Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (6 Viewers)

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Thank you again for the informative post.
I've never suggested that engine-less airframes are shipped from NAA to the UK, but that Mustang airframes already in the UK get towards the Mk.X. That is for 1943, not for 1944.
I understood that, but pulling all Mustang I depends on decision date may not yield a significant fighter force due to continuing operational attrition.
BTW - when you say 'in far higher quantities in 1943' - do you mean in, say, Spring to early Summer of 1943, or after October of 1943?
After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.
Rommel was not in Normandy before late 1943.
Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.
Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

Thank you.
As you can see, I have no intention to sweep any Mustang (be it in parts or as whole aircraft) from NAA to be given to just anyone.

Lol - I get that.
 
After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.
From the point of view of the 8th AF bombers and their people, that means no P-51s in 1943.

Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.
Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

That is my point here all the time - Spitfires cannot do what the Mustangs can, due to the relatively small fuel tankage and worse mileage of the former.
 
No.26 Squadron RAF gets its first NA-73 Mustang I on 9 January 1942.

Other Squadrons as follows:


Added to that other RAF users of Mustang I in UK in at least more than 4 on strength at any given time include: 41 Operational Training Unit (OTU for Army Co-operation and Tactical Reconnaissance); A&AEE; AFDU; 83 GSU; 84GSU; No.285 (AA Support) Sqn.

Getting equipped with the Mustang is one thing, getting operational is another. Of note, a number of the RAF Army Co-operation Squadrons that re-equipped with the Mustang I in late 1942 into early 1943 eg: 168, 171, 231, had continued to operate the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk in the AC role until such time as sufficient Mustangs became available for them to re-equip with the Mustang.

No.26 Squadron RAF based at RAF Gatwick, flew the first recorded operational sortie on the Mustang I on 10 May 1942 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Berck-sur-Mer and also strafed railway engine and rolling stock nearby and a coastal defence (AA) post.


Most of the units who didn't fly operational sorties before October-November 1942 were largely taken up in that timeframe since receiving their Mustangs participating in a number of large scale Army exercise in the UK - doing Army Co-operation. You also then have the situation in late 1942 where a number of the ACC Squadrons equipped with the Mustang I are earmarked to be moved to the MTO to provide the Tac/R support for Operation Torch. Included in those are No.225 Squadron and No.241 Squadron who passed their Mustang I back into the 'pool' and proceeded overseas without their aircraft, re-equipping with Hurricane IIs on arrival in the MTO.

Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.
But that doesn't meet the requirements of the planners from Day 1. The required low level coverage from late 1942 was of all beaches from the Hook of Holland, all the way around to Lannion on the Brest Peninsular AND all potential airborne landing zones behind the immediate potential beach head areas AND all enemy installations, encampments, supply depots, repair facilities, airfields AND road, rail and river/canal transport and resupply lines to a depth of 100 miles from the coast. The planners require that for not just the initial landing planning, but for the planning for the development and expansion of the beach head, including location where the Allied forces would place their airfields, supply dumps, etc; and then planning for expected enemy counter attacks and movement of enemy reserves from other areas; and then eventual Allied breakout from beach head area. In terms of those short range aircraft available at the time. The Hawker Hurricane wasn't suitable - range, performance and camera installations. (When it was suggested in early 1944 that some of the Tac/R Squadrons earmarked to particpate in the Invasion might have to re-equip with Hurricanes due to a potential shortage of Allison engine Mustangs, there was a near revolt. The re-equipment of some of the Squadrons with Spitfire Vs was considered at the time barely acceptable and when the two squadrons equipped with the Spitfire V were used in relation to the invasion in 1944, their role was strictly limited to naval gunfire direction where they would be able to utilise a drop tank to extend their time on station - which they could not use in the low level Tac/R role to extend range.) The Spitfire V which would be the primary replacement candidate wasn't suitable - first issue in 1942 into 1943 is getting airframes released from Fighter Command, demand at home and abroad was exceeding available supply - so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO? And if they are planning for a 1943 invasion they will be wanting to ramp up the number of dedicated 'pure' fighter squadrons. Range is second issue with Spitfire V, as well as limited camera installations without significant modifications - PRU was having enough trouble keeping up with their own demands for modifications for PR Spitfires at that time. Hawker Typhoon wasn't suitable - range, performance, reliability and as was discovered in 1944 when the Typhoon was utilised briefly in the role, significant issues in relation to the quality of photography obtained due to transmission of engine and airframe vibration to the cameras. And more broadly at the inter-service and political level, any percieved reduction in the capabilities of the aircraft available to perform the role would be siezed upon by the War Office - they were already highly reticent about any potential invasion of France in 1943 for a number of factors and the level and degree of support being provided and proposed to be provided by the RAF in the plans for any potential invasion in 1943 was considered by the War Office to be underwhelming and unbalanced.
 
I would not suggest the Hurricane.

The RAF FC will be getting way more than a good replacement for the Spitfire V in the fighter role.
Spitifre V will most likely be getting some fuel tankage in the wings so the range/endurance can be better, as well as the Merlin 20s nicked from Hurricane production (yes, these engines fit on the Spitfires) so the low-alt performance can be improved vs. the 'normal' Mk.Vs.

- so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO?
In 1943, Russians get less of Hurricanes and Spitfires, say about 200 of each less? They - Stalin - was complaining that Hurricanes are not at their liking anyway.

I'll agree that the whole idea of Mustang X conversions in hundreds will be much more troubled by the inter-service and political messing, rather than by some technical or tactical considerations.
 
Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?
This just reminded me of something I had read ages ago.

Quite a few NA-73s being shipped to Britain were lost in a U-Boat attack in the Atlantic in 1942.

There were other instances, but this may help in accounting for discrepancies between units manufactured and units put into RAF service.
 
Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.
Low level fighter escort by Mustang Is to RAF 2 Group Bostons to target in north-western Netherlands outside range of Spitfires in September 1942, Norway September 1942 - Lewkowicz without formal approval; Eastern Netherlands & Western Germany October 1942. Then in December 1942 thru February 1943, low level escort to RAF 2 Group Bostons, Venturas, Mitchells and Mosquitos - a number of those ACC Mustang operations escorting 2 Group where FC couldn't, apparently by all reports got a number of very high level FC noses out of joint which led to a directive that the Mustangs were not to be used for any more 2 Group bomber escort work. Interestingly in 1943, a number of the ACC Mustang Squadrons were used working in conjunction with RAF Coastal Command, flying INSTEP sorties to potentially intercept Luftwaffe long range fighters - mainly Ju-88 - intercepting returning RAF CC long range maritime patrol aircraft returning from their anti U-boat patrols out over the Bay of Biscay. And in late 1942 through into 1943 the low level performance of the Allison Mustangs called upon by FC for the standing patrols against the Luftwaffe low flying hit and run raids against the southern English coast - Spitfires couldn't catch them down low and the Typhoons given their fuel usage rates could not stay on patrol for anywhere near as long.

Not to the perspective of RAF Fighter Command at the time which was still very much focussed on home defence and the 'leaning into Europe' operations within the useable range of the aircraft involved. At that time, FC did not have an identified long range fighter requirement as the RAF's primary bomber activity was at night. There was a lot of talk in the Air Staff about converting RAF 2 Group over to heavy bombers to add to the long range night time bomber offensive. 2 Group survived in part because of the pressure from the War Office for light/medium bombers for the immediate battlefield interdiction role as/when an invasion took place, and as more information came back from the MTO on the use of light/medium bombers used in conjuction with fighter bombers for support of the Army in the field on active operations - doing what the heavy bombers could not do.

And I can imagine the reaction from 'Bomber' Harris hearing that a supply of additional Merlins suited for use on Bomber Command's heavy bombers was opening up. He would have jumped on them in an instant. There was enough tension between Fighter Command and Bomber Command on allocation and prioritisation of resources, especially Merlins, notwithstanding what Coastal Command was seeking, or training command or what was being proposed as the transport aircraft requirements. 200+ extra Merlins Harris would view as fair game for 50 extra heavy bombers for his use - he was already decrying the 'political' supply of aircraft to theatres outside the ETO and to Allies as detracting from his ability to build Bomber Command up to the levels he considered neccessary for the "knockout blow" by the heavies. At the same time, Harris is playing the political game of RAF night time vs USAAF daylight bombing, so how invested is he in seeing the USAAF wavering about their ability to continue on with their daylight campaign in the absence of suitable long range escort fighters?

The need for the RAF's own long range fighters even into 1943 is still being conceived with the focus always coming back to large twins not single engine types, and always the program stalls because in addition to the long range, home defence requirements keep getting added to the specification eg rapid rate of climb, overly high upper operational ceiling, excessive armament weight.

(The above based on Greg Baughen's very well researched series of books about the RAF's policy environment from WW1 onwards, plus my own digging into Air Ministry files, Air Staff records and minutes, multiple RAF wartime and post-War analysis papers, plus discussions with quite a few who were actually there involved in all this at the time.)
 
Hi All,

I finally listened to this webcast today, then read all of the follow-up comments. I don't know Greg (or even his last name), but the more I dig through the Archives, the more I see massive holes in his arguments. I suspect entering the argument would be a waste of time, especially since I don't even know if he reads the notes presented on this site. Critically, he makes no mention of the budget, which was one of Arnold's primary concerns before and during the war. Why would he have wasted money developing drop tanks for the P-36 when it was soon to be replaced by better aircraft. (He rejected upgrading Hawaii's P-36As to P-36C standards for exactly that reason.)

He also forgets that Arnold, Eaker (which he should pronounce "Acre"), and Spaatz (which he should pronounce "Spots") were not in total control - they were still subservient to the Army. The Eighth Bomber Command (not the Eighth Air Force) was sent to England to support Marshall's planned spring 1942 invasion of France. When that adventure was postponed, the focus moved to a Mediterranean second front. Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker had to fight to keep any air power in the UK, and that was to develop strategic bombing capabilities.

Yes, the "bomber mafia" failed to imagine what was needed for their plans to succeed. But in the 1930s they planned for an escorting fighter force - they just didn't recognize they'd be flying from England rather than France, that ground-based radar would become far more effective in organizing enemy defenses, or that the Germans would build and train so damn many defensive fighters. (The plans against the less developed Japanese defenses in the early war are often overlooked, but I suspect those air battles were closer to what the AAF originally expected.)

It all makes me wish I'd been more knowledgeable and had better questions when I interviewed Eaker in 1976 - I'd have loved to taken the time to hear his insight back then.

Cheers,


Dana
 
The actual number of NA-73 lost in transit to the UK is around 20. In digging through all the various source documentation on losses for NA-73 Mustang I from the USA to the UK, there is contradiction between figures in original documentation in the exact number lost and which airframes were lost, but it keeps coming out on average around 20.

On top of the actual losses during shipping, there were a number of airframes in the early, initial batches, where damage was incurred during transit. That covered things like saltwater ingress into the shipping crates, movement of components in the shipping crates, within the cradles holding major airframe components, which led to airframes and airframe components requiring repair or replacement before a complete airframe was available for issue to a Squadron. (Other issue to consider at this stage, is that airframe component spares included as a part of the purchase package had NOT started shipping to the UK - this led to mix n match upon reassembly between undamaged major airframe components - undamaged fuselage from one aircraft, matched with undamaged wings from another aircraft, which leads to some 'dodgy fixes of c&m between 'A' scheme and 'B' scheme airframes, and later mis-identification of airframes at crash sites due to mixing of serials on major components.) Rapid feedback to the NAA in the US from the UK on the issues, led to changes in the crating arrangements and where the aircraft crates were placed on ships for shipment across the Atlantic, that reduced the level of damage in transit.

Then there was the issue of unmodified and modified NA-73 Mustang I to units. That is a story in itself. The NA-73 Mustang I that arrived in the UK, had a number of items that were intended to be supplied and installed in the UK upon arrival. There were also modifications identified early in the production run and in early trials that needed to be implemented into the aircraft already received in the UK and those still in the process of being manufactured by NAA in the USA. Included in that were things like the armour plate behind the pilot's seat: RAF radio equipment and UK RAF oxygen equipment and connectors; RAF IFF; fixes for the early issues identified with the chemical reaction between UK specification and formulation glycol and the US manufactured radiator system materials; then the armament mounting and ammunition feed chutes and case and link ejection chute modifications; gun sight mount modifications; etc to arrive at what the RAF would consider at the time to be an operationally modified NA-73 Mustang I airframe, cleared for operational use. That list would change over time.

But, to allow Squadrons to become familiar with the NA-73 Mustang I, a large percentage of the aircraft were initially issued to Squadrons in an 'unmodified' state - for conversion to type only, not for operational use except in an 'emegency'. It was intended that as future deliveries in the UK arrived, they would be modified before issue to Squadrons, the unmodified aircraft would be handed back to 'someone' to then be modified and brought up to operational status, and then issued out to a Squadron. That turned into a beaurocratic 's***t fight' between the various parties involved, a fight about who was responsible, who was going to do the works, what the priorities for the works to be conducted were, priorities on the material/resources required. Part of the fight came back to a decision made when the NA-73 Mustang I were first offered to Army Co-operation Command and the desire of the senior officers in that command to have something, anything, better and potentially more reliable than the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks ACC was using at the time - which were going through a particularly bad period of serviceability with over 95% of the Tomahawks with ACC in the UK at that time grounded for a range of technical and serviceability issues with no timely solution in sight.

As a result of that, the total number of NA-73 Mustang I available for issue to Squadrons for operational use was low. That improved over time, and by the time the first of the NA-83 Mustang I started to arrive, the arrangements for getting them reassembeld after shipping, modified and issued out to Squadrons was significantly better.

So by August 1942 you have 15 RAF ACC Squadrons either converted to and operational on the Mustang I, or in the process of converting to and working up to operational status on the Mustang I. If push were to have come to shove in mid-August 1942 (Operation JUBILEE timeframe), more Squadrons could have been used operationally if required, but at the time the need was not seen to exist. As an example, pilots from two of the RAF ACC Mustang I squadrons that had already commenced operations before Operation JUBILEE, whilst their squadrons were not directly involved, they were attached to FC squadrons taking part in the operation and flew a number of operational sorties. The decisions also on which squadrons were involved in Operation JUBILEE, including a number where it was their first operational use and experience, did raise some pointed questions in the post operation analysis.
 

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