Hellcat vs Spitfire - which would you take?

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No, they didn't.. what they did do, however is go after German fighters that pulled out of range of P-47s and Spits.

If you were a modest student of airpower in ETO you might have known that neither the P-47 nor Spitfire were able to prevent the LW from stopping deep strategic bombing by the US - dead in its tracks between the August 6, 1943 and October 14, 1943 Schweinfurt attacks. The P-47 was powerless to stop the LW Fighter arm and the P-38 was ineffective.

There was a reason that the 8th AF lost more KIA than the Marines in WWII. IIRC, between the RAF and USAAF, their losses KIA exceeded the combined US/Commonwealth KIA in PTO. After Midway, the IJN was a shell of its former self and it was the F4F that carved the heart out of that pilot pool. Try to recall instances of combat in the PTO in which the USN (or USAAF or RAAF or RNZAF) lost 30 or more shot down in air combat in a day in the PTO after Midway?

The PTO simply didn't meet the intensity test of the Battle of Germany.
While there's a lot of truth to that, it's really nonresponsive. Your conclusion, too, in your last sentence, I don't know where you got that from. The bottom-line is, you're not really being full of news, here. It's conceded why we needed this new aircraft. It came in at a time when Germany was hurting for the most part as much as Japan was, and for much the same reasons. There's your issue.
 
The people in the PTO might disagree with the inrensity test part. Wasn't as widespread since Islands are smaller than continents, but intensity-wise, the Japanese put up as much fight as anybody in the world did. Didn't generate the losses of D-Day, but landings on small islands were fought just as hard by smaller forces. I daresay that tropic weather was every bit as hard on troops as winter weather, ruined eqipment, clothes and food much more quickly, and had a much wider variety of bad things borne by mosquitos, snakes, etc. than continental Europe.

Each was a deadly challenge and I'd hate to have to choose which one to go fight in.
 
You know drgondog, I wasn't there and do not know the complete details, having been born after the report was created. Maybe you could tell me how it was done. Volunteers at our Museum who flew for the Navy just post-war say it was a well considered report. They were certainly closer to it than I was or am.

Greg - you are such a sly devil.. You can say FU in so many clever ways by pointing out that neither you nor I were there.. and then leaning to your always convenient fall back of referencing 'phantoms at the hanger' to support your thesis - rather than point to a well documented source pool of Victory CLAIMS prior to AWARDS.

Try this..


You didn't have to submit an Encounter Report to Research the format. You didn't have to be a Squadron I/O to Research the process. You don't have to be born prior to WWII to Understand the process. You just have to DO the research rather than rely on anecdotal discussion.

One thing is that the report is victory awards by the Navy, not a claims list. One of the things they DID was to cross-check the claims with the after action reports for accuracy.


Wow - the holy grail. Where is the claims list? Where are the Encounter reports that sourced the Claims within the "List"? Do such reports have witness or gun camera review as they transformed from Claim to Credit?


Greg - THIS is what happens at the I/O de-briefings in the USAAF - at least the 8th AF. One by one all the pilots making claims review the time, location and type aircraft. In many cases the number of rounds expended was a detail in the briefing. The claims are cross referenced to a witness - or held in suspension for review of combat film. The pilot writes up the report AFTER the briefing, gathers his witness for signature and passes to the I/O. The film is extracted and loaded up after the reports are collected - and individually reviewed by the I/O. He makes a judgment BUT in the case of no witness, the film accompanies the Encounter Report and passed to 8th AF VC Board for review and approval, downgrade or elimination of the credit.

The I/O for each squadron prepares the Mission Flash Report, which includes Claims that passed I/O review. The Gp I/O reviews all the squadron Reports and prepares the Group Summary - then sends to 8th AF HQ - where each Division I/O assembles all the Bomb and Fighter Group Mission Summaries and prepares the 8th AF Daily Mission Report. Each of these documents are stored in duplicate at Group/Squadron HQ.. and so on,

The 8th AF VCB receives and reviews a.) all the Encounter Reports submitted and signed by the pilot, witness and I/O. For those that have no witness, they review the film. The pilot, serial number, rank, squadron/Group, date, time and type a/c is logged and recorded. Victory Credit assessment is finalized, individual reports sent back to Group for Credit, and report retained at Division level.

Post WWII, the 8th AF Victory Credit Review Board convened and ALL the victory credits were reviewed and documented line by line, pilot by pilot, enemy a/c by a/c for 8th AF FC. The 8th VCB is stored on microfilm 520.3652 - index 1954.

In some cases names are mispelled, in other cases there are two entries for one credit. USAF 85 reviewed the 8th VCB and eliminated the errors but made no changes to the record otherwise.



If there are people who doubt the Navy, fine. That's their perrogative and I would not attempt to change their mind. I'll take it at face value and would accept British, German, or Japanese data from official military reports before any civilian revisionist reports. I doubt if any report summarizing a 5+year long war is 100% accurate, but if all the national lists are even 95% accurate, then we could still make some very valid comparisons. I probably would not trust Soviet data simply due to their history of rewriting the facts to fit the new party line.

As for what is so special, I posted the report number and, unusually so, it is availavle online for download. You probably already have it in your pdf fliles. Most of the USAAF data I have seen listed individually doesn't tell you the vicitim type or the type of the victor for individual data, just the name, rank, unit, date, victories awarded. So the US Navy tables that list action sorties, victories over fighters, bombers, losses on action sorties, losses on non-action sorties, especially by aircraft type are in a form I prefer since the essential data is there.

Then you carefully avoided the single biggest and best documented repository of US Victory Credits on file and available to all that have even the slightest intellectual curiosity? Set yourself free and get 8th VCB Reports. You will have to search elsewhere as I noted for loss records, and you will have to make judgments as I did from parsing the MACR, including eyewitness and German reports attached to the MACR.

I have seen the USAAF WWII data in scanned form, but the scanning is terrible, generates WAY too may OCR errors when that is attempted, and I'm not going to type in tens of thousands of records for fun. Maybe if I get REALLY bored. I might work on it with someone, but don't want to tackle that one alone. Likely if I did and even if it were 100% correct, most wouldn't believe it anyway. If they don't buy into official victory lists, why would they think any better of an honest attempt to collect the data for later analysis?

And if you don't credit the OPNAV report, that's fine. You may be right. And you may be ignoring a good source. You certainly have turned up with and shared some data in here before, so maybe you have different totals?

So, for the simple minded folk like myself that don't operate on faith rather than fact. Tell us the USN/USMC approach to post action de-briefing and recording and reporting of Claims as the individual squadrons reported, then transformed claims to awarded credits. Show us the representative USN version of Encounter Reports, verification steps in the process, submittal of claims to a higher Review Board and walk us through that award to documentation to Roll up into 1946 Report?

Surely the Encounter Reports and the associated Victory Credit Board notice to the pilot of his credit has a USN/USMC analogue for you to be passionately devoted to 'Truth ".

Does a repository of the original documented claim/witness reports exist? If so, where? if not, why not?
 
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MACRs probably have far more validity than any USN similar report - simply because many losses were duly noted in a KU or J report for any US aircraft loss found on the Continent through 1944...the Pacific Ocean didn't reveal many clues with respect to losses and the Japanese records are poor to non-existent. The combination is what I used to compile the 355th FG Loss statistics and the rest of the 8th AF (WIP).

Absent such processes as Existed within say 8th AF for both losses and victory credits how do support USN process 'better'?
This may be of relevance, here. Greg turned us onto this link. Look at the full link to get an appreciation of what really went on in this study. Note, here, as regards this enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, the authors were conscious of the issue of over-claiming, and methodically dealt with it the best they could. That's not to say, give them a medal. It is to say, sure, one has to factor that in, absolutely.

ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED IN COMBAT
Airborne enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by naval aircraft, in aerial combat only. Planes destroyed by own anti-aircraft fire or in suicide crashes are not included. Enemy aircraft reported as "probably destroyed" are not included. Squadron claims, as made in ACA-1 or other action reports, are the basis for these figures. They thus represent the evaluations only of the squadron intelligence officer, squadron commander, and in some cases the air group commander. However, rarely was there any further evaluation by higher authority of squadron claims with respect to airborne enemy aircraft.

In evaluating pilot claims for ACA-1 reports squadron intelligence officers were instructed to follow the definitions of "destroyed" established for the command or theater. Subsequent to early 1944 this was the standard Army-Navy definition that the plane must be seen to crash, disintegrate in the air, be enveloped in flames, descend on friendly territory, or that its pilot and entire crew be seen to bail out. Prior to this time the definitions varied between commands, but the definitions used in the principal naval theater (SoPac) were at least equally stringent.

The degree to which squadron intelligence officers and commanders succeeded in eliminating duplicating and optimistic pilot claims is not known, but it is believed the amount of overstatement is relatively low. Since 93% of all enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by Naval aircraft were claimed by single-seat fighters and the bulk of the remainder were claimed by two-place dive bombers and by lone search planes, the tremendous duplication of gunners' claims experienced by air forces operating large formations of heavy bombers with multiple gun positions is largely eliminated. Duplication of claims between fighter planes can be more easily controlled by careful interrogation.

Over-optimism has always been difficult to control. During the early part of the war, before standard definitions were in force, before full-time trained Air Intelligence Officers were available to apply them, and before the need for conservative operational intelligence was fully appreciated, action reports may often have overstated enemy losses. Evidence from the Japanese has tended to indicate that in SOSB of the early actions, and even as late as the Rabaul raids of early 1944, there was such overstatement.

It must be remembered, however, that the bulk of Naval aerial engagements in the Pacific did not involve the mass combat of Europe. Even the large-size engagements seldom involved more than 30 of our planes against 30 of the enemy's at any one time within visible range of any one point. By far the greatest number of engagements involved only 1 to 8 of our planes, or the same number of the enemy's. Thus in the main the claims under this heading, off set as they are by the exclusion of planes classified as "probably destroyed", are believed to be near the truth, with only local exception, and to be as conservative as those of any major airforce.

http://www.history.navy.mil/download/nasc.pdf
 
drgondog,

How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.

• One plane, one kill. No shared kills
• Without a witness, a Luftwaffe fighter pilot had no chance to have his victory claim confirmed. Such a claim, even if filed, would not pass beyond group level.
• The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on gun-camera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, squadron mate, or a ground observer of the encounter.
• There was no possibility, as with some RAF and USAAF pilots, of having a victory credited because the claiming officer was a gentleman and a man of his word. The German rule was simply "no witness – no kill."
• The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.

How close was the American system to the above?
 
• The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.

Yet this near perfect system still enabled the LW to shoot down every Spitfire RAF possesed, at least twice in 1940 and then shot down every single aircraft the VVS possesed in 1941.

Personally I couldnt care less what pilot X shot down and whether airforce Y had a better system than airforce Z. These threads monotonously turn into nationalistic pissing contests.
 
IF you don't care.. or can't contribute positively, Then why answer? Perhaps your vain attempt to start a pissing contest. Nothing nationalistic with me.
It was just a question, so if you know the answer, I'm all ears.
 
IF you don't care.. or can't contribute positively, Then why answer? Perhaps your vain attempt to start a pissing contest. Nothing nationalistic with me.
It was just a question, so if you know the answer, I'm all ears.

You made a statement that the German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than other systems. I merely pointed out that even this system was error prone and allowed LW pilots to get credits where no plane was shot down. No airforce in any war since 1912 when aircraft were first used in a military role can claim to have a perfect or anywhere close to perfect system of claims and credits. Parsifals idea that on average claims were around 30% higher than genuine victories seems to be on the money in my admittedly limited reading of fighter combat.

I have never flown in combat and I currently only hold a Micro-Light license but I have been in several situations where adrenaline was pumping and I know that what the brain remembers is not always what happened. This is human nature and is not to be seen as criticism of anyone or any airforce.

I might not have a dog in this fight but as a member of this forum I am allowed to comment as the moderators see fit. If your not happy with my comments press the button at bottom left and feel free to report me.
 
drgondog,

How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.

• One plane, one kill. No shared kills
• Without a witness, a Luftwaffe fighter pilot had no chance to have his victory claim confirmed. Such a claim, even if filed, would not pass beyond group level.
• The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on gun-camera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, squadron mate, or a ground observer of the encounter.
• There was no possibility, as with some RAF and USAAF pilots, of having a victory credited because the claiming officer was a gentleman and a man of his word. The German rule was simply "no witness – no kill."
• The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.

How close was the American system to the above?

8th AF VCB Review and decision ~ 6 weeks elapsed time from date of claim.

If you Believe Tony Wood recap of LW Credits, the LW was only 2:1 over claim despite theoretical combat film. When you match up LW Credits for 8th Bombers and Fighters, and match up to ALL USAAF losses including ditching in Channel or North Sea, crashing upon crossing Channel, sanctuary in Sweden and Switzerland it is pretty consistent 2:1. I have researched over 80 significant 8th AF battles and have rarely found LW credits better that 1:2 against actual losses reflected by 8th AF for all causes.
 
Thanks drgondog. I don't believe any claims, unless I can cross check, or some other reputable person with documentation can or did before me.
I still have questions of 8th AF claims, which don't jive with some JG 11, JG 26, and JG 27 loss reports, but that's for another thread. Thanks again.

@ fastmongrel, I don't need to report anything a trivial as what you posted, the mods here have a hard enough time moderating.
 
No awards system has withstood close scrutiny. They all, without exception tend to buckle when placed under the microscope. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the efforts of the fighters, whilst absoolutely essential, did not actually win battles except with onbe or two very notable exceptions (Battle of britain, Defence of the reich being the two i can think of)

Ive no doubt the germans would have a very good and thorough awards and confirmation system. It was still hopelessly innacurate, as many post war studies have shown. It also suffered, at times from higher than normal levels of political interference, and with regards to own losses can be shown to hide losses by keeping write offs on strength long after it was obvious they would never fly again.

This gets off topic anyway. The point that needs to be taken from all this, is that the lions share of losses for the Japanese were taken long after the Japanese had stopped trying to challenge seriously the US control of the air. Rather like the russians on the eastern front, where air superiority was a "nice to have" but "nonessential" pre-requisite for their style of warfare, the japanaese came to concentrate more than 50% of their air efferts in the last year of the war on strikes against US surface targets, mostly extremely vulnerable (but potentially very dangerous) Kamikaze attacks. Germans did something similar in 1944 over germany, when they decided to concentrate on the bombers.

For the japanese, this tacit surrender of the air battle did not come as a result of the Hellcat. That just put the nail in the coffin. it didnt come as a result of the Wildcat, or any other fighter. these all helped, but the Japanese could have tolerated these losses and still be competitive in the air. What killed it for them was the relentless attacks by the allied bomber forces, that attacked and attacked and just kept coming. They forced the japanese to react when they really needed to pull back rest and recuperate.. That moment was just after Guadacanal and Kokoda. The limit placed on the allied success was their lack of carriers. If they had had a viable carrier force just after guadacanal, it would have been even uglier for the japanese than it was.
 
The people in the PTO might disagree with the inrensity test part. Wasn't as widespread since Islands are smaller than continents, but intensity-wise, the Japanese put up as much fight as anybody in the world did. Didn't generate the losses of D-Day, but landings on small islands were fought just as hard by smaller forces. I daresay that tropic weather was every bit as hard on troops as winter weather, ruined eqipment, clothes and food much more quickly, and had a much wider variety of bad things borne by mosquitos, snakes, etc. than continental Europe.

Each was a deadly challenge and I'd hate to have to choose which one to go fight in.

I believe that the "intensity test" was in reference to the air war, not to the ground war.
 
OK, it's pretty hard to get the concentration of aircraft over the ocean from carriers the same as over Europe since the quantity of planes are limited by carrier capacity or whatever was stationed at an atoll or island.

In that case, Drgondog has a point. Individual fights might have been just as tough, but there were fewer of them at any one time.
 
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Why does it seem like a lot? If someone is banned they can't create a new account. The site has features to prevent that.

Erm respectfully got to 100% disagree with you on that one Adler. I am a computer moron but I could create sock puppets quite easily unfortunately trolls can create sock puppets using various tricks, a quick google brings up plenty of ways the saddoes can do it. Sock puppet creators often use the same tricks paedophiles use to cover there tracks.
 
drgondog,

How fast were claims in the 8th airforce was officially recognized? The reason I ask is because the Luftwaffe had a very stringent approval process for the confirmation of aerial victories.

• One plane, one kill. No shared kills
• Without a witness, a Luftwaffe fighter pilot had no chance to have his victory claim confirmed. Such a claim, even if filed, would not pass beyond group level.
• The final destruction or explosion of an enemy aircraft in the air, or bail-out of the pilot, had to be observed either on gun-camera film or by at least one other human witness. The witness could be the German pilot's wingman, squadron mate, or a ground observer of the encounter.
• There was no possibility, as with some RAF and USAAF pilots, of having a victory credited because the claiming officer was a gentleman and a man of his word. The German rule was simply "no witness – no kill."
• The German system was impartial, inflexible, and far less error-prone than either the British or American procedures. German fighter pilots had to wait several months, a year, or sometimes even longer for a kill confirmation to reach them from the German High Command.

How close was the American system to the above?

That "One plane, one kill. No shared kills" might have led to some pulling of rank cases when in some other a/fs where shared kills were allowed, the kill might have been simply shared.
IIRC at least Barkhorn was deemed so reliable claimer that later in his caree he didn't necessarily need a witness and he still remained very reliable claimer, maybe with exception the time when he was nearing his 300.
As you know at least some of the LW stars got their medals within days when their claims reached the number of kills needed to certain medal. I have never heard that anyone of them was later informed that"sorry, but the confirmation process didn't accept some of your claims so after all you are not allowed your medal. Give it back, please".
 

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