Groundhog Thread v. 2.0 - The most important battle of WW2

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"the U Boats had no influence at all"

British and Americans sure spent a lot of time, money, effort and lives fighting something that had no influence.

How many escort destroyers, Frigates, corvettes and other escorts?
How much time spent developing better asdic/sonar?
How much time spent on radar for smaller ships?
How much time spent on better anti sub weapons?

and that is just the surface ships.
go through the list again for aircraft engaged in anti sub work.
 
Sometime shortly before the shooting started, Doenitz told Hitler that he would need ~300 submarines to win the war. The idea was that he needed somewhere around 80-100 submarines active (ie on the hunt) in the Atlantic at any given time. He said that if he had these he could prevent the US from supplying England, and accomplish what they had failed to do in WWI.

While there is no real way to say if this would have worked historically, I have to believe the increase in losses would have been enormous even in relative terms to what the actual historical losses were.
 
British and Americans sure spent a lot of time, money, effort and lives fighting something that had no influence.

How many escort destroyers, Frigates, corvettes and other escorts?
How much time spent developing better asdic/sonar?
How much time spent on radar for smaller ships?
How much time spent on better anti sub weapons?

and that is just the surface ships.
go through the list again for aircraft engaged in anti sub work.
Don't forget the USN's K-Ships, too.

But in the end, since there was no U-Boat threat according to "some people", I guess ASW stands for "A Solid Waste"...
 
The lack of fighter range was suicidal- it should have been easily foreseen and drop tanks developed prior to it.

It's a widely held myth that this might have tipped the balance and enabled a LW victory, but it would have made little difference to the outcome, to be honest. The Germans lost because of an overestimation of how well they were doing and an inability to continue because they were not able to replace their losses as fast as Fighter Command could replace theirs. German intelligence was faulty and never really gave them an accurate picture of how they were doing at destroying RAF aircraft and airfields, so they miscalculated when to begin attacking London. Sure, more RAF fighters might have been shot down, but the German heads overestimating their successes wouldn't have changed even with longer-ranged Bf 109s.

By the end of October 1940, the RAF had more fighters than they began the battle with, but the LW had not been able to recuperate their increasing losses to the same degree - they had to replace fighters, bombers, recon aircraft, long-range fighters, and dive bombers and their aircrews, whereas the Brits only had to replace fighters and their pilots. It was a battle of attrition the LW were losing at and having longer-ranged fighters wouldn't have changed that at all. British tactics also nullified the advantages the German fighters had over the British ones, largely their superior numbers and superior altitude. Stats show that Bf 109s shot down more RAF fighters than RAF fighters shot down Bf 109s, but the LW lost a larger number of aircraft all up than the British did. The Brits achieved a higher kill to loss ratio compared to the LW.
 
Many (not "most) convoys made it through intact becaise the Atlantic is a large place.

Perhaps a few convoys were detected by "chance", but the German Navy and Air force were conducting specific search patterns. This is not called "chance", but "deliberate".

This statement: "And, I see that you are falling in the code breaking trap" appears to come from deep within the conspiracy zone - yes the German Enigma code was broken.

And this is a fascinating comment:
"what arrived in Britain was mainly determined by the amount of goods that was going to Britain".

This part, however, appears to be the remark of a person who desires that history changes to their liking and/or refuses to accept the historical truth:
"the U Boats had no influence at all"
Most convoys were detected, not by U Boats, but by the German B Dienst ( The German Ultra ),which was breaking the code of the RN/USN.
But,the B Dienst could not give a detailed information about the direction of a convoy and of the place where a convoy would be , that's why the B Dienst messages were mostly useless . And, if/when they were precise, than was there still the problem to concentrate a number of aircraft to attack the convoy , and when there were enough U Boats available, there was the problem that they needed to have sufficient fuel and ammunition and if they had sufficient fuel/ammunition, there was the problem of speed :U Boats were slower than fast convoys .The Torch convoys had no losses,because the B Dienst could not tell where they could be found, because there were not enough U Boats with sufficient fuel,ammunition and speed to attack them , NOT because of the information from Ultra .
The result was that in most cases Dönitz could do nothing with the information he received from the B Dienst .
This also means that it was the same for the Ultra messages : Ultra was REACTING on the messages of the B Dienst ,and ,as these messages had only a low threat level, Ultra could do not much .
How many convoys were redirected because of an Ultra warning ? Only a minority .
And how many convoys that were not redirected ,were attacked ? Only a minority .
And, what were the losses of the non redirected convoys that were attacked ? Very low .
A convoy that was not redirected was not doomed and a convoy that was redirected was not saved .
And it is obvious that the amount of goods that left the US for Britain had a very big influence on the amount of goods that reached Britain : if during a month 1 million tons left the US for Britain, not more than 1 million tons could reach Britain even if there were no attacks from the U Boats .
It was the same for NA : in November 1941 the Italians sent 79000 ton of materiel to NA of which 30 000 ton arrived (37 % ) ,in December 1942 they sent 13000 ton of which 6000 arrived ( 47 % ) ,what was better :47 % or 37 % ? It is obvious that 37 % was better ,and if in December 1942,100 % arrived (13000 ) , it is obvious that 37 % was better ,because more was sent in November 1941 .
The U Boats had no possibility at all to starve Britain ,and the mistakes from Dönitz make things even worse for Germany . Mistakes as Drumbeat ....
The U Boats failed in WW 1 ,they were doomed to fail in WW 2 .
 
Most convoys were detected, not by U Boats, but by the German B Dienst ( The German Ultra ),which was breaking the code of the RN/USN.
But,the B Dienst could not give a detailed information about the direction of a convoy and of the place where a convoy would be , that's why the B Dienst messages were mostly useless . And, if/when they were precise, than was there still the problem to concentrate a number of aircraft to attack the convoy , and when there were enough U Boats available, there was the problem that they needed to have sufficient fuel and ammunition and if they had sufficient fuel/ammunition, there was the problem of speed :U Boats were slower than fast convoys .The Torch convoys had no losses,because the B Dienst could not tell where they could be found, because there were not enough U Boats with sufficient fuel,ammunition and speed to attack them , NOT because of the information from Ultra .
The result was that in most cases Dönitz could do nothing with the information he received from the B Dienst .
This also means that it was the same for the Ultra messages : Ultra was REACTING on the messages of the B Dienst ,and ,as these messages had only a low threat level, Ultra could do not much .
How many convoys were redirected because of an Ultra warning ? Only a minority .
And how many convoys that were not redirected ,were attacked ? Only a minority .
And, what were the losses of the non redirected convoys that were attacked ? Very low .
A convoy that was not redirected was not doomed and a convoy that was redirected was not saved .
And it is obvious that the amount of goods that left the US for Britain had a very big influence on the amount of goods that reached Britain : if during a month 1 million tons left the US for Britain, not more than 1 million tons could reach Britain even if there were no attacks from the U Boats .
It was the same for NA : in November 1941 the Italians sent 79000 ton of materiel to NA of which 30 000 ton arrived (37 % ) ,in December 1942 they sent 13000 ton of which 6000 arrived ( 47 % ) ,what was better :47 % or 37 % ? It is obvious that 37 % was better ,and if in December 1942,100 % arrived (13000 ) , it is obvious that 37 % was better ,because more was sent in November 1941 .
The U Boats had no possibility at all to starve Britain ,and the mistakes from Dönitz make things even worse for Germany . Mistakes as Drumbeat ....
The U Boats failed in WW 1 ,they were doomed to fail in WW 2 .
 
And the results were was meaningless as were the results of the British code breakers .
Why were they meaningless, they were used to direct wolf packs, without the information you need to set up a picket line across the Atlantic and communicate by radio which gives away your position and strength. You just make glib assertions with no basis, then move on to another when challenged.
 
If I put 14 million tons of goods and 3,500 ships in your back yard how long will it take for you to clear it up? What is the "code breaking trap" another one of your madcap fact free revelations?
At PH ,the British MV fleet was stronger than on September 1 1939 .
 
At PH ,the British MV fleet was stronger than on September 1 1939 .
Well it would be wouldnt it, since so many European nations transferred their flags, like Norway for instance, or did you think I didnt know?

The British politician Philip Noel-Baker, Baron Noel-Baker, commented after the war,"The first great defeat for Hitler was the battle of Britain. It was a turning point in history. If we had not had the Norwegian fleet of tankers on our side, we should not have had the aviation spirit to put our Hawker Hurricanes and our Spitfires into the sky. Without the Norwegian merchant fleet, Britain and the allies would have lost the war".[1]

 
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The battle of the Atlantic would be lost if it forced the UK to give up due to fuel and material and food shortages, Churchill faced two confidence motions in 1942 and the battle of the Atlantic was part of the debate Churchill said on July 2nd "At the same time, in spite of our losses in Asia, in spite of our defeats in Libya, in spite of the increased sinkings off the American coast, I affirm with confidence that the general strength and prospects of the United Nations have greatly improved since the turn of the year, when I last visited the President in the United States."

I have never seen any discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic that only mentioned U Boat numbers and U boat sinkings, have you? All the discussion I have read involved many topics, like u boat numbers, u boat production, allied action to prevent U boat production and to sink u boats. There is code breaking, the entry of USA in the war, closing the "Atlantic gap" centimetric RADAR, advances in SONAR, hedgehog and other devices and counter devices like schnorkel and Metox receivers. Then there were the surface raiders and actions against surface raiders. The only thing that is the same for bombers is that you want to boil everything down to a statement of a few words to cover everything. Here is Wiki, a place to start Battle of the Atlantic - Wikipedia
You are repeating the classic Hollywood interpretation : the truth is very simple : the Germans had to prevent the arrival of ships with goods in Britain and the return of ships without goods to the US . To do this ,the FIRST requirement was to know where these ships were : and this was IMPOSSIBLE .
The Allies,OTOH, had NOT to search to find where the U Boats were (this also was IMPOSSIBLE ) and not to sink U Boats ,they had only to prevent the U Boats to sink M/V .
If less,or even no U Boats were lost, that does not mean that more MV would be lost .
And if more U Boats were lost, that does not mean that less MV would be lost .
There was no causal relation between both .
U Boats and M/V were mostly lost by chance .
 
You are repeating the classic Hollywood interpretation : the truth is very simple : the Germans had to prevent the arrival of ships with goods in Britain and the return of ships without goods to the US . To do this ,the FIRST requirement was to know where these ships were : and this was IMPOSSIBLE .
The Allies,OTOH, had NOT to search to find where the U Boats were (this also was IMPOSSIBLE ) and not to sink U Boats ,they had only to prevent the U Boats to sink M/V .
If less,or even no U Boats were lost, that does not mean that more MV would be lost .
And if more U Boats were lost, that does not mean that less MV would be lost .
There was no causal relation between both .
U Boats and M/V were mostly lost by chance .
If the USA and Britain and Commonwealth had maintained their military as they were at the start of the war Sept 39 for UK and Dec 41 for USA then the Germans would have starved the UK. Germany had no chance of prevailing in a fight of industry and technology but that doesnt mean no chance especially since you maintain almost everything the allies did had no effect. What means to sink U Boats did the British have on Sept 3rd 1939?
 
Well it would be wouldnt it, since so many European nations transferred their flags, like Norway for instance, or did you think I didnt know?

The British politician Philip Noel-Baker, Baron Noel-Baker, commented after the war,"The first great defeat for Hitler was the battle of Britain. It was a turning point in history. If we had not had the Norwegian fleet of tankers on our side, we should not have had the aviation spirit to put our Hawker Hurricanes and our Spitfires into the sky. Without the Norwegian merchant fleet, Britain and the allies would have lost the war".[1]

That I didn't know before. Ships of the "free" navies got a lot more press. Great thread!
The warships, that is.
 
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You are repeating the classic Hollywood interpretation : the truth is very simple : the Germans had to prevent the arrival of ships with goods in Britain and the return of ships without goods to the US . To do this ,the FIRST requirement was to know where these ships were : and this was IMPOSSIBLE .
The Allies,OTOH, had NOT to search to find where the U Boats were (this also was IMPOSSIBLE ) and not to sink U Boats ,they had only to prevent the U Boats to sink M/V .
If less,or even no U Boats were lost, that does not mean that more MV would be lost .
And if more U Boats were lost, that does not mean that less MV would be lost .
There was no causal relation between both .
U Boats and M/V were mostly lost by chance .
Bletchley Park
 
You are repeating the classic Hollywood interpretation : the truth is very simple : the Germans had to prevent the arrival of ships with goods in Britain and the return of ships without goods to the US . To do this ,the FIRST requirement was to know where these ships were : and this was IMPOSSIBLE .
The Allies,OTOH, had NOT to search to find where the U Boats were (this also was IMPOSSIBLE ) and not to sink U Boats ,they had only to prevent the U Boats to sink M/V .
If less,or even no U Boats were lost, that does not mean that more MV would be lost .
And if more U Boats were lost, that does not mean that less MV would be lost .
There was no causal relation between both .
U Boats and M/V were mostly lost by chance .
The ACTUAL truth is straightforward:
This thing called "shipping lanes" meant that locating "MV" (real world word is "shipping") was not difficult, the problem was determining WHEN, not where.
The Luftwaffe used long range aircraft (Fw200, Bv222, Bv138 etc.) to locate the convoys and either radioed the location of the convoy(s) to the Kreigsmarine or attacked (if it was able/armed and/or a smaller, less defended convoy).

Try as you might, both with fractured facts and creative, baseless facts, you cannot change history.
 
That I didn't know before. Ships of the "free" navies got a lot more press. Great thread!
The warships, that is.
Unless you read into things in detail it isnt obvious. Most discussion just mentions tons lost in a convoy or a year, not who owned the vessels. The Norwegian fleet was massive in comparison to the size of Norway and its trade and also had a large percentage of tankers and newer diesel types.
 
Unless you read into things in detail it isnt obvious. Most discussion just mentions tons lost in a convoy or a year, not who owned the vessels. The Norwegian fleet was massive in comparison to the size of Norway and its trade and also had a large percentage of tankers and newer diesel types.
Dont forget the dutch merchant ships.
 
The ACTUAL truth is straightforward:
This thing called "shipping lanes" meant that locating "MV" (real world word is "shipping") was not difficult, the problem was determining WHEN, not where.
The Luftwaffe used long range aircraft (Fw200, Bv222, Bv138 etc.) to locate the convoys and either radioed the location of the convoy(s) to the Kreigsmarine or attacked (if it was able/armed and/or a smaller, less defended convoy).

Try as you might, both with fractured facts and creative, baseless facts, you cannot change history.
I think he's doing great at it!
 

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