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When US Navy claims were vetted after the war, they were found to be mostly a LOT more reliable than claims over Europe. The reasons were obvious. Most Naval aircraft fighters were of the 4 - 8 vs. 4 - 8 variety and not the 1,000 plane raids that could be seen over Europe. Thus it was MUCH easier to keep track of what happened because there were many fewer planes involved. Some of the largest Pacific encounters involved only some 25 - 30 planes for each side. The accuracy of claims for ALL sides was MUCH better when the numbers of combatants were small.
Some of the very early Naval encounters were inflated, but they settled down rapidly and, by the time the Hellcats got there, the type of claims versus actuals inaccuracy in Parsifal's post above should have been largely a thing of the past.
The USA probably has the best data I have found for any air arms of WWII.
If we are talking getting the numbers out early , the Grumman is one hell of a success story. if we are talking cutting edge technology and performance to boot. then the hellcat is just another garden variety late war aircraft.....a bit slow, very tough, good at what it was designed for. This was a thread about Hellcat and A6M performance last time I looked.
If the F6F is truly such a mediocre design, it is well to remember that its kill ratio is still higher than its contemporaries, so Grumman must have done something right.
Global-scale industrial wars are won by making a whole hell of a lot of "pretty good" airplanes, handing them over to scared, green kids, and throwing them at the enemy in huge numbers. They are not won by comparing performance data line by line and declaring a winner.
If the F6F is truly such a mediocre design, it is well to remember that its kill ratio is still higher than its contemporaries, so Grumman must have done something right.
"The importance of flight hours should be a no-brainer. During World War II, when some nations simply didn't have the fuel available for pilot training, they saw combat (and non-combat) losses increase as training-hours-in-the-air went down. Nazi Germany's warplanes began losing, big time, when they could no longer produce enough fuel to allow their trainee pilots sufficient time in the air. This was a trend that had been ongoing since 1942. Up until that time, new pilots got 240 hours of flying time before entering combat. By comparison, British pilots only received 200 hours and Soviet pilots even less. Germany ruled the skies. But in late 1942, Germany reduced training time to 205 hours. The British now had the fuel, and increased theirs to 340 hours, while the US was providing 270 hours. In the Summer of 1943, the British increased flying time to 335 hours and the US went to 320 hours. At the same time, the Germans reduced it to 170 hours. A year later, the Germans were down to 110 hours, while the British were at 340 hours and the Americans at 360.
The situation was the same in the Pacific, where increasingly effective U.S. submarine attacks sank so many Japanese tankers that there was not enough fuel available to train pilots. In 1941, a Japanese pilot trainee 700 hours of flight time to qualify as a full fledged pilot in the Imperial Navy, while his American counterpart needed only 305 hours. About half of the active duty pilots in the U.S. Navy in late 1941 had between 300 and 600 hours flying experience, a quarter between 600 and 1000 hours, and the balance more than 1000 hours. Most of these flight hours had been acquired in the last few years. But at the beginning of the war nearly 75 percent of the U.S. Navy's pilots had fewer flying hours than did the least qualified of the Japanese Navy's pilots.
On the down side, the Japanese pilot training program was so rigorous that only about 100 men a year were being graduated, in a program that required 4-5 years. In 1940, it was proposed that the pilot training program be made shorter, less rigorous, and more productive, in order to build up the pool of available pilots to about 15,000. This was rejected. Japan believed it could not win a long war, and needed the best pilots possible in order to win a short one.
Naturally, once the war began, the Imperial Navy started losing pilots faster than they could be replaced. For example, the 29 pilots lost at Pearl Harbor represented more than a quarter of the annual crop. The battles of the next year led to the loss of hundreds of superb pilots. This finally forced the Japanese to reform their pilot training programs. Time to train a pilot, and hours in the air spiraled downward. By 1945 men were being certified fit for combat duty with less than four months training. In contrast, the U.S. Navy was actually increasing its flight time, while keeping pilot training programs to about 18 months. In 1943, the U.S. Navy increased flight hours for trainees to 500, while Japan cut its hours to 500. In 1944, the U.S. hours went up to 525, while Japan cut it to 275 hour. In 1945, a shortage of fuel had Japanese trainee pilots flying on 90 hours before entering combat. In the air, this produced lopsided American victories, with ten or more Japanese aircraft being lost for each U.S. one.
This experience was remembered after World War II, and reinforced when, in campaign after campaign, the side with the fewer training hours per pilot, suffered the greatest losses. Now, unable to afford fuel for training, flight simulators are being used more frequently. These devices are becoming cheaper and more realistic, but research (mostly from training exercises, not actual combat) shows that each hour of simulator time is worth only about half or two-thirds of an hour in the air."
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Global-scale industrial wars are won by making a whole hell of a lot of "pretty good" airplanes, handing them over to scared, green kids, and throwing them at the enemy in huge numbers. They are not won by comparing performance data line by line and declaring a winner.
If the F6F is truly such a mediocre design, it is well to remember that its kill ratio is still higher than its contemporaries, so
Grumman must have done something right.
Based on that I think no matter how good a fighter aircraft the IJN were able to operate, they doomed themselves from the start.
A point i often make, is, all other things being equal, if the USN was the one with the Zeke, and the Japanese were equipped with the Hellcat, in the same time frames, the US would still win, with virtually no changes to the loss ratios. We would now be singing the praises of how the American Zeke, despite its light construction, was able to fly rings around the Japanese hellcat, and achieve kill loss ratios of 10 or 20 or 30:1.
According to real-life history, the F6F was not anywhere CLOSE to a mediocre design, judging from the results it achieved. It did VERY well wherever it went, regardless of who was flying it.
......
So ... and again ... if anyone wants to help to try to settle some WWII aerial scores and knows where we can get the information to DO it, I'd be interested in helping out as part of the team. I can supply most claims, with sources. We can start anywhere and, when we finish, it would be preferable to what we now have, which is endless guessing and argument.
According to real-life history, the F6F was not anywhere CLOSE to a mediocre design, judging from the results it achieved. It did VERY well wherever it went, regardless of who was flying it.
"Naturally, once the war began, the Imperial Navy started losing pilots faster than they could be replaced. For example, the 29 pilots lost at Pearl Harbor represented more than a quarter of the annual crop. The battles of the next year led to the loss of hundreds of superb pilots."
Based on that I think no matter how good a fighter aircraft the IJN were able to operate, they doomed themselves from the start.
The Soviets claim they're a LOT better than the Chinese, but their claims add up to more Sabres than we deployed to Korea. We know the tail numbers that went over and the tail numbers that came back, and their claims add up to WAY more than the actual losses. Most of the tail numbers that DID come back wound up in National Guard or Reserve units for some period, so their histories after Korea are pretty well known.
Maybe that is why the subject is so hard to research ... national pride is at stake and the truth is nothing compared with national pride.
Found some interesting information of flight training time in WW2 by the various countries. It's interesting to see the required hours of training actually spelled out. I also think this is very pertinent when we discuss the performance of aircraft - as they are only as good as the pilots flying them.
On the down side, the Japanese pilot training program was so rigorous that only about 100 men a year were being graduated, in a program that required 4-5 years. In 1940, it was proposed that the pilot training program be made shorter, less rigorous, and more productive, in order to build up the pool of available pilots to about 15,000. This was rejected. Japan believed it could not win a long war, and needed the best pilots possible in order to win a short one.