Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2 (1 Viewer)
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,002
- Jun 25, 2013
Well, Germany did attack through Poland, although, at the time, Germany and the USSR had a non-aggression pact, and both countries pretty much simultaneously attacked Poland: neither Germany nor the USSR* had any use for an independent Poland.
For Hitler to have kept the UK out of the war, he'd have to forego attacking Poland. Since destruction of Poland was a historical goal of both Germany (and Prussia before that) and the USSR (and Russia before that), that wasn't going to happen. While anti-bolshevism was a third cornerstone of nazi ideology, I suspect, had the USSR was seen as more militarily competent*, Hitler would have stopped before crossing into Soviet-controlled areas.
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* Would Hitler have attacked the USSR had it been able to quickly conquer Finland? I suspect the answer would have been "no."
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parsifal
Colonel
The claim being made at the beginning of this side siscussion was that Germany could concentrate on Ruaaia and not attack Britain. That is effectively impossible after Munich.
So now we are facing a slight variation to that. Firstly the pursuers of the German wet dream for WWII are saying 'just attack poland, then push onto the SU. All sorts of problems arise from that. The first is that Britain and france by definition have to be in the war under that scenario. Germany cannot attack Poland without bringing into the war France and Britain after munich. I will concede that hitler had a very outside, remote chance of succeeding over the Danzig corridor issue without full scale war breaking out, but there simply is no way that Germany can unleash a steamroller on Poland without drawing into the war France and Britain. France and Britain
So an attack into Poland in the late summer of 1939 will lead to a two front war for Germany. In 1939 she has 50 front line divisions in the east and 15 2nd and 3rd line divisions in the west. She has the hoax known as the Siegfried line and a neutral Belgium temporarily blocking the northern corridor to the Ruhr. She has shortages of oil (very reduced oil from Rumania until the fall of france), limited other strategic materials 9none being shipped by the SU) and a strong liklehood of action by the western allies. France intended to launch major offensives in early 1941…..with the SU in the mix it can be expected they will bring this forward at least a year. Belgium was interested in joining the allies but was looking for security assurances from the French and british. These could be provided by the Summer '40.
Germany has no hope of winning a two front war in 1939/40. The whole reason for her success in 1940 was her ability to concentrate forces which she could not do with Russia in the war. in her much weakened military position, she would be facing at least 200 Soviet Divisions and not nearly enough raw materials, MT or munitions to finish the job.
There are all sorts of problems with an attack in 1939 or 1940
So now we are facing a slight variation to that. Firstly the pursuers of the German wet dream for WWII are saying 'just attack poland, then push onto the SU. All sorts of problems arise from that. The first is that Britain and france by definition have to be in the war under that scenario. Germany cannot attack Poland without bringing into the war France and Britain after munich. I will concede that hitler had a very outside, remote chance of succeeding over the Danzig corridor issue without full scale war breaking out, but there simply is no way that Germany can unleash a steamroller on Poland without drawing into the war France and Britain. France and Britain
So an attack into Poland in the late summer of 1939 will lead to a two front war for Germany. In 1939 she has 50 front line divisions in the east and 15 2nd and 3rd line divisions in the west. She has the hoax known as the Siegfried line and a neutral Belgium temporarily blocking the northern corridor to the Ruhr. She has shortages of oil (very reduced oil from Rumania until the fall of france), limited other strategic materials 9none being shipped by the SU) and a strong liklehood of action by the western allies. France intended to launch major offensives in early 1941…..with the SU in the mix it can be expected they will bring this forward at least a year. Belgium was interested in joining the allies but was looking for security assurances from the French and british. These could be provided by the Summer '40.
Germany has no hope of winning a two front war in 1939/40. The whole reason for her success in 1940 was her ability to concentrate forces which she could not do with Russia in the war. in her much weakened military position, she would be facing at least 200 Soviet Divisions and not nearly enough raw materials, MT or munitions to finish the job.
There are all sorts of problems with an attack in 1939 or 1940
parsifal
Colonel
Bottom line....Germany was boxed in after munich and war with the west a foregone conclusion. She lacked the means in 1939 to fight a two front war. She lacked the means to fight a one front war in the east.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"She lacked the means to fight a one front war in the east."
For a hopeless, hamstrung, misguided nation, Germany certainly did an remarkable job of out-fighting Russia for most of the war in the East.
Parsifal, since you're so knowledgeable about German shortcomings,
, I would appreciate hearing whether or not you think Germany, unencumbered by the war with Russia, could have been defeated by Britain and the USA ... without recourse to the A bomb.
Germany and Russia bound by the 1939 M-R Pact ... Germany has resources for $$$ and technology.
For a hopeless, hamstrung, misguided nation, Germany certainly did an remarkable job of out-fighting Russia for most of the war in the East.
Parsifal, since you're so knowledgeable about German shortcomings,
, I would appreciate hearing whether or not you think Germany, unencumbered by the war with Russia, could have been defeated by Britain and the USA ... without recourse to the A bomb.Germany and Russia bound by the 1939 M-R Pact ... Germany has resources for $$$ and technology.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
IMO, the most important battle in Europe was the Battle of Moscow December-January 1941-42
parsifal
Colonel
Germany in 1939 lacked the divisions, the MT and the AFVs to take on Russia. The conquest of France Belgium and the BEF yielded more than 100000 vehicles to the German armed forces, and between june 1940 and june 1941, French and Dutch motor vehicle factories delivered more than 40000 soft skinned vehicles to the heer. Im not 100% sure of wastage in that time, but about 50000 vehicles would seem a reasonable guess
On top of that German domestic production was in the order of 80000 vehicles in that period 1939-40 iirc.
Overall, the German motor transport park grew by about 180-200000 vehicles, 80% of which ended up in military service. When it is considered that about 600000 truck were committed to Barbarossa, the importance of this delay comes home in spades.
There were other areas that needed to be critically expanded and improved.....the ones that call to mind immediately include the expansion and modernisation of the tank arm. Railways management was another area the germans needed to address before they could make any deep penetrations into Russia. Even after 22 months of constant expansion the German railways management (i forget the title of this ministry) could still only manage three main axes of advance, and these could only advance to the minsk/riga/Kiev lines in the first 6 months of the real campaign. The advance to Riga was the easiest component, because of the similarities of the Baltic states railnet to the german system
The A-Bomb didn't produce outright victory in any theatre all on its own, so I cant see it winning outright in the ETO either just by itself.
The biggest problem facing the western allies against Germany unencumbered by a war in the East, was manpower. The british were running out of men entirely by Normandy. the problem for the US was slightly more nuanced. They had plenty of men as such, but they lacked trained manpower. its hard to see the Americans working up the mass army strategy in time to defeat the Germans in time, and I cant see how a nuclear strategy will deliver complete victory either
however I also don't see the Russians as single handedly being able to win either. It was a coaltion of nations that defeated the Germans
On top of that German domestic production was in the order of 80000 vehicles in that period 1939-40 iirc.
Overall, the German motor transport park grew by about 180-200000 vehicles, 80% of which ended up in military service. When it is considered that about 600000 truck were committed to Barbarossa, the importance of this delay comes home in spades.
There were other areas that needed to be critically expanded and improved.....the ones that call to mind immediately include the expansion and modernisation of the tank arm. Railways management was another area the germans needed to address before they could make any deep penetrations into Russia. Even after 22 months of constant expansion the German railways management (i forget the title of this ministry) could still only manage three main axes of advance, and these could only advance to the minsk/riga/Kiev lines in the first 6 months of the real campaign. The advance to Riga was the easiest component, because of the similarities of the Baltic states railnet to the german system
The A-Bomb didn't produce outright victory in any theatre all on its own, so I cant see it winning outright in the ETO either just by itself.
The biggest problem facing the western allies against Germany unencumbered by a war in the East, was manpower. The british were running out of men entirely by Normandy. the problem for the US was slightly more nuanced. They had plenty of men as such, but they lacked trained manpower. its hard to see the Americans working up the mass army strategy in time to defeat the Germans in time, and I cant see how a nuclear strategy will deliver complete victory either
however I also don't see the Russians as single handedly being able to win either. It was a coaltion of nations that defeated the Germans
parsifal
Colonel
Take out the massacres carried out by the germans and the loss rates still favour the germans, but not by much when you consider who was on the attack most. German and Russian losses in military operations, as opposed to all causes is still hotly debated, but I believe Russian military casualties are between 9 and 12 million. German East Front casualties have been qioted as low as 2 million, but many reject that number. most settle on a figure of about 5 million for the germans.
As far as the germans outfighting the Russians, what are you basing that on? Germany was on the attack for a total of 10 months (not contiguously) during the campaign, whilst Russian was on the offensive for a total of 24 months, the remainder i would consider in a condition of stalemate. not bad for a nation being consistently and decisively outfought.
Shortround6
Major General
A problem with a lot of these comparisons is that there are several things you need to wage war, man power is a big one and not all divisions are the same. Some are divisions in name only and might be more properly described as regiments (or even battalions on occasion). Both Germany and Russian were guilty of this at times.
Industrial might comes into play, using steel simply because I have the figures. The US was No 1 not only by a large margin but it produced more steel per year than the rest of the world put together and still had a large margin. The US from 1942 to 1945 produced 80.6 to 86.6 million tons of steel per year. Germany was No 2 with (excluding 1945) a low of 21.5 anda high of 30.6 million tons. The UK was 3rd with just around 12-13 million tons per year, The Russians started good with a claimed 17.9 million tons in 1941 but it took until 1944 to get over 8.5 million tons. Japan never got over 8.8 million tons and Canada, after 1940 pretty much equalled Italy, Hungary and Romania put together.
Effective use of the weapons (actual tactics/combat performance) is also important, It was here that the Germans shined, although brighter in some spots than others (some spots are better described as black holes). But good tactics/discipline can only do so much in the face of fuel and ammunition shortages.
Germany may have had the power to take on England or Russia, it did not have the power to take on both. Once the US entered the war it was game over. Even without A bombs.
The British, American and Russian armies could artillery fire their way across the German held areas, Not elegant, or smart but if you can fire many times the artillery shells your enemy can he has to be awful clever to make up for it. British, American and Russian field communications were getting better too, more radios per division allowing for better coordination (in general , there will always be foul ups).
Industrial might comes into play, using steel simply because I have the figures. The US was No 1 not only by a large margin but it produced more steel per year than the rest of the world put together and still had a large margin. The US from 1942 to 1945 produced 80.6 to 86.6 million tons of steel per year. Germany was No 2 with (excluding 1945) a low of 21.5 anda high of 30.6 million tons. The UK was 3rd with just around 12-13 million tons per year, The Russians started good with a claimed 17.9 million tons in 1941 but it took until 1944 to get over 8.5 million tons. Japan never got over 8.8 million tons and Canada, after 1940 pretty much equalled Italy, Hungary and Romania put together.
Effective use of the weapons (actual tactics/combat performance) is also important, It was here that the Germans shined, although brighter in some spots than others (some spots are better described as black holes). But good tactics/discipline can only do so much in the face of fuel and ammunition shortages.
Germany may have had the power to take on England or Russia, it did not have the power to take on both. Once the US entered the war it was game over. Even without A bombs.
The British, American and Russian armies could artillery fire their way across the German held areas, Not elegant, or smart but if you can fire many times the artillery shells your enemy can he has to be awful clever to make up for it. British, American and Russian field communications were getting better too, more radios per division allowing for better coordination (in general , there will always be foul ups).
parsifal
Colonel
It would be far from all beer and skittles for the allies. If there is no war in Russia, germany has the opportunity to normalise its workforce, which will lift production in all areas, including steel.
Moreover, massive amounts of American steel were needed to replace and build up shipping losses. 7 million tons of shipping were built in 1942 and 14 million in 1943. In terms of raw steel consumption to make those ships, ive read that the allies expended 10 tons of steel to make 7 tons of shipping. That means that straight away, of that 30 million tons 20 million of it is earmarked for non-combat purposes. Massive proportions of US forces never left the continental US, and there were reasons for that. One of the reasons was the shortages of shipping. until the shipping issue was solved, buidup of US forces was going to be very limited. After a year of effort at building up their forces for TORCH, the US was able to commit the equivalent of a single corps. Hardly the stuff of a ramaging army. After 3 years of continuous buildup, the US effort amounted to less than 70 divs. This was a finitie limit for the americans, no matter what they did they could not expand any faster than that.....They struggled against the 40 or so german divs deployed in the west, with British and Canadian help. What would have happened if there were 100+ frontline German divs to face them ?
A war against germany unfettered by the Russian front was unwinnable for the allies.
I have good friends in this debate. it was napoleon who said "victory does not always belong to the big battalions" . The American penchant to rely on firepower and numbers will not always work im afraid
Moreover, massive amounts of American steel were needed to replace and build up shipping losses. 7 million tons of shipping were built in 1942 and 14 million in 1943. In terms of raw steel consumption to make those ships, ive read that the allies expended 10 tons of steel to make 7 tons of shipping. That means that straight away, of that 30 million tons 20 million of it is earmarked for non-combat purposes. Massive proportions of US forces never left the continental US, and there were reasons for that. One of the reasons was the shortages of shipping. until the shipping issue was solved, buidup of US forces was going to be very limited. After a year of effort at building up their forces for TORCH, the US was able to commit the equivalent of a single corps. Hardly the stuff of a ramaging army. After 3 years of continuous buildup, the US effort amounted to less than 70 divs. This was a finitie limit for the americans, no matter what they did they could not expand any faster than that.....They struggled against the 40 or so german divs deployed in the west, with British and Canadian help. What would have happened if there were 100+ frontline German divs to face them ?
A war against germany unfettered by the Russian front was unwinnable for the allies.
I have good friends in this debate. it was napoleon who said "victory does not always belong to the big battalions" . The American penchant to rely on firepower and numbers will not always work im afraid
Shortround6
Major General
It certainly wouldn't be beer and skittles but the Germans also have limits on manpower and raw materials
One web site claims in 1943 only 42% of the iron ore used was produced in Germany, 38% was from Sweden and 20% was fro occupied territories (mosty France?)
germans were getting Manganese from the ukraine, tin and tungsten (ores) from Portugal and Chrome ore from turkey. Once the German empire starts to collapse material shortages are going to start showing up.
One web site claims in 1943 only 42% of the iron ore used was produced in Germany, 38% was from Sweden and 20% was fro occupied territories (mosty France?)
germans were getting Manganese from the ukraine, tin and tungsten (ores) from Portugal and Chrome ore from turkey. Once the German empire starts to collapse material shortages are going to start showing up.
parsifal
Colonel
Another issue to consider are the reasons for Germany's attack on Russia in the first place. it has been suggested this arose primarily because of hitlers insane hatred of the jews and Slavic peoples. Certainly true to an extent, but there were more immediate reasons in the road to war with the USSR
Firstly, Germany saw the Russian occupation of the Baltic states as a betrayal of a prior understanding between the two nations. germany viewed these states as German clients, and no agreement had been reached with respect to allowing the Russians to occupy them.
Secondly, the Soviet aggression against Rumania was seen as a blow to a vital German interest. As was Stalins overall and stated intent to bring the whole of the Balkans under his control.
Thirdly was the consistent refusal by the russianss to move South rather than SE. These revelations all occurred about the time hitler was making his decisions in the latter part of 1940. Virtually none of hitlers thinking processes and decisions had much to do with continued British resistance, though I don't disagree that he should have paid far more attention to this when making his decision. Hitler correctly surmised that England was "on the canvas" after Dunkirk and wouldn't be any problem to him for some time to come. He believed he could use blitzkrieg to knock out Russia before any of that mattered. He was wrong.
Firstly, Germany saw the Russian occupation of the Baltic states as a betrayal of a prior understanding between the two nations. germany viewed these states as German clients, and no agreement had been reached with respect to allowing the Russians to occupy them.
Secondly, the Soviet aggression against Rumania was seen as a blow to a vital German interest. As was Stalins overall and stated intent to bring the whole of the Balkans under his control.
Thirdly was the consistent refusal by the russianss to move South rather than SE. These revelations all occurred about the time hitler was making his decisions in the latter part of 1940. Virtually none of hitlers thinking processes and decisions had much to do with continued British resistance, though I don't disagree that he should have paid far more attention to this when making his decision. Hitler correctly surmised that England was "on the canvas" after Dunkirk and wouldn't be any problem to him for some time to come. He believed he could use blitzkrieg to knock out Russia before any of that mattered. He was wrong.
parsifal
Colonel
I agree the gerans have their share of problems. For them to contiinue resistance effectively it would be necessary for them to have conitued access to Russian resources, as well as Swedish iron ore etc.
You can probably draw some rough parallels with WWI here.....with Russia knocked out of the war in 1918, it still took the combined efforts of Britain, France, the Empire the US and a bunch of other small nations to achieve victory. in this scenario we have missing France and Russia, and the efforts of the dominions is much reduced comparatively, mostly because of the PTO. A small portion of USGFs are also tied up in the far east.
I think in this scenario the allies would make their way through Spain rather than a cross channel attack
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michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... Germany saw the Russian occupation of the Baltic states as a betrayal of a prior understanding between the two nations. germany viewed these states as German clients, and no agreement had been reached with respect to allowing the Russians to occupy them."
Parsifal, are you saying the Secret Protocols of the August, 1939, Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact are fiction?? Sounds like it!
Hitler knew very well what he agreed to, granted he did NOT appreciate Stalin's opportunistic greed in taking all of Lithuania and Bukovina, however he also knew he would occupy those areas soon enough ... AND HE DID.
I base my claim (with the exception of Bagration, in 1944) of Germany outfighting the Soviets to the long fighting retreat and the successful breakouts that the Germans achieved ... they were as formidable in defense as in attack. For the most part they made the Russians pay more dearly to retake the ground than Germany had paid to take it in the first place.
Parsifal, are you saying the Secret Protocols of the August, 1939, Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact are fiction?? Sounds like it!
Hitler knew very well what he agreed to, granted he did NOT appreciate Stalin's opportunistic greed in taking all of Lithuania and Bukovina, however he also knew he would occupy those areas soon enough ... AND HE DID.
I base my claim (with the exception of Bagration, in 1944) of Germany outfighting the Soviets to the long fighting retreat and the successful breakouts that the Germans achieved ... they were as formidable in defense as in attack. For the most part they made the Russians pay more dearly to retake the ground than Germany had paid to take it in the first place.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"... A war against germany unfettered by the Russian front was unwinnable for the allies."
Damn hard to do.
"... It was a coalition of nations that defeated the Germans"
More like a coalition of ideologies
Damn hard to do.
"... It was a coalition of nations that defeated the Germans"
More like a coalition of ideologies
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Shortround6
Major General
I believe that England alone (and I include the commonwealth) could not have done it. England and America probably could have but it would have take longer (several years) and cost many more Commonwealth and American lives.
as far as raw manpower goes, in 1939 Germany had around 80 million people (that included Austria and the Sudetenland) and the Americans had 132 million.
turing raw manpower into combat divisions is a bit different
The UK had about 46 million, commonwealth had ???? India being a huge question mark as how many Indian soldiers could you raise to go fight in Europe?
The Soviet population in 1937 was 170 million but that number was manipulated to match Stalin's number in a report to the All-Union Communist Party, doesn't really matter if it is off by 10 million or so.
The Problems with turning large populations into large armies is weapons production and training. There were stories ( I don't know how true) of Russian 3rd wave troops being issued no rifle but just a few 5 round clips of ammunition, before being sent forward to attack, they were expected to pick up a rifle from a dead or wounded soldier from the 1st or 2nd wave. This was in some of the darkest days and things certainly got better as the war went on.
as far as raw manpower goes, in 1939 Germany had around 80 million people (that included Austria and the Sudetenland) and the Americans had 132 million.
turing raw manpower into combat divisions is a bit different
The UK had about 46 million, commonwealth had ???? India being a huge question mark as how many Indian soldiers could you raise to go fight in Europe?
The Soviet population in 1937 was 170 million but that number was manipulated to match Stalin's number in a report to the All-Union Communist Party, doesn't really matter if it is off by 10 million or so.
The Problems with turning large populations into large armies is weapons production and training. There were stories ( I don't know how true) of Russian 3rd wave troops being issued no rifle but just a few 5 round clips of ammunition, before being sent forward to attack, they were expected to pick up a rifle from a dead or wounded soldier from the 1st or 2nd wave. This was in some of the darkest days and things certainly got better as the war went on.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
Parsifal, I think you are misunderstanding my post.
I didn't say that there was a viable strategy "Germany could concentrate on Ruaaia and not attack Britain" the point I was making Without Britain in the war, the Soviets can't survive Barbarossa.
Well no, not necessarily.
We are talking July of 1940 here, so Poland is already occupied, and France is no longer in the war.
The question is, would Britain be successfully invaded (unlikely in the extreme) or would they seek an armictice and exit the war. (Possible but unlikely, given the personalities involved)
There WAS a discussion during Dunkirk, with some members of the British cabinet in favour of asking Italy to mediate a deal with Germany, and Hitler himself being in favour of some deal with Britain.
May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis - Wikipedia
Obviously the two sides were miles apart, with each side unwilling to concede anything close to what the other would accept, nevertheless there was a possibility of a negotiated settlement (however remote)
Shortround6
Major General
For Russia alone in 1941 (France already out and British negotiate a peace of some sort) things get real iffy.
Yes Russia has roughly twice the manpower, however after the German gains of the summer/fall of 1941 Russian steel production drops to about 1/2 of what it was before the German invasion and is roughly 1/4 to 1/3 of German steel production.
Without lend lease Russia's survival may be iffy in 1942. Russia's ability to go the offensive in 1943 will be pretty much non-existent.
Worst case is Russians loose, best case is a years long stalemate.
A lot depends on how the lend lease is valued and how much the lend lease substituted for Russian production and when. For instance when you simply compare lend lease tanks to total Russian production the argument can be made that Russia didn't depend on lend lease
But one book on Russian tanks says 1941 production of Russian tanks was 6,274 of which 1.907 were light tanks (T-40s and T-60s mostly) with no assault guns. Production in 1942 was 24,639 tanks ( (9,553 of the light tanks, now with T-70s) and 51 assault guns while 1943 saw 19,949 tanks (3,463 of them light) with 4,047 assault guns. Some of the tanks were better models so 1000 1943 tanks had more fighting value than 1000 1941 models.
How much or how well lend lease tanks helped fill in the gaps in the winter of 1941/42 or into the spring I don't know (some members here claim up to 20% in certain battles)
Lend lease also covered thousands of tons steel, alloys for making high grade steel, explosives for filling shells, propellent powder for both artillery and small arms and brass/copper for making small arms cartridges. I am not saying the Russians could not make quantities of their own but a Russian army in 1942-44 with even 20% less ammo and supplies would be in a much harder position trying to go over on the offensive.
It gets really difficult trying to assess the impact that lend lease had as a lot of the impact was behind the scenes so to speak.
Yes Russia has roughly twice the manpower, however after the German gains of the summer/fall of 1941 Russian steel production drops to about 1/2 of what it was before the German invasion and is roughly 1/4 to 1/3 of German steel production.
Without lend lease Russia's survival may be iffy in 1942. Russia's ability to go the offensive in 1943 will be pretty much non-existent.
Worst case is Russians loose, best case is a years long stalemate.
A lot depends on how the lend lease is valued and how much the lend lease substituted for Russian production and when. For instance when you simply compare lend lease tanks to total Russian production the argument can be made that Russia didn't depend on lend lease
But one book on Russian tanks says 1941 production of Russian tanks was 6,274 of which 1.907 were light tanks (T-40s and T-60s mostly) with no assault guns. Production in 1942 was 24,639 tanks ( (9,553 of the light tanks, now with T-70s) and 51 assault guns while 1943 saw 19,949 tanks (3,463 of them light) with 4,047 assault guns. Some of the tanks were better models so 1000 1943 tanks had more fighting value than 1000 1941 models.
How much or how well lend lease tanks helped fill in the gaps in the winter of 1941/42 or into the spring I don't know (some members here claim up to 20% in certain battles)
Lend lease also covered thousands of tons steel, alloys for making high grade steel, explosives for filling shells, propellent powder for both artillery and small arms and brass/copper for making small arms cartridges. I am not saying the Russians could not make quantities of their own but a Russian army in 1942-44 with even 20% less ammo and supplies would be in a much harder position trying to go over on the offensive.
It gets really difficult trying to assess the impact that lend lease had as a lot of the impact was behind the scenes so to speak.
parsifal
Colonel
Freebird
Sorry, but that is different to the scenario put to me firstly by Grau Geist and then a variation to that by yourself. This later permutation of what is now well and truly a moving feast, is that Britain will somehow bow out in July1940......well no they didn't, and by july with churchills power well and truly established, it was never going to happen. The change point comes just prior to the French capitulation, by which time Italy is already in the war, with all the problems that entails.
If Italy were to be enticed into the role of honest broker, Britain would be looking for concessions from the Italians before they made their plunge. in reality that was never going to happen, but in my opinion, any chance of that occurring is with the Italians joining the Allies in 1940 and France accepting the Union with great Britain offer made by Churchill. The idea that the British would simply meekly submit to German demands was never going to happen once Winston was in the drivers seat.
Now, the next thing is, whether Russia could withstand Barbarossa without british help. in the longer term, as SR says, things get iffy for Russia without the alliance, but in 1941, assistance from the british to Russia was so minute as to be inconsequential. The logistics realities for the germans meant that additional men they might be able to bring to bear has no benefit to them in 1941. They cant supply them beyond the frontiers, and the frontiers are not where the battle was decided. At least until the end of 1942 that situation would remain the dominant controller of operations in the East. There were no additional resources in the logistics field. Some might argue that the MTO could be "shut down" without being specific as to how that might be achieved, but even if that was temporarily a necessity, an event like the greek invasion, or worse an invasion of Russia is not going to see the british just standing idly by. There will be a reaction.
So no I don't accept this version of alternate history either. Its essentially a straw man argument in my view
Sorry, but that is different to the scenario put to me firstly by Grau Geist and then a variation to that by yourself. This later permutation of what is now well and truly a moving feast, is that Britain will somehow bow out in July1940......well no they didn't, and by july with churchills power well and truly established, it was never going to happen. The change point comes just prior to the French capitulation, by which time Italy is already in the war, with all the problems that entails.
If Italy were to be enticed into the role of honest broker, Britain would be looking for concessions from the Italians before they made their plunge. in reality that was never going to happen, but in my opinion, any chance of that occurring is with the Italians joining the Allies in 1940 and France accepting the Union with great Britain offer made by Churchill. The idea that the British would simply meekly submit to German demands was never going to happen once Winston was in the drivers seat.
Now, the next thing is, whether Russia could withstand Barbarossa without british help. in the longer term, as SR says, things get iffy for Russia without the alliance, but in 1941, assistance from the british to Russia was so minute as to be inconsequential. The logistics realities for the germans meant that additional men they might be able to bring to bear has no benefit to them in 1941. They cant supply them beyond the frontiers, and the frontiers are not where the battle was decided. At least until the end of 1942 that situation would remain the dominant controller of operations in the East. There were no additional resources in the logistics field. Some might argue that the MTO could be "shut down" without being specific as to how that might be achieved, but even if that was temporarily a necessity, an event like the greek invasion, or worse an invasion of Russia is not going to see the british just standing idly by. There will be a reaction.
So no I don't accept this version of alternate history either. Its essentially a straw man argument in my view
Freebird
Master Sergeant
US Lend Lease is not that big a factor is Soviet survival up to Stalingrad, though the lack of Lend Lease (especially trucks) would play a big factor in the post-Kursk offensives and Red army mobility.
However there is a good chance that the war won't last that long
