How good was the soviet air force?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

In Western Europe there were air wars as in the BoB and Malta and the allied bombing campaign against Germany. In N Africa the war was on the ground, while the LW had successes in the air it had little effect on the ground war, Marseilles and his squadron (s) didnt shoot down bombers. Same in the BoB, eventually raids became Jabo raids by S/E Bf 109s loosing off bombs at 20-30,000ft over London. The loss of an aircraft was far in excess of the damage they did. Same for the tip and run Fw 190 raids on UK. This set a precedent. In the east, using jabo fighters against tanks and ground positions was a fools errand, the LW planes were far more valuable than the targets they were attacking and Russia had tens of thousands of them, just as in the west the allies had tens of thousands of military vehicles.

Interesting points.

The Luftwaffe in North Africa did (very generally speaking) prefer to attack fighters, but they also did initially shoot down a lot of bombers and fighter-bombers (which were pretty effective for the Allies as battlefield CAS and operational interdiction). I think what you saw in North Africa was a kind of similar arc to what happened in Russia in some ways, but also different in some important ways. The initial phase was similarly, kind of a slaughter by the Germans, though it was on a smaller scale with many 'rallies' and small corrections as each side sent in new units to kind of up the ante. In the early (or middle-early, after the first period which was Italian vs. British biplanes etc.) days the Germans were certainly wiping out a lot of Allied bombers, Blenheims and so on. More importantly, their I think simultaneously overhyped and under-rated Stuka was able to perform CAS strikes and operational / logistics interdiction (including devastating attacks on shipping) very effectively. To a lesser extent, also their Ju 88s. I believe this contributed substantially to many of their land victories.

Over time though, the Allies shifted to more effective tactics. They switched to using fast light bombers (Bostons, and Martin 167 and 187) and to fighter-bombers, with Kittyhawks and later Spitfire MkVs as escorts. As one Luftwaffe pilot put it, they still felt the Bf 109F or G had an advantage overall, but closely engaging these fighters in escort mode was "without prospects", so the Germans gradually switched to almost exclusively hit and run attacks from above, to pick off the escorts, and swoop down on stragglers. This had some attrition and morale effect on the DAF, but was not effective for them in terms of the ground war. Simultaneously and more ominously for the Germans, the Ju 88 and then finally the Ju 87 became so vulnerable to Allied fighters by the end of 1942 that they had to replace it. That eliminated an important advantage they had in the tank and infantry battles on the desert.

The biggest difference between say, Malta and North Africa vs. Russia, was that to win, the Luftwaffe together with their (I think highly underrated) Italian allies in the Regia Aerontautica, really needed to have near-parity in numbers, because their advantage in tactics and aircraft performance was narrowing rapidly toward a vanishing point (reached, arguably, by 2nd El Alamein). So the Axis forces were something like 2 for every 3 Allied planes, or even close to 1 for 1 before key battles. They still had a slight edge in outcomes in air to air combat, because their fighters had better high altitude performance and could attack from above, but they couldn't afford the near parity in attrition.

In Russia by contrast the Luftwaffe were initially able to control the sky over the battlefield with a local numerical ratio of something like 1 to 2 or 1 to 3. And still win air combat at extraordinary rates. The I-153 and I-16s, once fairly modern fighters say in the Spanish Civil War, were just too far behind for 1941-42, as was VVS pilot training, tactics, logistics etc. This is why clapped out Hurricanes and Tomahawks (often sent directly from the Middle East) were still very helpful, because they gave Soviet pilots a chance, and forced the Luftwaffe to increase their numbers. The Luftwaffe went from around 30% of their aircraft on the Russian front to closer to 50% by the time of Stalingrad, and took much higher losses of these.

When you go from "The Hardening" as I called it, into "The Pivot" circa late 1942 and early 1943, the Germans could no longer maintain a major advantage in the vast expanse of battlefields in the East with just half of their air force. But by this time, increasing fighting in the Med, especially with the invasion of Sicily in Summer 1943, and at the same time, the beginning of the USAAF daytime bombing campaign, meant that the Germans could not afford to send more planes to Russia. They needed them for home defense and the tactical war in the south. So this is one of the ways in which the many crises for the Axis started to dovetail together into a mounting catastrophe.

(Edited to reflect the ratios in the paper linked below)

 

[Snautzer01]

loss of an aircraft was far in excess of the damage they did

I do not agree. The airplanes pilots ground crew radar crews etc etc that had to be in top condition and there. Not to mention the costs of this operation. Further more it tied up assets to GB that could have been sent elsewhere.
Not to mention costs of people going to hiding and stop producing.
It is not only the dropped bomb that does the damadge.

 

[Barrett]

Since we're on a WW2 forum, presumably the question addressed The GPW.
But
The Soviet Air Force existed from 1922 to 1991. LOTS of room for interpretation.

 

[marathag]

. I have heard of the Il-2 and IL-10 which are both ground attack

The most produced aircraft, but also the one with the highest losses.

Early IL-2 was single seat, later the two seat, but Il-2 gunner's position not having armor was probably part of that, and corrected with the Il-10, that wasn't ready for combat til June 1944

Would the VVS been better off with more BB-1/Su-2/Su-4/Su-6 than the Il-2 spam?

I believe so.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The most produced aircraft, but also the one with the highest losses.

Early IL-2 was single seat, later the two seat, but Il-2 gunner's position not having armor was probably part of that, and corrected with the Il-10, that wasn't ready for combat til June 1944

Would the VVS been better off with more BB-1/Su-2/Su-4/Su-6 than the Il-2 spam?

I believe so.

More Pe-2 I'd say, and then Tu 2 when they became available

 

[Stig1207]

This is an interesting perspective on the Luftwaffe vs Soviet airforces in WWII

Luftwaffe Research

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This is an interesting perspective on the Luftwaffe vs Soviet airforces in WWII

Luftwaffe Research

This is in-line with my earlier comment that most of the Luftwaffe assets were not in the Russian front, at least after the first few months. Losses (close to 50%) seem to be fairly high there though. It also elevates the relevance of the Mediterranean Air War (and the severe problems it caused for the Luftwaffe starting in the second half of WW2) which is another point I've been making in some other threads for a while now.

Key tables

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I think it's also notable that the Germans were able to continue to use their dive bombers in the East late into the war, and that that is where they put them, since they had become unusable for strategic bombing after the BoB in 1940, and no longer viable for tactical bombing in the Med after late 1942. Same for Bf 110 etc.

Air assets in the Med declined after mid 1943 because the war had shifted into a near attrition al ground war in Italy.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This is pretty interesting too

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Honestly it's more losses in the East than I was estimating.

 

[NevadaK]

This report was interesting and provides some insight to how the Soviet Air Force approach combat in the Eastern Front.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R556.pdf

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Speaking of Soviet aircraft, does anyone know if this particular 'blue-gray on light-green-gray' color scheme is real?

I found one wartime (allegedly) color photo but it's hard to tell if it's colorized. And now I can't find it.

 

[NevadaK]

Greetings Wild Bill,

That looks like the grey on grey camouflage paint scheme, although the print colors look a bit off. I found this site which provides some examples of Yak - 9 paint schemes.

Yak-9, grey-grey camouflage prototype

and this page seems to have a good overview of Soviet paint schemes for fighters.

table of colors

Kk

 

[bf109xxl]

Speaking of Soviet aircraft, does anyone know if this particular 'blue-gray on light-green-gray' color scheme is real?

View attachment 755009

View attachment 755010

I found one wartime (allegedly) color photo but it's hard to tell if it's colorized. And now I can't find it.

The gray-blue camouflage was tested at the Air Force Research Institute in June 1943 and was found to be optimal. Since July 1943 it was the standard color scheme. Moreover, aircraft with this color scheme were not repainted white in winter.

 

[NevadaK]

Hi Venomstick121,

Others have provided some excellent resources to learn more about the range of aircraft the Soviet Air Force during WW2. As to how good was the Soviet Air Force, I heard it put this way:

Beginning in 1941, the Soviet Air Force bore the brunt of the Luftwaffe at a time when it possessed neither aircraft of equal ability, staff training, and inadequate command and control. During this time, the Soviet aircraft industry was forced to relocate, disrupting production as well as development of new aircraft. The relocation also led to the construction of an entirely new industrial infrastructure from raw materials mining to transportation to refinement. Despite this the Soviet aircraft industry began to introduce aircraft in late 1943 that helped to bring parity to the air war and ultimately air superiority in late 1944. The Soviet air force was able to develop techniques to operate in the most challenging environments as well as tactics appropriate to the war on the eastern front. To a large degree, the Soviet air force relied on staff and pilots who had significantly less education and training than their adversary. The Soviet air force prevailed at a time when it experienced astounding losses and hardships.

 

[bf109xxl]

The relocation also led to the construction of an entirely new industrial infrastructure from raw materials mining to transportation to refinement.

This relocation (evacuation) was foreseen even BEFORE the war. In most cases, the relocation was carried out either to already operating plants with their expansion, or to prepared sites. Indeed, it was rather a consistent (and often planned) development of the existing structure than the creation of a new one. Not all plants were relocated. Many decisions to produce certain types of airplanes and engines were erroneous and resulted in additional losses of airplanes and pilots. The Soviet political and economic systems demonstrated inefficiency even with a high mobilization capacity.

Despite this the Soviet aircraft industry began to introduce aircraft in late 1943 that helped to bring parity to the air war and ultimately air superiority in late 1944.

A much more important factor was the dramatic decrease in the number of Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front. The Soviet airplanes were inferior to German airplanes even in 1944. While flight performance was close, the survivability and controllability of Soviet aircraft were still insufficient in many cases.

 

[NevadaK]

This relocation (evacuation) was foreseen even BEFORE the war. In most cases, the relocation was carried out either to already operating plants with their expansion, or to prepared sites. Indeed, it was rather a consistent (and often planned) development of the existing structure than the creation of a new one. Not all plants were relocated. Many decisions to produce certain types of airplanes and engines were erroneous and resulted in additional losses of airplanes and pilots. The Soviet political and economic systems demonstrated inefficiency even with a high mobilization capacity.

A much more important factor was the dramatic decrease in the number of Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front. The Soviet airplanes were inferior to German airplanes even in 1944. While flight performance was close, the survivability and controllability of Soviet aircraft were still insufficient in many cases.

I don't believe the pre-Barbarossa evacuation amounted to much. The vast majority of evacuation occurred after the German invasion.

This copied from another source:

"On June 23rd 41 mobilisation production plans went into force. On June 24th the Evacuation Council was set up and on the 30th the State Defense Committee was organised with Stalin as its head. In July 41 300,000 railway wagons were in operation in August 185,000 in September 140,000 in October 175,000 in November 123,000. In the July November period 1,503 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east. It took two and a half years to erect a blast furnace before the war but furnaces No. 5 and 8 were erected in eight monthes at Magnitogorsk. In October tank building plant No.183 was working in November it was evacuated and in December it resumed production. Tank production went from 4,177 in the second half of 41 to 11,021 in the first half of 42.
Military production increased 180% in the urals in 1942 compared to 41 200% in the Volga area and 140% in Western Siberia.
In 1942 4.4 million industrial workers were trained or re-educated. The number of women operating for example forging and press machines rose from 11% 1941 to 50% end of 42.
The Germans siezed or put out of action 31,850 big and small industrial enterprises. German industrial capacity in 41 including conquered countries was :-
31.8 million tons of steel against the Soviets 18.3
rolled stock 22.5 m.tons against Soviets 13.1
coal 506mt against Soviets 165.9mt
stock of metal cutting machines 1694 thousand Soviet 58.4 thousand

From an article by Colonell G.S. Kravchenko 1967

"There had been only scant pre-war contingency planning, there were no actual plans for any strategic industrial withdrawl into the eastern hinterlands, where the building of new plants and the construction of new railways had proceeded very slowly"........."the highly centralised state machine was scattered behind the Volga"......."the very lowest echolons of the Party and administrative machine proved to be inflexable to the point of inertia".

From John Erickson The Road To Stalingrad."

Also this map shows not only the scope of post-1941 relocation but in the upper left impact on production.

https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2Fpke4m7pvo3u01.jpg

We can debate the relative merits of LW vs VVS fighter aircraft, but Soviet pilots certainly felt that late model Yaks and Lavochkins were equal or better than their opponents, especially at lower altitudes where combat occurred.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

A much more important factor was the dramatic decrease in the number of Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front. The Soviet airplanes were inferior to German airplanes even in 1944. While flight performance was close, the survivability and controllability of Soviet aircraft were still insufficient in many cases.

That is highly debatable. Soviet fighter aircraft like Yak-3 and La 5FN were not inferior to German types at the altitudes where they were fighting.

 

[bf109xxl]

I don't believe the pre-Barbarossa evacuation amounted to much. The vast majority of evacuation occurred after the German invasion.

It made possible relatively fast growth of production AFTER the evacuation. I wrote that the possibility of the evacuation was considered BEFORE the war and many sites were ALREADY prepared - there was no specific evacuation plan, but the construction of a large number of sites began before the war and allowed at least part of the plants to be deployed much faster. It was not completely new structure.

Soviet pilots certainly felt that late model Yaks and Lavochkins were equal or better than their opponents, especially at lower altitudes where combat occurred.

Yes, of course - in comparison with the previous models they were better. Unfortunately many of young pilots could not tell us about their impressions, because they were shot down in the first two or three sorties. Flight performance is not an absolute criterion for superiority. Do you know the problem with the engine trottle control on La-5? Pilots were forced to fly with the open cockpit canopy, because otherwise they would not be able to bail out with a parachute - at speed the canopy was jammed; open canopy reduced the maximum speed drastically. The La-7 had troubles with the engine overheating, etc. The data from tests cannot be used for a RELIABLE comparison without considering of many technical details. Aircraft with improved design were delivered to the front much later than the prototypes were tested. The only Soviet fighter that was comparable (or even superior) in performance to German fighters was the I-185. But it was not mass produced.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Yak 3 was generally superior to all German fighter types below 5,000 meters. Rate of climb, acceleration, turn time, roll, it was better in almost every respect. And faster at the lower altitudes than all but the rarest fighter variants (or say, the jets which were not around much).

Yak 9 and La 5FN / La 7 were at least equivalent, depending on subtypes.

You are seriously exaggerating issues with the canopy. Crews were not typically flying La 5 with open canopies, that was something that happened with LaGG-3 and early Yak-1 etc. in the first year of the war. Same for issues with overheating etc. All aircraft had some issues, including all of the German aircraft.