How good a plane was the P-40, really? (1 Viewer)

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In early Dec 1941 around 74 Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighters were stationed at various airfields on the island of Oahu. Give them sufficient warning of the incoming IJN strike so that all/most can get to altitude on an intercept course and we'll see how well the P-40 does. Nagumo's first strike will face six or more ready and briefed formations like the below.

I've been thinking about this too, having just finished "Pearl Harbor: From Infamy to Greatness" by Craig Nelson. When you consider what Taylor and Welch accomplished with two P-40C's, which only had their four wing .30's armed (shot down six as I recall), you have to wonder what might have happened if even a couple dozen of the P-40E's had been in the air.
 
I think the P-40 was a pretty decent fighter for the time it was developed. Later fighters were better but, as suggested above, they darn well SHOULD have been since they were designed to BE better.

This is a pretty good post with some of the basics, but also has some common misconceptions. I'll try to correct these.

The P-40 rolled very well, better than later designs.

Correct

It climbed decently at low altitudes, on the order of 3,000 fpm.

Correct, though it depended on the loadout and engine settings. Fully loaded P-40 climbed like an overloaded truck.

It had the same armament as the P-51 / F6F, so the guns weren't a negative.

True although a fair number flew with the four guns (same as P-51B or early F4F)

It was limited to about 15,000 feet as a fighter. Could reach the 30,000 feet, but wasn't really performing well there.

This is where it gets tricky.

Stats on P-40s are almost always based on the P-40E or P-40N. The most important types in combat, certainly for the US, were the K, F and L. For the Commonwealth K and M.

P-40 performance really depended A LOT on the type, the engine, and the loadout. Weight for a given mission (or test) could vary by 1,500 lbs or more.
Some tests were done at military or continuous power, some at WEP.

I think this is an accurate breakdown, where possible I linked to test documents on WW2aircraftperformance

P-40B Tomahawk IIa - critical altitude ~17,000 ft, top speed 350 mph, initial climb 3200 fpm
P-40C Tomahawk IIb - critical altitude ~16,000 ft, top speed 340 mph , initial climb 2800 fpm*
P-40D Kittyhawk I critical altitude ~13,000 ft, top speed 354 mph, initial climb 2580 fpm*
P-40E critical altitude ~ 12,000 ft, top speed 344 mph, initial climb 1800 fpm* (original engine settings, up to March / April 1942)
P-40E critical altitude ~12,000 ft, top speed 361 mph, initial climb 2500 fpm* (higher boost settings, by march April 1942)
P-40K critical altitude ~12,000 ft, top speed 365 mph, initial climb 3200 fpm*
P-40F critical altitude ~18,500 ft, top speed 374 mph or 370 mph, initial climb 2960 fpm*
P-40L critical altitude ~18,500 ft, top speed 372 mph, initial climb 3200 fpm*
P-40M critical altitude ~17,500 ft, top speed 350 mph, initial climb 2000 fpm*
P-40N critical altitude ~17,500 ft, top speed 378 mph, initial climb 3300 fpm* or 3720 fpm (stripped version, four guns, WEP)
P-40N critical altitude ~17,500 ft, top speed 340 mph, initial climb 1960 fpm* (heavy FB version, six guns)

* bomb shackles, sway braces and other field equipment lowered top speed by about 5 -15 mph, depending on maintenance and individual aircraft.
The earliest Tomahawk types (P-40B) did not have external fuel tanks etc.

P-40D, E and K could use higher boost settings due to their (lower altitude) supercharger ratio.
P-40F and L had two speed superchargers so they actually had two critical altitudes.

P-40F was actually one of the heaviest types, the stipped F version and the L were closer to P-40K weight.

All versions of the P-40 were able to operate fairly well about 2-4,000 ft over their Critical Altitude, as performance dropped off somewhat gradually. This depended on how heavily they were loaded and on atmospheric conditions. P-40F for example achieved it's best speed at 19270'.

P-40s could carry a lot of fuel, oil, ammunition, and other equipment. Heavier loaded planes performed more poorly, at least at the beginning of the sortie.

Turned well. Not like a A6M, but pretty well.

Correct. Better than most Allied or any German or Italian monoplane fighter.

Main disadvantages were:
1) Restricted to low altitudes. About 15-16,000 feet as a fighter.

See above.

2) Not very fast. You had to work to get it faster than 320 mph.

Top speed was about 340-380 mph depending on the exact type and loadout. It is also worth noting that most P-40 variants had particularly good low altitude speed. For example, the 'stripped' P-40N made 344 mph at 2,960 feet. That's still quite fast for that altitude in 1943.

Someone edited the Wikipedia article on the P-40 a while back so now it's 330 mph etc. but that just isn't reality.

3) Relatively short range ... 850 miles. That means about 350 mile radius if you want some reserve fuel.

That is the right number. But it's about twice the range of a Hurricane, Spitfire V, Bf 109E or F, Macchi 202 etc.

4) Relatively poor initial pilot training with regards to combat-readiness.

A lot of pilots did not have much (or in some cases any) time on type before going into action. Some units in combat very early on though had very good and experienced leadership, which I think made a difference.

Main Advantages:
1) Rugged and available.
2) The engine was very reliable.
3) Was available in some numbers early.

I would say, 'ruggedness' is a bit of cliche, though it does appear to be true. Maneuverability (roll and turn), dive acceleration and dive speed, low altitude speed (especially at higher boost). Serviceability in tropical climates turned out to be high compared to other types.

One of the mysteries of the P-40, and one key to it's success, was that speed was not adversely affected by the tropical filters they used, unlike Hurriance and Spitfire. I think this accounts for some of the operational outcomes.

Possible:
Had they built the P-40Q, it wouldn't have been a P-51D, but it WOULD have been head and shoulders better than the regular P-40 in the theaters where the P-40 was being used a a primary aircraft.

P-40 was arguably the most important fighter aircraft for the Commonwealth forces in North Africa from late 1941 until the arrival of the Spitfire Mk IX in 1943. RAF and commonwealth Kittyhawk pilots claimed 420 victories and Tomahawk pilots claimed another 77, for 497 total in the MTO. Commonwealth P-40 aces including Neville Duke, Clive Caldwell, Billy Drake and James Edwards all killed Luftwaffe 'experten' while flying the P-40. 46 British / Commonwealth pilots made ace while flying the P-40 in North Africa, including seven double (or more) aces.
P-40 was the main USAAF fighter in the MTO from mid 1942 through 1943, and this turns out to be a more important Theater in many respects. It did very well for the US in this Theater, in part because they had the better (Merlin Engined) versions, in part because their pilots were well trained before going into combat, in part because they flew with British units for operational training before going fully operational. Five US fighter groups plus the 99 FS (Tuskeegee) flew the P-40 in the MTO, and made 598 victory claims.
(Total US plus commonwealth claims in type are 1095. For comparison, Luftwaffe units consisting of 5 JG claimed 1,118 P-40s, and lost 711 aircraft in Theater)
P-40 was the main USAAF fighter in China and Burma into 1944. It did extremely well in this Theater. The P-40 was the only Allied fighter type that had a good record against the Ki-43 prior to the arrival of the Spit VIII.
P-40 was one of the most important types in the South Pacific, in US, RAAF, and RNZAF units. Australian P-40 pilots claimed 150 victories in Theater and New Zealand pilots claimed 99 victories with the P-40.
The P-40 (both Tomahawk and Kittyhawk types) was one of the most important aircraft in the VVS in 1942 and early 1943. I could never figure out how many victories Soviet pilots claimed on the P-40 but there were dozens of aces on the type, and many Soviet pilots noted that it was competitive the Bf 109F, though they had significant maintenance issues with it during winter.

There were at least 86 US P-40 aces and 46 British Commonwealth, as well as an unknown number of Soviet, and at least one Free French.

According to this count, the P-40 was the top scoring Allied fighter in the CBI, and the fifth highest scoring US fighter of the war, after the P-47 but before the F4U or F4F.

P-40s were disliked by USAAF planners and generals because of it's poor altitude performance and (when sufficiently loaded) climb. It was right at the tipping point regarding weight vs power. You can see a difference of 1,000 fpm climb rate or 20-30 mph speed based on tests done with 1,000 weight difference.

The altitude limitation was it's biggest flaw. This was most severe with the early Kittyhawk aircraft with a critical altitude of around 12,000'. This meant that P-40 pilots in the MTO often had to use 'big wing' tactics, waiting for high performance Axis fighters to attack, and turning into the attack as a squadron, then mixing it up if the Axis fighter stuck around. The thing was, the Axis fighters had to stick around if they wanted to shoot down Allied bombers or fighter-bombers. This is how many of them got shot down. Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica pilots also had little choice when attacked at their airfield or caught escorting their own bombers.

However the altitude limtation meant it could not be used to escort Strategic Bombing missions and was always vulnerable at higher altitudes, requiring the use of special tactics. Where it was used was not so much a matter of priorities, ala "the best planes go to the most critical Theaters". That may apply initially but it would have been retired long before it was. It continued to be used because in Theaters where the bombers were flying low (because they were being used in tactical warfare) it worked better than everyone expected. The atltitude limitation was a big problem though and no fighter pilot wanted to let the enemy attack first. However, most pilots that flew the P-40 really liked them, because they came to trust that it contributed to their survival. I think the ruggedness part of this, while true, is exaggerated. It was the ability to perform the escape maneuver, due to roll, turn and dive performance, that saved so many Allied pilots lives. Increased engine boost, which was a factor in the success of so many other types, also played a role in this.


The P-40 overall lasted in combat, as a front line fighter, much longer than Allied planners expected or wanted, in part because pilots and commanders learned to use some of it's traits, mainly maneuverability and dive speed, to keep them viable against higher performing aircraft, and partly because intended replacements either took longer than expected to arrive, or had extended / sustained teething problems that left them less effective than hoped in Theaters.

* into early 1944 by USAAF units in the MTO (79th FG was still flying P-40 fighter missions over Anzio)
* through the end of 1944 by USAAF units in the CBI
* into mid 1944 by USAAF and Australian / NZ units in the Pacific (not certain on the exact dates for Australian / NZ P-40s but IIRC from Pacific Victory Roll)
* into mid 1943 in the Soviet Union (VVS, it remained in service in PVO units until mid 1944)

It is underrated, though when it is defended it's defenders tend to overlook the major flaws.
 
I don't have hard numbers on this, but I'm pretty sure that in the MTO, USAAF P-40 FGs had a lower loss rate in air combat than the P-38 FGs did.
 
In the MTO, the Tomahawk IIB was able to cope with the Bf 109E7, but were at a notable disadvantage against the 109F2*
The Kittyhawk I and IA were also at a clear disadvantage against the Bf 109F2 and F4 and MC 202.
The Kittyhawk III was about equal to 109F4 or G2, but at a disadvantage against the faster 109G4 or G6 and the later MC 202 and MC 205.
The Kittyhawk II and IIA (P-40F and L) were about equal to the Bf 109s up to early G6. and the MC 205.
The Kittyhawk IV (P-40N) was used almost exclusively as a fighter-bomber in Theater, and were usually flown extra 'heavy' (sometimes with three bombs).

* although they were still able to cause losses for JG 27 and their appearance resulted in changes in tactics.
 
Th P-40 never had the speed or altitude performance to be useful on operations from UK, range wasnt the issue. The Mustang Mk I had speed and range, whether it was more capable in turn, roll and dive didnt matter, it could get in and get out.
The RAF spent 1941-1943 flying fighter rhubarbs at low altitude over France and getting pilots killed strafing Germans on bicycles. They didn't need high altitude performance for that. Mustang I was superior to P-40 but the RAF didn't have them until later. There probably wasn't any thought given to it but sending Tomahawks and Kittyhawks to North Africa was good because they didn't need tropical kits to operate in a place warmer than northern Europe.
 
The RAF spent 1941-1943 flying fighter rhubarbs at low altitude over France and getting pilots killed strafing Germans on bicycles. They didn't need high altitude performance for that. Mustang I was superior to P-40 but the RAF didn't have them until later. There probably wasn't any thought given to it but sending Tomahawks and Kittyhawks to North Africa was good because they didn't need tropical kits to operate in a place warmer than northern Europe.
The P-40 and the P-39 were tried out on missions from UK by the RAF and couldnt do it, the Mustang Mk I could and was wanted by the RAF with Allisson engine until the end of the war.
 
I know it's forbidden to mention it, but the plane we shouldn't name wasn't quite as bad as I'd thought in the South Pacific, though it was clearly limited in capability.

I think I understand now why it did well in Russia.
 
I know it's forbidden to mention it, but the plane we shouldn't name wasn't quite as bad as I'd thought in the South Pacific, though it was clearly limited in capability.

I think I understand now why it did well in Russia.
All around it wasnt a bad plane but the examples delivered to UK were actually prototype/ pre production versions. As they were being packed off to Russia the first Mustang Mk Is were being unpacked in UK and the P-40 was already well established and sorted with the RAF
 
Yah I think the 'unpacking and sorting' part goes a long way. There are a lot of little problems to solve and it helps to get through a substantial work-up before combat deployment. P-40 was definitely on the British radar from the days they got their first P-36s.

The plane that must not be named, did seem to suffer from a particular wide gap between stated / intended performance and actual performance. Both for US units and during British evaluation. Closing that gap may have been a combination of getting the improved versions with more power, (or just using higher power, I wonder if it could also be to do with boost settings like with the early Kittyhawks.?) and / or learning to deal with all the little problems, which takes some time and a lot of man-hours. People tend to forget that the Russians didn't get them into action (IIRC) until 1943, after a good long work-up.

I suspect there may have also possibly been a climate based aspect to the story as well, as in the Solomons they seemed to be particularly slow, with pilots complaining that they could not outrun A6Ms. The Soviets for the most part, seemed to get better speed from them (though in some cases this was with the later types).
 
I don't have hard numbers on this, but I'm pretty sure that in the MTO, USAAF P-40 FGs had a lower loss rate in air combat than the P-38 FGs did.
One wonders if loss rate based on hours rather than sorties, like was used Stateside to calculate accident rates, would change the equation? I think this plays a role in the loss rate comparisons of Lancasters vs Halifaxes as well.
 
One wonders if loss rate based on hours rather than sorties, like was used Stateside to calculate accident rates, would change the equation? I think this plays a role in the loss rate comparisons of Lancasters vs Halifaxes as well.

I don't know, but of the three P-38 Fighter Groups operating in the med (1st, 14th, and 82nd) one had to be pulled out of action due to losses and another paused operations. The 14th FG went into combat in November 1942 and they were using them for a wide array of missions and they were taking very heavy losses. They had to be pulled out in January 1943, transferring their remaining aircraft to the 82nd FG. The 1st FG also ran really low on aircraft and almost got shut down, but resumed action after a pause. Later the 14th was reformed and put back into action in May 1943.

After that they started mainly using the P-38s to escort B-24s at higher altitudes, which they were well suited for (this was at around 20,000 feet, so not super high), and sometimes B-25s and B-26s on raids against shipping.

This site has a decent overview.


I think the early F and G P-38s didn't have all the bells and whistles that the later types had, and didn't really have a lot of advantages over a Bf 109 or MC 202. I think in particular they didn't have a way to disengage, partly because of the dive limitations.

It took a while to find the right niche for them. Later on they did will in Italy with the P-38H, J and L types.
 
Many (over 40) years ago I worked with a man who flew P-40s in North Africa. Alas, I can no longer ask him about the aircraft.

In any case, everything I've read is that the P-40 had excellent and predictable handling. I think many posters underestimate the value if that, as it enables all pilots to get more out of an aircraft.
 
I don't know, but of the three P-38 Fighter Groups operating in the med (1st, 14th, and 82nd) one had to be pulled out of action due to losses and another paused operations. The 14th FG went into combat in November 1942 and they were using them for a wide array of missions and they were taking very heavy losses. They had to be pulled out in January 1943, transferring their remaining aircraft to the 82nd FG. The 1st FG also ran really low on aircraft and almost got shut down, but resumed action after a pause. Later the 14th was reformed and put back into action in May 1943.

After that they started mainly using the P-38s to escort B-24s at higher altitudes, which they were well suited for (this was at around 20,000 feet, so not super high), and sometimes B-25s and B-26s on raids against shipping.

This site has a decent overview.


I think the early F and G P-38s didn't have all the bells and whistles that the later types had, and didn't really have a lot of advantages over a Bf 109 or MC 202. I think in particular they didn't have a way to disengage, partly because of the dive limitations.

It took a while to find the right niche for them. Later on they did will in Italy with the P-38H, J and L types.
What you say is true. The early losses resulted in the 78th FG transferring all aircraft and most pilots to North African units, and reconstituting with P-47s before they could go operational in ETO.
82nd had about half stripped to fill out 1st and 14th on arrival in NA.
 
One of the P-40 units, 33rd Fighter Group, also had to go through an 'operational pause' for a few weeks in winter / spring 1943. All of the P-39 units were pulled out of front line duties and assigned to 'maritime patrol'. It was a tough time, peak air combat in North Africa. They were having air battles with 100-200 aircraft some days.

Once all five US P-40 fighter groups were up though, plus several Spitfire groups and the P-38s, and the Hurricanes, plus the big bombers smashing their bases to pieces, they basically broke the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica, and drove them out of the region. One of those fighter groups basically captured Pantelleria from the air. Fighting got very intense in Tunisia, kept up the tempo through the invasion of Sicily and basically didn't let up through Anzio.
 
Allied aircraft were at a tactical disadvantage against the Luftwaffe in the Western Desert because they were operating at lower altitudes, often escorting light and medium bombers. The Germans could initiate combat, pick off a straggler or two and disengage before the RAF pilots could react. RAF tactics during this time were often uninspired. The finger-four formation was slow to be adopted and fighters often adopted the defensive circle when attacked.
One thing noted by many observers was that, though the Germans scored a lot of kills, they were mostly against fighters. The bombers generally got through.
 
Going from memory, Hans Joachim Marsailles had a considerable numbers of P-40s to his credit.

He did, with two caveats - a lot, as in at least a third maybe half of the planes he claimed as P-40s turn out actually to have been Hurricanes. And he definitely overclaimed a good bit.

But there is no doubt Marseille shot down at least dozens of P-40s. Marseille was a genius pilot, by all accounts, and he had a skill and a specific attacking tactic that was pretty unique. He would dive into the defensive Lufburry circles being flown by kittyhawk pilots, and pick them off with deflection shots while flying vertically, from above or below, all the while avoiding being shot by their comrades. According to most of the other German pilots in his unit, very few others could pull it off. Some noted that he was very lucky, but he was also clearly a gifted pilot. He definitely made the most of the Bf 109F, arguably the most maneuverable and best handling Bf 109 variant.

But the luck wasn't permanent, and there were other good pilots around. Three weeks before his death, Marseille was shot up and nearly shot down by James "Stocky" Edwards, flying a P-40. Three days later, Edwards also shot down and killed Günter Steinhausen (40 victories), having previously shot down and killed Otto Schulz (51 victories), all while flying the "vastly inferior" P-40. Maybe this is just down to pilot skill. Anyway, it was luck, a bad engine, which did him in ultimately.

To be clear though, I think most variants of the P-40 were inferior to most contemporaneous variants of the Bf 109 in several respects. Part of the reason P-40s did pretty well in the Middle East overall is because there was a lag in the fighter variants being sent there, at least initially. The Tomahawks were initially facing Bf 109E types, which they could cope with. Then the 109F came in.

The Bf 109F (which was contemporaneous) was significantly superior to the Tomahawk and early Kittyhawks. It was 30-40 mph faster, had a much better climb rate, and a performance ceiling more than 3km higher than the Kittyhawk I. Vastly improved DAF tactics (finger four and Big Wing), better radios, better training, plus boosting performance of the Kittyhawks helped close the gap a little bit by mid 1942, but the much lower altitude limitations of the Kittyhawk remained a problem - it's why they were in those Lufburry circles, although this was changing with the "Big Wing". The 3 km altitude discrepancy still made it very easy for Axis pilots like Marseille and the many other JG 27 'experten' to attack from above, and to choose whether to engage or not engage.

When the Merlin XX powered Kittyhawk II and IIa first arrived also in mid-1942, eventually equpping 5 full US Fighter Groups (33rd, 57th, 79th, 324th and 325th FGs), 1 indepdenent USAAF (Tuskegee) sqn (99th FS), and 2 British / Commonwealth squadrons (260 RAF and 3 RAAF), this raised the effective operating altitude substantially, about 8,000 feet, which made the Kittyhawk units capable of operating at about 20,000', similar to the Spitfire Vs. And as this was where the Luftwaffe and RA fighters were typically patrolling, it put them on a much nearer to equal footing. It meant that unless they were very high, they could be attacked whether they wanted to fight or not.

Bf 109F-4 and G series, and MC 202s, could still perform better at higher altitudes, but this specific advantage was now minimized. They still had the dilemma of coming to grips with the Spitfires and the new P-40s (which they thought was another aircraft type, often identifying it as P-46) and the latter were 30-40 mph faster than the older Kittyhawk Is, and every bit as maneuverable. The Luftwaffe could still try to pick of Allied pilots from above, but if they wanted to have a role in the ground war (i.e., either destroying Allied bombers and fighter bombers, or protecting their own) they had to mix it up with the Allied fighters. And that meant taking losses, which were ultimately too much for JG 27, which was broken and had to be pulled out after second El Alamein, and then for the other units brought in to replace them (JG 77 and JG 51) which were also broken in North Africa, Sicily and Italy.

TL : DR - Marseille was probably one of the best pilots of the war, flying one of the best fighters in the world while at his peak. But I'm not sure if that means the plane hew flew was 100% of the reason for his success. Experten like him were shot down by RAF pilots flying Kittyhawks, and he was himself nearly shot down.
 
Allied aircraft were at a tactical disadvantage against the Luftwaffe in the Western Desert because they were operating at lower altitudes, often escorting light and medium bombers. The Germans could initiate combat, pick off a straggler or two and disengage before the RAF pilots could react. RAF tactics during this time were often uninspired. The finger-four formation was slow to be adopted and fighters often adopted the defensive circle when attacked.
One thing noted by many observers was that, though the Germans scored a lot of kills, they were mostly against fighters. The bombers generally got through.

Yes, 100% accurate. DAF fighter units were not using finger four until mid 1942. They also did not have good radios and often failed to notify each other of attacks in time. They flew a variety of oddball formations, with weaving pairs etc., and often at quite a bit lower even than their limited critical atitude allowed, down to 5-7,000 ft. All of this made them easy to pick off, both according to the Luftwaffe pilots and to some of the DAF pilots.

The Luftwaffe and RA pilots would fly in small groups (often just a pair or four planes) go over an Allied formation, and fly down to pick one or two off. However, they often did not stick around to engage the bombers because to do so usually meant the lost enough 'E' that they would have to dogfight with the Allied fighters, and this, as one German pilot put it, was "without prospects". So fighter units, especially the top cover, were taking quite awful losses while the bombers and fighter-bombers were usually getting through to destroy or disrupt ground targets.

Conversely, the Luftwaffe fighter units hated flying bomber escort, and often insisted in flying far (as in 5,000 ft or more) above the bombers, so they wouldn't be vulnerable to being bounced. Sometimes they were so high they didn't notice that the bombers were being attacked until notified on the radio. When Allied fighters appeared, especially if they were near the same altitude (since Stukas didn't fly very high), the Luftwaffe fighter pilots would abandon the bombers, and in turn that meant that the bomber pilots would at the slightest sign of Allied fighters quickly jettison their bombs and start flying evasively to save their lives.

One thing a Hurricane was very good at, by the way, was shooting down Axis bombers.

So all this meant that the Luftwaffe was already declining in effectiveness through the first half of 1942, even while they were running up high victory scores. There was tension over this between the bomber and fighter units, and more seriously between the Luftwaffe and the Afrika Korps, but Rommel and other commanders did not seem to be able to do anything about it.

The tactic the DAF developed, "Big Wing", made possible in part with improved radios, was to increase to military power when the Luftwaffe fighters were sighted above, then wait until the squadron commander called 'break left' or 'break right'. Then the whole squadron would push their throttles forward, wheel around and face into the attack from above, guns blazing. This pretty much eliminated the picking off from above thing, so long as they spotted the Axis fighters. They also started escorting large bomber missions to attack Axis airbases, with both their light bombers (Bostons, Baltimores, Marylands, later B-25s and B-26s) and their heavy bombers (B-17s and especially B-24s) which meant that a (usually small, as in one flight) CAP / high cover would have to engage the fighters, some of whom were going to be much higher flying Kittyhawk IIs, and the rest would be climbing up from below, which was not a good place to be for them.

This is how the deadly JG 27 and then JG 77, and part of JG 51, as well as several of the also quite formidable but often overlooked Regia Aeronautica units lik 6 Gruppo CT, 96 Gruppo CT, 8 Gruppo CT, 9 Gruppo CT, 10 Gruppo CT etc., were destroyed in North Africa.
 

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