Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[pbehn]

Not quite. He had mad ideas but he also had the personal charisma, ruthlessness and plain cunning to carry them through. He was surrounded by sycophants who were happy to hang on to his coat tails and do his bidding for personal power and gain irrespective of what was the best for the people of the country.

I agree but that mainly just helped him get power and hold onto it. Most of the German military's achievements were in spite of him not because. When he seriously intervened in a situation it usually brought disaster.

 

[Glider]

I agree but that mainly just helped him get power and hold onto it. Most of the German military's achievements were in spite of him not because. When he seriously intervened in a situation it usually brought disaster.

Exactly the same could be said of course for Stalin from both of us

 

[Glider]

I'm not going there

 

[ljadw]

I'm glad you know so well what I remember and what I forget....and it's particularly nice of you to remind me of things I've forgotten. Being a mind-reader must be a useful skill to possess!

I'll deal with your comments about Hitler's plans for Russia first, then move onto your statements about autarky, and then delve into the tangled topic of appeasement.




Firstly, the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer) was NOT disbanded. Fromm remained in charge from 1 September 1939 thru 20 July 1944. "As soon as possible" is not a timeline. A phrase familiar to military planners that has the same meaning is "as soon as conditions permit." The simple fact is that the Replacement Army remained intact. You can't take an event that did NOT happen (the disbandment of the "Reserve Army") and use it as proof of anything regarding Hitler's intent towards Russia.

Your statements are also highly selective and ignoring all the evidence that contradicts your view. For example, Plan Otto, which started as the annexation of Austria, had a second component dealing with how to invade Russia. Planning for that second part of Plan Otto commenced in July 1940. In December 1940 Plan Otto was renamed Operation Barbarossa. In short, straight after the conquest of France, Hitler orders planning to commence for the invasion of Russia....and yet you're trying to convince me that he had no intention of invading Russia? Sorry, I call BS on that.

Also, let's go back to my previous post about Hitler's early planning for invading Russia. Back in August 1936, he tasked Goering to develop the "Four Year Plan" for the invasion of Russia. Fast forward 4 years EXACTLY and, surprise of surprises, Hitler orders planning for the invasion of Russia. There's no point doing operational planning if you don't have sufficient forces for the task. Hitler recognized that in 1936. The Four Year Plan was designed to expand the German military so that it had the resources to invade Russia. With that plan successfully executed, and with what were perceived as sufficient forces, Hitler embarked on the operational planning (Plan Otto) to invade.

Interestingly, Plan Otto called for the annihilation of 240 Soviet divisions with a planning assumption that the USSR could only generate 60 new divisions in the timeframe. During Operation Barbarossa, the German Army actually destroyed 248 Soviet divisions...but the USSR regenerated 220 new divisions. This highlights Hitler's key flaw....he failed to adapt his plans to changing circumstances. Fall Gelb sought to knock the Western Allies out of the war so that Germany could focus on the Communist threat to the east. When Britain unsportingly refused to be cowed, Hitler had the option of doubling down to remove Britain from the war or proceeding with his plan to turn east. He chose the latter. As I noted previously, whenever Hitler had the chance to consolidate, he instead chose escalation. It was that key attribute that most led to the downfall of the Third Reich by May 1945.





Autarky is the establishment of economic independence and self-sufficiency and hence it is the exact opposite of international trade. Yes, Germany participated in international trade in 1938 because it had not yet achieved autarky. Again, let's go back to the Four Year Plan which started in 1936 with a goal of achieving autarky in 1940. Hitler was more than ready to use whatever tools were available to achieve his goals, which is why other world leaders came to so mistrust him. He would say one thing and then weeks or months later would do the exact opposite. Just look at the treaty signed with the USSR in 1939, accomplished to give Germany some additional breathing room. Hitler had no love of the USSR but he leveraged that treaty to buy space and time so he could finish his "grand plan." Hitler traded with the outside world in 1938 because he had to in order to keep his Four Year Plan moving forward.

The problem is Germany lacked the resources to be self-sufficient. A key shortfall was oil but there were also needs for additional arable land, raw materials, and even extra factory-based production capacity. You can't magically create those things inside a nation with finite geographic and resource limitations without fundamentally altering the make-up of the country...and, even then, you can't magically generate oil if your nation doesn't have that resource. The entire scope of Hitler's offensives can be traced back to the need for autarky. In other words, he didn't want to trade with the international community. He wanted to occupy those lands that had useful resources and pillage them for Germany's benefit. Hence the drive for autarky was the propelling idea that resulted in the war.




I will agree that appeasement is the effort to avoid a war and that once war starts, appeasement is indeed dead. HOWEVER...once that war has commenced, if a country feels it can no longer prevail in the conflict, then it will sue for peace. It is the suing for peace in 1940 that is possible if the Battle of Britain had been lost. The arch-appeasers prior to 1939 would have been among the most vocal in trying to secure peace terms if that's what Parliament decided.

You should note that I don't see appeasement prior to 1939 as a negative thing. Britain needed time to rearm. In 1938, Britain was in no position to do ANYTHING about the German invasion of Czechoslovakia. Likewise, it could do nothing to prevent the invasion of Poland a year later. However, by then, the British Government felt it had sufficient forces on-hand, and rearmament was progressing at sufficient pace, to allow the country to prevail IF war broke out.

Losing most of the Army's heavy equipment in France was a major operational blow. Losing France as a key ally was a major strategic blow. It's entirely conceivable that further operational setbacks during the Battle of Britain could have resulted in the British Government suing for peace. There WERE calls within Parliament in May 1940 for Britain to negotiate terms with Hitler. Those calls would have been amplified if 11 Group had withdrawn, thus denuding London of up-threat defences.

Again, if you read what I wrote previously, I freely admitted the fallacy of the idea that Churchill led a plucky Britain that was united in standing alone against Germany. There were many contrary voices, hence why continued British involvement in the war was anything but a foregone conclusion.

As to rearmament, yes the "10-Year Rule" was abandoned in 1932 but that did not mean that Britain immediately started building up its armed forces. The economy in the early 1930s simply wasn't up to the task of sustaining a massive rearmament programme. The following lists the size of the British Army during the 1930s (the numbers are in thousands)

1930: 317.30
1931: 319.10
1932: 316.80
1933: 316.40
1934: 317.40
1935: 320.80
1936: 339.30
1937: 352.40
1938: 384.80
1939: 1,068.85

It's abundantly clear that, through most of the 1930s, the size of the British Army flat-lined, with only slight increases starting in 1936 and the really big jump only coming after the Munich Crisis. Again, appeasement was necessary because Britain simply wasn't ready for another major war in the 1930s.

About the Ersatzheer : the fact that it was not disbanded is not a good argument :the point is that Hitler gave the order on June 20 to disband it, which means that on that day ,Hitler was not thinking on an attack against the Soviets .That he later changed his opinion is proving what I said : that the Barbarossa decision was not a free ideological decision but a decision forced upon Hitler because he saw no other possibility to finish the war with Britain before the US would intervene .
About Plan Otto : plans do not prove intentions : in the twenties US had plans for war with Britain ,but not intentions .Besides , the war against Britain had til the autumn priority in armament questions . The Wiki article about Plan Otto is totally unreliable .
The Four Year Plan had not as meaning to make Germany ready for war with the USSR .
There is no proof that Fall Gelb wanted to eliminate the Wallies to give Hitler the possibility to focus on the communist threat in the East ,because : there was NO such threat and Hitler knew it and admitted it .
About the autarky : Germany was totally self-sufficient in oil.In September 1939 its imports from South America disappeared, but they were simply replaced by synthetic produced oil.
Germany had in 1939 8,3 million tons of oil (import/production ) of which 5,2 million from imports .
In 1940 6,9 million ,of which 2,1 million imports and the German war machine did not stop.
About appeasement : there were no peace terms for Britain, only capitulation .And we have the proof that the chief of the appeasers (Chamberlain ) opposed capitulation . British position was not bad in June 1940, even better than that of Germany : the only thing Britain had to do was to continue the fight til the US intervened .
About British rearmament : this had nothing to do with appeasement which was born immediately after the Treaty of Versailles .
Britain could not help CZ in 1938, neither could it help Poland in 1939 , but the fact remains that Britain mobilized in 1938 and that Chamberlain told the population that,except a miracle, there would be war in a few days .The only reason why there was no war between Britain and Germany in 1938 ,was that there was no war between Germany and the Czechs in 1938 .
About a possible retreat of Group 11 to airfields north of London : this would not improve Germany's position as Group 11 would still be able to attack the German bombers .And, a bigger destruction of London than happened in the HTL,would also not force Britain to give up : during the Battle of Berlin,a big part of Berlin was destroyed by BC,but Germany did not give up . Thus why would Britain give up ?
About British rearmament : the small increase of the army is not a proof for the claim that there was only a small rearmament ,because there was no need for a big increase of the army .
Priority was given to the LoC with the Empire and thus for the Navy . On the second place came the RAF and the AA Defense to protect the UK against a sudden air attack ( The Douhet Doctrine had a lot of influence ) .The Army came on the last place,and justifiedly ,because Poland would fall before France and Britain could launch an offensive to Berlin . And, even if they could, they would not do it , as the war was not about Poland, but about Germany .
Chamberlain told his sisters the following in 1938 : we can not save, not help CZ, we can only wage a war of revenge which will destroy Europe and the Empire and which will make of CZ a Soviet satellite .
It was the same for Poland .
Britain and France were better off without Poland and CZ,and these were better off without the Wallies .The war was fought for a moral principle ,which was that war was bad and evil and that who started a war was a criminal . ( The Briand-Kellogg Pact ) which outlawed war .

 

[buffnut453]

About the Ersatzheer : the fact that it was not disbanded is not a good argument :the point is that Hitler gave the order on June 20 to disband it, which means that on that day ,Hitler was not thinking on an attack against the Soviets .That he later changed his opinion is proving what I said : that the Barbarossa decision was not a free ideological decision but a decision forced upon Hitler because he saw no other possibility to finish the war with Britain before the US would intervene .
About Plan Otto : plans do not prove intentions : in the twenties US had plans for war with Britain ,but not intentions .Besides , the war against Britain had til the autumn priority in armament questions . The Wiki article about Plan Otto is totally unreliable .
The Four Year Plan had not as meaning to make Germany ready for war with the USSR .
There is no proof that Fall Gelb wanted to eliminate the Wallies to give Hitler the possibility to focus on the communist threat in the East ,because : there was NO such threat and Hitler knew it and admitted it .
About the autarky : Germany was totally self-sufficient in oil.In September 1939 its imports from South America disappeared, but they were simply replaced by synthetic produced oil.
Germany had in 1939 8,3 million tons of oil (import/production ) of which 5,2 million from imports .
In 1940 6,9 million ,of which 2,1 million imports and the German war machine did not stop.
About appeasement : there were no peace terms for Britain, only capitulation .And we have the proof that the chief of the appeasers (Chamberlain ) opposed capitulation . British position was not bad in June 1940, even better than that of Germany : the only thing Britain had to do was to continue the fight til the US intervened .
About British rearmament : this had nothing to do with appeasement which was born immediately after the Treaty of Versailles .
Britain could not help CZ in 1938, neither could it help Poland in 1939 , but the fact remains that Britain mobilized in 1938 and that Chamberlain told the population that,except a miracle, there would be war in a few days .The only reason why there was no war between Britain and Germany in 1938 ,was that there was no war between Germany and the Czechs in 1938 .
About a possible retreat of Group 11 to airfields north of London : this would not improve Germany's position as Group 11 would still be able to attack the German bombers .And, a bigger destruction of London than happened in the HTL,would also not force Britain to give up : during the Battle of Berlin,a big part of Berlin was destroyed by BC,but Germany did not give up . Thus why would Britain give up ?
About British rearmament : the small increase of the army is not a proof for the claim that there was only a small rearmament ,because there was no need for a big increase of the army .
Priority was given to the LoC with the Empire and thus for the Navy . On the second place came the RAF and the AA Defense to protect the UK against a sudden air attack ( The Douhet Doctrine had a lot of influence ) .The Army came on the last place,and justifiedly ,because Poland would fall before France and Britain could launch an offensive to Berlin . And, even if they could, they would not do it , as the war was not about Poland, but about Germany .
Chamberlain told his sisters the following in 1938 : we can not save, not help CZ, we can only wage a war of revenge which will destroy Europe and the Empire and which will make of CZ a Soviet satellite .
It was the same for Poland .
Britain and France were better off without Poland and CZ,and these were better off without the Wallies .The war was fought for a moral principle ,which was that war was bad and evil and that who started a war was a criminal . ( The Briand-Kellogg Pact ) which outlawed war .

You're big on making bold statements but the "evidence" you provide doesn't align with the actual chain of events.

Just how long do you think it takes to plan an operation of the scale of Barbarossa? For the record, I currently support planning of military operations and I can tell you that it would take many months to develop a viable operational plan. Thus the timeline from Otto being initiated in July 1940 until the execution of Barbarossa in June the following year makes perfect sense. However, you seem to think that Hitler just decided to invade Russia on a whim, ordered it and made it happen all in the summer of 1941. I'm afraid that's just not practical and doesn't align with how military operations are planned or executed.

I'm giving up responding to you. Your mind is clearly made up and no amount of evidence to the contrary will dissuade you from your beliefs. You keep jumping around within disconnected, cherry-picked anecdotes but your "evidence" lacks coherence, nor does it fit all the available historiography.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

How's this for a scenario? One of the German electronics boffins succeeds in convincing Goering of the strategic importance of the British radar and fighter direction network, resulting in an all out campaign that "blinds" the RAF. This allows an intense campaign against RAF facilities and AAA everywhere within the reach of bombers and drop tank equipped MEs, establishing air superiority and an umbrella for Sealion and, in conjunction with Uboats and Eboats, a potent opposition to any naval forces that sortie from Scapa Flow or other bases to interdict the invasion. London blitz never occurs, British historical icons are not threatened or damaged, and Churchill and the warhawks are toppled from power. Hitler has a full year to prepare for Barbarossa with the industrial resources of western Europe at his disposal, while Japan is incentivized to go north and west for the resources she needs rather than into SE Asia. Stalin, rather than Hitler, is confronted with a two-front war with huge logistical issues, and "America first!" reigns supreme in the western hemisphere.
This makes BoB the decisive battle, and renders the others moot.
(And sets the stage for Orwell's 1984)

 

[pbehn]

You're big on making bold statements but the "evidence" you provide doesn't align with the actual chain of events.

Just how long do you think it takes to plan an operation of the scale of Barbarossa? For the record, I currently support planning of military operations and I can tell you that it would take many months to develop a viable operational plan. Thus the timeline from Otto being initiated in July 1940 until the execution of Barbarossa in June the following year makes perfect sense. However, you seem to think that Hitler just decided to invade Russia on a whim, ordered it and made it happen all in the summer of 1941. I'm afraid that's just not practical and doesn't align with how military operations are planned or executed.

I'm giving up responding to you. Your mind is clearly made up and no amount of evidence to the contrary will dissuade you from your beliefs. You keep jumping around within disconnected, cherry-picked anecdotes but your "evidence" lacks coherence, nor does it fit all the available historiography.

In Bungays "The Most Dangerous Enemy" he says that during the Battle of Britain Adolf eyes had already turned to planning invading Russia.

 

[swampyankee]

Does this ring any bells regarding global current events??

Alas, yes. "Demogogue" is a very common role in politics: Modi, Berlusconi, Le Pen, Ugo Chavez, Putin, and it's frequently associated with racism, antisemitism, hypernationalism, and other unsavory isms.

 

[pbehn]

How's this for a scenario? One of the German electronics boffins succeeds in convincing Goering of the strategic importance of the British radar and fighter direction network, resulting in an all out campaign that "blinds" the RAF. This allows an intense campaign against RAF facilities and AAA everywhere within the reach of bombers and drop tank equipped MEs, establishing air superiority and an umbrella for Sealion and, in conjunction with Uboats and Eboats, a potent opposition to any naval forces that sortie from Scapa Flow or other bases to interdict the invasion. London blitz never occurs, British historical icons are not threatened or damaged, and Churchill and the warhawks are toppled from power. Hitler has a full year to prepare for Barbarossa with the industrial resources of western Europe at his disposal, while Japan is incentivized to go north and west for the resources she needs rather than into SE Asia. Stalin, rather than Hitler, is confronted with a two-front war with huge logistical issues, and "America first!" reigns supreme in the western hemisphere.
This makes BoB the decisive battle, and renders the others moot.
(And sets the stage for Orwell's 1984)

They only need to destroy and keep destroyed 4 Chain Home stations on the coast of 11 group, to give a path in to all of Park's airfields and a route into London.

 

[Glider]

About the Ersatzheer : the fact that it was not disbanded is not a good argument :the point is that Hitler gave the order on June 20 to disband it, which means that on that day ,Hitler was not thinking on an attack against the Soviets .

This is such rubbish I am disappointed in you. Hitler had the ultimate power and anyone who disagreed with him payed a huge price. If he had meant the order, the only thing you can be sure of is that it would have been carried out. He was a master of playing political games and I am as confident as I can be that this order was meant for an outside audience, namely the USA.

That he later changed his opinion is proving what I said : that the Barbarossa decision was not a free ideological decision but a decision forced upon Hitler because he saw no other possibility to finish the war with Britain before the US would intervene .

Its quite possible that severe tension between Germany and Russia could be seen as an inevitable prelude to war, however its equally possible that tension could be high without war. After all its clear that Stalin would agree to almost everything to avoid war.

About Plan Otto : plans do not prove intentions : in the twenties US had plans for war with Britain ,but not intentions .Besides , the war against Britain had til the autumn priority in armament questions . The Wiki article about Plan Otto is totally unreliable .

As ever a big statement supported by what ?

About the autarky : Germany was totally self-sufficient in oil.In September 1939 its imports from South America disappeared, but they were simply replaced by synthetic produced oil.
Germany had in 1939 8,3 million tons of oil (import/production ) of which 5,2 million from imports .
In 1940 6,9 million ,of which 2,1 million imports and the German war machine did not stop.

I strongly disagree with the belief that Germany was self sufficient in oil. It made huge and very expensive investments in the production of synthetic oil but it was never sufficient. Until the day war broke out against Russia they were still importing oil. The shortage of oil is a common theme throughout the history of the war and there is a strong case for saying that if Hitler had concentrated solely on gaining the oilfields the outcome of the conflict would have been radically altered.

About appeasement : there were no peace terms for Britain, only capitulation .And we have the proof that the chief of the appeasers (Chamberlain ) opposed capitulation . British position was not bad in June 1940, even better than that of Germany : the only thing Britain had to do was to continue the fight til the US intervened .

Because your opposed to capitulation doesn't mean that your not in favour of appeasement in the form of a negotiated settlement. A simple offer after the fall of France, along the lines of 'We will cease all offensive operations against the United Kingdom and its Empire and the UK ceases any offensive operations against Europe' would have been taken seriously by a lot of people.
It would also have scared the hell out of Russia as they would be facing the resources of Europe not just Germany.

About British rearmament : this had nothing to do with appeasement which was born immediately after the Treaty of Versailles.

Rearmament was to do with the preparations for war. You clearly don't know the steps the UK took to prepare for war which were far more extensive that just increased the size of the armed forces.

Britain could not help CZ in 1938, neither could it help Poland in 1939 , but the fact remains that Britain mobilized in 1938 and that Chamberlain told the population that,except a miracle, there would be war in a few days .The only reason why there was no war between Britain and Germany in 1938 ,was that there was no war between Germany and the Czechs in 1938 .

The reason why there was no war in 1938 and the UK was unable to help CZ was that we were not yet ready for it, Geographically it was too far and France was against anything that would trigger Germany.

About a possible retreat of Group 11 to airfields north of London : this would not improve Germany's position as Group 11 would still be able to attack the German bombers .And, a bigger destruction of London than happened in the HTL, would also not force Britain to give up : during the Battle of Berlin, a big part of Berlin was destroyed by BC,but Germany did not give up . Thus why would Britain give up ?

To a degree this is the only part where you have a point but I should remind you that we have the advantage of hindsight. If you had told Hitler that Berlin and the other cities would suffer the level of damage they did and yet the country would continue to operate, almost certainly they wouldn't have believed you.

A general point. You seem to have a certainty that the USA would partake in the war. This was far from certain and there were many voices in the USA that were against it. If there had been a negotiated settlement between the UK and Germany then they would have stayed out of it.

 

[buffnut453]

To the point about Bomber Command's (and 8th AF's) campaign against Berlin, the geographic, political, strategic and operational contexts for that campaign were entirely different than those facing Britain in May/June 1940.

My theory for a potential way for Britain to lose the BoB does not involve Germany bombing Britain into submission. It's about Germany demonstrating that it could attack Britain at will be neutralizing the key front-line defences of Fighter Command. Such a chain of events, coming on the back of the ignominious retreat from Dunkirk, and acknowledging that the British Army left most of its heavy equipment behind in France, could have have resulted in tectonic political shifts in Whitehall.

In 1944, Germany still had a substantial army and its factories were still producing massive quantities of war materiel. Although the Allies were advancing, Germany proper was still not under immediate threat of invasion, and still posed a substantial threat. The political environment was also entirely different. The Fuhrer was a dictator, and killing him was the only way to remove his grip on power. He couldn't be reasoned with, couldn't be voted out of power, and he steadfastly refused to change his mind, even when events didn't go as planned.

For all these reasons, and more, we can't compare the response of Germany to the Allied bombing campaign with Britain's potential response to a retreat by 11 Group in 1940.

 

[buffnut453]

To a degree this is the only part where you have a point but I should remind you that we have the advantage of hindsight. If you had told Hitler that Berlin and the other cities would suffer the level of damage they did and yet the country would continue to operate, almost certainly they wouldn't have believed you.

This is a key point. In the summer of 1940, the RAF's heavy bomber was the Wellington. The Lancaster hadn't flown yet, the B-24 was only just entering production and wouldn't enter into service for another year, and the B-17 was only available in very small numbers (perhaps 50-100). A strategic bombing campaign of the scale ultimately delivered by the Allies was a pipe dream. The true effectiveness of bombing and its impact on civilian morale were still largely unknown.

 

[ljadw]

You're big on making bold statements but the "evidence" you provide doesn't align with the actual chain of events.

Just how long do you think it takes to plan an operation of the scale of Barbarossa? For the record, I currently support planning of military operations and I can tell you that it would take many months to develop a viable operational plan. Thus the timeline from Otto being initiated in July 1940 until the execution of Barbarossa in June the following year makes perfect sense. However, you seem to think that Hitler just decided to invade Russia on a whim, ordered it and made it happen all in the summer of 1941. I'm afraid that's just not practical and doesn't align with how military operations are planned or executed.

I'm giving up responding to you. Your mind is clearly made up and no amount of evidence to the contrary will dissuade you from your beliefs. You keep jumping around within disconnected, cherry-picked anecdotes but your "evidence" lacks coherence, nor does it fit all the available historiography.

YOU were using Lukacs as a source for your arguments .
But, what did I find when I googled John Lukacs?

'' In Lukacs's view, Barbarossa was not inspired by anti-Communism or any long-term plan to conquer the Soviet Union,but it was rather an ad hoc reaction forced on Hitler in 1940-1941 by Britain's refusal to surrender .''
And the article on Wiki gives as source :The Hitler of History, P 133 & 149-150 .
Thus, even Lukacs is disagreeing with you . And Kershaw was going in the same direction .
Other point : you are unable to understand that a plan ( not Otto ) being ''initiated'' in July 1940,does not mean that the political leadership had decided to execute this plan .
FYI :
there were several ''plans '' not ONE plan ,and the final plan was composed of elements of these several plans .
There were (and the list is not exhaustive )
Operationsentwurf Ost (5 August ) by Marcks who estimated the Soviet strength on 119 divisions and 28 brigades and expected a campaign of 9-17 weeks .
There was also the Operationsstudie Ost from Lossberg (15 September )
And Paulus also was involved (29 )ctober )
On December 18 Hitler signed the Barbarossa Weisung, but even then,the preparations continued:
On January 31 1941 the OKH presented its Aufmarschanweisung Barbarossa .
Hitler did not decide in July 1940 to attack the SU ,but at the end of 1940, always with the caveat that if Britain capitulated before the start of Barbarossa, this would make Barbarossa not only unnecessary , but also impossible :
140 combat divisions were committed for Barbarossa and 10 Security divisions who would kill Jews and potential partisans . Bit if Britain gave up, Germany would need at least 40 divisions for the occupation of the British Islands (including Ireland ).As there were no 40 divisions available in Germany, the only solution would be to take away 40 divisions from the Ostheer .which would make Barbarossa impossible .

 

[ljadw]

The shortage of oil is a common theme throughout the history of the war and there is a strong case for saying that if Hitler had concentrated solely on gaining the oilfields the outcome of the conflict would have been radically altered.





.

Shortage of oil was, till the Autumn of 1944, not caused by production problems but by transport problems .
And the German experts doubted very much that the capture of the Caucasian oil could make a difference .Because it was impossible to transport this oil to Germany and because the SU could continue the war without this oil .
Source : Germany and WWII Tome 6 P 808 (German edition )
And we know that the Soviets arrived in Berlin,while the Caucasian oil production was in 1945 only the half of that in 1940 .
About US War Plans against Britain : see War Plan Red .
Plans do not indicate intentions.

 

[ljadw]

How's this for a scenario? One of the German electronics boffins succeeds in convincing Goering of the strategic importance of the British radar and fighter direction network, resulting in an all out campaign that "blinds" the RAF. This allows an intense campaign against RAF facilities and AAA everywhere within the reach of bombers and drop tank equipped MEs, establishing air superiority and an umbrella for Sealion and, in conjunction with Uboats and Eboats, a potent opposition to any naval forces that sortie from Scapa Flow or other bases to interdict the invasion. London blitz never occurs, British historical icons are not threatened or damaged, and Churchill and the warhawks are toppled from power. Hitler has a full year to prepare for Barbarossa with the industrial resources of western Europe at his disposal, while Japan is incentivized to go north and west for the resources she needs rather than into SE Asia. Stalin, rather than Hitler, is confronted with a two-front war with huge logistical issues, and "America first!" reigns supreme in the western hemisphere.
This makes BoB the decisive battle, and renders the others moot.
(And sets the stage for Orwell's 1984)

The importance of Radar in 1940 is much overestimated

 

[ljadw]

I agree but that mainly just helped him get power and hold onto it. Most of the German military's achievements were in spite of him not because. When he seriously intervened in a situation it usually brought disaster.

This only proves the strength of the propaganda of the defeated German generals .Hitler did not cause the defeat of Germany : the responsibles of the defeat of Germany were FDR, Churchill and Stalin .
Liddell Hart, Guderian and Halder have been proved to be liars .

 

[ljadw]

Its always important to remember that Hitler was a barking mad rabble rouser with no experience of doing anything, most of the people around him were the same.

As were/are most politicians .
But all this does not prove that Hitler was responsible for the defeat of Germany .

 

[ljadw]

Again, you're being selective in offering punchlines as evidence to support your theory. The only reason the USSR became Britain's "continental sword" is because Britain refused to sue for peace in 1940. As explained previously, Hitler had been planning to invade Russia for at least 4 years by that point in time.

Explained, but not proved .The only reason Hitler attacked the USSR was that it was Britain's continental sword .If both the US and the USSR openly had said that they would not support Britain, Britain would probably have given up .
Besides, what is important is NOT what Hitler planned to do,but what he had the intention to do and what he could do .

 

[The Basket]

Explained, but not proved .The only reason Hitler attacked the USSR was that it was Britain's continental sword .If both the US and the USSR openly had said that they would not support Britain, Britain would probably have given up .
Besides, what is important is NOT what Hitler planned to do,but what he had the intention to do and what he could do .

Er.....I write total bilge. But even I in all my stupid glory can't match this.

 

[ljadw]

A general point. You seem to have a certainty that the USA would partake in the war. This was far from certain and there were many voices in the USA that were against it. If there had been a negotiated settlement between the UK and Germany then they would have stayed out of it.

After the GOP convention of August 1940,war with Germany was a fact , and it was nearing : very fast .
Willkie was as anti-German as FDR and supported also the New Deal .On a lot of points he was more to the left than FDR .
Thus the American electors had the choice between Roosevelt and Roosevelt .
There were also other things (supported by the GOP establishment ) as
conscription in peace time
a two ocean fleet
Lend Lease
the Atlantic Fleet chasing the German U Boats .
Britain would fight as long as it could expect US support and a negotiated settlement was out of the question .