GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Lo, as ye might perchance, be of advanced age, thou dost not apply the linguistics of such...
Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (1 Viewer)
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SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
"Said Admiral Kimmel" was a snappier beat than "That's what Admiral Kimmel said". I thought it funnier.
- Thread starter
- #163
I was riffing on the "That's what she said" joke.
It may not be a funny joke ...
"Wow! I've never seen anyone drop a bomb that big!"
"That's what she said."
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
Totally got the reference.
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I also prefer the Vogon "Resistance is USELESS" as opposed to the Borg "Resistance is futile". The Vogons really commit.
I'm sorry, I missed this.
100% agree and Martin Middlebrook wrote a book on it which I have yet to read.
What I was trying to do was contrast the different approaches of the two forces. Harris undoubtedly had a formidable force at his disposal and Peenemuende was a significant target. It just wasn't Schweinfurt, which I suspect Eaker was hoping he would get RAF support for.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,263
- Sep 30, 2021
If Eaker was expecting Bomber Command to quickly hit his idea of key targets = Harris Panacea targets, at least strike away from the full moon period during the second half of 1943.
Schweinfurt had a pre war population of around 36,000, asking Bomber Command to find a target that small, that deep in 1943 was really setting a task. The full moon was on 15 August 1943, rising at 1924 GMT and in the second half of 1943 the German defences had largely denied the use of full moon periods to the heavy bombers, a raid on Nuremburg on 10 August, when the moon set before midnight GMT, was followed by four raids on Italy, Peenemunde on 17 August, then Leverkusen on 22 August with the moon 3rd quarter rising at 2242 GMT. The moon was full on 13 October 1943, rising at 1743 GMT. Bomber Command did no major night raids 9 to 17 October.
Harris reports Schweinfurt covered 293 acres of which 126 acres or 43% was destroyed, 293 acres = 0.46 square miles, if a square the urban area would have 0.68 mile sides. In good to moderate weather in Germany (excluding Berlin) from around June 1943 to March 1944 Bomber Command was achieving around mid 50's percent of bombs within 3 miles of the aiming point. Harris considered the Schweinfurt ball bearings plants would require 6 or 7 attacks to destroy it, he hit first the city on 24/25 February 1944, the night of the new moon, the April attack was 4 days after the new moon.
After the August and October 1943 strikes the 8th next attacked Schweinfurt on 24 February 1944.
Bomber Command's step up of effort was not as dramatic as the USAAF, doubling from around 15,000 long tons a month in the second half of 1943 to around 31,000 tons a month in the first half of 1944, then around 56,500 tons a month in the second half of 1944. It had 246 Lancasters on 1 January 1943, then 405 on 1 July and 610 on 31 December. In late January 1943 it had around 1,000 aircraft in the operational units, but that includes the 2 Group light and medium bomber and around 200 Wellingtons, still around 1,000 strong in late December but 2 Group had gone to 2nd TAF and 21 Wellingtons.
The Pointblank directive issued 14 June 1943 changed the primary targets to
German fighter strength
German submarine yards and bases
The remainder of German aircraft industry
Ball bearings
Oil
Secondary targets were synthetic rubber and military motor transport.
Bomber Command was as far as practical to design operations to complement the 8th Air Force operations against the above target list.
14 January 1944, Air Marshal Bottomley (Deputy Chief of Air Staff) to Harris,
"6. It is particularly important that you should do your utmost to destroy at an early a date as possible, the town of Schweinfurt and the ball bearing factories which it contains. One third of the town's population is employed in the ball-bearing industry; the "de-housing" of the town and the infliction of heavy casualties amongst those workers would, in itself, be a valuable contribution."
In January 1944 Harris was in the middle of the Battle of Berlin, his attempt to end the war by air power. AM Bottomly actually mentioned 6 cities to Harris, of these 4 were attacked,
Kassel, hit on 3/4 October and 22/23 October 1943.
Leipzig 20/21 October and 3/4 December 1943 also 19/20 February 1944,
Brunswick hit 14/15 January 1944.
Augsburg hit on 25/26 February 1944
The 8th hit Kassel on the 28th and 30th of July 1943, then again on 19 April 1944.
The 8th hit Brunswick for the first time on 11 January 1944
The 8th hit Leipzig for the first time on 20 February 1944.
The 8th hit Augsburg for the first time on 25 February 1944.
The other two towns mentioned were, according to the British Official History, not hit by the 8th until February 1944.
So Harris was complying with the pointblank directive rather better than the 8th when it came to aircraft industry attacks until around February 1944 anyway. This is not surprising given the 8th was waiting on enough long range fighters and Bomber Command was steadily being forced out of much of Germany.
Translated German raid reports,
SCHWEINFURTH, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo, 8a 1151 - Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 17 AUGUST 1943, (USAAF). Approximately 270 aircraft took part in this raid from 1600 until 1700 hours. The main weight of the attack fell on the Central Station, Old Town and the industrial and barracks area.
Bombs dropped: 1 mine, 1317 H.E. (59 duds), 27 phosphorous bombs 1800 oil bombs.
Houses: 160 destroyed and 1010 damaged.
Fires: 19 major and 150 medium to small fires.
Casualties: 249 dead, 639 injured.
The firms of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co., Fichtl & Sachs Ballbearing Works and the Rothhenburger Metal Works were severely damaged. No. 2 Works of the Vereinigte Kugellager Works was partially damaged.
The Central Station was destroyed and a few trains burnt out. The Goods Yards were also hit, damaging buildings, tracks and rolling stocks. Damage was also caused to 2 barracks. The Municipal Gas Works were destroyed and Post Office buildings badly damaged. On the firm of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. 33500 kg of H.E. and 3900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped, destroying 19000 sq. metres = 8% of the total area of the factory.
SCHWEINFURTH, E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 14 OCTOBER 1943 (USAAF). There are no German documents available which give details of where the bombs fell but it is evident from the following the ball-bearing works were mainly affected. About 250 - 300 aircraft took part.
Bombs Dropped: A number of mines, 1200 H.E., 1500 oil bombs.
Houses: 107 destroyed and 280 damaged.
Casualties: 283 dead and 359 injured.
Of the bombs dropped, 3600 kg of mines, 35500 kg of H.E. and 2400 kg of incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Kugellagerwerk Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. They destroyed 19400 sq. metres of the factory area, equal to 8.5% of the total area. In addition 45 1000 lb (2 duds) H.E. and 43 261b (2 duds) incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Vereinigten Kugellager-fabrik, Works I and II.
SCHWEINFURT, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 24/25 FEBRUARY 1944. This is the only source available and information refers to the ball-bearing works only. No details are available of any other results of the raid.
Estimated No. of Aircraft: 1100
Weight of Bombs dropped: 102681 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Weight of Bombs on work areas: 68330 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Floor area of works buildings destroyed: 79435 sq. metres.
SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 13 APRIL 1944, (USAAF). A medium heavy attack was launched against Schweinfurt and Augsburg as well as a number of airfields. From 1313 to 1525 hours penetrations by strong formations with fighter escort took place between Longwy and Remagen. The more northerly forces attacked Schweinfurt and at 1436 hours a covering force was at Kaiserslautern and after covering the returning bombers left the LGK area between Luxemburg and Remagen.
At 1338 hours the stronger forces change course to SE in the Saarbruecken/Pirmasens area for their attack on Augsburg and airfields. (For detail, see under Augsburg and Airfields.)
Bombs dropped: 500 H.E., 2500 oil bombs.
Houses: 53 destroyed, 106 severely damaged, 282 medium to slight damage.
Fires: 40 major, 31 medium and 100 smaller fires.
Casualties: 13 dead, 37 injured.
The Rotenburger Metal Works are reported as destroyed, while Kugelfischer, VKF and Duetsche Gelatine suffered severe and Fichtel & Sachs medium damage.
At Fichel & Sachs 756 sq. metres of floor space were destroyed by 67 incendiary bombs and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. suffered damage from 1800 kg of mines, 29000 kg of H.E. and 3500 kg of incendiary bombs which destroyed 17% (= 42500 sq. metres) of floor space.
In addition, 500 H.E., 270 fragmentation and 606 oil bombs were dropped on the 80 localities, destroying 77 houses and damaging 203, killing 114 and injuring 130.
SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 26/27 APRI 1944L. Between 0054 and 0143 hours a force estimated at 400 to 500 aircraft entered the area and steered an E course between Mannheim and Stuttgart and later a N course to Schweinfurt.
Bombs dropped: 6 mines, 300 H.E., 5000 phosphorous bombs, 20000 incendiary bombs.
Houses: 122 destroyed, 120 severely damaged, 64 medium damage, 335 slightly damaged.
Casualties: 5 dead, 45 injured.
The ball-bearing works sustained fairly heavy damage. No. 1 Works of the United Ball-bearing Co. were obliged to reduce their production for some days. At Fichtel & Sachs the gas generator plant was put out of action for some time as a result of fire and the Star Co. suffered very severe damage, resulting in a 100% drop for some time. The Rotenburger Metal Works also suffered a 100% drop for about a fortnight as a result of severe damage by H.E. bombs.
In the Armaments Ministry document the weight of bombs dropped on Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft, Kugellager Fichtel & Sach and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. is given as about 22000 kg of mines, H.E. and incendiary bombs. The greatest weight fell on Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. but 68% (16625 sq metres) of the works area of the Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft was destroyed.
SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 19 JULY, (USAAF). About 200 - 250 bombers with fighter escort penetrated on an easterly course from 0810 to 0903 between Schneeifel and Ahrweiler.
Bombs dropped: 1000 H.E., 1200 oil bombs, 5000 incendiary bombs.
Houses: 123 were destroyed and 200 sustained medium to slight damage.
Casualties: 5 dead, 30 injured and 49 missing.
Fichtel & Sachs ball-bearing works sustained damage causing 100% loss of production for the time being, and Star Ball-bearing works suffered medium damage. The telephone and teleprinter service were put out of action. The Adolf-Hitler Barracks also suffered damage by H.E.
According to Document E. 2606, 39 H.E. and 10 incendiary bombs fell on Fichtel & Sach, destroying 9416 sq. m. of floor space of the works. At Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co 18000 kg of H.E. and 1900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped destroying 18000 sq. m. (= 8%) of the total works complex.
SCHWEINFURT, E. 970 - LGK XIV, 9 OCTOBER 1944, (USAAF). About 350 - 400 aircraft carried a raid between 1432 and 1515 hours, when the main target was the industrial area of the town.
Bombs dropped: 1500 - 2000 H.E. as well as incendiary bombs.
Fires: 1 major and 12 smaller fires.
Casualties: 22 dead, 14 unrecovered.
Kugel-Fischer was hit by 9 H.E. and some damage was caused. No.2 works of VKS suffered severely in the press shop, lathe department, machine tool shop etc. A quantity of oil was burnt. The Star Ball-bearing works suffered from H.E. and the main water supply was destroyed. Considerable damage was also caused to the electricity supplies.
The Central Station was hit by 58 H.E. and 5 duds, causing 12 lines to be put out of action. A quantity of H.E. bombs was alto dropped on targets in the neighbourhood of Schweinfurt causing material damage and a number of fatal casualties.
GregP
Major
It looks to me as if he picks something that he can construe as unusual, pursues a theory as to how this could have happened, and then presents it as "the way it was" and waits for comments.
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GregP
Major
Flying with drop tanks does not mean you have to drop them when they are empty. You absolutely CAN land with empty tanks, and dropping them will require an explanation to the commanding officer if you are over home terrotory.
Yes. Middlebrook's says that (the first bit) in his book on Schweinfurt. Full moon period, small target, etc.. I just ordered a copy of his book on Peenemünde.
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Close but not quite.
His original bomber mafia theory is just parroting a blog post from Trent Telenko on Chicagoboyz.net. The same article was picked up as a source by James Stevenson / Pierre Sprey and published on David Axes website. Sprey and Stevenson are pretty well known for having basically abysmal takes on any aircraft produced after 1945.
At one point Telenko was collaborating with Sprey / Stevenson on a book about the "Bomber Mafia." I don't think this book ever came out.
Greg might not be a "Reformer" in the same sense as Sprey or Stevenson, but he is intellectually adjacent to people that think incredibly nonsensical things like that the M2 Browning is a better armament than the 20mm Vulcan because start-up time, and that the primary factor in modern aerial combat is maneuverability to facilitate gun kills.
I made a whole thread on the nonsense that Stevenson/Sprey were promoting circa 2006.
View: https://x.com/i/status/2059809848125263889
GregP
Major
Those guys have some points, IF you are flying a fighter aircraft.
A fighter needs to do many things. Maneuverability and guns are included in those things. However, an Attack aircraft, or an Interceptor (or other type) should not be pressed into service as fighters in normal service, they should be what their primary mission is. Sure. maybe have some small load-out for defense in a pinch, but their primary mission should be paramount. Today, we patrol with F-35s as primary fighters a LOT of the time.
To me, the absolute worst aircraft is one designed to do ALL jobs.That is a multirolle aircraft. It can do many jobs, true. But not any single one well enough to defeat dedicated resistance from a purpose-designed fighter interceptor. A plane designed to fight at 50,000 feet likely will not be very good down at tree-top level and vice versa. When the B-58 Hustler was overtaken by high-altitude missiles, it could not change into a low-altitude intruder. The structure simply wasn't designed for it and the bumps down low were eating away at the structure rapidly when they tried to fly it low and fast. Just one example of many.
Sprey makes a lot of good points and fails to mention others. In my mind, he fails to take into account for software, modern sensors, and stand-off weapons. He does that for a reason. The primary reason is political. We have some wonderful BVR (beyond visual range) killing weapons developed or capable of being developed, but our philosophy doesn't allow for their use in practice. When is the last time the USA allowed a BVR weapoin to be used air-to-air? The short answer is never to date.
If your rules of engagement force you to close and identify before attacking, then BVR weapons are wonderful in theory but useless in practice. A maneuverable flgihter aircraft is likely required since, when it closes, it can easily be facing an opponent who IS a maneuverable fighter. Sure, it could maybe kill the enemy fighter from 40 miles away, but it isn't allowed to do so by highrer command. If it has to close anyway, then it should be able to close and fight at close range, and it should be good at the job.
I have nothing against BVR weapons myself but, if you (assuming you are the pilot) are forced to close and identify before firing, then an airplane like the F-35 is not very useful. It carries little air-to-air capability and the gun is a joke. It is a 25 mm with an internal load of 182 rounds! So, you have a short time attacking a target before you are out of ammunition, whether using one or both missile or the entire 182 rounds of gunfire. Maybe the gun there for weight and balance. It certainly is not there to be an effective air-to-air weapon. The other air-to-air weapon is two AIM-120 missiles. Two!
The F-35 CAN carry 2,000 pounds of air-to-ground, and they can be guided weapons, so it CAN cause some havoc on the ground. But in air-to-air use, it is like going hunting with a accordion. To be effective in air-to-air combat, it needs to ram the enemy. I consider the F-35 to be the most expensive white elephant ever procurred.
Since we are flying F-35s, I wish them to succeed during their service lifespans, but I would never have approved their purchase to begin with. If I were in charge, and I know I am not, I'd immediately pursue the design of something new with "better" mission specifications. Naturally, I do not have all the information the people who decided on the F-35 had at the time it was decided to produce it. Whatever it was, they wound up with the F-35 in a role that includes "fighter aircraft." It isn't very good at "fighter aircraft."
At least the F-22 has six AIM-120s and two AIM-9s, plus a cannon with 480 rounds. To have that many AIM-120s in the air at the same time, you'd need three F-35s! There should be some air-to-air load out on the F-35 where the internal space has AIM-120s in it. Maybe if has that and I just don't know that. If so, then perhaps it Isn't as bad as I paint above. If not, thenh it IS that bad.
Sorry, just ranting, so I'll stop.
A fighter needs to do many things. Maneuverability and guns are included in those things. However, an Attack aircraft, or an Interceptor (or other type) should not be pressed into service as fighters in normal service, they should be what their primary mission is. Sure. maybe have some small load-out for defense in a pinch, but their primary mission should be paramount. Today, we patrol with F-35s as primary fighters a LOT of the time.
To me, the absolute worst aircraft is one designed to do ALL jobs.That is a multirolle aircraft. It can do many jobs, true. But not any single one well enough to defeat dedicated resistance from a purpose-designed fighter interceptor. A plane designed to fight at 50,000 feet likely will not be very good down at tree-top level and vice versa. When the B-58 Hustler was overtaken by high-altitude missiles, it could not change into a low-altitude intruder. The structure simply wasn't designed for it and the bumps down low were eating away at the structure rapidly when they tried to fly it low and fast. Just one example of many.
Sprey makes a lot of good points and fails to mention others. In my mind, he fails to take into account for software, modern sensors, and stand-off weapons. He does that for a reason. The primary reason is political. We have some wonderful BVR (beyond visual range) killing weapons developed or capable of being developed, but our philosophy doesn't allow for their use in practice. When is the last time the USA allowed a BVR weapoin to be used air-to-air? The short answer is never to date.
If your rules of engagement force you to close and identify before attacking, then BVR weapons are wonderful in theory but useless in practice. A maneuverable flgihter aircraft is likely required since, when it closes, it can easily be facing an opponent who IS a maneuverable fighter. Sure, it could maybe kill the enemy fighter from 40 miles away, but it isn't allowed to do so by highrer command. If it has to close anyway, then it should be able to close and fight at close range, and it should be good at the job.
I have nothing against BVR weapons myself but, if you (assuming you are the pilot) are forced to close and identify before firing, then an airplane like the F-35 is not very useful. It carries little air-to-air capability and the gun is a joke. It is a 25 mm with an internal load of 182 rounds! So, you have a short time attacking a target before you are out of ammunition, whether using one or both missile or the entire 182 rounds of gunfire. Maybe the gun there for weight and balance. It certainly is not there to be an effective air-to-air weapon. The other air-to-air weapon is two AIM-120 missiles. Two!
The F-35 CAN carry 2,000 pounds of air-to-ground, and they can be guided weapons, so it CAN cause some havoc on the ground. But in air-to-air use, it is like going hunting with a accordion. To be effective in air-to-air combat, it needs to ram the enemy. I consider the F-35 to be the most expensive white elephant ever procurred.
Since we are flying F-35s, I wish them to succeed during their service lifespans, but I would never have approved their purchase to begin with. If I were in charge, and I know I am not, I'd immediately pursue the design of something new with "better" mission specifications. Naturally, I do not have all the information the people who decided on the F-35 had at the time it was decided to produce it. Whatever it was, they wound up with the F-35 in a role that includes "fighter aircraft." It isn't very good at "fighter aircraft."
At least the F-22 has six AIM-120s and two AIM-9s, plus a cannon with 480 rounds. To have that many AIM-120s in the air at the same time, you'd need three F-35s! There should be some air-to-air load out on the F-35 where the internal space has AIM-120s in it. Maybe if has that and I just don't know that. If so, then perhaps it Isn't as bad as I paint above. If not, thenh it IS that bad.
Sorry, just ranting, so I'll stop.
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Stevenson/Sprey/Boyd only have good points if you consider air combat to be completely frozen at 1950.
There is not a single aviation project that Sprey would not have stripped of features in order to pursue even higher levels of low speed maneuverability and there is not a single missile program that Sprey would not have cancelled if given his way. He is a complete philistine.
Even the "Fighter Mafias" brainchild, the F-16, was ruined in their eyes by the USAF when they adopted if as a multirole aircraft and the modifications increased it's empty takeoff weight.
Stevenson's book on the legacy F/A-18 makes almost exactly the same criticism of the Navy. The plane is horrible because the Navy took the YF-17, made it heavier, more complicated, and turned it into a bomber.
They rinsed the same old playbook off time and time again with the F/A-18E, the F-22, and the F-35. There has never been a plane that was maneuverable enough, small enough, or cheap enough for the likes of Sprey and his ilk.
You can actually see the hatchet job they do on the F-22 in their own presentation by claiming it is actually worse than both the F-16 and the F-15 in terms of maneuverability. This is something that is just flatly untrue.
GregP
Major
The WOW avionics are a boon to the modern fighter pilot, that's for sure.
I think I'd rather have a maneuverable, air-superiority fighter controlling some attack drones than F-35s flitting about. Give the drones all the load-carrying, targeting, and navigation ability they need, and then send them a target to prosecute. Meanwhile, there is nothing saying a maneuverable fighter or pair of them cannot escort and assign 20+ drones to an attack while being defended by perhaps 8 air-to-air drones and their own weapons.
The Hornet was a good airplane for the 1980s - 2000s. It's a good airplane now unless matched against 4.5+-gen enemy fighters or a modern air defense system. Then it is perhaps less than wonderful, although it is quite capable at lower speeds. Tough to beat at 450 knots.
Personally, I like the F-22 but despise the F-35. Still, we fly what we fly and I wish them all well while simultaneously wishing they do not get a reason to be called up. for combat. Would be very nice to see a new design, specified for using modern weapons that can be sent or recalled from their control aircraft. Sort of like an aerial terminator. It would be hard for even an advanced autonomous fighter to take over the world within one fuel load of range and time. And, never give the robots the freedom to make attack go - no go decisions. That should come from a commander, verfied and authenticated, and we'd best be better at stopping hacking of them than we are at stopping bank and credit card fraud.
Cheers.
I think I'd rather have a maneuverable, air-superiority fighter controlling some attack drones than F-35s flitting about. Give the drones all the load-carrying, targeting, and navigation ability they need, and then send them a target to prosecute. Meanwhile, there is nothing saying a maneuverable fighter or pair of them cannot escort and assign 20+ drones to an attack while being defended by perhaps 8 air-to-air drones and their own weapons.
The Hornet was a good airplane for the 1980s - 2000s. It's a good airplane now unless matched against 4.5+-gen enemy fighters or a modern air defense system. Then it is perhaps less than wonderful, although it is quite capable at lower speeds. Tough to beat at 450 knots.
Personally, I like the F-22 but despise the F-35. Still, we fly what we fly and I wish them all well while simultaneously wishing they do not get a reason to be called up. for combat. Would be very nice to see a new design, specified for using modern weapons that can be sent or recalled from their control aircraft. Sort of like an aerial terminator. It would be hard for even an advanced autonomous fighter to take over the world within one fuel load of range and time. And, never give the robots the freedom to make attack go - no go decisions. That should come from a commander, verfied and authenticated, and we'd best be better at stopping hacking of them than we are at stopping bank and credit card fraud.
Cheers.
By "Fighter Mafia" standards the F-18 was a HORRIBLE airplane. The wing loading was too high, the thrust to weight ratio was too low, and the cost was far too expensive. James Perry Stevenson wrote a whole entire book about how terrible the F-18 was and why it should have never been bought in the first place! What Stevenson advocates for in his book is a navalized YF-16.
The plane that they envisioned would not have even been able to fire radar guided missiles in the first place. The original air-to-air configuration for the F-16 was equipped with only 2 Aim-9 Sidewinders; it would not receive the ability to fire radar guided missiles until 1989. And even then this ability was only possible because the radar that the F-16 was equipped with was ultimately larger than the extremely basic radar that Boyd wanted to equip it with!
The below are from Stevensons book which is available for free online.
If the Fighter Plane Mafia had gotten their way then you would only have an air superiority fighter that is capable of winning a dogfight inside of 3,000 feet. None of this other technology would exist because it doesn't match their simple + cheap + plentiful paradigm that they advocated for.
There is a reason that no air force in the world adopted Boyd lightweight fighter concept as envisioned. It was a complete dead end by the late 1970s and that trend has only continued to this day. If Sprey had his way you would be sitting in a fighter with no stealth capability (too expensive + doesn't work) while having to rely on Aim-9 (only useful for forcing the target to make a break turn) and a gun.
All of the lines of attack against the F-35 are identical to the same criticisms that were made against the F-18. In fact one of the big "issues" with the F-35 being a poor dogfighter is that it essentially handles somewhere between an F-18C and an F-18E instead of having the EM performance of an F-16. This is one of the reasons that early USAF squadrons had some issues with it; they were trying to fly it like its an F-16.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
And the F-16 as well.
GregP
Major
I never brought u.p "the fighter mafia," you did.
By the time it was retired, the F-14 Tomcat cost us 125 man-hours of maintenance for every flight hour. It had built-in avionics and built-in systems. The F-18 is modular. If a box goes bad, change the box and go fly ... and fix the box on the test bench.
It dropped flight time to about 20 - 25 maintenance hours per flight hour. So, it was a LOT cheaper to fly than the F-14. Likely a bit higher now thath theyha re all older, but still WAY less than before, when systems were integral to the airframe.
Relative to the USA other fighters and most opposition, the F-18 turns quite well. They have had several generations of avionics, and a newer F-18 has VERY good avionics. Maybe not as good as an F-22 or F-35, but good. I'd hate to be the one counting on the F-18 to NOT be good in a fight. Might not have a good day.
You don't sound like a fan of Pierre Sprey and friends, and the F-16 is WAY beyond anything flying around confidently in 1950.
As for me, while I don;t buy everything Sprey and friends say, they make some very good points, for ANY timeframe. Because his ideas are perhaps overtaken by technology in some areas doesn't mean all his points are bad or necessarily wrong. They need to be looked at with an eye toward what is available now, not discarded as totally outmoded.
An Immelmann turn was invented in WWI, but is still used quite successfully today. A rolling scissors, though ionvented much later, is largely outdated becasue most of the aircraft in combat today have a thrust to weight ratio and speed brakes that make a rolling scissors almost ineffective as a means of getting on someone's tail by using drag and offset. So, an idea has to be looked at with regard for the attacking and defending platforms together with their resepective technologies/
By the time it was retired, the F-14 Tomcat cost us 125 man-hours of maintenance for every flight hour. It had built-in avionics and built-in systems. The F-18 is modular. If a box goes bad, change the box and go fly ... and fix the box on the test bench.
It dropped flight time to about 20 - 25 maintenance hours per flight hour. So, it was a LOT cheaper to fly than the F-14. Likely a bit higher now thath theyha re all older, but still WAY less than before, when systems were integral to the airframe.
Relative to the USA other fighters and most opposition, the F-18 turns quite well. They have had several generations of avionics, and a newer F-18 has VERY good avionics. Maybe not as good as an F-22 or F-35, but good. I'd hate to be the one counting on the F-18 to NOT be good in a fight. Might not have a good day.
You don't sound like a fan of Pierre Sprey and friends, and the F-16 is WAY beyond anything flying around confidently in 1950.
As for me, while I don;t buy everything Sprey and friends say, they make some very good points, for ANY timeframe. Because his ideas are perhaps overtaken by technology in some areas doesn't mean all his points are bad or necessarily wrong. They need to be looked at with an eye toward what is available now, not discarded as totally outmoded.
An Immelmann turn was invented in WWI, but is still used quite successfully today. A rolling scissors, though ionvented much later, is largely outdated becasue most of the aircraft in combat today have a thrust to weight ratio and speed brakes that make a rolling scissors almost ineffective as a means of getting on someone's tail by using drag and offset. So, an idea has to be looked at with regard for the attacking and defending platforms together with their resepective technologies/
GregP
Major
Sprey is a controversial character, even five years after his passing.
One of the problems with radical thinkers like Sprey is that they go against the grain and they become lightning rods for all kinds of criticism. Sometimes it's warranted. But without radical thinkers, we simply don't ask ourselves enough questions and sometimes that includes the right questions. But they don't fit in and when they are wrong, it's invariably used as ammunition.
A P-47 in a revetment at Boxted is a valuable asset which, if blown up by a strafing FW-190, causes lower dispatch rates for that fighter group. An F-35 on an apron in a place like Oman is a nice juicy target that will, if destroyed by a $40,000 drone, blow a much bigger hole in the local defence system. Add to that the fact that a P-47 took maybe a few days to build, while an F-35 takes upwards of a year and the problems start to mount. America is having exactly this problem at the moment with depleted weapons stocks: they are being used up at a much greater rate than they can be produced. This is why Sprey favoured much simpler weapons systems.
What he was proposing was to leverage the American industrial economy more effectively than apparently endless capability development.
That's something most people find difficult to understand: the difference between capability based planning and strategic planning. The internet will ALWAYS favour capability-based planning. Sprey's philosophy is definitely not without its limitations: pilot training in an era of scaling back, is one such limitation. He was thinking in terms of thousands of fighters, flown by thousands of pilots in hundreds of squadrons. But in terms of application, you'd need a much bigger air force than what you have today. We can judge programs on their own merits but to a degree that makes us reliant on post hoc ergo propter hoc arguments.
Anyone who thinks Sprey's research into the LWF program was somehow ill informed has likely missed the point. It was about finding out what worked. America didn't have the Me-262. Instead, America won the daylight air war over Germany with more prosaic equipment. That all changed for the jet age. Sprey was only asking whether it had changed for the better.
Now, I'm not saying for a minute that I agree with him or the Chicagoboyz network. Far from it. But shouldn't history and the assessment of what was achieved also involve asking apparently dumb questions (like this one) occasionally? Because if we don't ask questions it becomes inevitable that we will eventually draw the wrong conclusions.
I brought them up because the term "Bomber Mafia" is inextricably tied to them and their crusade against the USAF/USN that they waged for 50+ years. Telenko's article and Greg's positions are basically informed by the framing that the "Fighter Plane Mafia", Boyd, Sprey, etc viewed themselves.
Speaking of the F-14 and the Navy; the "Fighter Plane Mafia" hated both with an intense passion. In part this is because the Navy's approach and success during Vietnam was completely antithetical to the narrative that guns on fighter planes were the only relevant way to kill other fighters, and because the Navy overall was quite dismissive of Boyd's Energy Maneuverability Theory as being the sole determinant of a fighters capabilities. It is hard to overstate the lengths to which Boyd proselytized about EMT once he had developed it; his whole entire career was dedicated to its efficacy and to the detriment of everything else.
None of these guys were ever able to graciously accept a win even when it was handed to them either; no matter the program and no matter the plane, all of the good aspects of it could be attributed to the input of the Fighter Plane Mafia, and any of the negatives could be attributed to the so-called "Bomber Mafia". For instance they could not take credit for any of the success of the F-16 during the Gulf War because it was used purely in a ground attacking role. It was not the bell-of-the-ball that proved the F-15 was too expensive and too complicated to work in air-to-air combat; it was actually the opposite.
This doesn't only apply to fighters as well; this is how the A-10's performance is summed up in Stevenson's book. Note how the thing that made the A-10 arguably as successful as it was during the first Gulf-War is actually derided and blamed for it's losses. The implication is that the A-10 would have performed its role even better during the Gulf War if it didn't have missiles in the first place.
Also note that rolling scissors is still considered an incredibly important maneuver; I do not know why you are under the impression that speed brakes or high thrust to weight ratios have made it irrelevant.
