Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

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If you wish to learn about air superiority and it's ability to sway a landing, then read about the Dieppe Landings.

The Allies did NOT have air superiority and the Luftwaffe (who DID have air superiority) massacred the Allied troops as they were trying to gain a beach head.
The Allied forces at Dieppe were not massacred by the LW AND the Allies needed air superiority the days of the landing,not weeks before .
 
Hey ljadw,

re "As I expected : you forgot the principal reason : THE WEATHER."

Why do you think the weather was the principal reason?

The reason I ask is that I do not see how the weather, be it clear and sunny or dark and stormy, would matter if the Germans do not have air superiority, and control (naval) of the English Channel. If they did not control both there is no way they would survive (intact) the crossing.
And if they had air and naval superiority, the weather would still make a fighting SL impossible after September 1940.
The Allies had air and naval superiority but did not land in the Autumn of 1944 .
The weather was already bad enough in June 1944 .
And, if Britain had given up, air and naval superiority would not be needed to land .
 
Without German military help, a Quisling regime would not long survive .

Based on what facts? You keep saying Britain would go back to war but what is your evidence for that? It's been pointed out numerous times that Britain was not entirely sold on a second war with Germany in the May/June 1940 timeframe. So, please, what's your evidence for the assertion you're making?
 
The people of London withstood the blitz because they knew Fighter Command was between them and the enemy, and that RAF squadrons were going up multiple times each day to try and protect them. Pull those defending fighters north, and the mindset of the Londoners may change markedly, with the greatest concern being the lack of defences. Be careful of applying hindsight and assuming that outcomes will continue as they did even if circumstances change.
NO : the RAF was not between them and the enemy during the night attacks in the Autumn and Winter,but still the Londoners withstood the blitz .
 
NO : the RAF was not between them and the enemy during the night attacks in the Autumn and Winter,but still the Londoners withstood the blitz .

Yes it was. Chain Home was still providing warning of incoming raids, giving civilians time to get to their shelters. Imagine a scenario where CH is neutralized so there's no warning of a raid. How would civilians feel then?
 
Boelcke might have an argument with this statement.

Just as pertinent to this discussion of the BoB, "First look, first shot, first kill" is also something that has stood the test of time.
First look, first shoot, first kill is a generalization: if the opponent refuses to fight,first look,first shot, first kill is worthless .
The initiative does not always belong to the enemy .
 
Based on what facts? You keep saying Britain would go back to war but what is your evidence for that? It's been pointed out numerous times that Britain was not entirely sold on a second war with Germany in the May/June 1940 timeframe. So, please, what's your evidence for the assertion you're making?
Quisling would not survive without German help, neither would Mussert in the Netherlands, neither were the governments of Eastern Europe when the Soviets were leaving .
 
First look, first shoot, first kill is a generalization: if the opponent refuses to fight,first look,first shot, first kill is worthless .
The initiative does not always belong to the enemy .

No, the initiative belongs with the attacker who decides the time and location of his attack. If the defenders don't fight, then the attacker has a much better chance of achieving his objectives.
 
Quisling would not survive without German help, neither would Mussert in the Netherlands, neither were the governments of Eastern Europe when the Soviets were leaving .

I said nothing about a Quisling regime. You raised that. I'm talking about the elected British Government winning the ballot on the case that continued war with Germany was not in the country's best interests. What evidence is there to suggest that such a scenario would fail?
 
But the principles of air power persist through time. You don't wave a magic wand and suddenly declare air superiority. It is a campaign-level effort to progressively degrade an adversary's ability to defend within the air domain. It takes time, it takes planning, and it must be integrated with other domains (land, sea, etc) to ensure the air campaign adapts to changing requirements.

Your assertion that German air superiority over Britain wasn't needed prior to Sea Lion is nonsense. If the decision to launch Sea Lion was at all dependent on German air superiority, then that superiority MUST be achieved BEFORE the decision is made to execute Sea Lion.
Air superiority before does not mean air superiority at the D Day .
 
No, the initiative belongs with the attacker who decides the time and location of his attack. If the defenders don't fight, then the attacker has a much better chance of achieving his objectives.
NO :if the defender (here FC ) avoids the fighting and thus remains intact the chance for the attacker to achieve his objective is very small .
To have air superiority,you must prevent the opponent to intervene on D Day ,and to do this you must eliminate or seriously weak him .You can only do this with his consent: if he withdraws to a region where he is save,you can't destroy him or seriously weak him .
Germany was the weaker one in both wars and thus it was condemned to search for victory by waging a short war with decisive battles .
 
Air superiority before does not mean air superiority at the D Day .

The air campaign in the weeks and months running up to your target date is what provides air superiority. Properly executed, an air campaign neutralizes the adversary's ability to mount a credible defence over your point of invasion. The Luftwaffe failed in this regard because they didn't maintain a focus on destroying 11 Group. If they'd done so, it would have been a major political blow. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

And PLEASE don't say that 11 Group can just retreat because you've been told numerous times of the operational and political consequences of such a decision. I'm still waiting for you to show me an example when defending fighters operated solely from behind a key target they were trying to protect.
 
NO :if the defender (here FC ) avoids the fighting and thus remains intact the chance for the attacker to achieve his objective is very small .
To have air superiority,you must prevent the opponent to intervene on D Day ,and to do this you must eliminate or seriously weak him .You can only do this with his consent: if he withdraws to a region where he is save,you can't destroy him or seriously weak him .
Germany was the weaker one in both wars and thus it was condemned to search for victory by waging a short war with decisive battles .

And what are the political consequences of FC not fighting. Imagine Churchill saying "We will fight them on the beaches but the RAF will retreat before the enemy landing.". Just how well will that go down in Parliament and with the people?

You're also ignoring the attitude of the pilots. They were literally defending their own families and you're telling them to pull back before the invasion? How would that affect morale?

Finally, with CH neutralized, how will you know where and when the enemy raids are arriving? How can defending fighters north of London do their job without CH to give an initial track as the raid approaches the coast? Look at what happened to airfields in Poland and France without radar warning. You can't rely on the Observer Corps unless they're cued by radar for a general area where to look. The sky is a big place and constantly searching without a cue to know where and when to pay attention is NOT a recipe for success.
 
Air superiority before does not mean air superiority at the D Day .
Actually in many ways it does.

Just for some fun I researched the definition of Air Superiority

Air Superiority That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

D Day wasn't just a one day event. The forces had to be transported to the embarkation ports, the ships had to be loaded, transported to the landing zones. The harbours built the forces landed and supplied/supported after the landing.
The defending forces had to be pinned down, communications disrupted, Headquarters and command and control destroyed, radars destroyed or jammed, defences worn down or neutralised.

These tasks took many weeks and it was because of them the Air Superiority on the day was almost guaranteed. I would argue that when the day came it was impossible for the Germans to seriously contest the war in the air on D Day because the allies had air superiority before the day.
 
The air campaign in the weeks and months running up to your target date is what provides air superiority. Properly executed, an air campaign neutralizes the adversary's ability to mount a credible defence over your point of invasion. The Luftwaffe failed in this regard because they didn't maintain a focus on destroying 11 Group. If they'd done so, it would have been a major political blow. Why is this so hard for you to understand?

And PLEASE don't say that 11 Group can just retreat because you've been told numerous times of the operational and political consequences of such a decision. I'm still waiting for you to show me an example when defending fighters operated solely from behind a key target they were trying to protect.
You are waiting for an answer on a wrong question that is based on the unproved claim that the mission of FC was to protect London,which was a military target where were living a lot of civilians .
The main mission of Dowding was NOT to protect London,but to conserve FC intact so that it could be used when its intervention was needed = on the start day of Sea Lion .
Your major political blow is an invention : there was no major political blow when Coventry or Liverpool were attacked or when London suffered very big during the night attacks in the Autumn and Winter .
If the Germans had a strategic air reserve in the Winter of 1943,they would not have used it to defend Berlin against the attacks from BC, but they would have spared it to use it on June 6 1944 .
And, there was no major political blow on 29 December when the City was attacked and strongly hurt .
 
You are waiting for an answer on a wrong question that is based on the unproved claim that the mission of FC was to protect London,which was a military target where were living a lot of civilians .
The main mission of Dowding was NOT to protect London,but to conserve FC intact so that it could be used when its intervention was needed = on the start day of Sea Lion .
Your major political blow is an invention : there was no major political blow when Coventry or Liverpool were attacked or when London suffered very big during the night attacks in the Autumn and Winter .
If the Germans had a strategic air reserve in the Winter of 1943,they would not have used it to defend Berlin against the attacks from BC, but they would have spared it to use it on June 6 1944 .
And, there was no major political blow on 29 December when the City was attacked and strongly hurt .

Wrong! The job of Fighter Command was to protect the UK from air attack. Period. That was it's sole role and purpose.
 

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