To end 1943 the 8th AF reports 29,523 bomber sorties, removing spares and abandoned operations cuts that to 27,984 sorties, of which 23,077 were credit and 19,049 effective, with 892 B-17 and 109 B-24 missing in action, 137 B-17 and 22 B-24 written off.
The table uses the Richard Davis attacking bomber sorties and missing bombers to calculate the percentages, it includes 146 night leaflet and 80 YB-40 sorties. All up 19,099 attacking sorties, 997 bombers MIA. Using airborne or credit (entered contested airspace) sorties will lower the percentages, adding write offs will up them. Davis is being used as the figures provide a breakdown by country attacked.
The figures are cumulative percentage losses to the given country, that is all sorties to date and all MIA to date, this helps remove the fluctuations from individual raids that had few losses and others that had heavy losses. General Eaker talked about 4% losses, unsustainable losses were generally considered to be 5% and above.
| Month | France | Germany | All Targets |
Aug-42 | 0.00 | n/a | 0.00 |
Sep-42 | 1.41 | n/a | 1.18 |
Oct-42 | 3.24 | n/a | 2.92 |
Nov-42 | 3.25 | n/a | 3.09 |
Dec-42 | 4.28 | n/a | 4.11 |
Jan-43 | 5.05 | 1.82 | 4.72 |
Feb-43 | 5.30 | 8.23 | 5.55 |
Mar-43 | 4.54 | 6.48 | 4.74 |
Apr-43 | 4.58 | 8.46 | 5.26 |
May-43 | 4.88 | 7.08 | 5.32 |
Jun-43 | 4.75 | 7.93 | 5.87 |
Jul-43 | 4.57 | 8.65 | 6.09 |
Aug-43 | 3.95 | 9.81 | 6.18 |
Sep-43 | 3.77 | 9.55 | 5.72 |
Oct-43 | 3.84 | 9.53 | 6.26 |
Nov-43 | 3.89 | 7.93 | 5.81 |
Dec-43 | 3.73 | 6.51 | 5.22 |
Losses to targets in France kept climbing until March 1943 then levelled out at above the Eaker figure and close to the unacceptable figure before finally declining from August 1943 onwards. Attacks on Germany were not quite a one way trend to end October 1943 but were heading that way and were never below 5% for any individual month. Warnings the 8th AF tactics were not working were early and persistent. While the 8th AF kept the figure of 300 bombers will drive the losses down to acceptable levels when attacking Germany the reality is it would have taken raids of 400 or more bombers taking no more losses than those actually flown with around half the sorties to achieve acceptable losses.
As of 10 October 1943 the 8th AF P-47 strength was 439, which included 105 C models, there were 220 D (no block number given), 12 D-1, 32 D-2, 57 D-5 and 13 D-6, it was the D-6 where the factory fitted external tank fitting changed to USAAF standard.
what's your actual benchmark for success, when comparing heavy losses to strategic achievement?
That depends on how big a set back to the enemy was caused by the bomb damage. One RAF raid on Berlin hit the Alkett works hard, loss of production in the 100's of STUG for example, Panzer IV production switched to STUG IV. The 1943 8th AF raid on Huls was one of the most effective ones for the war.
The only way to limit them was to keep raids to within the then limited range of the available fighter cover and to keep flight times over occupied Europe short. When they eventually ventured further forth over the Reich proper in 1943 under 'Pointblank', the losses were so high (something like 20% of aircrew killed or wounded) that the 8th had to suspend operations.
See above, what limited range figure are you using? Also operations were not suspended, operations outside of fighter cover were cancelled.
The USAAF only had to look at what happened to the Luftwaffe during the BoB. And it could have looked at (and listened to) the two and a half year's worth of direct war experience of the RAF
More immediate were the USAAF results from its operations against Japan and more particularly the operations in the Mediterranean with escorted and unescorted B-17 and B-24 raids. The effects on bomber losses of P-38 escorts in the Mediterranean was quite clear to Spaatz and Doolittle.
the self-defending daylight strategic bomber was a proven bogus philosophy ... a lesson evidenced that, aside from early B36 models, western bombers designed post-war concentrated on speed, altitude performance (be that high or low), counter-measures and offensive load.
Post war nuclear weapons meant 1 sortie per target, no need for large and therefore obvious formations. The speeds being used made defensive guns near useless though the B-47 and B-52 were fitted with tail turrets. In addition the fuel was heavier and consumption was higher, removing guns and gunners was an obvious weight saver. However you can claim the self defending bomber continued as the mission profiles were beyond fighter range, defences became electronic, not guns. Along with speed, height etc.