Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (1 Viewer)

[drgondog]

Thank you again for the informative post.
I've never suggested that engine-less airframes are shipped from NAA to the UK, but that Mustang airframes already in the UK get towards the Mk.X. That is for 1943, not for 1944.

I understood that, but pulling all Mustang I depends on decision date may not yield a significant fighter force due to continuing operational attrition.

BTW - when you say 'in far higher quantities in 1943' - do you mean in, say, Spring to early Summer of 1943, or after October of 1943?

After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.

Rommel was not in Normandy before late 1943.

Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.

As per your questions:
- 1) Wasn't the RAF doing the escort as much as the combat radius allowed them? RAF was also doing the high-altitude recon, up to the interwar German-Polish border. There are still the Tyhoons and Spitfires doing the short range low altitude work, that I have no wish to remove from there.
- 2) Spitfire.
- C) Of course.

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

Thank you.
As you can see, I have no intention to sweep any Mustang (be it in parts or as whole aircraft) from NAA to be given to just anyone.

Lol - I get that.

 

[tomo pauk]

After October, actually after December when both Inglewood and Dallas were producing at near optimal quantities.

From the point of view of the 8th AF bombers and their people, that means no P-51s in 1943.

Agreed, but beachead defenses were in play from 1941.

Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

That is my point here all the time - Spitfires cannot do what the Mustangs can, due to the relatively small fuel tankage and worse mileage of the former.

 

[ColFord]

Oct 24th 1941, First Mustang I arrives in England.
Nov 11th 1941, four more arrive in England.
Jan 1942, Mustang I production peaks at 92 per month.
April 1942. No 2 squadron is the first unit to get Mustang Is in the RAF.
May 10th 1942 is the first combat operation. No 2 squadron raids (strafes?) a German airfield near the French coast.
July 1942, last Mustang I comes off the production line. Here is were things get tricky, How many Mustang Is are in California or in transit?
Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?
Aug 19th 1942. Perspective. The RAF also has 4 squadrons of Typhoons for Dieppe and just 4 squadrons of Spitfire IXs in service.
Jan 1943, RAF has 15 squadrons of Allison powered Mustangs in service.
This will rise to a max total of 21 squadrons. (when?)

No.26 Squadron RAF gets its first NA-73 Mustang I on 9 January 1942.

Other Squadrons as follows:

Added to that other RAF users of Mustang I in UK in at least more than 4 on strength at any given time include: 41 Operational Training Unit (OTU for Army Co-operation and Tactical Reconnaissance); A&AEE; AFDU; 83 GSU; 84GSU; No.285 (AA Support) Sqn.

Getting equipped with the Mustang is one thing, getting operational is another. Of note, a number of the RAF Army Co-operation Squadrons that re-equipped with the Mustang I in late 1942 into early 1943 eg: 168, 171, 231, had continued to operate the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk in the AC role until such time as sufficient Mustangs became available for them to re-equip with the Mustang.

No.26 Squadron RAF based at RAF Gatwick, flew the first recorded operational sortie on the Mustang I on 10 May 1942 against a Luftwaffe airfield near Berck-sur-Mer and also strafed railway engine and rolling stock nearby and a coastal defence (AA) post.

Most of the units who didn't fly operational sorties before October-November 1942 were largely taken up in that timeframe since receiving their Mustangs participating in a number of large scale Army exercise in the UK - doing Army Co-operation. You also then have the situation in late 1942 where a number of the ACC Squadrons equipped with the Mustang I are earmarked to be moved to the MTO to provide the Tac/R support for Operation Torch. Included in those are No.225 Squadron and No.241 Squadron who passed their Mustang I back into the 'pool' and proceeded overseas without their aircraft, re-equipping with Hurricane IIs on arrival in the MTO.

Make the photos of these defenses by using short-range aircraft.

But that doesn't meet the requirements of the planners from Day 1. The required low level coverage from late 1942 was of all beaches from the Hook of Holland, all the way around to Lannion on the Brest Peninsular AND all potential airborne landing zones behind the immediate potential beach head areas AND all enemy installations, encampments, supply depots, repair facilities, airfields AND road, rail and river/canal transport and resupply lines to a depth of 100 miles from the coast. The planners require that for not just the initial landing planning, but for the planning for the development and expansion of the beach head, including location where the Allied forces would place their airfields, supply dumps, etc; and then planning for expected enemy counter attacks and movement of enemy reserves from other areas; and then eventual Allied breakout from beach head area. In terms of those short range aircraft available at the time. The Hawker Hurricane wasn't suitable - range, performance and camera installations. (When it was suggested in early 1944 that some of the Tac/R Squadrons earmarked to particpate in the Invasion might have to re-equip with Hurricanes due to a potential shortage of Allison engine Mustangs, there was a near revolt. The re-equipment of some of the Squadrons with Spitfire Vs was considered at the time barely acceptable and when the two squadrons equipped with the Spitfire V were used in relation to the invasion in 1944, their role was strictly limited to naval gunfire direction where they would be able to utilise a drop tank to extend their time on station - which they could not use in the low level Tac/R role to extend range.) The Spitfire V which would be the primary replacement candidate wasn't suitable - first issue in 1942 into 1943 is getting airframes released from Fighter Command, demand at home and abroad was exceeding available supply - so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO? And if they are planning for a 1943 invasion they will be wanting to ramp up the number of dedicated 'pure' fighter squadrons. Range is second issue with Spitfire V, as well as limited camera installations without significant modifications - PRU was having enough trouble keeping up with their own demands for modifications for PR Spitfires at that time. Hawker Typhoon wasn't suitable - range, performance, reliability and as was discovered in 1944 when the Typhoon was utilised briefly in the role, significant issues in relation to the quality of photography obtained due to transmission of engine and airframe vibration to the cameras. And more broadly at the inter-service and political level, any percieved reduction in the capabilities of the aircraft available to perform the role would be siezed upon by the War Office - they were already highly reticent about any potential invasion of France in 1943 for a number of factors and the level and degree of support being provided and proposed to be provided by the RAF in the plans for any potential invasion in 1943 was considered by the War Office to be underwhelming and unbalanced.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Hawker Hurricane wasn't suitable - range, performance and camera installations. (When it was suggested in early 1944 that some of the Tac/R Squadrons earmarked to particpate in the Invasion might have to re-equip with Hurricanes due to a potential shortage of Allison engine Mustangs, there was a near revolt.

I would not suggest the Hurricane.

The re-equipment of some of the Squadrons with Spitfire Vs was considered at the time barely acceptable and when the two squadrons equipped with the Spitfire V were used in relation to the invasion in 1944, their role was strictly limited to naval gunfire direction where they would be able to utilise a drop tank to extend their time on station - which they could not use in the low level Tac/R role to extend range.) The Spitfire V which would be the primary replacement candidate wasn't suitable - first issue in 1942 into 1943 is getting airframes released from Fighter Command, demand at home and abroad was exceeding available supply

The RAF FC will be getting way more than a good replacement for the Spitfire V in the fighter role.
Spitifre V will most likely be getting some fuel tankage in the wings so the range/endurance can be better, as well as the Merlin 20s nicked from Hurricane production (yes, these engines fit on the Spitfires) so the low-alt performance can be improved vs. the 'normal' Mk.Vs.

- so who then misses out Malta? MTO? Darwin? Reverse Lend Lease to USAAF in ETO or MTO?

In 1943, Russians get less of Hurricanes and Spitfires, say about 200 of each less? They - Stalin - was complaining that Hurricanes are not at their liking anyway.

And more broadly at the inter-service and political level, any percieved reduction in the capabilities of the aircraft available to perform the role would be siezed upon by the War Office - they were already highly reticent about any potential invasion of France in 1943 for a number of factors and the level and degree of support being provided and proposed to be provided by the RAF in the plans for any potential invasion in 1943 was considered by the War Office to be underwhelming and unbalanced.

I'll agree that the whole idea of Mustang X conversions in hundreds will be much more troubled by the inter-service and political messing, rather than by some technical or tactical considerations.

 

[GrauGeist]

Aug 18th 1942 The British had 4 squadrons equipped with Mustang Is. Where are the rest of the 617 Mustang Is? In British depots? on ship? being crated at Inglewood?

This just reminded me of something I had read ages ago.

Quite a few NA-73s being shipped to Britain were lost in a U-Boat attack in the Atlantic in 1942.

There were other instances, but this may help in accounting for discrepancies between units manufactured and units put into RAF service.

 

[ColFord]

Yes, but IIRC the RAF could barely reach Amsterdam or west France.

Low level fighter escort by Mustang Is to RAF 2 Group Bostons to target in north-western Netherlands outside range of Spitfires in September 1942, Norway September 1942 - Lewkowicz without formal approval; Eastern Netherlands & Western Germany October 1942. Then in December 1942 thru February 1943, low level escort to RAF 2 Group Bostons, Venturas, Mitchells and Mosquitos - a number of those ACC Mustang operations escorting 2 Group where FC couldn't, apparently by all reports got a number of very high level FC noses out of joint which led to a directive that the Mustangs were not to be used for any more 2 Group bomber escort work. Interestingly in 1943, a number of the ACC Mustang Squadrons were used working in conjunction with RAF Coastal Command, flying INSTEP sorties to potentially intercept Luftwaffe long range fighters - mainly Ju-88 - intercepting returning RAF CC long range maritime patrol aircraft returning from their anti U-boat patrols out over the Bay of Biscay. And in late 1942 through into 1943 the low level performance of the Allison Mustangs called upon by FC for the standing patrols against the Luftwaffe low flying hit and run raids against the southern English coast - Spitfires couldn't catch them down low and the Typhoons given their fuel usage rates could not stay on patrol for anywhere near as long.

The RAF FC will be getting way more than a good replacement for the Spitfire V in the fighter role.
Spitifre V will most likely be getting some fuel tankage in the wings so the range/endurance can be better, as well as the Merlin 20s nicked from Hurricane production (yes, these engines fit on the Spitfires) so the low-alt performance can be improved vs. the 'normal' Mk.Vs.

Not to the perspective of RAF Fighter Command at the time which was still very much focussed on home defence and the 'leaning into Europe' operations within the useable range of the aircraft involved. At that time, FC did not have an identified long range fighter requirement as the RAF's primary bomber activity was at night. There was a lot of talk in the Air Staff about converting RAF 2 Group over to heavy bombers to add to the long range night time bomber offensive. 2 Group survived in part because of the pressure from the War Office for light/medium bombers for the immediate battlefield interdiction role as/when an invasion took place, and as more information came back from the MTO on the use of light/medium bombers used in conjuction with fighter bombers for support of the Army in the field on active operations - doing what the heavy bombers could not do.

And I can imagine the reaction from 'Bomber' Harris hearing that a supply of additional Merlins suited for use on Bomber Command's heavy bombers was opening up. He would have jumped on them in an instant. There was enough tension between Fighter Command and Bomber Command on allocation and prioritisation of resources, especially Merlins, notwithstanding what Coastal Command was seeking, or training command or what was being proposed as the transport aircraft requirements. 200+ extra Merlins Harris would view as fair game for 50 extra heavy bombers for his use - he was already decrying the 'political' supply of aircraft to theatres outside the ETO and to Allies as detracting from his ability to build Bomber Command up to the levels he considered neccessary for the "knockout blow" by the heavies. At the same time, Harris is playing the political game of RAF night time vs USAAF daylight bombing, so how invested is he in seeing the USAAF wavering about their ability to continue on with their daylight campaign in the absence of suitable long range escort fighters?

The need for the RAF's own long range fighters even into 1943 is still being conceived with the focus always coming back to large twins not single engine types, and always the program stalls because in addition to the long range, home defence requirements keep getting added to the specification eg rapid rate of climb, overly high upper operational ceiling, excessive armament weight.

(The above based on Greg Baughen's very well researched series of books about the RAF's policy environment from WW1 onwards, plus my own digging into Air Ministry files, Air Staff records and minutes, multiple RAF wartime and post-War analysis papers, plus discussions with quite a few who were actually there involved in all this at the time.)

 

[Dana Bell]

Hi All,

I finally listened to this webcast today, then read all of the follow-up comments. I don't know Greg (or even his last name), but the more I dig through the Archives, the more I see massive holes in his arguments. I suspect entering the argument would be a waste of time, especially since I don't even know if he reads the notes presented on this site. Critically, he makes no mention of the budget, which was one of Arnold's primary concerns before and during the war. Why would he have wasted money developing drop tanks for the P-36 when it was soon to be replaced by better aircraft. (He rejected upgrading Hawaii's P-36As to P-36C standards for exactly that reason.)

He also forgets that Arnold, Eaker (which he should pronounce "Acre"), and Spaatz (which he should pronounce "Spots") were not in total control - they were still subservient to the Army. The Eighth Bomber Command (not the Eighth Air Force) was sent to England to support Marshall's planned spring 1942 invasion of France. When that adventure was postponed, the focus moved to a Mediterranean second front. Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker had to fight to keep any air power in the UK, and that was to develop strategic bombing capabilities.

Yes, the "bomber mafia" failed to imagine what was needed for their plans to succeed. But in the 1930s they planned for an escorting fighter force - they just didn't recognize they'd be flying from England rather than France, that ground-based radar would become far more effective in organizing enemy defenses, or that the Germans would build and train so damn many defensive fighters. (The plans against the less developed Japanese defenses in the early war are often overlooked, but I suspect those air battles were closer to what the AAF originally expected.)

It all makes me wish I'd been more knowledgeable and had better questions when I interviewed Eaker in 1976 - I'd have loved to taken the time to hear his insight back then.

Cheers,


Dana

 

[ColFord]

This just reminded me of something I had read ages ago.

Quite a few NA-73s being shipped to Britain were lost in a U-Boat attack in the Atlantic in 1942.

There were other instances, but this may help in accounting for discrepancies between units manufactured and units put into RAF service.

The actual number of NA-73 lost in transit to the UK is around 20. In digging through all the various source documentation on losses for NA-73 Mustang I from the USA to the UK, there is contradiction between figures in original documentation in the exact number lost and which airframes were lost, but it keeps coming out on average around 20.

On top of the actual losses during shipping, there were a number of airframes in the early, initial batches, where damage was incurred during transit. That covered things like saltwater ingress into the shipping crates, movement of components in the shipping crates, within the cradles holding major airframe components, which led to airframes and airframe components requiring repair or replacement before a complete airframe was available for issue to a Squadron. (Other issue to consider at this stage, is that airframe component spares included as a part of the purchase package had NOT started shipping to the UK - this led to mix n match upon reassembly between undamaged major airframe components - undamaged fuselage from one aircraft, matched with undamaged wings from another aircraft, which leads to some 'dodgy fixes of c&m between 'A' scheme and 'B' scheme airframes, and later mis-identification of airframes at crash sites due to mixing of serials on major components.) Rapid feedback to the NAA in the US from the UK on the issues, led to changes in the crating arrangements and where the aircraft crates were placed on ships for shipment across the Atlantic, that reduced the level of damage in transit.

Then there was the issue of unmodified and modified NA-73 Mustang I to units. That is a story in itself. The NA-73 Mustang I that arrived in the UK, had a number of items that were intended to be supplied and installed in the UK upon arrival. There were also modifications identified early in the production run and in early trials that needed to be implemented into the aircraft already received in the UK and those still in the process of being manufactured by NAA in the USA. Included in that were things like the armour plate behind the pilot's seat: RAF radio equipment and UK RAF oxygen equipment and connectors; RAF IFF; fixes for the early issues identified with the chemical reaction between UK specification and formulation glycol and the US manufactured radiator system materials; then the armament mounting and ammunition feed chutes and case and link ejection chute modifications; gun sight mount modifications; etc to arrive at what the RAF would consider at the time to be an operationally modified NA-73 Mustang I airframe, cleared for operational use. That list would change over time.

But, to allow Squadrons to become familiar with the NA-73 Mustang I, a large percentage of the aircraft were initially issued to Squadrons in an 'unmodified' state - for conversion to type only, not for operational use except in an 'emegency'. It was intended that as future deliveries in the UK arrived, they would be modified before issue to Squadrons, the unmodified aircraft would be handed back to 'someone' to then be modified and brought up to operational status, and then issued out to a Squadron. That turned into a beaurocratic 's***t fight' between the various parties involved, a fight about who was responsible, who was going to do the works, what the priorities for the works to be conducted were, priorities on the material/resources required. Part of the fight came back to a decision made when the NA-73 Mustang I were first offered to Army Co-operation Command and the desire of the senior officers in that command to have something, anything, better and potentially more reliable than the Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks ACC was using at the time - which were going through a particularly bad period of serviceability with over 95% of the Tomahawks with ACC in the UK at that time grounded for a range of technical and serviceability issues with no timely solution in sight.

As a result of that, the total number of NA-73 Mustang I available for issue to Squadrons for operational use was low. That improved over time, and by the time the first of the NA-83 Mustang I started to arrive, the arrangements for getting them reassembeld after shipping, modified and issued out to Squadrons was significantly better.

So by August 1942 you have 15 RAF ACC Squadrons either converted to and operational on the Mustang I, or in the process of converting to and working up to operational status on the Mustang I. If push were to have come to shove in mid-August 1942 (Operation JUBILEE timeframe), more Squadrons could have been used operationally if required, but at the time the need was not seen to exist. As an example, pilots from two of the RAF ACC Mustang I squadrons that had already commenced operations before Operation JUBILEE, whilst their squadrons were not directly involved, they were attached to FC squadrons taking part in the operation and flew a number of operational sorties. The decisions also on which squadrons were involved in Operation JUBILEE, including a number where it was their first operational use and experience, did raise some pointed questions in the post operation analysis.

 

[tomo pauk]

And I can imagine the reaction from 'Bomber' Harris hearing that a supply of additional Merlins suited for use on Bomber Command's heavy bombers was opening up. He would have jumped on them in an instant. There was enough tension between Fighter Command and Bomber Command on allocation and prioritisation of resources, especially Merlins, notwithstanding what Coastal Command was seeking, or training command or what was being proposed as the transport aircraft requirements. 200+ extra Merlins Harris would view as fair game for 50 extra heavy bombers for his use - he was already decrying the 'political' supply of aircraft to theatres outside the ETO and to Allies as detracting from his ability to build Bomber Command up to the levels he considered neccessary for the "knockout blow" by the heavies. At the same time, Harris is playing the political game of RAF night time vs USAAF daylight bombing, so how invested is he in seeing the USAAF wavering about their ability to continue on with their daylight campaign in the absence of suitable long range escort fighters?

Thank you again for the informative posts.
I thing that we're in some broad agreement - it will be a political opposition to be worried about here, not the fear that industry will not do it's part on my suggestion for the hundreds of Mustang X.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

First, the strategic role of airpower in the form of heavy bombers destroying enemy industry was the 'mantra'. Not the 'bomber will always get through'.

Yet AWPD-1 and -42 expected unescorted heavy bombers to fulfill the destruction of industry, therefore while the bomber would always get through was an overstatement the assumption was get through with on average acceptable casualties with good bombing results.

Second, Eaker (proxy for Arnold) committed to the successful application of daylight strategic bombing to Churchill at Casablanca. There were no caveats expressed. In fairness to Eaker, his commitment was based on achieving a 600 bomber strike force (roughly 900 in inventory) - which in turn was committed by Arnold.

As I read it, 300 strong to drive losses down to acceptable levels, a figure from 1942, then 600 to actually do the required damage in the required time frame?

Arnold however was immediately undermined by the RAF's insatiable desire for majority provision of US production, and USSR and China also intruded via FDR decrees.

I would disagree with the RAF part of the above, and substitute "Air War" in general, maintaining the forces already deployed by the allies, including the USSR, around the world.

Another key point is the RAF was taking small numbers of the B-17, B-24, P-38 and P-47 the USAAF wanted for the 8th Air Force. The P-47 was the USAAF planned new single engine single seat fighter, giving the P-38, P-47, B-17 and B-24 as the USAAF turbo supercharged 1942/43/44 planned front line combat force.

Sticking to end 1943 Britain had 45 B-17E January to June 1942 and 19 B-17F August to October 1943, plus of course the 1941 B-17. Ignoring the LB series of the B-24 Britain had 368 B-24D and 188 B-24J, Canada another 19 B-24D, the USN 361 B-24D or J. All up 5 P-47 delivered for foreign customers to end 1943. The ex France standard P-38 had been rejected and no P-38 ordered, about the only direct pressure point the RAF was exerting would be the P-47G versus P-40 from Curtiss orders.

By April/May it was clear that even with much better crews and tactics, addition of chin turret, etc.,

Not quite about the turrets, First B-17G were accepted in August 1943, first 8th Air Force B-17G loss 4 October.

Eaker also sniffed out pressure from Eisenhower and Spaatz to relocate 8th AF to Italy following the invasion - and Eisenhower was requesting even more than the B-24 groups already dispatched to 9th AF for Tidal Wave.

Is invasion operation Torch or the invasions of Italy?

The 8th's B-24 groups had an interesting 1943, with detachments to the Middle East, of which the Ploesti raid is the most famous. By mid year the 8th had 10 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational. The detachments meant that from the end of June to the beginning of September 1943 the 8th flew no B-24 operations while the number of B-17 groups rose to 16. It also meant despite having 4 operational B-24 groups in mid September the 8th was down to 1 as of the 19th, then back up to 4 on 4th October.

Torch itself had 3 squadrons of the 93rd deployed 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, what is termed Husky, Ploesti, Post Husky from 2 July to 22 August for the 44th, 93rd and 389th, then the same groups again 21 September to 1 October in 5th Army Support. For most of 1943 the Mediterranean offered the best opportunities to the western allies. Then with well supplied bases available in Foggia places out of range of Britain, like Ploesti and Austria were now in range. AWPD-1 southern force except the bombers were in Italy instead of Egypt.

The 8th Air Force had 21 B-17 groups on D-day, it still only had 4 operational B-24 groups in early December 1843, 7 by the end of the year, and 19 on D-Day. The 15th Air Force formed with 4 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups in November 1943, added 8 B-24 groups December/January, then 2 B-17 and 5 B-24 groups February/March. Constraints on the forces were now mostly logistical, not crews and aircraft.

The overarching dilemma that confronted Arnold, was that Eaker had to get results or Churchill was going to prevail and 8th AF would be absorbed by Bomber Command for joint night attacks.

As I understand things there was no chance of absorption, if anything a pure night campaign would end up with the US absorbing the RAF given the numbers. Rather the 8th would convert a number of units to night operations while retaining others to do day operations where they had adequate fighter cover.

Over this was by mid 1943 everyone understood the combat radius of the P-51B even with 180 gallons of internal fuel was better than the existing P-38 and P-47, 500 miles with 150 gallons of external fuel. With probably better performance as well but it would be a 1944 fighter. While the plans for more internal fuel in all three fighters were being advanced. It makes the chances of the USAAF going over to night bombing in large numbers quite small.

Still the suggestions, like those for army and navy related operations, rubbed nerves still raw from the inter war period about airpower and who had the final say, present in all air forces.

There is truth to observations of Anglophobia existed through US military ranks - and certainly with Adm King, probably Arnold and maybe Marshall. I personally think the disease was a major factor in the slow acceptance of the P-51 Mustang.

Admiral King definitely to the point there are claims it hampered the war effort. Not so sure about Arnold and Marshall, though they certainly had some strong comments about the British, mirroring some British comments about Americans. Patriots tend to assume "we" are the best. Some comments indicate the Mustang had a not invented here stigma. A lot of time and effort had gone into creation of the mass production and deployment systems backing the USAAF, sudden changes were most unwelcome and almost certainly going to cost aircraft numbers when everyone was screaming for more. You say you want North American to build the B-24 needed to drop bombs, now you say stop that, build P-51 to enable the B-24 built somewhere else to drop bombs? But you still want lots more B-24? Dallas had 1 B-24G accepted in March 1943, the next in June, ending B-24 production in November 1944. First P-51C in August 1943, one factory, two new designs, what could possibly go wrong? Remember we need all those Dallas built AT-6 as well. Meantime at Inglewood we have shut down AT-6 to free capacity mostly for B-25, now you want to transfer all B-25 production to Kansas City?

Interesting to me is the USAAF deployments of the P-51B seem to really be about the use of the P-51 and P-51A, not picking up on the altitude performance increase. 1943 was the year the allied production system caught up to war needs instead of always being behind and that took time to understand, 1944 saw the wind down begin. I would not rule out inertia, an unwillingness or perceived inability to make big changes or deciding the current situation could not afford the change costs.

21 of the first RAF order for 320 Mustang I were lost at sea, 4 more to the USSR, all 300 of the second order arrived, as did 92 of the Mustang Ia order, plus 50 Mustang II as compensation for Mustang Ia taken over by USAAF. As of end February 1943 the RAF reported 510 Mustang I and 93 Mustang Ia on strength, by end 1943 it was 365 Mustang I, 80 Mustang Ia, 50 Mustang II, 257 Mustang III. When considering extra 2 stage Merlins remember Spitfire V production ended in August 1943 at Castle Bromwich and October at Westland.

When it comes to Photographic Reconnaissance Spitfire IV production ended in February 1943, Spitfire IX began in November 1942, the 16 mark XI were build April/May 1944. One factor in reconnaissance aircraft shortages was the USAAF time to deploy its own reconnaissance units in 1943.

When it comes to invading France any 1942 operation was a save the USSR idea, as of mid 1942 the US Army had the 1st Armoured and 34th Infantry in Britain and 5th Infantry in Iceland. As of mid 1943 the 5th was still in Iceland (until August) the 29th Infantry was in Britain, there were 9 US divisions in the Mediterranean. North Africa not cleared until May 1943 ruled out an invasion of France in 1943 along with all the material shortages and the U-boat threat, again unless it was to save the USSR.

Requirements for tactical reconnaissance grew as the invasion came closer and the Germans began intensive work on defences, not only coastal but field works further inland. As far as I know the 1943 raids on France normally used the standard reconnaissance units as did the transport plan etc. strikes in 1944.

By the way low level operations over the sea tends to give engines problems from the salt water spray they ingest.

In creating the Army/Air system the Middle East proved the crewed bombers were no real use for battle support, they took too long to arrive and needed escorts. Coming up with a Battlefield Interdiction plan required things to interdict, the western desert had few bridges, rail lines, cross roads etc. to attack which left the light and medium bomber units looking for targets, the heavy bombers tended to be more efficient bombing the ports or fixed enemy positions. To an extent the non heavies survived as there were not enough heavies present, then came Tunisia, Sicily and Italy. Easy to see why back in Britain 2 Group seemed worth changing yet as fighter sweeps tended to be ignored the group was needed to provide the day bomber force the Luftwaffe needed to stop, while releasing the heavies for longer range work but remember the day of the fighter bomber was dawning. Yes there were lots of ideas about the future. So 2 group in June 1944 had 6 Mosquito fighter bomber squadrons,2 Boston/A-20, 4 Mitchell/B-25. With the Mosquito largely dedicated to night interdiction.

To translate the ideas required the strength, Bomber Command still had 16.5 Wellington squadrons at the start of 1943, along with 11 Halifax ,17 Lancaster and 8 Stirling, plenty more candidates for heavy bombers before doing the 2 Group units.

One difference between the USAAF and RAF was the RAF idea of fighter range, the P-51 without the rear fuselage tank was RAF long range given perceived pilot work load and navigation skills. As of early/mid 1943 the RAF was going to obtain lots of P-51, perfect for those long patrols defending the battlefield. And you wonder whether that had any influence on USAAF deployment plans.

 

[J.D.]

To answer your question requires a list of bomber mafia members and where they were in 1943, with particular reference to having influence over 8th Air Force target decisions. To turn it around how did the 8th Air Force command continue to justify the tactic and account for the problems so far? Please provide the quotes.

I'm asking you.

You need to define few, an absolute number or a percentage of operations done? Under what conditions?

Definitions aren't going to answer this. It's a question of working with reason and trade offs. Everyone has their opinion on how much is too much.

As for conditions, you've provided the figures for that already.

Let me ask you again: what options did Eaker really have? Because it's pretty hard to come up with a scenario where either they are bombing something relatively unimportant because it's within fighter range or they are bombing something important and taking big losses.

For whom, at which level? Think combat units taking heavy losses might have a different perspective than a more senior command?

Next mission to where? In any case in 1943 weather dictated a lot of 8th Air Force operations and therefore timings.

See above. And yes: weather was a critical factor that nearly everyone overlooks.

Yet it is coming across as the exact opposite, and quite clearly.

I don't see how. The only reason you have given me for believing that Eaker and Arnold ignore the results is because you say they did. This is the same approach applied by Vlaun. The mission data doesn't support a conclusion like that unless you ignore all other factors. When human judgement is involved you can't get a complete picture unless you know exactly what was in their minds. Not every waking minute of every day but what went into their reports or the private notes.

Let's take what drgondog said about the gunners' claims. Even if they accepted a third of the number, it's entirely possible to envisage a situation where Eaker has a set of figures on one side of the ledger saying that the Luftwaffe is losing aircraft in large numbers and on the other side is the Eighth's losses. Pretty soon one side is going to reach a breaking point. So it becomes a question of which balance sheet you believe over the other. That's not doctrine: that's probability.

Eaker and Arnold ignored lots of advice from others, good and bad. Perhaps as Bill has pointed out the advice on gunner shoot down claims? The advice a long range high performance fighter was impossible? As it turned out as far as the USAAF is concerned, there was only a small gap in bomber versus fighter range the late 1930's if the fighters could carry external fuel, it grew when the B-17 became a mass item, which shrank in 1944 only to blow out again with the B-29.

How do you know they ignored it? Where do they say that?

Being in a sealed room with fingers in ears does that.

I'll repeat: I'm trying to keep this polite and I'd appreciate the same in return. These kind of remarks are not helping you get your point across.

If there is so much information out there that you have drawn this conclusion so clearly, do you think you could provide some direct quotes?

Your obvious misunderstanding of the situation indicates you did not do the reading.

I stopped reading here.

This is not acceptable in the context of a reasonable discussion and I see no point in continuing. I really hate doing this Geoffrey but it serves no further purpose.

You have a lot of excellent information Geoffrey and I have continually acknowledged that but you have not shown:

1) Any concrete evidence via quotes that either Arnold or Eaker "ignored" the advice, despite repeated requests;
2) That there was a direct link between the extensive figures you have presented and the claim that they ignored advice. In fact, the only supporting thing you have said what that the trend was obvious, which is not the same thing;
3) Any alternative high value targets that could have been bombed without sustaining heavy losses.

I'll remind you of something you said in relation to my original point:

Boilerplate or orthodox tend to form around the available evidence, deciding this is wrong requires evidence to the contrary.

In journalism, the object in normal circumstances, is to get both sides of the story and the best available version of the truth. Very often that means asking difficult and occasionally confronting questions.

What it is not is saying, "This is how it is, now prove me wrong."

You could have helped here Geoffrey, you really could.

J.D. out.

 

[J.D.]

Arnold was well aware that deep strikes into Germany and the campaign to destroy the LW in preparation for Overlord was of highest priority for AAF. He was skeptical that the P-38 was suitable as 'the choice' and more skeptical that the P-47 would not be the solution. While he was getting input from multiple sources that the P-51B might work, he KNEW that the P-75 was increasingly behind schedule. That said, he could only Personally do two things short term. One divert P-38s to Britain. Two, hold Eaker's feet to the fire - 'Fight with what you have while I orchestrate help from above'. For longer term, The FAREP directives issued to expedite the Long Range Escort were in motion, P-38J and P-51B added more fuel internally to contribute to already tested wing drop tanks - but Arnold made the delivery of THE long range escort by January to his new Chief of Staff LG Barney Giles.

In the context of that timeframe, this makes for an interesting conundrum and one that would doubtless invoke inter-service rivalries. I did wonder about how long range bombing could be prioritised over the invasion of Sicily.

The overarching dilemma that confronted Arnold, was that Eaker had to get results or Churchill was going to prevail and 8th AF would be absorbed by Bomber Command for joint night attacks. Everybody but Churchill knew that course would be a disastrous change of course, perhaps fatal, to the dream of an independent Air Force. At times Arnold felt like RAF was a more formidable foe than either Germany or Japan.

This would have been a disaster. With the Americans, at least they showed some sense of priority. Harris was a different story. It became clearer the longer the war went on that Harris was running his own war. Target choice was quixotic and without any serious signs of cooperation. My understanding is that he was asked to bomb the Schweinfurt factories by night but declined because he believed the target too small. This was almost reasonable by his lights.

Result of Arnold's view after recovering from his cardiac arrest in the May-July 1943 period-
"we are where we are"
"stuff is coming at the end of the year. but I'm ordering immediate P-38 diversion from MTO"
"pressure is being applied to Republic for drop tank compatibility but not available until late summer"
"fight with what you have and I'll (Arnold) do my best to bring reinforcements"
"I expect results"
'That will be all!"

Was this one memo or part of a series?

 

[drgondog]

Yet AWPD-1 and -42 expected unescorted heavy bombers to fulfill the destruction of industry, therefore while the bomber would always get through was an overstatement the assumption was get through with on average acceptable casualties with good bombing results.

Geoffrey, Agreed, partially. This is a complicated discussion. Just before AWPD-1 delivered in Sept 1941, USAAC FM-1-15 "Tactics and Techniques of Air Fighting" led by the same key contributor Muir Fairchild. The basic tenant was that a primary mission of the Air Forces was to 'Destroy the Hostile Air Forces Freedom of the Air". The re-prioritized Emmons Board 'to-do' list placed the 1500mi range singe engine fighter as number one for FY42 Developments. That said, there was a key statement made in AWPD-1, namely "It is unwise to neglect the development of escort fighters designed to enable bombardment formations to fight through to their objective".

My agreement is that if war started the day after AWPD-1, then there were no escort fighters capable of reaching German targets (Japan was not really contemplated) in the inventory. By early 1942 Drop tanks for both ferry and tactical purposes were issued A-1 Priority, but Spaatz advanced the notion of 'escort bomber' in April 1942 as recognition that given the high-altitude capable fighters coming on-stream, they still would not be able to escort bombers over bomber ranges at the envisioned target.

Hence - The B-40 and B-41 development - and the first introduction of chin turrets on the B-17 and B-24.

AWPD/42 issued in Sept 1942 complimented AWPD-1 but it was more about allocations of air assets to focus on Germany first. AWPD/42 was an articulation of the agreements that Arnold and Adm Tower's visit to Britain in May 1942. More on this below.

As I read it, 300 strong to drive losses down to acceptable levels, a figure from 1942, then 600 to actually do the required damage in the required time frame?

I have to re-check, but I believe the Eaker commitment to AWPD-1 and the agreed joint Combined Bomber Offensive was 600 to achieve the objectives by generating 300 plus sorties per mission on a frequent basis. It was not until the mid-July 1943 timeframe that Eaker ever dispatched 300 on a mission culminating August 17th, which set back his inventory until all the B-24s had been returned and refitted. Even so, the B-24s did not participate except as decoys for the October 14 Schweinfurt mission.

I would disagree with the RAF part of the above, and substitute "Air War" in general, maintaining the forces already deployed by the allies, including the USSR, around the world.

I would cite the Slessor arrangement arising from ABC conversations Jan-Mar 1941, followed by the Arcadia Conference between FDR and Churchill Dec/Jan 1942 as reference. From Huston (American Airpower Comes of Age) -- "it called for Britain to retain all the output from her own production, all US produced aircraft from their orders in process, all French orders, an allocation from continuing US production as well as the 'entire output, from any new expansion. If America drawn in the war new US capacity would be split 50-50".

The underlying issue was that ALL of the allocations were new US aircraft, approximately 5 percent for B-17/B-24, and 8 percent of Transport. I don't remember the A-20, B-25 etc. allocation but it was high. More important 82% of the British allocation were modern medium and light bombers and pursuit. After Pearl Harbor, the US not only had most of its offshore modern aircraft destroyed, but most of the aircraft in the US inventory were P-36, P-43, B-18 and early model P-40/P39. The effect was a major dilution in the training and expansion of AAF to agreed objectives. Coupled with the attrition in growth was the pressure to subordinate US rmy and Navy to British Command. "You provide the resources, we'll run the operations. Run along littel boy". was the perceived attitudes that Marshall, Arnold and King experienced. The committed allocation pointed to RAF and Coastal Command receiving 31% of total 1942 US tactical airplane production.

The above issues were the stimulus for Arnold and Tower's visit to Britain in May 1942. At the table for the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting were:
British were more interested in 'here and now' (understandably) than US achieving its aims for full partnership in combat under US leadership.
The Slessor/Arnold-Portal Agreement pre-Dec would cripple AAF ability to meet committed objectives.
New demands for Martlets and C-47s for RN and Army would cripple USN fleet defense and AAF transport and logistics capability.

The final agreement from the meetings resulted in a huge scale down of Heavy bomber, medium bomber and pursuit allocations, overall a 55% reduction from RAF demands to US/RAF agreement between January and June 12, 1942.

It was also after this trip that Arnold joined Eisenhower to appeal to Marshall to remove Cheney, and replacing him with Eisenhower as CG ETO

Another key point is the RAF was taking small numbers of the B-17, B-24, P-38 and P-47 the USAAF wanted for the 8th Air Force. The P-47 was the USAAF planned new single engine single seat fighter, giving the P-38, P-47, B-17 and B-24 as the USAAF turbo supercharged 1942/43/44 planned front line combat force.

Coastal Command was taking the bulk of B-17 and B-24 allocations, The RAF wanted P-40s and P-51s, specifically did not want P-38 or P-39. Also Coastal Command wanted 500 PBY from USN but Tower/King were able to reduce that allocation to less than 100 later.

Not quite about the turrets, First B-17G were accepted in August 1943, first 8th Air Force B-17G loss 4 October.

First Chin turret delivered on modified B-17F as YB 40, operational in July.

Is invasion operation Torch or the invasions of Italy?

I lost the thread - Torch castrated the Bolero inspired 8th AF build up in late 1942. The planned invasion of Italy is what inspired Eisenhower to raid the 8th AF chicken coop once again in days leading to invasion of Sicily. June-July activities well documented in Davis
"Carl A. Spaatz" works.

The 8th's B-24 groups had an interesting 1943, with detachments to the Middle East, of which the Ploesti raid is the most famous. By mid year the 8th had 10 B-17 and 2 B-24 groups operational. The detachments meant that from the end of June to the beginning of September 1943 the 8th flew no B-24 operations while the number of B-17 groups rose to 16. It also meant despite having 4 operational B-24 groups in mid September the 8th was down to 1 as of the 19th, then back up to 4 on 4th October.

IIRC the movement of the 2nd BD B-24s began in May 1943. 8th AF operational bombers were entirely B-17 until the first of four B-24 groups went operational (again) on 2 October. Three by October 8th and all four by 9 October but none flew the second strike at Schweinfurt on the 14th. Our sources (mine:Freeman) could differ.

Torch itself had 3 squadrons of the 93rd deployed 13 December 1942 to 20 February 1943, what is termed Husky, Ploesti, Post Husky from 2 July to 22 August for the 44th, 93rd and 389th, then the same groups again 21 September to 1 October in 5th Army Support. For most of 1943 the Mediterranean offered the best opportunities to the western allies. Then with well supplied bases available in Foggia places out of range of Britain, like Ploesti and Austria were now in range. AWPD-1 southern force except the bombers were in Italy instead of Egypt.

Spaatz joined Eisenhower in posing that 8th move to Italy in summer 1943.

As I understand things there was no chance of absorption, if anything a pure night campaign would end up with the US absorbing the RAF given the numbers. Rather the 8th would convert a number of units to night operations while retaining others to do day operations where they had adequate fighter cover.

My understanding was that the plan in process would be to re-train on-site aircrew and provide for training in-bound B-17/B-24 crews to RAF BC tactics and infrastructure. There would be zero sense in subordinating RAF, either philosophically or practically to US Command for night operations. It was a horrible idea from my perspective. Fortunately the 8th was permitted to scale attacks to those in or close to P-38 escort, while re-building - and plan for Ops to re-start in January with anticipated increases to the hoped for long range fighter escort and promised range extensions for the P-47.

Over this was by mid 1943 everyone understood the combat radius of the P-51B even with 180 gallons of internal fuel was better than the existing P-38 and P-47, 500 miles with 150 gallons of external fuel. With probably better performance as well but it would be a 1944 fighter. While the plans for more internal fuel in all three fighters were being advanced. It makes the chances of the USAAF going over to night bombing in large numbers quite small.

Totally agree

Still the suggestions, like those for army and navy related operations, rubbed nerves still raw from the inter war period about airpower and who had the final say, present in all air forces.

Totally agree.

Admiral King definitely to the point there are claims it hampered the war effort. Not so sure about Arnold and Marshall, though they certainly had some strong comments about the British, mirroring some British comments about Americans. Patriots tend to assume "we" are the best. Some comments indicate the Mustang had a not invented here stigma.

Totally agree, and specifically to the 'not invented here' animosity in1942 and even 1943.

A lot of time and effort had gone into creation of the mass production and deployment systems backing the USAAF, sudden changes were most unwelcome and almost certainly going to cost aircraft numbers when everyone was screaming for more. You say you want North American to build the B-24 needed to drop bombs, now you say stop that, build P-51 to enable the B-24 built somewhere else to drop bombs? But you still want lots more B-24? Dallas had 1 B-24G accepted in March 1943, the next in June, ending B-24 production in November 1944. First P-51C in August 1943, one factory, two new designs, what could possibly go wrong? Remember we need all those Dallas built AT-6 as well. Meantime at Inglewood we have shut down AT-6 to free capacity mostly for B-25, now you want to transfer all B-25 production to Kansas City?

Totally agree - again.

Interesting to me is the USAAF deployments of the P-51B seem to really be about the use of the P-51 and P-51A, not picking up on the altitude performance increase. 1943 was the year the allied production system caught up to war needs instead of always being behind and that took time to understand, 1944 saw the wind down begin. I would not rule out inertia, an unwillingness or perceived inability to make big changes or deciding the current situation could not afford the change costs.

Totally agree - with amplification. The CAS branch of Military Requirements embraced the A-36, P-51A and P-51B as close air support/battlefield air superiority, while most of the other senior leaders picked sides and championed the P-47 and P-38. Barney Giles closed the discussions and convinced Arnold to order all new P-38J and P-51B to ETO. Even then, the Director of Air Defense, who was given assignment authority globally, assigned the P-51FG (354, 357, 363FG) to 9th AF with Invasion Tactical Air role.

Geoffrey - Before I bow out, I wish to thank you publicly for the Major contributions you made to my new book!