I think while we have
finally kind of caught up to the basic histories of the individual aircraft types, (including, during the brief détente between Russia and the West back in the 90s, some pretty good overviews of the roles, efficacy and overall importance of a lot of the Lend-Lease or donated Western aircraft types used by the Soviets) an accurate view of the overall history of the Soviet air forces, VVS, PVO etc. during WW2, has really not filtered down into the understanding of US aviation enthusiasts, even in places like this.
I think the reasons are pretty simple. I'd list three main ones.
1) Most people into aviation learn about and penetrate the mysteries of the air forces of their own nations, and those of their allies, and to a lesser extent, those of the forces their nations were at war with. The Soviet aviation buffs haven't really been part of the conversation in the West post WW2, and the pilots are all dead now, the first generation or two of Soviet aviation enthusiasts are also dying out already. There wasn't much dialogue.
2) We are also influenced a lot by the Cold War and our perception of the 'commies' as the supposedly bumbling, not very sophisticated, Boris Badenov enemy; and by the very popular 1950s-60s era memoirs of Luftwaffe pilots whose somewhat propaganda tinged accounts give, I think, a rather slanted impression. Some of them were of course incredibly successful, and to be fair to them, most pilots memoirs from any nation emphasize the glory of their own side rather than that of their opponents.
But there is a little 'extra' propaganda edge to many of these accounts. And I think a lot of the (stupendous) German success in air combat in the East was in the early part of the war when the Soviets were ill prepared. Very much like the heavy losses of US and British Commonwealth pilots to the Japanese in the East in Java, the Philippines, Malaya, Burma etc.
3) The Soviet Air war specifically was fought in a very different way from our own. While the US and British focused heavily on the Strategic bombing campaign, the Soviets emphasized much more the tactical air war over the battlefield. Many US and British aviation enthusiasts and historians assume that the Anglo-American approach was the correct one, and that the Soviets were wrong, but that is highly debatable.
Just as we in the Anglophone world got some nasty surprises in the Cold War era from the Soviets in say, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, I think there is no escaping the fact that the mighty German war machine was mostly defeated by the ultimately even mightier Soviet war machine. Very, very decisively. And Soviet air power was clearly a big part of that.
In my opinion the Soviet Air forces went through three phases during the war.
The first, from June to September or October 1941, "
Collapse". A ton of outdated, 1930s era Soviet warplanes, I-15s, I-153s, I-16s, SU-2, SB, and TB-3 bombers and so on, as well as some newer but as yet, still very buggy or limited types like MiG-3, LaGG-3, and Yak-1, were wiped the hell out by a stupendous hammer blow from the Luftwaffe. Soviet losses were on the order of 10-1 or 20-1 in some cases. This is the part of the war that many of the German aces loved to write about, and many Axis supremacy oriented aviation fans tend to emphasize. There is no doubt that the Luftwaffe was like an eagle among the doves for the first several months of the war, though they did also take some losses which tends to be overlooked.
Then in the fall and winter of 1941, there began "
The Hardening" of Soviet resistance, which gradually firmed up and lasted into the fall of 1942. This took pace as the Germans were feeling the effects of their first Russian winter, which both their troops, and their aircraft were ill prepared for (for a variety of reasons, like the need to drain
all fluids from aircraft overnight). This coincided with their approach to Leningrad, Moscow, and Sevastopol. In this period, the Soviets were moving factories across the Urals, frantically working out the bugs in both their newer aircraft designs (with designers sometimes literally having guns to their head), and their abysmally chaotic manufacturing processes (greatly complicated by having to move the factories). During this period, the Soviets were relying heavily on a lot of Lend-Lease and donated aircraft. Hand-me-down (often clapped out) Hurricanes, Tomahawks and early model Kittyhawks were still better against Bf 109s than I-153s and MiG-3s. Very fast Boston bombers and DC-3 transports also proved helpful. This period was still a disaster for the Soviets, but not quite at the same nightmare-slaughterhouse rate, and the Germans losses sharply increased from their heyday in the first few months. Based on Bergstrom etc., Soviet air to air combat losses are at a ratio of around 3-1 to 5-1 by roughly mid 1942, depending where and when exactly. Soviet aircraft are just starting to have an effect on the ground war, but it's not decisive.
Phase three, "
The Pivot", starts some time in 1942. You could say it started after the Siege of Moscow was lifted (January) or much later at Stalingrad (August / September). It was a gradual and uneven shift. As it became apparent that the Soviets might actually win, and could certainly kill some Germans which the Anglo-Americans would therefore not have to face, the British and Americans started sending them more modern and less worn out aircraft - including some Spitfire V and then later Spitfire IX, later model P-40s (mostly P-40K and M) and then P-39s, B-25s, and later-model Bostons.
The better Soviet made types also started hitting the front lines in greater numbers with much better (though still inconsistent) manufacturing standards - Il-2, Il-4, Pe-2 bombers, and Yak 1b, Yak -7, and Yak 9 fighters were all flying in some numbers by the end of 1942. The LaGG-3 was somewhat improved, and the radial engined La 5 would appear in spring of 1943 (literally saving the life of Semyon Lavochkin). Soviets are still losing at a rate of about 2-1 or 3-1, but even that was too much for the Luftwaffe. Soviet pilot training and tactics were improving, more units were starting to get radios in their aircraft, and these were working a bit better. They were already making wide use of air to ground rockets. German aircraft attrition was high both from combat but also just because of the conditions, while the Soviet aircraft were
designed for the harsh local conditions, and some of the Western types like the P-39 seemed to be highly adaptable to them. Germans were starting to have serious fuel problems.
By mid-1943 larger numbers of US made P-39s, Soviet La 5 and then La 5FN fighters came into the fight, more improved Yak-1B, Yak-7B, and Yak-9 fighters, Pe-2 dive bombers, and Il-2 attack planes were swarming all over the Eastern Front. The pivot was shifting at an accelerating rate. German fighter pilots were still probably ahead in the kill / loss ratio, but German ground forces, with already strained supply lines, were starting to suffer increasingly frequent rocket attacks and strafing from the air. Accurate Pe-2 and later some Tu-2 dive bombers were hitting German operational targets with increasingly deadly precision. The Luftwaffe couldn't protect the whole battlefield. It's highly debated to this day how much ground attack and light / dive / attack / fighter bomber aircraft (both Soviet and Western) were able to affect tanks (personally I think there was an over-correction and this is now underestimated), but it's clear that German logistics, artillery, and light combat vehicles such as halftracks, and clearly also some tanks were being destroyed.
This last phase just kept accelerating through the war. I'd say by 1944 there is absolutely no doubt that the Soviet air forces were having a telling affect on the ground war. The Germans, in turn were increasingly blunted. Their best ground attack aircraft, the Stuka, was finally sidelined by Soviet fighters, and it's replacement was basically the Fw 190. Very good as we know, but expensive to produce and not available in enough numbers, and by 1944 no longer so far ahead of say, La 5FN or Yak-3 as to be able to operate with the kind of near impunity that the
Sturzkampfgeschwader enjoyed in 1941-1942. The Fw 190 was also just not as accurate as a bomber as a Ju-87.
We know the Germans didn't win a lot of major battles after Stalingrad. The question is, to what extent their repeated defeats were due to Soviet aircraft, to what extent to Soviet tanks and rockets and so on. Everything improved. The early Soviet tanks the German "tank aces" were rolling over in 1941 looked like this
By 1944 you had stuff like this
plus multiple-122mm 'Katyusha' rocket launchers, lots and lots and lots of artillery, burp guns, Generals like Zukhov, etc. etc. So it's hard to be sure which elements mattered most. But it seems clear that the VVS played a significant role.