German guided bombs

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DB
another piece of daydreaming, from where the He 111s would have coming, are you sure that USAAF heavy bombers would not have bombed those packed up a/fs where the Hes were based before the invasion?

Juha
 
Hello Dave
a couple facts
LW and WM generally believed schwerpunkt
what was the main front for Germany in 43?
what was the main offensive of WM in summer 43?
what was the main bomber used in effort to try to hinder Soviet built-up in Kursk Bulge before the Oper Zitadel?
And besides that, what was the bomber used in the only "sustained" strategic effort against Soviet armament industry by LW?

And you think that LW would have scrapped both of the 2 latter points for the possibility of having exceptional luck in timing of one massive torpedo attack in to them a secondary front? and after all LW had already a torpedo KG, namely KG 26, happened it attack just at the right moment? Some historical analyze, please.

Juha
 
CasablancaConference 12 February 1943
The Avalon Project : CASABLANCA CONFERENCE 1943
the only terms on which we shall deal with an Axis government or any Axis factions are the terms proclaimed at Casablanca: "Unconditional Surrender."
The "Unconditional Surrender" plank was inserted by President FDR. Perhaps the destruction of U.S. 7th Army at Sicily would convince American leadership they should consider negotiation.

1943 Germany has nothing to lose. They cannot defeat a Soviet invasion of Central Europe as long as the Soviet Union receives virtually unlimited economic support from the USA.
 
It worked at Taranto.
It worked at Pearl Harbor.
It worked at Bari.

With luck it could work during Operation Husky also.

With an incredible amount of luck. And with an incredible amount of foreknowledge. How many Months to retrain those bomber crews to be torpedo bombers? Start training before the Sicily invasion? to DEPEND on the Allied AA gunners not firing?
 
Allied ships shot down many of their own a/c and db thinks the Lw could have been lucky?
 
Hello Dave
you are really daydreaming
firstly, the shooting down of allied cargo planes happened on the night 11/12 July, when the seaborne landing had happened very early on 10 July, so allied had had 2 days to disembark their troops from the troops transports!!!
secondly, according to Hooton's Eagle in Flames waters off the invasion beaches were too shallow for convetional torpedo attacks so LW torpedo bombers had to use circling torpedos, so all that special training and all the lost opportunies that followed from withdrawal of those 4 KGn for training were vain. Of course if the LW had done what you have suggested we would now have a thread "A Huge Missed Opportunity" on how, if Germans had used those 4 KGn reserved for massive torpedo attack would have been used to execute strategic offensive against Soviet armament industry and then to stop Soviet reinforcements for reaching the Kursk Bulge, the victorious panzers would have been able to rout Red Army and then to drive to Moscow

Juha
 
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Then they will employ skip bombing. That appears to have been the Luftwaffe preferred maritime attack method anyway.

Frankly I don't understand why the Luftwaffe didn't do this during 1942. A relatively small number of maritime attack aircraft caused a great deal of trouble for PQ convoys heading to the White Sea. A couple full strength KG stationed in Northern Norway might completely closed the Northern convoy route to the Soviet Union.
 

New routes would have been used.

Wiki
The Arctic route was the shortest and most direct route for lend-lease aid to the USSR, though it was also the most dangerous. Some 3,964,000 tons of goods were shipped by the Arctic route; 7% was lost, while 93% arrived safely.[6] This constituted some 23% of the total aid to the USSR during the war.

Other routes used for the passage of goods were the Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route.

The Persian corridor was the longest route, and was not fully operational until mid 1942. Thereafter it saw the passage of 4,160,000 tons of goods, 27% of the total.[6]

The Pacific route opened in August 1941, but was affected by the start of hostilities between Japan and the US; after December 1941, only Soviet ships could be used, and, as Japan and the USSR observed a strict neutrality towards each other, only non-military goods could be transported.[7] Nevertheless, 8,244, 000 tons of goods went by this route, 50% of the total. [6]

..........................

Where were these 2 full strength KG to come from?
 
Easier said then done.

The best routes are via the Baltic and Black Sea. Those are out.

The rail line to Vladivostok was single track. The Soviet Union poured considerable resources into this line but a single track several thousand miles in length cannot be further expanded. They would need to double the track, which takes years even with unlimited resources.

The Persian Gulf route required a huge effort. The Soviet Union and Britain had to jointly invade and occupy Iran. Then they had to upgrade port facilities, RR rolling stock, ferries across the Caspian Sea etc. Cargo throughput of this route cannot be easily expanded. Building new rail lines or doubling existing tracks requires that a bunch of tunnels and bridges be expanded.

And then there's Turkey.
Historically PM Churchill expended considerable resources in a fruitless effort to get Turkey as a military ally. If the White Sea convoy route is closed Britain and the USA may consider invasion. Opening the Dardanelles would make all other Lend-Lease routes to the Soviet Union unnecessary. But first you need to win Gallipoli II and you know Turkey would get German assistance.
 
Opening the Dardanelles would be almost useless. Even with Turkey as an ally with the Axis in Greece and Bulgaria the Aegean sea is going to be too contested to send supply convoys through. Once through in the black sea were do you go? What ports do the Russians have in the Black Sea that are not under German control or with in easy reach of German air power?

It may be easier to build railroad track that port facilities. Docks, dredged harbors, Cranes, etc.

More aircraft in Norway would not have closed the arctic route. Slowed it down perhaps. Take a look at a map. A convoy in the Black sea is like shooting fish in a barrel compared to finding and attacking a convoy in the Norwegian and Barents seas.
The White sea is a choke point but is under cover of Land based air. More carrier coverage of the arctic convoys would have allowed them to continue.

Please remember that for every "stunt" or redeployment of a few groups of planes the Allies can also redeploy a few hundred planes or or a few ships to counter it.
 
Arctic route - 23% of the total
Persian Gulf route - 27% of the total
Pacific route - 50% of the total

Where would Germany get the forces from to aid Turkey? Certainly not from the Eastern Front nor the African Front.
 
back to the thread topic gents where do guided bombs come into play here when mentioning of thousands of miles of travel to parts almost unknown and where needed S/E escorts will not be available and bomber KG's are at a premium plus in major jeopardy due to loss of fuel reserves and so far away from needed A/F's and simple watch by Allied land coverage
 

If you look PQ 18 LW lost 24 torpedo bombers, KG-26 - 19 bombers (HE-111/Ju-88 ) Kustenfliegergruppen 406/506/906 - 5 x HE-115 plus 3 Ju 88A bombers, rather too high for LW to long run.

Juha
 
and too bad for the LW Juha this remained consistent on the PQ raids, again no back up escorts and granted many torpedo craft were shot down by Allied ship AA
 
24 ships out of 36 total. More then 142,000 tons in all.
.....Approximately half the damage was by German aircraft. German Navy got the rest.
.....430 tanks lost.
.....210 bomber aircraft lost.
.....3,350 motor vehicles lost.
.....100,000 tons of ammunition lost.

If the Luftwaffe lose 50 or 100 aircraft to accomplish such damage it is still a great victory for Germany. Put a Do-217 KG in Norway equipped with Hs-293 guided weapons and such convoy losses might become routine.
 
Hello Dave
PQ 17 was a special case because most of the losses happened after the convoy was dispersed and escorts withdrawn, and LW had nothing to do with that decision, and many of the losses were sunk by U-boats. And after initial successes Hs 293 was not overly successful against convoys at Biscays IIRC.

Juha
 
PQ 17 was in June of 1942. First operational use (success?) of the Hs 293 was August 1943.

How many more carriers did the Allies have in Aug/Sept of 1943 than in the summer of 1942? Even F4F wildcats would make short work of missile carrying bombers.
 

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