Greg Spouts Off About P-38 Drop Tanks (3 Viewers)

[Squish]

Anyone who thinks Sprey's research into the LWF program was somehow ill informed has likely missed the point. It was about finding out what worked. America didn't have the Me-262. Instead, America won the daylight air war over Germany with more prosaic equipment. That all changed for the jet age. Sprey was only asking whether it had changed for the better.

It was ill-informed though.

The Lightweight Fighter as envisioned by Boyd was purely a vessel to attempt to prove the efficacy of Energy Maneuverability Theory. The whole reason that they lobbied for it was because Boyd's input on the F-15 beyond a certain point became increasingly marginalized and because the USAF did not design the F-15 to be the pure dogfighter that Boyd wanted it to be. The YF-16 and YF-17 as envisioned without the ability to fire air to air radar missiles, without a meaningful radar, and without any ability to conduct air to ground operations was a completely stillborn concept.

There is not really a single time post-1970 that Sprey or Boyd were not looking completely backwards. Even when the USAF adopted the F-16, Boyd said that they ruined it by loading it up with air to ground junk, and basically insinuated that he should have purposely designed it with even less fuel then it already had.

What they essentially envisioned was a fantasy world where missiles did not exist and would not improve, and that winners and losers would be determined by who had the most of the best turning airplanes with the best kind of machine guns.

Sending Aim-9J equipped F-16As against R-24R and R-27R equipped MiG-23s and MiG-29s circa 1985 would have been a suicide mission. Even by the time of its adoption the F-16 was also too much airplane for USAF pilots in the Fighter Mafias eyes which is why they wasted a lot of time lobbying to replace F-15s with hordes of F-5s!

If the Fighter Plane Mafia had been around for World War II they would have designed an American Oscar or an American Spitfire. The P-38 would not have ever been adopted because it was too complicated, too expensive, and didn't turn well enough.

 

[elbmc1969]

Whatever else, the wars of the 2020s have illustrated the virtues of cheap and cheerful in vast numbers.

 

[elbmc1969]

(It's also evident that with a $20 million budget, you could end Amazon U.S. as a going concern.)

 

[Engineman]

Those guys have some points, IF you are flying a fighter aircraft.

A fighter needs to do many things. Maneuverability and guns are included in those things. However, an Attack aircraft, or an Interceptor (or other type) should not be pressed into service as fighters in normal service, they should be what their primary mission is. Sure. maybe have some small load-out for defense in a pinch, but their primary mission should be paramount. Today, we patrol with F-35s as primary fighters a LOT of the time.

To me, the absolute worst aircraft is one designed to do ALL jobs.That is a multirolle aircraft. It can do many jobs, true. But not any single one well enough to defeat dedicated resistance from a purpose-designed fighter interceptor. A plane designed to fight at 50,000 feet likely will not be very good down at tree-top level and vice versa. When the B-58 Hustler was overtaken by high-altitude missiles, it could not change into a low-altitude intruder. The structure simply wasn't designed for it and the bumps down low were eating away at the structure rapidly when they tried to fly it low and fast. Just one example of many.

Sprey makes a lot of good points and fails to mention others. In my mind, he fails to take into account for software, modern sensors, and stand-off weapons. He does that for a reason. The primary reason is political. We have some wonderful BVR (beyond visual range) killing weapons developed or capable of being developed, but our philosophy doesn't allow for their use in practice. When is the last time the USA allowed a BVR weapoin to be used air-to-air? The short answer is never to date.

If your rules of engagement force you to close and identify before attacking, then BVR weapons are wonderful in theory but useless in practice. A maneuverable flgihter aircraft is likely required since, when it closes, it can easily be facing an opponent who IS a maneuverable fighter. Sure, it could maybe kill the enemy fighter from 40 miles away, but it isn't allowed to do so by highrer command. If it has to close anyway, then it should be able to close and fight at close range, and it should be good at the job.

I have nothing against BVR weapons myself but, if you (assuming you are the pilot) are forced to close and identify before firing, then an airplane like the F-35 is not very useful. It carries little air-to-air capability and the gun is a joke. It is a 25 mm with an internal load of 182 rounds! So, you have a short time attacking a target before you are out of ammunition, whether using one or both missile or the entire 182 rounds of gunfire. Maybe the gun there for weight and balance. It certainly is not there to be an effective air-to-air weapon. The other air-to-air weapon is two AIM-120 missiles. Two!

The F-35 CAN carry 2,000 pounds of air-to-ground, and they can be guided weapons, so it CAN cause some havoc on the ground. But in air-to-air use, it is like going hunting with a accordion. To be effective in air-to-air combat, it needs to ram the enemy. I consider the F-35 to be the most expensive white elephant ever procurred.

Since we are flying F-35s, I wish them to succeed during their service lifespans, but I would never have approved their purchase to begin with. If I were in charge, and I know I am not, I'd immediately pursue the design of something new with "better" mission specifications. Naturally, I do not have all the information the people who decided on the F-35 had at the time it was decided to produce it. Whatever it was, they wound up with the F-35 in a role that includes "fighter aircraft." It isn't very good at "fighter aircraft."

At least the F-22 has six AIM-120s and two AIM-9s, plus a cannon with 480 rounds. To have that many AIM-120s in the air at the same time, you'd need three F-35s! There should be some air-to-air load out on the F-35 where the internal space has AIM-120s in it. Maybe if has that and I just don't know that. If so, then perhaps it Isn't as bad as I paint above. If not, thenh it IS that bad.

Sorry, just ranting, so I'll stop.

BVR capability air-to air is very important to have, but as you say, it has more recently been restricted to match the limited War ROE and problems with Stealth IFF . Also, asset capability to withhold BVR and still kill after vis ID has been a strong asset of western tech. However, just watch if any opposition in a shooting War starts to shoot BVR against Western assets and the BVR ROE will rapidly appear.

Eng

 

[Engineman]

Overall, the reasons for carrying guns on modern Fighter/Bomber aircraft are widely discussed. However, you can be sure that the individual requirements for doing so are deeply considered by the aircraft owner/operators. Gun types have strengths and weaknesses, but beyond that National or financial pressures also come into play.
Personally, I think that in air to air gun fighting, the instantaneous fire capability of a Revolver cannon is an advantage but, I am sure any modern gun is lethal.
Weight and balance factors have been built into aircraft that require ballast if guns not fitted. This may not look advantageous but, it has been a factor for decades, just look at the ballast carried by many aircraft types! Overall, compromise is sometimes needed.

Eng

 

[J.D.]

If the Fighter Plane Mafia had been around for World War II they would have designed an American Oscar or an American Spitfire. The P-38 would not have ever been adopted because it was too complicated, too expensive, and didn't turn well enough.

Not sure why you think that. In fact, in a slightly obscure way, it highlights a pretty significant point. Michael Claringbould's book "P-47D Thunderbolt Series Southwest Pacific 1943-1945", suggests the Ki-43 performed quite well against the P-47 in New Guinea.

Muraoka Shinichi, 248th Sentai commander, after eight Ki-43-II Hayabusas fought sixteen P-47Ds from the 36th Fighter Squadron on 26 December 1943, resulting in two P-47Ds shot down for no Japanese losses wrote:

"When we met the Thunderbolts they immediately surrounded and separated us from protecting the Donryu (bombers). They attacked from above, outnumbering us three or four to one, however we lost no fighters. In conclusion we did not lose, and one Hayabusa which failed to drop one of its fuel tanks survived. I am of the firm opinion that the Thunderbolt can be shot down if we take advantage of its mistakes. Four enemy Thunderbolts only amount to one or two of our planes..."

Claringbould concludes:

"Numerous works to date referencing the history of the Thunderbolts in the SWPA fail to underline its disappointing SWPA record which at times verged on the disastrous. All narratives of the highest-achieving Thunderbolt combat unit, the 348th FG, portray the popular image of success: a superior type carving its way through inferior opposition, earning disproportionately favourable combat results. This curious and bogus narrative derives from accepting Allied claims at face value instead of cross-checking with relevant Japanese records, and not consulting the USAAF field maintenance logs."

Now, I'm sure you intended to say the opposite but in fact, while the USAAC/USAAF would never have accepted a fighter like the Oscar, largely because of its lack of things like self-sealing tanks, a point is made. A smaller, lightweight fighter might have been very useful in the Pacific.

On the matter of the P-38, the Fighter Mafia's objection to complexity was specifically about systems complexity and maintenance burden, not aerodynamic sophistication per se.

 

[J.D.]

It looks to me as if he picks something that he can construe as unusual, pursues a theory as to how this could have happened, and then presents it as "the way it was" and waits for comments.

I guess everyone here has an opinion on Greg Gordon one way or the other. But the overwhelming majority of people here have a much greater understanding of these matters than most of his YouTube viewers.

But I think most here would probably accept the idea that "context is everything".

Given the choice between strategy and capability-based planning and the internet ALWAYS defers to capability, even if unconsciously. And take that to its extreme, subtract historical record and any form of context and you get Greg.

My most recent experience of him involved me asking - unwisely, as it turned out, for some historical examples of what he was talking about. His response left me gobsmacked. He was only interested in technical details. In other words for him, context is not important. Without context, you can conclude whatever you like.

 

[drgondog]

I guess everyone here has an opinion on Greg Gordon one way or the other. But the overwhelming majority of people here have a much greater understanding of these matters than most of his YouTube viewers.

But I think most here would probably accept the idea that "context is everything".

Given the choice between strategy and capability-based planning and the internet ALWAYS defers to capability, even if unconsciously. And take that to its extreme, subtract historical record and any form of context and you get Greg.

My most recent experience of him involved me asking - unwisely, as it turned out, for some historical examples of what he was talking about. His response left me gobsmacked. He was only interested in technical details. In other words for him, context is not important. Without context, you can conclude whatever you like.

I have had quite a bit of off-line conversation via Andrew Horton. Greg has a rich knowledge of technical data for a lot of aircraft, That said his knowledge of history surrounding events and complexities confronting those aircraft he talks about are woefully deficient.

That said, he is a nice and thoughtful person, and I still enjoy debating with him. He will never change his views about Arnold, nor Republic's role in delaying drop tank capability for the P-47 nor the impossibility that drop tanks on the P47D would have eliminated the need for the P-51B.

 

[J.D.]

I have had quite a bit of off-line conversation via Andrew Horton. Greg has a rich knowledge of technical data for a lot of aircraft, That said his knowledge of history surrounding events and complexities confronting those aircraft he talks about are woefully deficient.

That said, he is a nice and thoughtful person, and I still enjoy debating with him. He will never change his views about Arnold, nor Republic's role in delaying drop tank capability for the P-47 nor the impossibility that drop tanks on the P47D would have eliminated the need for the P-51B.

I appreciate that, Bill. I really do. My understanding is that he's a professional pilot, which puts him ahead of a lot of people. I have been a pilot (fixed wing) and have a couple of thousand hours as a back seater in a helicopter. He knows a lot more than me about cruise efficiency and range calculations because it's his job. And yes, he can pull up a rich data set pretty much from memory. That's extremely useful for someone like him.

I just think he's misusing it, which is a shame.

There are a lot of people who are very different IRL than on YouTube or 20th Century YouTube (TV). You get an image of them - one they definitely control themselves - that may not reflect who they really are.

 

[elbmc1969]

I appreciate that, Bill. I really do. My understanding is that he's a professional pilot, which puts him ahead of a lot of people. I have been a pilot (fixed wing) and have a couple of thousand hours as a back seater in a helicopter. He knows a lot more than me about cruise efficiency and range calculations because it's his job. And yes, he can pull up a rich data set pretty much from memory. That's extremely useful for someone like him.

I just think he's misusing it, which is a shame.

There are a lot of people who are very different IRL than on YouTube or 20th Century YouTube (TV). You get an image of them - one they definitely control themselves - that may not reflect who they really are.

His short video on why the Wrights used a canard, even though they knew that it had inferior stability to an elevator on the tail, was illuminating. I had known nothing about it.

 

[Squish]

Not sure why you think that. In fact, in a slightly obscure way, it highlights a pretty significant point. Michael Claringbould's book "P-47D Thunderbolt Series Southwest Pacific 1943-1945", suggests the Ki-43 performed quite well against the P-47 in New Guinea.

Because that is almost precisely what he did with the Lightweight Fighter Program.

From Flying Camelot by Michael Hankins; the bolding is my emphasis.

Sprey based his plans on the existing initial work by General Dynamics and Northrop, the FX-404 and N-700 respectively. For specific requirements, Sprey called for using far less fuel than previous fighters and for using lighter materials, even if that meant relaxing safety standards. Avionics was a sticking point—he argued against forward-looking radars, saying they "have been singularly unsuccessful in tactical air combat," and that ground-based radars should be used instead. Although Sprey allowed for some electronics (such as a ranging gun sight, UHF radio, and a passive electronic countermeasures receiver for warning), he insisted on eliminating as much avionics and computer equipment as possible, including automated navigation and intercept computers, autopilot, digital data links, and identify-friend-or-foe systems. He called for maneuvering capability at speeds from Mach .4 to Mach 1.5 and saw no need to go above Mach 2. He demanded a single, low bypass ratio (0.5) engine, claiming a second engine was a liability. He favored guns over missiles but wanted the smallest caliber gun that was still capable of destroying an enemy plane. He completely rejected the radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and infrared AIM-4 Falcon missiles and judged the AIM-9 Sidewinder as "almost acceptable." He also called for deleting other features, including self-sealing tanks, a bulletproof windshield, a powered canopy, nose wheel steering, a tailhook, and nuclear protection.

The LWF as envisioned by the Fighter Plane Mafia would have been a one-trick pony who's only merit would have been turn-fighting at close range with no other capabilities. When the USAF actually adopted the aircraft, they significantly altered it from what Boyd and his followers envisioned and they actively lobbied against it. Not only would they lobby against the multirole capabilities of the F-16, they would also spend the rest of their careers lobbying against the F-15 and that the F-16 should replace it in the air to air role, and they would eventually even end up lobbying against the F-16 by demanding that it perform a flyoff against the F-20. There was never a plane that they didn't think would benefit by being smaller, lighter, cheaper, and better at turning.

Hankins book terminates with the Gulf-War and the Boyd acolytes fading into irrelevancy. However even when we look at Sprey's works after 1991 and until his passing...he was always advocating for exactly the same thing...hence the slideshow from 2006 which is advocating for replacing the F-22 with just hordes of F-16s.

Michael Claringbould's book "P-47D Thunderbolt Series Southwest Pacific 1943-1945", suggests the Ki-43 performed quite well against the P-47 in New Guinea.

We should address what this statement actually means and give it some kind of context and actually quantify what "quite well" looks like for the Ki-43 because I think this statement is just fundamentally wrong.

First I think it should be stated that the Ki-43 is an exemplary dogfighter; it was essentially designed for that specific purpose to the detriment of other attributes. For instance due to its extremely light design it did not have any useful payload of bombs and its primary armament was the weakest of basically any fighter during World War II with being limited to 2x.50 caliber machine guns for most of the war.

Let's start with Clarinbould's conclusion and see what "success" looks like for the Ki-43 in the SWPA.

"Numerous works to date referencing the history of the Thunderbolts in the SWPA fail to underline its disappointing SWPA record which at times verged on the disastrous. All narratives of the highest-achieving Thunderbolt combat unit, the 348th FG, portray the popular image of success: a superior type carving its way through inferior opposition, earning disproportionately favourable combat results. This curious and bogus narrative derives from accepting Allied claims at face value instead of cross-checking with relevant Japanese records, and not consulting the USAAF field maintenance logs."

Now, I'm sure you intended to say the opposite but in fact, while the USAAC/USAAF would never have accepted a fighter like the Oscar, largely because of its lack of things like self-sealing tanks, a point is made. A smaller, lightweight fighter might have been very useful in the Pacific.

This is from Claringbould's book P-47D Thunderbolt vs Ki-43 Oscar and is in regards to the documented aerial losses of Ki-43 and P-47 Thunderbolts in New Guinea. The figures that he cites are from his own work of cross referencing claims vs verified losses and represents his most educated guess on the actual loss ratio between Thunderbolts and Oscars in New Guinea.

"Perhaps a more valid comparison between the effectiveness of the P-47 and the Ki-43 in New Guinea in 1943–44 can be made by studying the number of actual losses of Thunderbolts and "Oscars" based on confirmed evidence. As previously noted, nine (perhaps ten) P-47s fell to the Ki-43, while 19 "Oscars" were shot down by Thunderbolts. This presents a kill ratio of approximately 2-to-1 in favor of the P-47. Such a figure would have astounded Fifth Air Force commanders who assessed that it was exponentially higher, and it is clear that the maneuverability of the "Oscar" and the tactics employed by its pilots served the IJAAF well.

However, these figures are secondary to the greater reality that most Ki-43s were destroyed on the ground by Fifth Air Force strafers and bombers – a threat that the Japanese could not negate. This was devastation on an industrial scale, and the fundamental misfortune and destiny of the IJAAF in New Guinea."

I personally do not find a 2:1 loss ratio to make any form of compelling case in favor of the Oscar. It certainly belays the point that the P-47 is perhaps over-rated by its fans, and that there was rampant over-claiming in the SWPA on both sides of by a factor of 6 according to Claringbould. Taking the loss ratio at face value, you need 2x as many Oscars as Thunderbolts in order to have equal impact in the air...and only in the fighter to fighter role. In every other conceivable role, from bomber destruction, to strafing, the Oscar is immeasurably worse. And the degree to which it is immeasurably worse is a direct result of its single minded design focus on dogfighting.

 

[GregP]

Can you point to a post where I mentioned "bomber mafia" or "fighter Mafia" except in response to you?

You appear to be obsessed with Pierre Sprey / Stevenson. Let it go, man.

The people who like him go just that, like him. I've rarely seen them try to cram him down anyone else's throat.

The people who don't, seem to obsess over him and try to convince everyone he is outdated and somehow evil. He isn't evil, just not happy with the way fighter design has been going. I'm not either, for somewhat different reasons than Sprey had.

But I didn't post about that topic.

 

[GrauGeist]

and its primary armament was the weakest of basically any fighter during World War II with being limited to 2x.50 caliber machine guns for most of the war.

Except several Italian fighters, like the MC.200

 

[Squish]

Can you point to a post where I mentioned "bomber mafia" or "fighter Mafia" except in response to you?

You appear to be obsessed with Pierre Sprey / Stevenson. Let it go, man.

The people who like him go just that, like him. I've rarely seen them try to cram him down anyone else's throat.

The people who don't, seem to obsess over him and try to convince everyone he is outdated and somehow evil. He isn't evil, just not happy with the way fighter design has been going. I'm not either, for somewhat different reasons than Sprey had.

But I didn't post about that topic.

I simply pointed out how the original article that Greg cites for his whole entire "Bomber Mafia" hypothesis originated from a blogsite and how that same blogpost was picked up by Stevenson / Sprey for their own articles. It is important to understand that Telenko, and by proxy Greg, is something of an acolyte of Boyd / Sprey / defense reform movement because it makes the way that he attempts to contextualize historical events understandable. Then you kind of went off on a tangent about your reservations about the F-35 that largely echo the classical reformer tropes.

The term "Bomber Mafia" largely doesn't appear to be used in print until around 1972; the whole phrase appears to be a pejorative crafted by Boyd + friends in their perpetual axe to grind against USAF leadership. This is a phrase that Greg and Telenko have appeared to borrowed from Boyd, Sprey, etc.

This framing is actually pretty important because one of the things that Boyd and his followers attempted to do in their fight for the Lightweight Fighter Concept was to characterize their aircraft as the de-facto successor to the P-51. The narrative that they really leaned into is that the AAC did not want the aircraft at all, only favored the highly complex designs like the P-47 and P-38, and had to basically have the plane shoved down their throat by a group of insurgent officers who went around their chain of commands. In doing so they sought to draw a direct parallel between what North American did with the P-51 and with what they attempted to do with the LWF.

From Stevenson's book on the F-18 in regards to the P-51. Bolding is my emphasis.

"Current doctrine and dogma in the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force state that sophisticated technology will remedy America's numerical inferiority. Lightweight fighter advocates maintain that the increase of sophistication in today's fighters is as faulty a decision as the military's belief prior to World War II that the bomber was invincible and would not need fighter escort. In light of today's Navy and Air Force resistance to lightweight fighters, it is ironic that the two most capable fighters in World War II were lightweight fighters."

"The fact that the P-51, the most successful fighter in World War II, was not only that era's lightest fighter—and not, as Larry Welch suggests, the most sophisticated of the day—is a testimony to the tenacity of the lightweight fighter union within the Army Air Force. Most of the benefits of lightweight fighters—lower cost, greater numbers for equal dollars, and higher performance—were known as far back as World War II."

"As the threat of World War II escalated from a possibility to a probability, the weight of fighter aircraft declined, and as fighters lost weight, they gained capability—not only individually but collectively. The lightweight fighter was ubiquitous, gave military commanders more options, and ultimately created larger exchange ratios against enemy fighters than did its more adipose stablemates. Fighter aircraft like the P-51 Mustang, F8F Bearcat, and F-16 Falcon are examples of fighters that are lighter than their contemporaries, are less expensive, and have greater performance."

"The benefits of the lightweight fighter concept were not lost on the designer of the P-51, Ed Schmued. While Republic Aviation was proposing an 11,500-pound XP-47 design, Schmued's XP-51 flew in October 1940 with a gross weight of only 7,965 pounds. The addition of the Merlin engine, the engine that made it famous, increased the weight to only 8,350 pounds. Schmued said that unnecessary Army Air Force regulations kept the P-51 heavier than necessary."

"Lightweight fighter advocates point out that the ME 262 versus the P-51 exemplifies their argument. The ME 262 was a quantum leap in technology over the P-51, new technology versus old, jet versus piston. Today, no nation has a fighter that equals the technological leap that the ME 262 represented over the P-51. But in spite of this difference in capability, the larger numbers of the less sophisticated P-51s so totally dominated the environment that the ME 262 was unable to exact a better than 1.5 to 1 exchange ratio against the "inferior" Mustang, an exchange ratio poorer than the 2.5:1 ratio the Navy said was unacceptable in Vietnam."

In the above excerpts you can see how they saw themselves as the spiritual successors to North American and also how they credit their own "Lightweight Fighter" concept for the Mustangs success. Note how when it comes to making the claims that the P-51 is a lightweight fighter that only the P-47 and the P-38 are considered in terms of "contemporary" and not any of the other Allied or Axis fighters; however when it comes to making the paradigm between complexity and simplicity that the point of discussion shifts to the Me-262.

The reasoning for this is pretty simple; when compared to contemporary fighters the P-51 is not exceptionally lightweight. It's empty weight is a good bit heavier than the Spitfire, P-39, and Bf.109. In fact it's initial empty weight was basically similar to that of the P-40, the aircraft that it was designed as a substitute for. As the war progressed the P-51 would become increasingly heavier due to the additional fuel required for the escort mission and the redesign between the P-51C to P-51D.

This trend was also not unique to the P-51 either; pretty much every nations single engine fighters would balloon in weight throughout the war; the Bf.109K was approximately 40% heavier than the Bf.109E. The Fw-190 also experienced significant levels of weight growth.

Similar statements can be made about the cost and complexity of the P-51; it was cheaper than both the P-47 and the P-38 but was not designed as an exceptionally cheap fighter in the same vein as the LWF that Sprey envisioned. It's manufacturing cost was pretty much similar to that of the P-40 and was also significantly greater than that of the Bf.109. At the same time there are some aspects of the P-51 manufacturing process that made it complex, namely its wing design, and the manufacturing standards that North American was able to maintain. Likewise the Merlin-61, and its supercharger arrangement, was more complex than that of the Allison engine that it had initially been adopted with.

Stevenson instead decides to focus on the combat record of the Me.262 because the relative success or failure of the P-47 / P-38 would be a lot more muddled. He does mention that the P-47 was relegated to a ground attack role because it didn't have the range required to escort the bombers, and then erroneously claims that was the task that it was designed for. Likewise he mentions that the P-38 was pulled out of Europe due to "it's inability to cope with the air-to-air environment" which completely discounts it's contributions in the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters.

The reason that they projected their own design philosophies and lionized the P-51 is because it was successful, and because it is rhetorically useful plot device to use as a cudgel to use against USAF brass since the 1970's. Airplanes like the P-39, which forewent a complex turbocharger, in favor of a simple single stage mechanical supercharger, because its service record in American hands was ultimately lackluster.

 

[GregP]

Well, I was around when the original specs for what became the F-35 were "sold" to start funding the program. One of the main tenets of the original JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) program, which eventually resulted in the F-35, was that it would be able to be a good fighter when the bombs were dropped. As time went on, that sort of got slowly less and less important, seemingly. As it flies now, it just isn't a good fighter. Sort of like an F-86D model was ... not much of a fighter.

Doesn't carry enough air-to-air ordnance to do anything except for 0 - 2 targets per sortie. We all know the evil horde won't attack with 1 - 2 aircraft, it will be a LOT more.

At least the F-15, F-16, and F-22 have some punch. The F-35 is, at best, inadequate to shoot down attackers except in very small numbers. It might have great avionics, but if you can't DO anything with them, they are useless in practice.

 

[Squish]

Well, I was around when the original specs for what became the F-35 were "sold" to start funding the program. One of the main tenets of the original JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) program, which eventually resulted in the F-35, was that it would be able to be a good fighter when the bombs were dropped. As time went on, that sort of got slowly less and less important, seemingly. As it flies now, it just isn't a good fighter. Sort of like an F-86D model was ... not much of a fighter.

Doesn't carry enough air-to-air ordnance to do anything except for 0 - 2 targets per sortie. We all know the evil horde won't attack with 1 - 2 aircraft, it will be a LOT more.

At least the F-15, F-16, and F-22 have some punch. The F-35 is, at best, inadequate to shoot down attackers except in very small numbers. It might have great avionics, but if you can't DO anything with them, they are useless in practice.

What makes you say that the F-35 is a bad fighter? In comparison to the F-15 or the F-16? Is 14 missiles enough air-to-air ordanance?

The reason that you don't ever see this configuration is just because it compromises the stealth of the aircraft and is just a fundamental misuse of its capabilities and sheds its largest advantage over 4th and 4.5 Generation fighters. But the capability to festoon it with missiles is a capability that exists.

 

[J.D.]

Because that is almost precisely what he did with the Lightweight Fighter Program.

From Flying Camelot by Michael Hankins; the bolding is my emphasis.

Sprey based his plans on the existing initial work by General Dynamics and Northrop, the FX-404 and N-700 respectively. For specific requirements, Sprey called for using far less fuel than previous fighters and for using lighter materials, even if that meant relaxing safety standards. Avionics was a sticking point—he argued against forward-looking radars, saying they "have been singularly unsuccessful in tactical air combat," and that ground-based radars should be used instead. Although Sprey allowed for some electronics (such as a ranging gun sight, UHF radio, and a passive electronic countermeasures receiver for warning), he insisted on eliminating as much avionics and computer equipment as possible, including automated navigation and intercept computers, autopilot, digital data links, and identify-friend-or-foe systems. He called for maneuvering capability at speeds from Mach .4 to Mach 1.5 and saw no need to go above Mach 2. He demanded a single, low bypass ratio (0.5) engine, claiming a second engine was a liability. He favored guns over missiles but wanted the smallest caliber gun that was still capable of destroying an enemy plane. He completely rejected the radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and infrared AIM-4 Falcon missiles and judged the AIM-9 Sidewinder as "almost acceptable." He also called for deleting other features, including self-sealing tanks, a bulletproof windshield, a powered canopy, nose wheel steering, a tailhook, and nuclear protection.

The LWF as envisioned by the Fighter Plane Mafia would have been a one-trick pony who's only merit would have been turn-fighting at close range with no other capabilities. When the USAF actually adopted the aircraft, they significantly altered it from what Boyd and his followers envisioned and they actively lobbied against it. Not only would they lobby against the multirole capabilities of the F-16, they would also spend the rest of their careers lobbying against the F-15 and that the F-16 should replace it in the air to air role, and they would eventually even end up lobbying against the F-16 by demanding that it perform a flyoff against the F-20. There was never a plane that they didn't think would benefit by being smaller, lighter, cheaper, and better at turning.

Hankins book terminates with the Gulf-War and the Boyd acolytes fading into irrelevancy. However even when we look at Sprey's works after 1991 and until his passing...he was always advocating for exactly the same thing...hence the slideshow from 2006 which is advocating for replacing the F-22 with just hordes of F-16s.


We should address what this statement actually means and give it some kind of context and actually quantify what "quite well" looks like for the Ki-43 because I think this statement is just fundamentally wrong.

First I think it should be stated that the Ki-43 is an exemplary dogfighter; it was essentially designed for that specific purpose to the detriment of other attributes. For instance due to its extremely light design it did not have any useful payload of bombs and its primary armament was the weakest of basically any fighter during World War II with being limited to 2x.50 caliber machine guns for most of the war.

Let's start with Clarinbould's conclusion and see what "success" looks like for the Ki-43 in the SWPA.


This is from Claringbould's book P-47D Thunderbolt vs Ki-43 Oscar and is in regards to the documented aerial losses of Ki-43 and P-47 Thunderbolts in New Guinea. The figures that he cites are from his own work of cross referencing claims vs verified losses and represents his most educated guess on the actual loss ratio between Thunderbolts and Oscars in New Guinea.

"Perhaps a more valid comparison between the effectiveness of the P-47 and the Ki-43 in New Guinea in 1943–44 can be made by studying the number of actual losses of Thunderbolts and "Oscars" based on confirmed evidence. As previously noted, nine (perhaps ten) P-47s fell to the Ki-43, while 19 "Oscars" were shot down by Thunderbolts. This presents a kill ratio of approximately 2-to-1 in favor of the P-47. Such a figure would have astounded Fifth Air Force commanders who assessed that it was exponentially higher, and it is clear that the maneuverability of the "Oscar" and the tactics employed by its pilots served the IJAAF well.

However, these figures are secondary to the greater reality that most Ki-43s were destroyed on the ground by Fifth Air Force strafers and bombers – a threat that the Japanese could not negate. This was devastation on an industrial scale, and the fundamental misfortune and destiny of the IJAAF in New Guinea."

I personally do not find a 2:1 loss ratio to make any form of compelling case in favor of the Oscar. It certainly belays the point that the P-47 is perhaps over-rated by its fans, and that there was rampant over-claiming in the SWPA on both sides of by a factor of 6 according to Claringbould. Taking the loss ratio at face value, you need 2x as many Oscars as Thunderbolts in order to have equal impact in the air...and only in the fighter to fighter role. In every other conceivable role, from bomber destruction, to strafing, the Oscar is immeasurably worse. And the degree to which it is immeasurably worse is a direct result of its single minded design focus on dogfighting.

Maybe I didn't make my point well enough.

This was not about trying to build a case that the USAAF should have used the Oscar or that, as things stood, the Oscar was superior. Nor was it supposed to be specific to the P-47 v Ki-43. You raised it and I thought it was a useful illustration.

I actually said that the USAAF would never have accepted it as it was but that history showed that, when examined closely, the aircraft didn't do nearly as badly as has been assumed or as what could be assumed from the spec sheet. A lot of Oscars didn't even have radios yet even at a 2:1 loss rate... that doesn't exactly paint the sort of picture you'd expect of inferior types being hacked from the sky in huge numbers. And even with only two machine guns, it was sufficient to take down a P-47.

My point was that a lightweight fighter in the Pacific might have been a useful thing.

 

[Squish]

Maybe I didn't make my point well enough.

This was not about trying to build a case that the USAAF should have used the Oscar or that, as things stood, the Oscar was superior. Nor was it supposed to be specific to the P-47 v Ki-43. You raised it and I thought it was a useful illustration.

I actually said that the USAAF would never have accepted it as it was but that history showed that, when examined closely, the aircraft didn't do nearly as badly as has been assumed or as what could be assumed from the spec sheet. A lot of Oscars didn't even have radios yet even at a 2:1 loss rate... that doesn't exactly paint the sort of picture you'd expect of inferior types being hacked from the sky in huge numbers. And even with only two machine guns, it was sufficient to take down a P-47.

My point was that a lightweight fighter in the Pacific might have been a useful thing.

The aircraft not doing as badly as originally assumed still does not paint a good overall picture. Losing twice as many pilots, many of them veterans at that point, to a relatively green unit while fighting in basically the ideal circumstances is simply not good.

Pilot training and being able to replace pilot losses is one of the biggest bottlenecks of the whole entire war. Losing double the number of fighter pilots on average is something that is not sustainable. The collapse of the IJAAF, IJNAF, and the Luftwaffe can just as largely be attributed to losing it's veteran pilots at unsustainable rates and compounding shortcuts that were increasingly taken to generate replacement pilots of sub-par quality further compounded their collapse in combat potential.

A 2:1 loss rate in fighter to fighter combat, especially when the "lightweight" fighter concept prioritizes specializing in that mission at the cost of all others, really betrays the flaw of the premise.

So what is the case for an American LWF in the Pacific? Under what circumstances would having a qualitative disadvantage of losing pilots at double the rate have been preferable to the actual routes that the AAF or USN actually took?

 

[J.D.]

So what is the case for an American LWF in the Pacific? Under what circumstances would having a qualitative disadvantage of losing pilots at double the rate have been preferable to the actual routes that the AAF or USN actually took?

Well, that's taking it literally, which assumes the same things I said I wasn't advocating. 2:1 losses, in this case, are predicated on a LWF being built to the same standards as the Oscar and the opposition being a P-47.

I've said it already: the USAAF would never have accepted an aircraft built that way.

 

[ThomasP]

re

When is the last time the USA allowed a BVR weapoin to be used air-to-air? The short answer is never to date.

Not quite true.

The USAF/USN ROE allowed BVR missile shots if the required conditions were met. There were 61(+/-2) AIM-7 missiles fired BVR during the Vietnam War, with a success rate of 2 kills. The reason for the strict ROE was the inability to reliably ID the target as friend-or-foe.

During Desert Storm the ROE allowed the USAF F-15C to make at least 16 BVR shots - the reason that I say at least 16 is that that is how many air-to-air kills were scored with AIM-7M Sparrow missiles launched from BVR, but the number of missiles launched BVR is still classified (I think - at least I have not been able to find the info). WVR the F-15Cs made 8 kills using the AIM-7M, and 7 kills with the AIM-9M. No other US aircraft made any BVR kills during Desert Storm (I think).

The current extreme emphasis placed on the avionics and data link / networking capability of the more recently introduced airframes like the F-35 is to allow the needed BVR IFF and location of the target, which in turn will allow greater use of BVR weapon systems - even under fairly strict ROE.

[edited for clarity]