German war production without war with West

[Jabberwocky]

I would say that the Panzer IV with the "longer barrel" was comparable if not better than the T-34-76 in technical aspects.

Yes, but the long barrel PZ IVs (Ausf F2/Ausf G with the L/43 75 mm cannon) appeared in direct response to German experiences of encountering the T-34 on the battlefield. The original prototype had the 50 mm L/60 cannon, but the 75 mm was rapidly redesigned to allow it to be shoehorned into the new turret.

The long barrel Pz IV was certainly superior in some respects, including the main armament, targeting optics, radios, general layout, turret arrangements and crew ergonomics.

However, it lagged the T-34 in armour protection and general mobility - two of the three key areas of armour performance - and the L/43 was only marginally superior to the 7.62 cm gun. The underlying design elements of the T-34 - wide stance, sloped heavy armour, powerful deisel engine, heavy cannon from the outset - were better than that of the Pz IV, but it was let down by a lack of attention to detail and a rush to get it into service. The T-34, by the assesment of the Germans themselves - see commentary by Guderian and von Kleist - was the finest tank in the world in 1941.

If you want to make an ideal tank for 1941, you'd probably take the armour scheme and general arrangement of the T-34, give it a more spacious three-man turret with better hatches and vision arrangements and marry it to German running gear and German interior design and then build it in German factories.

 

[silence]

The Pz IV's biggest advantages were it optics and its five-man crew (T-34/76 only had four).

You're still going to see the Panther and the Tiger as responses to Soviet tanks as well as the more ludicrous armor developments like the Ferdinand. There will still surely be a lack of recovery vehicles. There might be no MG42; there won't be a Sturmgewehr. There's no tank losses in France, so there's more of them. I suspect the T-34 and KVs are going to be at least as big of a shock as they were historically.

Without Britain there's no Balkans campaign, so Barbarossa can start much earlier. No need for a DAK so you can also throw Rommel into the mix if you'd like, along with JG 2, 26, 27, and I/JG 77. There's no partisan war in the Balkans either.

There's no LW losses in France or Britain; this means the 3000 LW losses won't happen; you'll have a larger, better trained LW, if not as experienced. You're still gonna see 109Fs and Gs (though the latter may not get so bloated) and FW 190s. Prob no jets, though, nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures. Minimal radar development. No Doras or Ta-152s. LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.

There's no Crete so you have the Fallshirmjaeger at full strength. No occupation of Western Europe means more troops available, which may well result in better sealing off of encircled Red Army troops.

On the other side, the Soviet Union is in the same starting position as it was historically, and there will be no benefit from lend-lease, so no fleets of trucks (greatly hurting Red Army mobility) and no Spam or wheat to feed the troops.

Germany will NOT have the benefit of the lessons learned in the Battle of France, but I suspect their performance will be similar at least to the end of '41.

What is most interesting (to me, anyway) is that Grofaz will NOT have the ego boost that the Battle of France gave him, so he just may not interfere as much - at least in the early stages.

The Germans will have more time, men, and equipment to throw into Barbarossa, so the USSR is going to be hurt even worse than historically.

BUT, if the USSR can manage to hold on and learn as they did historically, they'll provide the German leadership with more time and opportunities to screw things up. AH started out pretty hands off but eventually became the worst sort of micro manager. Stalin took the opposite path. Its a question of how much time there will be for the evil twins morph into their historical late-war selves.

Oh, and the USSR won't get the gold braid for their officers' uniforms.

 

[silence]

If you want to make an ideal tank for 1941, you'd probably take the armour scheme and general arrangement of the T-34, give it a more spacious three-man turret with better hatches and vision arrangements and marry it to German running gear and German interior design and then build it in German factories.

Sounds like a Panther. I'd throw in a diesel engine, too.

 

[wiking85]

There might be no MG42; there won't be a Sturmgewehr.

Why not?

Prob no jets, though,

Again, why not?

nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures.

There were night actions on the Eastern Front, the Soviets had night bombers and night fighters, both things that the LW would need to fight.

Minimal radar development.

Why? The Soviets didn't have an air force? Historically the Germans used radar extensively on the Eastern Front, though in the more mobile variety than fixed stations because of the mobile front lines. Pre-war the Germans developed radar seriously. The war in the West didn't change that trajectory, so its absence wouldn't mean it would suddenly ratchet downward. In fact the Germans would have need for night time guidance bombing and defense against Soviet night and day attacks from the air, not to mention jamming of Soviet radar.

No Doras or Ta-152s.

Depends on whether the Germans adopt higher level bombing that needed escorting. The Soviets had high altitude fighters. Also it would be interesting to see the way the Me109 and Fw190 would evolve with only the need for lower altitude fighting (no slow G series for the Me109? perhaps the FW190A series actually speeds up instead of getting loaded down with heavier anti-bomber weaponry).

LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.

The LW developed pretty rapidly pre-war, so that's not much different from what the historical pace was during wartime. Also the LA-5 showed up in 1942, so that's not a lot of time before the LW picks up the pace if they stick to your prediction.

There's no Crete so you have the Fallshirmjaeger at full strength. No occupation of Western Europe means more troops available, which may well result in better sealing off of encircled Red Army troops.

Also no disaster in Holland or losses in Norway, so the FJ are still a surprise. They weren't publicly revealed until the Norwegian campaign.

Germany will NOT have the benefit of the lessons learned in the Battle of France, but I suspect their performance will be similar at least to the end of '41.

AFAIK the most important lessons were mostly learned in Poland, with France just honing the weapon further.

What is most interesting (to me, anyway) is that Grofaz will NOT have the ego boost that the Battle of France gave him, so he just may not interfere as much - at least in the early stages.

That's important too.

BUT, if the USSR can manage to hold on and learn as they did historically, they'll provide the German leadership with more time and opportunities to screw things up. AH started out pretty hands off but eventually became the worst sort of micro manager. Stalin took the opposite path. Its a question of how much time there will be for the evil twins morph into their historical late-war selves.

Funny that people ignore Stalin's meddling in the war early on, which led to a lot of disasters. Both Hitler and Stalin were hands off when things went well, but in bad times they interfered. So if the Soviets are doing worse, would Stalin lay off his generals?

 

[stona]

yes U-boat production consumed resources but under the already laid out plans much of that would happen anyway assuming the UK was potentially an opponent in any war until late 1939.

Britain was not a potential opponent before 1938. This isn't the thread for this but the earliest expression of Hitler's foreign policy toward Britain would be the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

Admiral Boehme considered it an effort to clear the air with Britain writing "there never was a more generous offer made, nor more honestly meant."
He did not consider Plan Z a threat to Britain as it would provide Germany with ten large battleships by 1948, still less than Britain's current fourteen. It was the French who had started building their Dunkerque class in 1933.

Admiral Schulze wrote that the 1935 treaty was "cordially welcomed, both by me and by practically the whole corps of German naval officers."

Vice Admiral Helmuth Heye wrote that the KM was "forbidden until shortly before the war to carry on studies and make plans in case of a war with England."

Because of Germany's geographical situation both Grand Admiral Doenitz and Vice Admiral Eberhardt Weichold conceded at the time that Germany's rearmament programme should concentrate on land forces and that the "great naval powers" [Doenitz] were not considered potential enemies. By "great naval powers" he meant Britain, Italy, Japan and maybe the USA.

Hitler's thinking was much influenced by Vice Admiral Wegener's "Seestrategie des Welkrieges". It makes it clear that there was no point in competing with the British.

"The Germans were so impressed with the tactical superiority of the British fleet that they did not understand that strategically the relative size of fleets plays no part."

Had German attitudes to Britain been different in the mid thirties those U-Boat plans might have been very different.

Sorry for the digression. Planning for a war with Britain didn't divert resources because it was not done seriously until shortly before the war.

Cheers

Steve

 

[wiking85]

Snip

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z

Plan Z was the name given to the planned re-equipment and expansion of the German Navy (Kriegsmarine) ordered by Adolf Hitler on January 27, 1939.[1] The plan called for a Kriegsmarine of

10 battleships
4 aircraft carriers
3 battlecruisers
3 old panzerschiffe
12 new panzerschiffe
5 heavy cruisers
36 M-class light cruisers
24 Spähkreuzer-type light cruisers
68 destroyers
90 torpedo boats
249 U-boats
by 1945 that was meant to challenge the naval power of the United Kingdom.[2]

This is pretty extensive building with an aim toward challenging the Western Powers for control of the North Sea. Without the British being the main focus after Germany conquers Poland in 1939 and with Germany gearing up for war against the USSR while also mobilizing the German economy for said war by 1941/42, the focus on the building up of the fleet is going to take a back seat to building for the LW and Heer for a war in the East. The battleships are a long term project and there's likely to be only a few steps made in that direction until Poland is overrun and the USSR becomes the main focus.

Of course the West remaining neutral and letting Germany focus on the East is but one scenario, which is actually not the one I outlined in the OP. In fact I was proposing that Germany still fights the West in 1940-41, but peace is made by March 1941 with Britain, giving Germany a free hand on the continent. We can discuss both scenarios and their validity, but if we run with my OP scenario then there will be naval build up in 1939-1941 and then the German economy has to reorient itself for a ground and air war.

 

[stona]

Well Wikipedia is wrong about the time frame, as several German Admirals are on the record stating the proposed ten battleships were not all expected before 1948. The proposed fleet was not to challenge the naval power of the UK, at least not according to pre war German naval doctrine. Protection of sea communications was better achieved through politics than extensive, and expensive, naval rearmament. Admiral Schultze claimed that Germany recognised that Britain's imperial requirements obliged her to maintain "a considerably stronger navy."
Initially the German fleet was developed to compete with those of her continental neighbours.

Yet another Admiral, this is Theodore Kranke.
"The Fuhrer was always emphasising the fact that war with England was politically out of the question, as there was no grounds for conflict, hence the naval treaty"

Post war Admiral Hans Meyer who had commanded Tirpitz wrote.
"It was beyond question that Hitler never wished a quarrel with England."

Germany's main naval concern in the 1930s seems to have been to protect her vital iron ore routes across the Baltic and it is for this reason that vessels under 600 tons were excluded from the 1935 agreement.

This is all a bit off topic

Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Without Britain there's no Balkans campaign, so Barbarossa can start much earlier. No need for a DAK so you can also throw Rommel into the mix if you'd like, along with JG 2, 26, 27, and I/JG 77. There's no partisan war in the Balkans either.

That's assuming that Italy's invasion of Greece and Albania goes well AND assuming Italy's land-grab in Africa goes well...

Such a huge IF there, but I will lay money on events unfolding as they did actually happen...

Prob no jets, though, nor nightfighters, etc except as private ventures. Minimal radar development. No Doras or Ta-152s. LW development will prob be at a pre-war kind of pace - at least until the La-5s start showing up. The RLM put a halt on any new projects that couldn't be realized in a year or less.

The jet program was underway before the war and the first combat jet flew just a few months after the Battle of France and almost a year before the invasion of Russia, so why not? Without pressure on resources from the west, development could have progressed along a much different path.

Radar showed it's value and would most likely continue to be refined just like any other advanced military hardware of it's time.

The Soviets had high altitude fighters. Also it would be interesting to see the way the Me109 and Fw190 would evolve with only the need for lower altitude fighting (no slow G series for the Me109? perhaps the FW190A series actually speeds up instead of getting loaded down with heavier anti-bomber weaponry).

Not like the British or Americans. Actually, very few Soviet fighters, with the exception of the MiG-1, MiG-3 and La-5, were effective at altitudes above 35,000 feet and several could not acheive 35,000+.
Historically, the airware of the Eastern front was fought at lower altitudes and there's probably no reason why the airware would be any different in this scenario...

 

[wiking85]

Not like the British or Americans. Actually, very few Soviet fighters, with the exception of the MiG-1, MiG-3 and La-5, were effective at altitudes above 35,000 feet and several could not acheive 35,000+.
Historically, the airware of the Eastern front was fought at lower altitudes and there's probably no reason why the airware would be any different in this scenario...

The Soviets didn't need to produce the types that could fly high historically. They had the Su-1/3 which did not enter production because of the lack of need. The Mig 3 was designed for fighting above 30,000 feet and actually performed worse at the typical altitudes during the fighting on the Eastern Front in 1941-45. With the Germans just focusing on the Soviets, they are more likely to actually produce a viable strategic bomber at some point (historically the four propellor He177B was ready for production in 1944 but cancelled due to the need for more fighters and the lack of fuel caused by allied bombing), which will mean the Soviets will have to have fighters capable of flying up to meet them at their likely altitudes that will be in excess of 25,000 feet to avoid AAA.

With more resources for offensive aircraft the LW is bound to engage in strategic bombing, so that will take place above 20,000 feet for the reasons above.

 

[bobbysocks]

even with out the west doing anything...i dont see germany being able to take the ussr in less than 10 years if ever. weather and terrain would have probably made it into yearly campaigns. the zealot like mindset of the soviet leadership would have fought to the bitter end with stick and stones if that was all they had. germany's only hope was to hit fast and hard to capture the soviet government before they could escape east. the vast expanse of the land is in itself a defense....unless germany would have been satisfied with the western 1/3 of the country. german supply lines within a few years would have been so long and thin ( 500 to a thousand miles long ) disrupting them would be extrememly easy. they might be able to own it but they would never have been able to subdue it.

 

[wiking85]

Well Wikipedia is wrong about the time frame, as several German Admirals are on the record stating the proposed ten battleships were not all expected before 1948. The proposed fleet was not to challenge the naval power of the UK, at least not according to pre war German naval doctrine. Protection of sea communications was better achieved through politics than extensive, and expensive, naval rearmament. Admiral Schultze claimed that Germany recognised that Britain's imperial requirements obliged her to maintain "a considerably stronger navy."
Initially the German fleet was developed to compete with those of her continental neighbours.

Yet another Admiral, this is Theodore Kranke.
"The Fuhrer was always emphasising the fact that war with England was politically out of the question, as there was no grounds for conflict, hence the naval treaty"

Post war Admiral Hans Meyer who had commanded Tirpitz wrote.
"It was beyond question that Hitler never wished a quarrel with England."

Germany's main naval concern in the 1930s seems to have been to protect her vital iron ore routes across the Baltic and it is for this reason that vessels under 600 tons were excluded from the 1935 agreement.

This is all a bit off topic

Steve

No worries, this is a pertinent OT. Hitler didn't view the British as an enemy until Munich, then they were a major concern. Plan Z was decided on and announced after Munich and Hitler renounced the Anglo-German naval treaty soon after (some 4 months after Plan Z made the AGNA moot).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-German_Naval_Agreement#Impact

By the late 1930s, Hitler's disillusionment with Britain led to German foreign policy taking increasing anti-British course.[67] An important sign of Hitler's changed perceptions about Britain was his decision in January 1939 to give first priority to the Kriegsmarine in relates in the allocation of money, skilled workers, and raw materials and to launch the Plan Z to build a colossal Kriegsmarine of 10 battleships, 16 "pocket battleships", 8 aircraft carriers, 5 heavy cruisers, 36 light cruisers, and 249 U-boats by 1944 to crush the Royal Navy.[68] Since the fleet envisioned in the Z Plan was considerably larger than that allowed by the 35:100 ratio in the A.G.N.A, the Z Plan made it inevitable that Germany would renounce the A.G.N.A. Over the winter of 1938-39, the fact that it became increasing clear to London that the Germans no longer intended to abide by the A.G.N.A played a role in straining Anglo-German relations.[69] Reports received in October 1938 that the Germans were considering denouncing the A.G.N.A were used by Lord Halifax in Cabinet discussions for the need for a tough policy with the Reich.[70] The German statement of December 9, 1938 that they intended to build to 100% ratio allowed in submarines by the A.G.N.A. plus to build to the limits in heavy cruisers led to speech by Chamberlain before the correspondents of the German News Agency in London warning of the "futility of ambition, if ambition leads to the desire for domination".[71] At the same time, Lord Halifax informed Herbert von Dirksen, the German Ambassador to Britain that his government viewed the talks to discuss the details of the German building escalation as a test-case for German sincerity.[72] When the talks began in Berlin on December 30, 1938, the Germans took an obdurate approach, leading London to conclude that the Germans did not wish for the talks to succeed.[73]

In response to the British "guarantee" of Poland of March 31, 1939, Hitler, who was enraged by the British move, stated "I shall brew them a devil's drink".[74] In a speech in Wilhelmshaven for the launch of the Admiral Tirpitz battleship, Hitler threatened to denounce the A.G.N.A. if the British persisted with their "encirclement" policy as represented by the "guarantee" of Polish independence.[74] On April 28, 1939 Hitler denounced the A.G.N.A.[74] To provide an excuse for the denunciation of the A.G.N.A, and to prevent the emergence of a new naval treaty, the Germans began refusing to share information about their shipbuilding,and thus left the British with the choice of either accepting the unilateral German move or rejecting it, thereby providing the Germans with the excuse to denounce the treaty.[75] At a Cabinet meeting on May 3, 1939, the First Lord of Admiralty, Lord Stanhope stated that "at the present time Germany was building ships as fast as she could but that she would not be able to exceed the 35 per cent ratio before 1942 or 1943".[75] Chatfield who by this time was serving as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence commented that Hitler had "persuaded himself" that Britain had provided the Reich with a "free hand" in Eastern Europe in exchange for the A.G.N.A.[75] Chamberlain stated that Britain had never given such an understanding to Germany, and commented that he first learned of Hitler's belief in such an implied bargain during his meeting with the Führer at the Berchtesgaden summit in September 1938.[75] In a later paper to the Cabinet, Chatfield stated "that we might say that we now understood Herr Hitler had in 1935 thought that we had given him a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe in return for his acceptance of the 100:35 ratio, but that as we could not accept the correctness of this view it might be better that the 1935 arrangements should be abrogated".[76] In the end, the British reply to the German move was a diplomatic note vigorously disputing the German claim that Britain was attempting to "encircle" Germany with hostile alliances.[76] The German denunciation of the A.G.N.A. together with reports of increased German shipbuilding in June 1939 caused by the Z Plan played a significant part in persuading the Chamberlain government of the need to "contain" Germany by building a "Peace front" of states in both Western and Eastern Europe, and of increasing the perception within the Chamberlain government in 1939 that German policies were a threat to Great Britain.[77]

 

[wiking85]

even with out the west doing anything...i dont see germany being able to take the ussr in less than 10 years if ever. weather and terrain would have probably made it into yearly campaigns. the zealot like mindset of the soviet leadership would have fought to the bitter end with stick and stones if that was all they had. germany's only hope was to hit fast and hard to capture the soviet government before they could escape east. the vast expanse of the land is in itself a defense....unless germany would have been satisfied with the western 1/3 of the country. german supply lines within a few years would have been so long and thin ( 500 to a thousand miles long ) disrupting them would be extrememly easy. they might be able to own it but they would never have been able to subdue it.

At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a disgusted populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly. Food and starvation will be a major concern at some point, as without the fields of Ukraine the USSR doesn't produce enough to feed itself and foreign exchange only holds out so long to mitigate the shortfalls.

 

[stona]

At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a disgusted populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly.

Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had. The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
Cheers
Steve

 

[davebender]

Historically the Soviet Union held on during 1941 because Germany didn't quite have enough military assets to finish them off in a single campaign season and Anglo-American assistance started arriving during August 1941. Neither condition applies in this scenario. Anti communist coalition invasion force should be at least a third larger and there will be no Anglo-American economic assistance.

 

[bobbysocks]

At some point Soviet leadership is going to be removed by a disgusted populace if the Germans are able to make the war too costly. Food and starvation will be a major concern at some point, as without the fields of Ukraine the USSR doesn't produce enough to feed itself and foreign exchange only holds out so long to mitigate the shortfalls.

if we were talking about a western country i would wholeheartely agree with you. the average person in the us or the uk/cw would have picked up a ball bat or pitchfork and started cleaning house themselves. but the mindset of the average soviet was a lot different. if on d-day ike would have rallied the troops and gave them a clip with 5 rounds of ammo in it and told them they can get a gun off of fallen comrade....i doubt d-day would have happened. i actually doubt ike would have gotten out of there alive! yet that kind of scenario was repeated in the eastern war....and while we hear of attempts to kill hitler by the germans...how many stories do we hear about the attempts to kill stalin?

 

[bobbysocks]

Historically the Soviet Union held on during 1941 because Germany didn't quite have enough military assets to finish them off in a single campaign season and Anglo-American assistance started arriving during August 1941. Neither condition applies in this scenario. Anti communist coalition invasion force should be at least a third larger and there will be no Anglo-American economic assistance.

they ( soviets ) held on to the western contested area...not just held on to existance. they had thousands of miles to retreat and all the time in the world. look at the size of the land.....the military assets needed to not only conquer but hold and subdue it are astronimical. guerrilla warfare would have put the war of attrition in the soviet favor. it might have taken 40 years but in the end they would have won the war ( germany pulling out ) by making it either too costly or the causing german population to demand change. i site the history of afghanistan...china...vietnam as prime examples.

 

[stona]

A woman in a food queue in Berlin in 1944 once compared the Nazi state to a snake, when urging her neighbour to stop talking about "the camps". "Tread on its tail and it will bite you" she said. The Soviet state, like any totalitarian state, was the same. Tread on its tail and it may well bite you.Cut off its head and it will die. Then anything is possible.
Cheers
Steve

 

[GrauGeist]

Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had. The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
Cheers
Steve

Totally agree...

Had Hitler insisted on a "winning hearts and minds" of the occupied territories during his push to Moscow instead of fostering his hatred, the people would have swelled the German's ranks with determined people that wanted to be free of Stalin and his crowd. He already had the White Russians as a special fighting unit.

That was surely an opportunity lost.

 

[silence]

if we were talking about a western country i would wholeheartely agree with you. the average person in the us or the uk/cw would have picked up a ball bat or pitchfork and started cleaning house themselves. but the mindset of the average soviet was a lot different. if on d-day ike would have rallied the troops and gave them a clip with 5 rounds of ammo in it and told them they can get a gun off of fallen comrade....i doubt d-day would have happened. i actually doubt ike would have gotten out of there alive! yet that kind of scenario was repeated in the eastern war....and while we hear of attempts to kill hitler by the germans...how many stories do we hear about the attempts to kill stalin?

Stalin's fear was the Politburo (sp?). At one point early in Barbarossa he was deathly afraid that he was going to be arrested. As far as "encouraging the troops", remember that the NKVD squads were right behind the regulars ready to shoot anyone who did anything other than try to fight: the Red Army soldiers faced certain death from their own or the possibility of death from the Germans.

 

[silence]

Unfortunately one of the results of Nazi, racist, ideology in territories occupied by the Germans was that they repressed and murdered the population more efficiently than even the Soviet system had. The Germans were welcomed as liberators in some areas (Belorus, Ukraine, which are large areas) but it didn't take them long to blow that chance. There's nothing like a "Fuhrerbefehl" or few "Einsatzgruppen" to concentrate the opposition.
Cheers
Steve

The citizens in the Baltic states were more than happy to help the Germans with this - or even do it themselves, especially in Latvia. My parents had an exchange student from Latvia for a year in the early 90s, several years after the collapse: my God, her hate for the Russians was downright frightening.