Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

[ljadw]

Wrong! The job of Fighter Command was to protect the UK from air attack. Period. That was it's sole role and purpose.

NO : this is wrong .
The job of FC was to do what the political and military leadership would order to do and this was depending on the military situation .
In May 1940 Dowding refused to send additional FC squadrons to France because he wanted to keep FC intact .
Would it not be so that the use of FC as an air force in being was better ( in the situations we discuss ) than to wast it in a decisive air battle or in an air campaign of attrition?
The Tirpitz never was fighting against the Home Fleet,but that does not mean that it was useless .Would the Bismarck not have been more useful if it did not leave the German harbours ?
A British fighter lost in an air battle over southern England could not participate in an attack on the German invasion fleet .
An intact FC on SL day would tie a big part of the LW ,resulting in more losses for the German invasion fleet .

 

[pbehn]

Winston was PM by the grace of Chamberlain .

But he died in November, you said Chamberlain would be there to oppose him, a new leder is not dependent on the old, read the link.

 

[pbehn]

The Netherlands and also Belgium were totally occupied by the Germans .

Not before they surrendered.

 

[pbehn]

Without war, elections could no longer be delayed : elections were scheduled for November 1939, but war prevented this .

What is your argument or is it just a series of contradictions? There was a war because Germany invaded Poland, are you now saying Germany doesnt invade Poland? Why?

 

[ARTESH]

depends on your definition of "Importance"! IMO, All of them were important!

 

[pbehn]

NO : this is wrong .
The job of FC was to do what the political and military leadership would order to do and this was depending on the military situation .
In May 1940 Dowding refused to send additional FC squadrons to France because he wanted to keep FC intact .
Would it not be so that the use of FC as an air force in being was better ( in the situations we discuss ) than to wast it in a decisive air battle or in an air campaign of attrition?
The Tirpitz never was fighting against the Home Fleet,but that does not mean that it was useless .Would the Bismarck not have been more useful if it did not leave the German harbours ?
A British fighter lost in an air battle over southern England could not participate in an attack on the German invasion fleet .
An intact FC on SL day would tie a big part of the LW ,resulting in more losses for the German invasion fleet .

Now you are just making stuff up, Dowding didnt refuse, he couldnt, he advised strongly against it and also advised the consequences.

Quote 'I believe that if an adequate fighter force is kept in this country, and if the Fleet remains in being, and if the home forces are suitably organised to resist invasion, we should be able to carry on the war single-handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But if the home defence force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France, defeat in France will involve the final, complete, and irremediable defeat of this country.'

On 19 May, Churchill issued a minute stating that no more squadrons should be sent to France. Dowding had got the tap turned off.

Dowding and Park: air war’s greatest commanders? | Military History Matters

The British had the most sophisticated air-defence system in the world, constructed and directed by a master strategist of modern industrialised warfare.

www.military-history.org

 

[buffnut453]

NO : this is wrong .
The job of FC was to do what the political and military leadership would order to do and this was depending on the military situation .
In May 1940 Dowding refused to send additional FC squadrons to France because he wanted to keep FC intact .
Would it not be so that the use of FC as an air force in being was better ( in the situations we discuss ) than to wast it in a decisive air battle or in an air campaign of attrition?
The Tirpitz never was fighting against the Home Fleet,but that does not mean that it was useless .Would the Bismarck not have been more useful if it did not leave the German harbours ?
A British fighter lost in an air battle over southern England could not participate in an attack on the German invasion fleet .
An intact FC on SL day would tie a big part of the LW ,resulting in more losses for the German invasion fleet .

Sorry but no. Military leaders are issued Terms of Reference that define their area of responsibility. TORs always close with a catch-all that says "and other orders as directed" but that's an AND statement not an INSTEAD OF statement. Those "other orders" must be accomplished in addition to the primary direction being provided to the officer. In Dowding's case, his primary responsibility was air defence of the UK, hence why he refused to send more fighters to France (air defence of France was France's problem to solve, not Dowding's).

Your suggestion to pull back north of London would be an abrogation of Dowding's responsibility to defend the UK. No military leader ignores their primary mission on the off-chance of some future "what if" possibility. You fight tonight with the forces that you have - you don't hold back and wait just in case. Holding back and waiting cedes the initiative to the adversary, and you risk having your forces picked off.

Not sure where you're going with the Tirpitz thing but its only real contribution was as a resource sink for the Allied bombing effort. It represented a potential threat that had to be neutralized. FC, or at least 11 Group's defensive area, still had to be neutralized regardless of where the aircraft were located.

You can't guarantee that FC would remain intact. That is a MASSIVE assumption that isn't borne out by the facts of air combat. You have yet to answer how FC will defend its airfields north of London if the Luftwaffe takes out a sizeable chunk of CH? Again, look at Poland, the Low Countries and France where, without radar, airfields were incredibly vulnerable. How could FC protect its airfields if it doesn't know German attacks are even coming their way? The Observer Corps might be of some use but the amount of warning they could provide would be minimal. There's a real risk that much of FC would get caught on the ground or still be struggling to climb to height when the Luftwaffe arrived overhead. That's not a recipe for a winning strategy. It's very likely that FC would suffer greater losses than was the case in the BoB as it played out.

 

[buffnut453]

Your major political blow is an invention : there was no major political blow when Coventry or Liverpool were attacked or when London suffered very big during the night attacks in the Autumn and Winter .
If the Germans had a strategic air reserve in the Winter of 1943,they would not have used it to defend Berlin against the attacks from BC, but they would have spared it to use it on June 6 1944 .
And, there was no major political blow on 29 December when the City was attacked and strongly hurt .

No, it's not. Coventry, Liverpool, London etc all happened while Fighter Command was doing its job to the best of its abilities. It wasn't perfect but the population recognized FC was doing its best and supported The Few. The situation would fundamentally change if FC retreats and doesn't fight, or if CH is neutralized and FC can't effectively fight because it lacks early warning. That change of popular view about The Few would be particularly felt if either of those situations comes up early in the BoB, hard on the heels of the disaster that was Dunkirk.

Your point about a German strategic air reserve is nonsense. Military forces are scaled to meet the threats that are present today. No military force has ever been created with such an excess of capacity that it can lounge about for a year waiting for "something to happen". You're applying one of the biggest retrospectroscopes that I've ever seen if you think, somehow, German leadership would have the foresight to hold back forces for D-Day a year before it happened.

 

[pbehn]

Sorry but no. Military leaders are issued Terms of Reference that define their area of responsibility. TORs always close with a catch-all that says "and other orders as directed" but that's an AND statement not an INSTEAD OF statement. Those "other orders" must be accomplished in addition to the primary direction being provided to the officer. In Dowding's case, his primary responsibility was air defence of the UK, hence why he refused to send more fighters to France (air defence of France was France's problem to solve, not Dowding's).

It is possible to theorise about a commander acting without authority. For example Rommel could have moved the panzer reserves to Normandy after D-Day, he would have faced the consequences though. With the RAF they were completely dependent on the UK state for everything except pilots. Without Churchills permission Dowdings airfields would have no power, no fuel no new planes or spares and few staff.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

First look, first shoot, first kill is a generalization: if the opponent refuses to fight,first look,first shot, first kill is worthless .
The initiative does not always belong to the enemy .

lol, it's like you can't help yourself.

Here, I'll help you out:

Doctrine is a body of carefully developed, sanctioned ideas which has been officially approved or ratified corporately, and not dictated by any one individual. Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference including intellectual tools that commanders use to solve military problems. It is what we believe to be true about the best way to do things based on the evidence to date.

[...]Rather, good doctrine is somewhat akin to a good commander's intent: it provides sufficient information on what to do, but does not specifically say how to do it. Airmen should strive to be doctrinally sound, not doctrinally bound.

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Doctrine_Primer/A%20Primer%20on%20Doctrine%208%20Oct%2020%20v2.pdf

First look, first shot, first kill is USAF doctrine, and it has its roots going all the way back to biplanes diving out of the sun in order to remain unseen while attacking (although the phrase wasn't formulated until the 1970s).

I'm not sure how you can pack so much fail into so few words, but I must confess a sort of respect for your economies of error.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm just waiting to see when it beats the Groundhog Day Thread. I'm wondering what color he would paint the British planes.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm just waiting to see when it beats the Groundhog Day Thread. I'm wondering what color he would paint the British planes.

Fear not -- if this thread gets closed, I'll go revive that one.

 

[buffnut453]

Fear not -- if this thread gets close, I'll go revive that one.

You're a very bad man!

 

[XBe02Drvr]

This has been worth the price of admission. Keep up the good work!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You're a very bad man!

Why, yes, I'm afraid so, I am.

 

[ljadw]

lol, it's like you can't help yourself.

Here, I'll help you out:

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/Doctrine_Primer/A%20Primer%20on%20Doctrine%208%20Oct%2020%20v2.pdf

First look, first shot, first kill is USAF doctrine, and it has its roots going all the way back to biplanes diving out of the sun in order to remain unseen while attacking (although the phrase wasn't formulated until the 1970s).

I'm not sure how you can pack so much fail into so few words, but I must confess a sort of respect for your economies of error.

Doctrines are subordinate to the circumstances .
Biplanes could only attack if there were opponents, if they had sufficient fuel, sufficient ammunition, if they had the order to attack, if, if ,...

 

[ljadw]

No, it's not. Coventry, Liverpool, London etc all happened while Fighter Command was doing its job to the best of its abilities. It wasn't perfect but the population recognized FC was doing its best and supported The Few. The situation would fundamentally change if FC retreats and doesn't fight, or if CH is neutralized and FC can't effectively fight because it lacks early warning. That change of popular view about The Few would be particularly felt if either of those situations comes up early in the BoB, hard on the heels of the disaster that was Dunkirk.

Your point about a German strategic air reserve is nonsense. Military forces are scaled to meet the threats that are present today. No military force has ever been created with such an excess of capacity that it can lounge about for a year waiting for "something to happen". You're applying one of the biggest retrospectroscopes that I've ever seen if you think, somehow, German leadership would have the foresight to hold back forces for D-Day a year before it happened.

The Few is a myth .

 

[pbehn]

The Few is a myth .

Is there anything in your world that isnt a myth? You know less than someone who has just watched The Battle of Britain.

 

[buffnut453]

The Few is a myth .

I mentioned "The Few" because it was a reference Churchill made, just like Churchill used the phrase "we will fight them on the beaches" which I also referenced in the same post.

How about actually answering questions that have been asked of you instead of such nit-picking idiocy.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Doctrines are subordinate to the circumstances .

Wrong again. Doctrines are guiding principles. Reread what I quoted above from the USAF's own source material.

Biplanes could only attack if there were opponents, if they had sufficient fuel, sufficient ammunition, if they had the order to attack, if, if ,...

Well, duh, Capt Obvious ... although orders to attack weren't always necessary. None of that, however, rebuts my objection to this idiotic claim:

Wrong : there are no principles of air power that persist through time .

Principles -- i.e., doctrine -- are persistent precisely because while the tools may change, best practices usually don't.

You're entitled to your own opinion. You are not entitled to your own facts.