Greatest disaster for Royal Navy

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Also some bad luck, one of the early hits on the PoW knocked out the radio.

However, Philips should have called for cover once the Japanese aircraft spotted Force Z and began to shadow
 
Loss of radio would be no thing as the destroyers and Repulse were there.

Force Z was peacetime deployment waving the flag. Wiki which is not the best states that Force Z would run for Ceylon at the first sign of trouble. That's what was envisaged when this plan was concocted.

Japanese armaments were an unknown quantity and the Western view on such things was usually adverse. The British may have envisioned any IJN air threat to be minimal and haphazard, using high altitude level bombing which has proved ineffective. Also any known surface vessels in the area were well within the PoW and Repulse wheelhouse.

I am sure if they knew what was coming they would have ran for the hills. Even with air cover.
 
The Basket said:
Loss of radio would be no thing as the destroyers and Repulse were there.
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Only Philips could authorize breaking radio silence.

Tennant was unaware that PoW had lost its radio.

The Basket said:
Force Z was peacetime deployment waving the flag. Wiki which is not the best states that Force Z would run for Ceylon at the first sign of trouble. That's what was envisaged when this plan was concocted.
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Wiki is wrong.
Churchill was of the opinion that PoW could "catch and kill" any Japanese ship.

Force Z's orders were clear when it left Singapore - intercept and interdict any Japanese landing.
This was not "waving the flag", it's mission (at least to Churchill) was military


Highly unlikely.
The defending troops were hard hit, they were duty bound to do their part, regardless of opposition.

The Royal Navy does not run away.
 
The Basket said:
Japanese armaments were an unknown quantity and the Western view on such things was usually adverse.
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Also untrue, I'm afraid. A file in the UKNA shows AHQFE asking RAF Mingaladon in Burma if they'd received the latest intelligence assessments about the "Type 0" in early Nov 1941.

Also, the British Library has a booklet that was published in early 1942 in India which had rather good performance figures for Japanese aircraft. Given the date of production, the info can only have come from the Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore which had prime intelligence production responsibility for the Far East.

For years the intelligence community was castigated for not providing accurate details of Japanese aircraft performance. These documents indicate that the assessments were remarkably accurate...it's just that the operational community refused to believe them.
 
Obviously Churchill was not aware of the Yamato.
Type 0 is the Zero not the Betty.
Japanese torpedoes were far more more effective than thought.
When Force Z was originally envisioned months before any ship set sail it was planned to use Ceylon if Singapore was overrun.
 
The Basket said:
Type 0 is the Zero not the Betty
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I know, but the booklet had pretty much all the operational fighter and bomber types.

Much of the blame for the loss of Force Z must rest with Phillips. Prior to taking up appointment, he had a long argument with an air Force officer, with Phillips maintaining that a well-handled ship at sea could evade any air attack. That sort of arrogance is, IMHO, of greater significance than whether British Intel knew specific details of Japanese torpedo capabilities.
 
The Basket said:
Force Z was a deterrent which never worked.
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I think a deterrent force could have been effective, if sent much earlier and in realistically greater strength. What this deterrent force really needed to do, was the same as the Brits did in North Africa and Madagascar, occupy French territory before the Axis can. That's the deterrent force I want, with Britain seizing FIC before Japan does per history in Sept 1940. With British and RAN cruisers and destroyers at Saigon, hopefully with Free French ships, with heavies (albeit obsolete ones) back at Singapore. Doing this while still fighting in Europe shows the Japanese that the empire will not be trifled with.
The Basket said:
Japanese were considered weak and so their threat was vastly underestimated.
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But this is the problem, Britain underestimated the enemy.
 
Tientsin incident.

Check this out if you want some context.

The RN Battle Fleet was offered to go to the Far East but war with Germany was only days away.

So not so much a green light but a red carpet with open invite. The Japanese knew the much vaunted Royal Navy was going to busy in Europe and it was open season.
 
Sid327 said:
….. 2] No tracer ammunition for the AA guns on one or both ships which would have helped with target correction (?)…..
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The principle close-range defence for both ships was the Vickers 2pdr pom-pom. Desperate for an excuse to explain how they had lost the PoW, which was their most modern battleship, the Lordships heaped the blame on the pom-pom. Whilst the pom-pom ammunition in use did not include a tracer round, there is no real evidence that the Japanese pilots were scared of the tracer used by the few 40mm Bofors guns also present, but the Bofors advocates saw their chance and seized on the event as an excuse to push the Bofors 40mm over the Vickers pom-pom. However, the pom-pom had proven itself in the Med and was credited with helping save HMS Indomitable in 1941. The RN even brought single-mount 2pdrs back into use to replace 20mm Oerlikons later in the War because the pom-pom was considered the better solution against Japanese kamikaze attacks, so I tend to consider the "no tracers for the pom-poms" as bluster. The real problem was the total lack of co-ordination with the RAF and the lack of a carrier. The fact that PoW's air-defence radar was also broken probably also played more of a role than the lack of pom-pom tracer.
 
Trying to hit a battleship with an aerial torpedo is not a gimme. So I would say that it is not hyperbole to say that a modern battleship with flak manoeuvring at sea is not going to be sunk as a given.

Plus PoW had Repulse and 4 destroyers so it wasn't sailing alone like Bismarck.

Plus PoW had torpedo defences. Also level bombing is not going to get results the same as torpedoes so in my view it was the scale of the assault as much as the individual attacks which was the issue.

Flak in the earlier part of the war was very light in comparison to later war so when a ship was refitted then it was always upgraded in flak capacity.

One issue with flak is that it was also designed as a dissuader so you don't bombs down the funnels. If you have to attack at maximum range so you don't get hit by flak then you probably miss. Kamikaze meant that you had to actually shoot down the aircraft which made flak more a numbers game. More bullets increase hit probability
 
The Basket said:
What was the worst moment for the Royal Navy during World War 2?

Loss of the Hood?
Loss of Force Z?
Loss of Glorious?
Loss of Royal Oak?
Ceylon raid by the IJN in 1942?

Even the Italian frogmen attacks in Alexandria Harbour?
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For me, it's the combined loss of the fast fleet carrier HMS Courageous, Glorious and Ark Royal. The first two would have been very useful for a greater attack on Taranto in Nov 1940, and then fast RAF ferries to Malaya, and Glorious and Courageous could have made for a much greater and earlier BPF.

Once the three Illustrious and Indomitable are active and supporting Ark Royal in 1941/2, I'd send all three Outrageous class to Singapore, or more likely Ceylon.

 
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I think we often forget how old the Royal Navy is. Founded in 1546, today's Royal Navy is 473 years old. To the RN, there was no disaster in WW2 comparable to those in its history. The RN is suppose to lose ships, big and small, that's why you have more than one.

The Dutch sailed up the Medway and destroyed the RN's battlefleet - can you imagine Bismarck, Tirpitz et al sailing into Scapa Flow or up the Thames, wrecking their targets and sailing home scot free? The RN's greatest disaster, IMO was the lost at Chesapeake Bay, leading to the loss of the American colonies. Win that battle and George Washington and his rebels will hang.
 
A new idea to me at least that Force Z was a Tirpitz type fleet in being where Force Z would hang about and would need substantial IJN assets to keep in check.

So that didn't work.

Although I agree the loss of Glorious and Courageous was a blow considering.

My view is that the first year in the Naval war against Japan was a dumpster fire in the Indian Ocean and then quickly replaced by the USN as top sea dog. So the true might of the Royal Navy was an empty threat followed by usurpation by a former rebellious colony. Boy that sucks.
 
I would put Alexandria high the list.

Its hard to evaluate Force Z. If ADM Philips had retired, Force Z may have been at the Sunda Straights or played a part in the Coral Sea.
 
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Oh of course.

The Greatest disaster was SMS Goeben.

This is the greatest disaster of them all.

If the Royal Navy had caught Goeben and Breslau then the Ottoman empire wouldn't have joined WW1. And that is IMHO the greatest disaster of a single incident.
 
The Basket said:
My view is that the first year in the Naval war against Japan was a dumpster fire
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At sea, Britain gave as good as it got from Japan. But you're right, the first year wasn't good for Britain, whilst the final year Britain brought it back to Japan.

Japanese sea power sank the old carrier HMS Hermes (no CAG aboard), four cruisers (HMS Cornwall, Dorsetshire, York and Exeter), four destroyers (HMS Tenedos, Thanet, Thracian and Stronghold), three submarines (HMS Stonehenge, Stratagem and Porpoise), four gunboats (HMS Tern, Cicala, Moth and Robin) and one minelayer (HMS Redstart).

In return, British sea power sank two cruisers (IJNS Ashigara and Haguro), twelve destroyers/frigates, eight submarines (I-160, I-27, I-30, I-34, I-124, I-166, RO-32, RO-33), eight minesweepers/layers and 29 transports. Most British kills were from 1944 onwards, suggesting an earlier deployment of RN assets, especially submarines might have increased Japan's losses to the RN.

Of course Japanese land-based aircraft (IJNAS) get top marks for sinking HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. But perhaps old Hermes aside, neither side scored any serious blows at sea.
 
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That incident was certainly a disaster but more for the Ottomans than the RN as it effectively lead to the end of their empire.
 
A lot of people died in the Middle East campaign in ww1. And today in Syria and Iraq. So stopping Goeben would have prevented All that. So not just a disaster for the Royal Navy but for the world.
 
The loss of Force Z was a major blow because they could have been very dangerous opponents.

Of course, the loss of a single ship has no top end consequences but the USN had no fast battleship to escort carriers in the first months of 1942 so at Midway and Coral Sea and this is where Repulse and PoW may have done a good job.
 
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