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wuzak,
As far as I know the Seafire XV just missed WW2. So you have to change Cats to a Bear. I don't think you want to go there.
Jeff
Seafire F Mk. XV NS.493 which is representative of production Mk. XV aircraft subsequent to about the 100th aircraft was sent to this
Establisment for measurement of level speed performance and position error, and the results of these tests are dealt with in this Part of the Report.
Parsifal, the only part of that Wikipedia quote I referenced you're not agreeing with is this part: "The U.S. successes were not only attributed to superior aircraft."
You're agreeing with this part: "ut also from 1942 onwards, they faced increasingly inexperienced Japanese aviators."
As a matter of fact that's your whole rationalization for everything PTO, pilot experience. It's not only your rationalization for the successes of the Hellcats. Here, while ignoring everything Wildcat and others enumerated, it's your lock-stock-and-barrel rationalization for the failures of your own Spitfires. Here's what says that, these excised parts from your former reply:
.You're on a personal crusade to rationalize everything PTO in terms of pilot experience. That's what you come down to. That's why you isolated that factor and dramatized it as the one-size-fits-all rationalization for the failures of these Spitfires, as well, to the exclusion of everything else said
And I in good faith credit your War heroes for their audacity and courage and you interpret that as a smart-crack.
Well, but of course. These were inexperienced pilots.
Crediting them for their heroism is but tantamount to patronization. That's in effect how obsessed you are with that pilot experience rationalization.
The quality of the aircraft does make a differnce, but it is not critical to winning an air war. There are many examples to prove that. Eastern Front is a great example, Defence of the reich is another. Air war over North Africa and Malta is another. British Carrier operations 1940-43 is another good example. Williason murray shows very clearly, further, that air to air action is not even amajor determinant of who wins an air campaign. Most losses arent even related to enemy fighters in most situations, so the quality of the fighters makes little difference as to who wins the air battle. Its as brutal as that.
Wrong again. The pilots of the Spitfire wing were the most experienced in the RAAF, led by the top scoring ace in the RAAF, Clive Caldwell. What they lacked was experience in the Spitfire. Caldwell had chalked up impressive victories in Tomahawks against the Germans, using turning fights to shot down many aircraft. he is credited with shooting down 5 German aircraft in one engagement.
Your assuming that I believe the Spitfire Wing to be an inexperienced outfit. It was not, at least against other opposition. What it lacked was experience in the Spit, and secondly, how to use the Spit against the Japanese.
Nonetheless, the two RAAF Spitfire squadrons in the UK - No 452 under the command of seven victory ace Sqn Ldr Raymond Thorold-Smith, and No 457, led by Sqn Ldr Ken James - together with the RAF's experienced No 54 Sqn, under Sqn Ldr Eric Gibbs, were ordered to move to Australia. Accordingly, No 452 Sqn was withdrawn from operations on 23 March 1942 while No 457 ceased active operations on 31 May. (Osprey Aircraft of the Aces 87: Spitfire Aces of Burma and the Pacific, Thomas, page 7)
The Spitfire wing's performance on this date (2 May 1943) would generate a great deal of ill-informed and unjustified criticism, much of which emanated from Australia's US allies. (Thomas, 13)
'I pulled away to port and to the rear, and finding I had only 22 gallons of fuel left I returned to base, landing with just two gallons to spare.'
This was a problem that many of the pilots faced during the mission, and most landed having been airborne for almost two hours - a long time in a Spitfire VC that relied exclusively on internal fuel. Bob Foster also commented to the author for this volume on the effect Zero-sens had on the tactics employed by No 1 Fighter Wing;
'As far as the Zero was concerned, the Spitfire VC had the advantage of speed and could out-climb and out-dive it. However, as with any other Allied aircraft, it could not match the Japanese fighter for manoeuvrability - one didn't try to "mix it" with the Zero. The escorts were always a menace, which meant that at least one squadron had to be detached to deal with them, leaving fewer to attack the bombers - hence the losses suffered by the latter were not as high as they might have been.'
In spite of all the criticisms made by those less informed following the action of 2 May 1943, the experienced Tim Goldsmith was confident that the tactics that had been used on the day were sound, and after his rescue he concluded his combat report by stating 'the strategical and tactical set-up for the wing immediately prior to the attack, organised by Wg Cdr Caldwell, was, in my opinion, 100 per cent perfect'. Nonetheless it had been a chastening experience for No 1 Fighter Wing. (Thomas 15)
*Include several Ki-46s which had been almost invulnerable until the arrival of Spitfires.With the change in Japanese priorities in the face of Allied successes elsewhere in the Pacific, the 12 November raid was the last time that the
Australian mainland was attacked, although occasional reconnaissance sorties continued. John Smithson's successes meant that in nine months
of action No 1 Fighter Wing had been credited with a total of 65 enemy aircraft destroyed* for the loss of 15 pilots in combat. Although standby was maintained, the war had now largely moved away. Whilst the Spitfires would see further action, the reality was that by early 1944 there were few Japanese aircraft left in the Southwest Pacific. (Thomas 26)
Well then, I'd have to agree that the F6F could do a land plane role. BUT, it would probably not do it as well as a fighter that was designed from the start as a point defence interseptor. The F6F was designed for shipboard operation. That means a lot of extra size and weight compaired to a land based interceptor. If it had been designed as such it would probably have looked more like a F8F.
Compairing the Hellcat to the Spitfire V seems off a little. They are nearly 2 years appart from entering operational service. It is hard to take the large Hellcat and strip it down to point interceptor. So it seems to me the best way to compair is to rig up the Spifire for carrier duty and then compare: Seafire III.
Height in meters / Speed in mph / Climb in fpm.
Height...Seafire III......F6F-5
S.L.......303/2500....318/3500
.1,000...318/2525....322/3440
.2,000...334/2550....333/3380
.3,000...348/2574....345/3180
.4,000...349/2590....358/2955
.5,000...344/2435....373/2605
.6,000...338/1960....376/2225
.7,000...330/1575....390/1835
.8,000...321/1175....383/1435
Maximum velocities: Seafire III 351/10,500ft. F6F-5 392/19,200ft.
Flight weights are: Seafire: 6,750-7,100 lbs. F6F-5: 12,406-12,420 lbs.
NOTE 1: In TAIC REPORT NO. 17 The F6F-5 reached 409 mph/21,600ft.
All performance figures are from wwiiaicraftperformance.org. One odd note: the Seafire speed figures are at +16 lbs. boost and the climb figures are at +9 lbs. boost. I do not know if the Seafire was cleared for +16 lbs. boost with the Merlin 50 engine.
Climb performance
Max. rate of climb in Main supercharger gear = 2260 ft/min at 5400 feet.
Max. rate of climb in Aux. Lowspeed supercharger gear = 1880 ft/min at 20500 feet.
Time to reach 10,000 ft. = 4.65 minutes
Time to reach 20,000 ft. = 10.0 minutes
Change gear height = 9200 feet
Level speed performance
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 315 mph (274 knots) at 2000 ft. in Main supercharger (314mph from 4000-8000ft)
Max. T.A.S. at max. permissible power (rich mixture) = 371 mph (322 knots) at 18700 ft. in Aux. Low Speed supercharger.
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/f6f/fn322.pdf
If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!This is one reason why to my personal opinion Montgomery was only an average to poor general, because he only could fight attrition battles.
If he was only average to bad, you have to wonder how bad were the ones before him were !!!!!
ps: It also brings into question how good Rommel and the other German generals were if they were continually getting beaten by a 'poor' general
There must have been a great shortage of trained monkeys in the Allied armies in the early part of the war then.Every trained monkey can fight an attrition battle, if he had superior numbers of troops, tanks, artillery and aircrafts and the supply to replace this superior numbers!