Early La-5 came on line in 1942. Would you classify 1942 as late war?
The quality of the early La-5 was terrible. The situation was changed rather to autumn 1944, but it does not mean that all shortcomings and manufacture defects were removed. E.g., until the very end of the war, La-5 pilots had to suffer from high air temperatures in the cockpit.
If no, then what does that have to do with my post and Harder?
Harder could get a better imagine of a worse aircraft. He just never experienced a really bad quality.
Late war La-5F were very different by the time they stopped production in april 1944 than when they first came on line, similar with the La-5FN when they ceased production in October 1944. It would be silly to assume similar performance of a batch 1 to a batch 54 La-5F.
The performance was not really better than that of the Bf.109G. The performance of the La-5 became acceptable rather in the late 1944 (FN model). All carbureted M-82 were unreliable on the La-5. The early La-7s had troubles with the engine as well - it was necessary to change the cylinder profile in order to achieve acceptable life time of the engine. But we talk about the manufacturing quality. It was low during the whole period of war - it increased steadily, however it remained insufficient. Minister (People's Commissar) of Aviation Industry Shakhurin was convicted for producing low-quality airplanes during the war years after the war ended.
Harder did not write a letter, he spoke to Göring personally. As a result Göring had a fit (not surprised) and refused to give an award to Harder (which was the reason he came to Göring in the first place).
Rather Harder was complaining about the Soviet fighters he was facing in late 1944 (late war) because… they were, in his opinion, very dangerous opponents his command was having troubles dealing with.
It doesn't matter. Harder's complaints about the quality of the planes would not have happened if he had had the opportunity to fly Soviet ones. Yes, the performance of Soviet airplanes was improving. But Soviet Air Force losses remained high - lower than before, but still, high compared to the Luftwaffe. Most importantly, the Soviets had achieved a gigantic quantitative superiority. The Germans banally lacked airplanes, not their qualities.
In your opinion is that because of poor manufacturing or quality? That would be a funny way of looking at the situation.
Quality was less important than quantity. The Germans could not provide sufficient quantity, and what was available - even with high efficiency of use! - could not meet the growing strength of the Soviet Air Force.
Agreed that Soviet aircraft began to be built with much less wood, beyond La-7 you have a host of Yaks, the Type 45 La-5FNs and many late war Type 39 FNs as well (as proven by wreck recoveries), the il-10 just to name a few more. Meanwhile the LW started to load up the Bf 109 with a bunch of wooden components, built aircraft about of wood (He 162), etc.
Not "much less wood", just "a bit more metal". The airplanes remained wooden with a slight increase in the proportion of metal in the structure. All-metal fighters were mass produced only after the war. And in 1945 it suddenly became clear that THOUSANDS of produced Yaks were unsuitable for further operation due to deterioration of wood and canvas parts. Wooden La's also went off the scene very quickly. I have already given the exact figures in one of the forum discussions.
To your words on aircraft loosing their wings in a dive, yes the Germans suffered from the same troubles. In addition, wing farrings were burnt off mid flight.
How often? I would appreciate any reference or your own estimation - I either missed it or wasn't interested enough in the subject.
Yes, they too had large scale concerns about poor glueing and it grounded many flights. ULTRA backs this up. The reason? Because they began resorting to more wooden components. Tail units were falling apart. Hard to fly a plane without a tail.
The Yak-9 suffered from gasoline leakages in the fuel system, which cost the lives of many pilots - the aircraft would catch fire in flight without enemy impact. Even in the history of the Normandie-Niemen squadron/regiment there were cases of non-combat losses of pilots from this defect due to poor assembly.
The increase in the Luftwaffe's accident rate since the fall of 1944 can be attributed to both a decline in the quality of assembly, which was distributed to small factories, and a sharp drop in pilot training. Can you separate these factors? What was the Luftwaffe's level of non-combat losses due to assembly defects? These are complex questions and I don't demand immediate answers - I would appreciate any references or estimates, I'm just curious and my knowledge here is clearly insufficient. When analyzing the accident rate in the Soviet Air Force, I would suggest that the pilot training factor was more important, but the accident rate was so high that poor assembly was still the cause of very high losses.
On the engine front, yes the VK-107 was premature. And how many aircraft flew with that engine exactly during the war vs the German ones?
Ca. 2500.
Jumo 213 had poor quality check as point out above (again via ULTRA). The DB 605 was a troubled engine that caused the death of too many pilots. The "star of Africa"'s death is yet another example (mid war). Harder being a late war example.
"Too many" - could you please estimate the rate?
So no, by late war production was not "superior". A brief glance into books dedicated to specific German aircraft should be ample to let the reader know production went amuck.
...but the Soviet Air Force still suffered high losses. Even with the deterioration of airplane quality and pilot training, the Luftwaffe was still a very effective war machine.
One would be surprised how riff German enigma traffic was with complaints about their machines.
From personal (very rich) experience, the Germans in general love to whine and complain - it is just a consequence of traditional perfectionism.
In case anyone will try to flip my text above into me stating Soviet aircraft were of great quality and tech advancement by late war, they were not of great quality or tech advancement. Rather the playing field had become level due to the reduction in LW quality.
I would almost agree, but with the phrase "the quality gap has narrowed". They haven't become equal.