How big was the FAA in Sept 1939?

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Admiral Beez

Major
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Oct 21, 2019
Toronto, Canada
I've read that the FAA was woefully undersized in Sept 1939. But how big was it, and how big did it need to be?

HMS Ark Royal needs 60 aircraft, each of the three Courageous class needs 48 aircraft, Eagle ~28 aircraft, Hermes and Argus each ~16. On top of this you need be training new personnel and procuring aircraft for the four Illustrious class that have been building since 1937 and very soon to enter service, so an additional 192 aircraft (~48x4). That's a total of 456 front line aircraft (38 squadrons). Add 50% that to a total FAA of about 684 aircraft to cover operational losses, spares, maintenance and training, with a total of perhaps 1,500 aircrew (pilots and observers/air gunner) deployed or in training, service ashore and leave. That's hardly a huge outlay for the Air Ministry and Exchequer, but was the actual FAA a lot smaller than this?

Of course the peacetime RN often deploys ships capable of, but not fitted (what's the official term for that, fitted for, but not with?) with combat systems. Look at today's Queen Elizabeth class carriers, sure they're in commission and sailing around, but without any fixed wing combat aircraft. In many ways the interwar carrier borne FAA looks like the IJNAF, with little planning or capability in place to rapidly scale up pilot and aircraft procurement to cover wartime losses.
 
I've read that the FAA was woefully undersized in Sept 1939. But how big was it, and how big did it need to be?

HMS Ark Royal needs 60 aircraft, each of the three Courageous class needs 48 aircraft, Eagle ~28 aircraft, Hermes and Argus each ~16. On top of this you need be training new personnel and procuring aircraft for the four Illustrious class that have been building since 1937 and very soon to enter service, so an additional 192 aircraft (~48x4). That's a total of 456 front line aircraft (38 squadrons). Add 50% that to a total FAA of about 684 aircraft to cover operational losses, spares, maintenance and training, with a total of perhaps 1,500 aircrew (pilots and observers/air gunner) deployed or in training, service ashore and leave. That's hardly a huge outlay for the Air Ministry and Exchequer, but was the actual FAA a lot smaller than this?

Of course the peacetime RN often deploys ships capable of, but not fitted (what's the official term for that, fitted for, but not with?) with combat systems. Look at today's Queen Elizabeth class carriers, sure they're in commission and sailing around, but without any fixed wing combat aircraft. In many ways the interwar carrier borne FAA looks like the IJNAF, with little planning or capability in place to rapidly scale up pilot and aircraft procurement to cover wartime losses.


Here you go:

"15. Memorandum by Fifth Sea Lord (1)
[ADM 1/10114] 4 September 1939
The Fleet Air Arm on outbreak of war
STATE OF FLEET AIR ARM 4TH SEPTEMBER 1939 …
1. First Line strength.
Carrier Aircraft Station
ARK ROYAL 42 T.S.R. 18 F.F. H ome Fleet.
GLORIOUS 36 T.S.R. 12 F.F. Mediterranean.
COURAGEOUS 24 T.S.R. Trade Routes.
FURIOUS N o formed squadrons. Training Pilots, Rosyth.
EAGLE 18 T.S.R. China.
HERMES 9 T.S.R. Channel Force.
ALBATROSS 6 Amphibians Sierra Leone.
Catapult Ships 41 Amphibians Distributed over Fleets.
18 T.S.R.
2. Reserves of aircraft.
A war reserve of approximately 50% exists over and above the 100%
Immediate Reserve to the First Line that is necessary to keep the first line
always to strength.
Allowing for probable war production rates and additional
commitments for new construction this meets a war wastage rate of –
10–15% per month in T.S.R. and Amphibians.
15–20% per month in Fighters.
for the next six months. War experience only can prove the adequacy of
this.
3. Training.
At Naval aerodromes – 192 aircraft of various types.
4. Fleet requirements unit.
14 aircraft employed in target towing and marking.
5. Crew Personnel.
Pilots and Observers are all absorbed in providing the above – no
pool exists, and there is no surplus for increasing training or forming new
squadrons for new construction. We require 100 further R.A.F. Pilots
immediately.
The present requirements are –
Pilots. Observers.
First line 230 190


(1) VA A. R. M. Ramsay.

Ancillary services 265 78
495 268
Available
(including 50 R.A.F.) 395 190
Deficiency 100 78
Our output from training raised our figures as follows:–
1st Nov. 1st Dec. 1st Jan. 1st Feb. 1st Mar.
'39. '39. '40. 1940. 1940.
Pilots. 430 430 475 520 570
Observers. 290 290 330 330 375
allowing the expansion required and war wastage. It may be possible to
return some pilots to the R.A.F. by March, 1940.
6. Maintenance Personnel.
Adequate numbers of on loan from R.A.F. and training now going on
will meet expansion.
7. Stores.
The state of stores and equipment is very unsatisfactory and a fuller
statement is in the attached appendix.
8. Overseas Bases.
For trade route carriers aerodromes are required at Kingston, Sierra
Leone, Gibraltar and Halifax. The Air Ministry are arranging to press on
with the first three – the Canadian Government with the last.
9. New Construction Carriers.
ILLUSTRIOUS to complete May, 1940.
VICTORIOUS " " September, 1940.
FORMIDABLE " " October, 1940.
INDOMITABLE " " April, 1941.
IMPLACABLE " " October, 1941.
INDEFATIGABLE " " June, 1942.
10. The Problem.
To maintain our present first line under war conditions and expand out
first line strength to meet new construction, a perfect balance is required
in provision of –
(a) Flying personnel.
(b) Stores and spares, and operational equipment.
(c) Aircraft, engine, and air frame construction.
(d) Provision of maintenance personnel.
Lack of balance at the moment lies in provision of stores and
operational equipment which is delaying the formation of new squadrons.
Balance only exists in crew strengths if 100 Pilots are transferred
immediately from the R.A.F. …


Jones, The Fleet Air Arm in WWII, 1939–1941"
 
To give you an example. The Blackburn Skua the maximum number of Skuas operational at any one time was 33. Yes thirty three aircraft and most of them were land based.
Jeez. Of course the cameraman can't be everywhere, but I don't think I've ever seen a photo of Skua on a carrier that wasn't HMS Ark Royal. To have the world's first all-metal, folding wing, monoplane, retractable undercarriage dive bomber, and then leave it on land or at the depot makes no sense.
 
To have the world's first all-metal, folding wing, monoplane, retractable undercarriage dive bomber, and then leave it on land or at the depot makes no sense.

From June 40 till late in the the year 2 squadrons of Skuas were attacking the coast of France and Belgium. They were withdrawn and the squadrons re-equipped with Fulmars. A FAA squadron was usually 10 aircraft at this time.
 
From June 40 till late in the the year 2 squadrons of Skuas were attacking the coast of France and Belgium. They were withdrawn and the squadrons re-equipped with Fulmars. A FAA squadron was usually 10 aircraft at this time.
Wikipedia says that in 1941 the Skuas were used for training and target tugs. This seems a waste to me when carriers like HMS Hermes have nothing but a dozen Swordfish, and Malaya needs aircraft. Clearly the FAA thought they had sufficient aircraft to leave the Skua at the RNAS.
 
It is not just aircraft, it is air crew and even more importantly, ground crew. You need something on the order to 8-12 ground crew for every single engine aircraft, open to correction.
Skilled ground crew, not men you can march in formation and chew gum at the same time.
Last Skua left the factory in March of 1940, and that may have been a clean up the factory plane, Nov and Dec of 1939 saw a total of 8 Skuas built (I don't know how many Rocs) supply of spare parts for a plane built in small numbers and out of production for over year might be a bit difficult. Didn't they have enough problems trying to service the aircraft they did have?
It is one thing to keep planes flying within a few hundred miles of the factory, trying to use them several months away by ship is a whole different problem. Instead of waiting a few days or week for a part, cannibalization becomes standard procedure and the number of available aircraft falls steadily.

Mayla was under defended, in part by obsolete or 2nd rate aircraft with inadequately trained aircrew and ground crew (who often did perform well in some instances), however shoving more obsolete or 2nd rate aircraft into Mayla without adequate support/preparation wasn't going to change the situation much.
 
Mayla was under defended, in part by obsolete or 2nd rate aircraft with inadequately trained aircrew and ground crew (who often did perform well in some instances), however shoving more obsolete or 2nd rate aircraft into Mayla without adequate support/preparation wasn't going to change the situation much.
I see your point. The only position I may question is the Skua's 2nd rate status in Malaya. As you wrote, sufficient air cover is a must, but a modern dive bomber would be useful for CAS and anti shipping.

Given that RNAS Simbang had, IIRC from Bloody Shambles a single Swordfish, the FAA should contribute something useful.
 
Less than 250 'front line' aircraft in a nominal 20 squadrons.
It would be interesting to see the growth in the FAA from 1939 to 1945. I imagine there's more than 250 front line FAA aircraft in the five Illustrious/Implacable class and HMS Unicorn shown below in April 1945 during the Okinawa Campaign.

image-asset.jpg

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

By the time this photo was taken in April 1945 the RN had six armoured deck fleet carriers, five Colossus class CVLs and forty-one CVEs. The last pair of the seven carriers of 1939, HMS Furious and HMS Argus had been removed from service by April 1945. Over the course of the war the RN lost eight carriers (HMS Courageous, Glorious, Ark Royal, Eagle, Hermes, Audacity, Avenger, Dasher). If we add all those together, excluding HMS Unicorn that's fifty-nine flat tops of various size. The FAA must have grown to a massive organization for training, procurement and maintenance of this scale.
 
Jeez. Of course the cameraman can't be everywhere, but I don't think I've ever seen a photo of Skua on a carrier that wasn't HMS Ark Royal. To have the world's first all-metal, folding wing, monoplane, retractable undercarriage dive bomber, and then leave it on land or at the depot makes no sense.

Illustrious operated Skuas and Rocs during her working up period.
 
Neither Buffaloes or Hurricanes were capable of holding their owns, much less anything the FAA could ill afford to bring there (Fulmars), so a barely 225 mph plane could make to much difference.

As a dive bomber, the Skua (and Roc) would have wreaked havoc amongst IJN shipping and smaller naval vessels. The Skua and Roc's maximum speed is achieved down low and so the speed differences between it and the older IJA/IJN fighters was less than it seems.
 
As a dive bomber, the Skua (and Roc) would have wreaked havoc amongst IJN shipping and smaller naval vessels. The Skua and Roc's maximum speed is achieved down low and so the speed differences between it and the older IJA/IJN fighters was less than it seems.

The Skuas did good work attacking the French and Belgian coast in 1940. Dive in from about 4,000 feet release bomb at 1600 feet and then throttle to the stop at wave height all the way home. They hardly had any casualties.
 
As a dive bomber, the Skua (and Roc) would have wreaked havoc amongst IJN shipping and smaller naval vessels. The Skua and Roc's maximum speed is achieved down low and so the speed differences between it and the older IJA/IJN fighters was less than it seems.

Well, with the speed advantage and a diving attack I think that is highly doubtfull that the Skua would outrun either the Ki 27 or the Ki 43.

Certainly the Skua the could have made quite a work of the japanese landing barges in SEA... if it could get through the fighter screen, in and out, otherwise they would became one shot guns, if they could got to the landing places.

The Skuas made a good job in Norway, as long as the RN/RAF got air supremacy, but that was far from been the scene in SEA in december 1941 and, IMO, Skuas would became more cannon fodder for IJAAF/IJNAF than anything else.
 
Certainly the Skua the could have made quite a work of the japanese landing barges in SEA... if it could get through the fighter screen, in and out, otherwise they would became one shot guns, if they could got to the landing places.
One thing the Skua offers is that it's the only monoplane aircaft in the FAA that can fit down Hermes' lifts. Hurricanes and non-folding Martlets are too wide, Fulmars too long; so it's Skuas, Gladiators, Swordfish or Albacores. The Buffalo would also fit, but the FAA doesn't have any. So without a crash barrier to facilitate deck parking of Hurricanes, if Hermes is to have any "fast" strike and fleet air defence capacity it has to be Skuas.
 
Production of the Skua.

Oct 1938.....................3
Nov 1938....................3
Dec 1938.....................6
Jan 1939......................9
Feb 1939....................15
Mar 1939...................15
April 1939..................23
May 1939...................23
June 1939..................17
July 1939....................26
Aug 1939...................14
Sept 1939..................11
Oct 1939....................16
Nov 1939.....................5
Dec 1939.....................3
March 1940................1

In Oct 1939 seven aircraft were shipped to Malta for the No 3 Anti-Aircraft Co-Operation unit for target towing. Many late production Skuas were completed as target tugs.

By the summer of 1941 any fighter/dive bomber Skuas were about two years old. Many had a fair number of hours having seen service with No 800, 801, 803 and 806 squadrons.
801 (the last squadron to fly the Skua on combat operations) only changing to Hurricanes in Aug of 1941.

The Skua used the sleeve valve Perseus engine. An engine not used by the Gladiators, Swordfish or Albacores.

Hermes had been placed in reserve in 1937 and then used as a training ship in 1938.

Hermes air group may have limited as much by fuel storage as by actual aircraft available.

Wiki claims that the planned increase in petrol storage to 13,000imp gallons during her last refits may not have been done???? confirmation or other source anyone?
 

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