Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

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I agree but that mainly just helped him get power and hold onto it. Most of the German military's achievements were in spite of him not because. When he seriously intervened in a situation it usually brought disaster.
 
About the Ersatzheer : the fact that it was not disbanded is not a good argument :the point is that Hitler gave the order on June 20 to disband it, which means that on that day ,Hitler was not thinking on an attack against the Soviets .That he later changed his opinion is proving what I said : that the Barbarossa decision was not a free ideological decision but a decision forced upon Hitler because he saw no other possibility to finish the war with Britain before the US would intervene .
About Plan Otto : plans do not prove intentions : in the twenties US had plans for war with Britain ,but not intentions .Besides , the war against Britain had til the autumn priority in armament questions . The Wiki article about Plan Otto is totally unreliable .
The Four Year Plan had not as meaning to make Germany ready for war with the USSR .
There is no proof that Fall Gelb wanted to eliminate the Wallies to give Hitler the possibility to focus on the communist threat in the East ,because : there was NO such threat and Hitler knew it and admitted it .
About the autarky : Germany was totally self-sufficient in oil.In September 1939 its imports from South America disappeared, but they were simply replaced by synthetic produced oil.
Germany had in 1939 8,3 million tons of oil (import/production ) of which 5,2 million from imports .
In 1940 6,9 million ,of which 2,1 million imports and the German war machine did not stop.
About appeasement : there were no peace terms for Britain, only capitulation .And we have the proof that the chief of the appeasers (Chamberlain ) opposed capitulation . British position was not bad in June 1940, even better than that of Germany : the only thing Britain had to do was to continue the fight til the US intervened .
About British rearmament : this had nothing to do with appeasement which was born immediately after the Treaty of Versailles .
Britain could not help CZ in 1938, neither could it help Poland in 1939 , but the fact remains that Britain mobilized in 1938 and that Chamberlain told the population that,except a miracle, there would be war in a few days .The only reason why there was no war between Britain and Germany in 1938 ,was that there was no war between Germany and the Czechs in 1938 .
About a possible retreat of Group 11 to airfields north of London : this would not improve Germany's position as Group 11 would still be able to attack the German bombers .And, a bigger destruction of London than happened in the HTL,would also not force Britain to give up : during the Battle of Berlin,a big part of Berlin was destroyed by BC,but Germany did not give up . Thus why would Britain give up ?
About British rearmament : the small increase of the army is not a proof for the claim that there was only a small rearmament ,because there was no need for a big increase of the army .
Priority was given to the LoC with the Empire and thus for the Navy . On the second place came the RAF and the AA Defense to protect the UK against a sudden air attack ( The Douhet Doctrine had a lot of influence ) .The Army came on the last place,and justifiedly ,because Poland would fall before France and Britain could launch an offensive to Berlin . And, even if they could, they would not do it , as the war was not about Poland, but about Germany .
Chamberlain told his sisters the following in 1938 : we can not save, not help CZ, we can only wage a war of revenge which will destroy Europe and the Empire and which will make of CZ a Soviet satellite .
It was the same for Poland .
Britain and France were better off without Poland and CZ,and these were better off without the Wallies .The war was fought for a moral principle ,which was that war was bad and evil and that who started a war was a criminal . ( The Briand-Kellogg Pact ) which outlawed war .
 

You're big on making bold statements but the "evidence" you provide doesn't align with the actual chain of events.

Just how long do you think it takes to plan an operation of the scale of Barbarossa? For the record, I currently support planning of military operations and I can tell you that it would take many months to develop a viable operational plan. Thus the timeline from Otto being initiated in July 1940 until the execution of Barbarossa in June the following year makes perfect sense. However, you seem to think that Hitler just decided to invade Russia on a whim, ordered it and made it happen all in the summer of 1941. I'm afraid that's just not practical and doesn't align with how military operations are planned or executed.

I'm giving up responding to you. Your mind is clearly made up and no amount of evidence to the contrary will dissuade you from your beliefs. You keep jumping around within disconnected, cherry-picked anecdotes but your "evidence" lacks coherence, nor does it fit all the available historiography.
 
How's this for a scenario? One of the German electronics boffins succeeds in convincing Goering of the strategic importance of the British radar and fighter direction network, resulting in an all out campaign that "blinds" the RAF. This allows an intense campaign against RAF facilities and AAA everywhere within the reach of bombers and drop tank equipped MEs, establishing air superiority and an umbrella for Sealion and, in conjunction with Uboats and Eboats, a potent opposition to any naval forces that sortie from Scapa Flow or other bases to interdict the invasion. London blitz never occurs, British historical icons are not threatened or damaged, and Churchill and the warhawks are toppled from power. Hitler has a full year to prepare for Barbarossa with the industrial resources of western Europe at his disposal, while Japan is incentivized to go north and west for the resources she needs rather than into SE Asia. Stalin, rather than Hitler, is confronted with a two-front war with huge logistical issues, and "America first!" reigns supreme in the western hemisphere.
This makes BoB the decisive battle, and renders the others moot.
(And sets the stage for Orwell's 1984)
 
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In Bungays "The Most Dangerous Enemy" he says that during the Battle of Britain Adolf eyes had already turned to planning invading Russia.
 
They only need to destroy and keep destroyed 4 Chain Home stations on the coast of 11 group, to give a path in to all of Park's airfields and a route into London.
 
About the Ersatzheer : the fact that it was not disbanded is not a good argument :the point is that Hitler gave the order on June 20 to disband it, which means that on that day ,Hitler was not thinking on an attack against the Soviets .
This is such rubbish I am disappointed in you. Hitler had the ultimate power and anyone who disagreed with him payed a huge price. If he had meant the order, the only thing you can be sure of is that it would have been carried out. He was a master of playing political games and I am as confident as I can be that this order was meant for an outside audience, namely the USA.

Its quite possible that severe tension between Germany and Russia could be seen as an inevitable prelude to war, however its equally possible that tension could be high without war. After all its clear that Stalin would agree to almost everything to avoid war.

As ever a big statement supported by what ? I strongly disagree with the belief that Germany was self sufficient in oil. It made huge and very expensive investments in the production of synthetic oil but it was never sufficient. Until the day war broke out against Russia they were still importing oil. The shortage of oil is a common theme throughout the history of the war and there is a strong case for saying that if Hitler had concentrated solely on gaining the oilfields the outcome of the conflict would have been radically altered.

Because your opposed to capitulation doesn't mean that your not in favour of appeasement in the form of a negotiated settlement. A simple offer after the fall of France, along the lines of 'We will cease all offensive operations against the United Kingdom and its Empire and the UK ceases any offensive operations against Europe' would have been taken seriously by a lot of people.
It would also have scared the hell out of Russia as they would be facing the resources of Europe not just Germany.

About British rearmament : this had nothing to do with appeasement which was born immediately after the Treaty of Versailles.
Rearmament was to do with the preparations for war. You clearly don't know the steps the UK took to prepare for war which were far more extensive that just increased the size of the armed forces.
The reason why there was no war in 1938 and the UK was unable to help CZ was that we were not yet ready for it, Geographically it was too far and France was against anything that would trigger Germany.
To a degree this is the only part where you have a point but I should remind you that we have the advantage of hindsight. If you had told Hitler that Berlin and the other cities would suffer the level of damage they did and yet the country would continue to operate, almost certainly they wouldn't have believed you.

A general point. You seem to have a certainty that the USA would partake in the war. This was far from certain and there were many voices in the USA that were against it. If there had been a negotiated settlement between the UK and Germany then they would have stayed out of it.
 
To the point about Bomber Command's (and 8th AF's) campaign against Berlin, the geographic, political, strategic and operational contexts for that campaign were entirely different than those facing Britain in May/June 1940.

My theory for a potential way for Britain to lose the BoB does not involve Germany bombing Britain into submission. It's about Germany demonstrating that it could attack Britain at will be neutralizing the key front-line defences of Fighter Command. Such a chain of events, coming on the back of the ignominious retreat from Dunkirk, and acknowledging that the British Army left most of its heavy equipment behind in France, could have have resulted in tectonic political shifts in Whitehall.

In 1944, Germany still had a substantial army and its factories were still producing massive quantities of war materiel. Although the Allies were advancing, Germany proper was still not under immediate threat of invasion, and still posed a substantial threat. The political environment was also entirely different. The Fuhrer was a dictator, and killing him was the only way to remove his grip on power. He couldn't be reasoned with, couldn't be voted out of power, and he steadfastly refused to change his mind, even when events didn't go as planned.

For all these reasons, and more, we can't compare the response of Germany to the Allied bombing campaign with Britain's potential response to a retreat by 11 Group in 1940.
 

This is a key point. In the summer of 1940, the RAF's heavy bomber was the Wellington. The Lancaster hadn't flown yet, the B-24 was only just entering production and wouldn't enter into service for another year, and the B-17 was only available in very small numbers (perhaps 50-100). A strategic bombing campaign of the scale ultimately delivered by the Allies was a pipe dream. The true effectiveness of bombing and its impact on civilian morale were still largely unknown.
 
YOU were using Lukacs as a source for your arguments .
But, what did I find when I googled John Lukacs?

'' In Lukacs's view, Barbarossa was not inspired by anti-Communism or any long-term plan to conquer the Soviet Union,but it was rather an ad hoc reaction forced on Hitler in 1940-1941 by Britain's refusal to surrender .''
And the article on Wiki gives as source :The Hitler of History, P 133 & 149-150 .
Thus, even Lukacs is disagreeing with you . And Kershaw was going in the same direction .
Other point : you are unable to understand that a plan ( not Otto ) being ''initiated'' in July 1940,does not mean that the political leadership had decided to execute this plan .
FYI :
there were several ''plans '' not ONE plan ,and the final plan was composed of elements of these several plans .
There were (and the list is not exhaustive )
Operationsentwurf Ost (5 August ) by Marcks who estimated the Soviet strength on 119 divisions and 28 brigades and expected a campaign of 9-17 weeks .
There was also the Operationsstudie Ost from Lossberg (15 September )
And Paulus also was involved (29 )ctober )
On December 18 Hitler signed the Barbarossa Weisung, but even then,the preparations continued:
On January 31 1941 the OKH presented its Aufmarschanweisung Barbarossa .
Hitler did not decide in July 1940 to attack the SU ,but at the end of 1940, always with the caveat that if Britain capitulated before the start of Barbarossa, this would make Barbarossa not only unnecessary , but also impossible :
140 combat divisions were committed for Barbarossa and 10 Security divisions who would kill Jews and potential partisans . Bit if Britain gave up, Germany would need at least 40 divisions for the occupation of the British Islands (including Ireland ).As there were no 40 divisions available in Germany, the only solution would be to take away 40 divisions from the Ostheer .which would make Barbarossa impossible .
 
The shortage of oil is a common theme throughout the history of the war and there is a strong case for saying that if Hitler had concentrated solely on gaining the oilfields the outcome of the conflict would have been radically altered.





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Shortage of oil was, till the Autumn of 1944, not caused by production problems but by transport problems .
And the German experts doubted very much that the capture of the Caucasian oil could make a difference .Because it was impossible to transport this oil to Germany and because the SU could continue the war without this oil .
Source : Germany and WWII Tome 6 P 808 (German edition )
And we know that the Soviets arrived in Berlin,while the Caucasian oil production was in 1945 only the half of that in 1940 .
About US War Plans against Britain : see War Plan Red .
Plans do not indicate intentions.
 
The importance of Radar in 1940 is much overestimated
 
I agree but that mainly just helped him get power and hold onto it. Most of the German military's achievements were in spite of him not because. When he seriously intervened in a situation it usually brought disaster.
This only proves the strength of the propaganda of the defeated German generals .Hitler did not cause the defeat of Germany : the responsibles of the defeat of Germany were FDR, Churchill and Stalin .
Liddell Hart, Guderian and Halder have been proved to be liars .
 
Its always important to remember that Hitler was a barking mad rabble rouser with no experience of doing anything, most of the people around him were the same.
As were/are most politicians .
But all this does not prove that Hitler was responsible for the defeat of Germany .
 
Explained, but not proved .The only reason Hitler attacked the USSR was that it was Britain's continental sword .If both the US and the USSR openly had said that they would not support Britain, Britain would probably have given up .
Besides, what is important is NOT what Hitler planned to do,but what he had the intention to do and what he could do .
 
Er.....I write total bilge. But even I in all my stupid glory can't match this.
 
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After the GOP convention of August 1940,war with Germany was a fact , and it was nearing : very fast .
Willkie was as anti-German as FDR and supported also the New Deal .On a lot of points he was more to the left than FDR .
Thus the American electors had the choice between Roosevelt and Roosevelt .
There were also other things (supported by the GOP establishment ) as
conscription in peace time
a two ocean fleet
Lend Lease
the Atlantic Fleet chasing the German U Boats .
Britain would fight as long as it could expect US support and a negotiated settlement was out of the question .
 

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