build longer range bombers but since London was only 300 miles or less from the German Border the Germans didn't need to build 600 mile radius bombers to hit it even without taking France/low countries.
The fact that the German beam systems were operational in the summer/fall of 1940 (construction started in 1939) shows the Germans were giving more thought to "long range" navigation for strategic bombing than the British were.

 

[Glider]

I know that it sounds simplistic but at the end of the day the German econamy and its limitied raw materials, meant that the Luftwaffe didn't have the choice. They could either have the tactcial airforce they had, or they could have the heavy four engined bomber airforce, not both.
The Lutwaffe grew from nothing to being a formidable force in a very short space of time, to grow even further would be askiing too much.

 

[GrauGeist]

My point wasn't the numbers or capability (they sucked), my point was that they did create aircraft that were deemed heavy-bombers by the standards of the time.

So did most of the world's airforces of the day, as these few examples (not a full list, however) show...
Britain: AW.38, Wellington
France: Amiot 143, F.220, MB.210
Italy: Z.1007, BR.20, SM.81
Japan: KI-1/KI-2, KI-20
Soviet Union: DB-A, TB-1, TB-3
U.S.: B-15, B-18, B-19

Actually, that's what's interesting: Some sources listed 3520 or so, others stated that it was able to haul over 11,000 pounds. I'm not sure how far it could fly while carrying this much, but the speed of the aircraft was comparable tot he Vickers Wellington

Double-check those sources. They may be citing "max. load" which would be opposed to "empty". Max. load would be fuel, defensive ammunition stores, fuel and full load of ordnance, etc.

The question revolved around why the Germans didn't build and operate heavy-bombers. They built many, they operated few.

SR put out a very good point on why the Germans didn't put a priority on heavy bombers.

The argument that medium bombers would do just as good of a job as heavy bombers won the day, however. The Germans were also notorious for forcing their types into being a "jack of all trades". Look at how the Ju88 went from a medium bomber, to a dive-bomber, torpedo bomber, heavy fighter, mine layer, night fighter and so on...they did actually perform in the medium bomber role, too!

Like I mentioned before, the RLM flip-flopped on alot of it's policies and this created a great deal of waste in regards to aircraft design, requirements and production.

Didn't the factory get bombed?

By late 1942 and particularly by late 1943, most of Germany's aircraft manufacturing facilities were coming under attack by Allied bombing. But it wasn't until 1944 that nearly any production facility in Germany was being scoured night and day.

There might have been infighting, but with Wever as the boss, he was able to dictate his policy. After his death, the decisions made were based on the remaining officers. Some ideas were good, others not so much.

Weaver may have been the boss, but resistance from the others in that circle would create delays and additional meetings and continuous bureaucratic circle-jerks.

Keep in mind that time was of the essence, if Germany were to have a viable bomber force (or fighters and other crucial assets) before they went to war, they needed to have a sizable force on hand, well trained, equipped and prepared before war started. This was simply not the case and as we see with their losses with the invasion of Poland, the lower countries and the battle of France, they were already in a precarious position when they started the Battle of Britain. Germany did not take it's production seriously until they were against the wall, and production output of fighters, for example, was highest in 1944, well after the writing was on the wall - had they been this serious in 1937, 1938, then they could have been in a better position to contest the Allies.

They were literally playing "catch up" from then onward.

The US Navy seemed to take the idea more seriously than the USAAC.

The Army had it's own way of thinking, regarding dive-bombing.

They had types like the A-12, A-24 and A-36 that were capable. The problem lays more in how they used them and the training and philosophy versus what the Navy doctrine was.

The one star of the USAAC/USAAF dive-bombing doctrine was the A-36 Apache, which did accomplish a great deal in many respects.

 

[Elmas]

Two Spitfires landed, very short of juice, in a U.S. bomber base where some B-17 were refuelled, and did stop near the bowser.

"Could you please refuel" asked one Pilot to the Petty Officer in charge.

"Sure" the Petty Officer replied, "but you have to wait for your turn. How many gallons you need?"
The Spitfire Pilot replied ...

"Oh, but it this case you can refuel with this.." said the Petty officer handling his Zippo to the Spitfire Pilot...

Always, when I read about a huge Luftwaffe force of heavy bombers, I wonder how many Zippo's would have been needed to refuel them....

 

[Shortround6]

The US Army had "attack" planes rather than dive bombers, although dive bombers fell into the attack catagory.
A-12

A-18

A-17

However in 1938 the Air Corp decided attack planes should be twin engine,leading to the A-20.

Attack planes were to be used either in direct support of the land battle or for close range interdiction. They carried four .30 cal machine guns (twice the armament of a Stuka) at a time when US fighters carried a single .50 and a single .30. They also carried multiple bombs instead of one big one )or one big and several small. The Army had gone to air cooled engines ( early version/s of the A-12 used a water cooled V-12) to reduce vulnerability to ground fire. The Army also did a lot of experimenting with planes fitted with smoke canisters/tanks for the rapid laying of smoke screens as part of the tactical battle,

However as ground troops got better and more AA guns both the "Attack plane" and dive bomber lost a lot of their appeal. Trading aircraft for a crater in a road junction or a machine gun bunker was a loosing proposition. For the Navy trading several aircraft for a destroyer was a definite win and trading even a dozen aircraft for a cruiser or carrier was also a big win. US Army also had designs for good artillery pieces sitting in drawers and just needed more money from congress to go into production. They didn't need quite the same air support for taking out strong points as some other countries did. Britain wound up with neither heavy artillery or aircraft for the first few years of the war.

Different countries had different needs and different doctrines which affected the aircraft produced/purchased. Too many countries often built ships/aircraft and other weapons based on what the other guy had (keeping up with the Jones's) rather than what they actually needed. Something that affects ACAMs (Arm Chair Air Marshals) even today
Just because Air Force A used a certain type plane to good effect doesn't mean it was also a good plane for Air Force B.

 

[Zipper730]

Double-check those sources. They may be citing "max. load" which would be opposed to "empty". Max. load would be fuel, defensive ammunition stores, fuel and full load of ordnance, etc.

The term payload was used.

SR put out a very good point on why the Germans didn't put a priority on heavy bombers.

The argument that two mediums are as good as one big one.

Keep in mind that time was of the essence, if Germany were to have a viable bomber force (or fighters and other crucial assets) before they went to war, they needed to have a sizable force on hand, well trained, equipped and prepared before war started.

Of course

This was simply not the case and as we see with their losses with the invasion of Poland, the lower countries and the battle of France, they were already in a precarious position when they started the Battle of Britain.

I never knew that

Germany did not take it's production seriously until they were against the wall, and production output of fighters, for example, was highest in 1944, well after the writing was on the wall - had they been this serious in 1937, 1938, then they could have been in a better position to contest the Allies.

I'm glad they weren't

The Army had it's own way of thinking, regarding dive-bombing.

They had types like the A-12, A-24 and A-36 that were capable.

The A-12 I know almost nothing about; the A-24 and -36 I do.

The problem lays more in how they used them and the training and philosophy versus what the Navy doctrine was.

True enough

The US Army had "attack" planes rather than dive bombers, although dive bombers fell into the attack catagory.

True enough. Could the A-14/A-18 dive-bomb?

Different countries had different needs and different doctrines which affected the aircraft produced/purchased. Too many countries often built ships/aircraft and other weapons based on what the other guy had (keeping up with the Jones's) rather than what they actually needed.[/quote]True.

Just because Air Force A used a certain type plane to good effect doesn't mean it was also a good plane for Air Force B.

However there were some good rules of thumb

 

[GrauGeist]

Another often over-looked Army dive bomber is the Curtiss A-25.

The Army ordered 900 SB2C aircraft from Curtiss. These were designated the A-25 and in a typical Army decision, changed their minds, and never used them as a combat platform. Instead, they were used as trainers and ten were given to Australia and 410 of them were given to the USMC, which redesignated them the SB2C-1A and used them for operational training.

The idea of dive bombing was adopted by the USN by the late 20's and remained an integral component until the immediate years following WWII, when the Navy drew the conclusion that the Soviet Navy did not possess enough surface assets to warrant a dive-bombing force.

The Navy's philosophy was that an enemy warship would be evasive and therefore requiring the bomb(s) be placed as close to the target as possible, unlike the typical Army's approach, which was to try and saturate the target with level bombing, which was also a philosophy held over from the 1920's.

During the inter-war period, the Army did consider, and experiment, with the dive-bomber as a solution for close support and "pinpoint" strikes, but they never seemed to take the Navy's advice or experience into account, and followed their own ideas on how dive bombing should be done. This is most likely the reason we see the Army selecting certain types for dive-bombing, but never really developing any effective program (with the exception of the A-36, of course).

 

[pbehn]

This was simply not the case and as we see with their losses with the invasion of Poland, the lower countries and the battle of France, they were already in a precarious position when they started the Battle of Britain.

I never knew that

Germany lost
285 destroyed and 275 damaged in Poland
260 destroyed in Norway
Up to the beginning of the campaign in France they lost 1,460 with 1,074 damaged, these are totals including those in training.
In France they lost 1,428 destroyed and 488 damaged which was approximately half its strength.

When told of the actual strength of the LW approx 700 bombers and 600 to 700 fighters not the 4500 bombers and 1500 fighters he had boasted about Goering is reported to have sat down in shock muttering "Is this my Luftwaffe".

 

[Zipper730]

Another often over-looked Army dive bomber is the Curtiss A-25.

The SB2C

The idea of dive bombing was adopted by the USN by the late 20's and remained an integral component until the immediate years following WWII, when the Navy drew the conclusion that the Soviet Navy did not possess enough surface assets to warrant a dive-bombing force.

True enough, but I should point out that the A-1 and A-4's were capable of such attacks

The Navy's philosophy was that an enemy warship would be evasive and therefore requiring the bomb(s) be placed as close to the target as possible

Lob it in their face

During the inter-war period, the Army did consider, and experiment, with the dive-bomber as a solution for close support and "pinpoint" strikes, but they never seemed to take the Navy's advice or experience into account, and followed their own ideas on how dive bombing should be done.

I didn't know that.

This was simply not the case and as we see with their losses with the invasion of Poland, the lower countries and the battle of France, they were already in a precarious position when they started the Battle of Britain.

Germany lost
285 destroyed and 275 damaged in Poland
260 destroyed in Norway
Up to the beginning of the campaign in France they lost 1,460 with 1,074 damaged, these are totals including those in training.
In France they lost 1,428 destroyed and 488 damaged which was approximately half its strength.

Wow

 

[pbehn]

Wow

The LW and most of the German military were set up to fight campaigns (which were highly successful) not a continuous war. They didnt really go on to a full war footing until 1942/43 by which time they were less than two years from complete defeat.