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One of the Soviet (fictional) anecdotes of the 1980s.I would almost agree, but with the phrase "the quality gap has narrowed". They haven't become equal.
Maybe not so simple, IJN lost 7 a/c shot down during its attack on Midway and 24 carrier planes plus some recce floatplanes during the shadowing the TF 17 and the two attacks on the USS Yorktown plus several fighter during the defence of the Kido Butai....Second, regarding the Battle of Midway there are two kinds of aircraft losses: aircraft shot down, aircraft lost due to the loss of aircraft carriers. The US lost something like 150 planes in the battle, almost all of them were shot down in air to air combat or AA fire. The Japanese lost something like 230 aircraft, almost all due to the sinking of the carriers. These losses are not the same. Critics of the US strategy at Midway point out that the decision to send US carrier aircraft into combat in a disorganized manner was more likely to end in disaster than success. As the battle played out, the US suffered near total losses until the late arriving dive bombers struck and sank or disabled the first three Japanese carriers. Had the dive bombers missed finding the Japanese, Midway would be looked at as an epic disaster and major error in leadership...
It seems that the Luftwaffe pilot that the Normandie-Niemen had to fight during their 3rd campaign (december 12, 1945 to the end of the war) were not all the rookies you seem to imply as on february 1945, it was already reduced to 25 able to fly pilots. Facing them among others was the JG 51. This campaign cost the regiment 9 deads, not including POWs and wounded, for 72 official kills.No wonder the French pilots on the Eastern front had much success with the Yak-3.
Fighting the Luftwaffe in the last 9 months of the war (or for most of that period) would have seemed like a big mopping-up operation - the quality of German pilots had seriously deteriorated by then.
In fact, there is indirect data on the Soviet Air Force - what was imputed to Shakhurin and other leaders of the Soviet aircraft industry at the trial in 1946. According to unverified information (by me), Stalin did not immediately believe the investigators - he trusted Shakhurin, so the accusation double-checked the figures: more than 45 thousand airplanes were not flown to combat missions, 756 accidents and 305 disasters occurred from November 1942 to February 1946 due to poor quality of assembly. Obviously, neither Shakhurin nor other aviation industry executives were to blame for this, but they became victims of the system in which they made a blistering career.Do you have any numbers for Soviet losses due to enemy action vs operational accidents/losses vs training accidents? It might be interesting to compare them against the Western losses due to similar causes.
Then:If Major Jürgen Harder had a chance to fly an early La-5, he would hardly have written tearful letters to Göring.
Are you under the impression early La-5s were the opponents on the Easter front in the late war based on what you wrote above?The quality of the early La-5 was terrible.
Late model La-5Fs were fine machines. They ceased production in April 1944. A better assessment would be early 1944 the La-5 (F and FN) series became a true competent opponent over the eastern front, not autumn.The situation was changed rather to autumn 1944, but it does not mean that all shortcomings and manufacture defects were removed.
Oh but he did: it was the Bf 109 which killed him in February 1945.Harder could get a better imagine of a worse aircraft. He just never experienced a really bad quality.
What???It doesn't matter. Harder's complaints about the quality of the planes would not have happened if he had had the opportunity to fly Soviet ones.
What?The performance was not really better than that of the Bf.109G.
What?The Germans banally lacked airplanes, not their qualities.
But simultaneously:Not "much less wood", just "a bit more metal".
Some consistency please.Yes, the La-7 had a metal wing spar, and the metal content in the structure increased significantly - it became 30% instead of 20%.
Sure, already given: ULTRA as found in HW-5. If you're looking for specific volumes you can try 550-702. Careful, they range between 200-500 pages per volume. Alternatively you can access some of this in the DEFE-3 series. I am sure more can be found elsewhere.I would appreciate any reference or your own estimation
100% Couldn't agree more.The increase in the Luftwaffe's accident rate since the fall of 1944 can be attributed to both a decline in the quality of assembly, which was distributed to small factories, and a sharp drop in pilot training.
Nor can I provide you with exact answers for the very same reasons you yourself wrote.These are complex questions and I don't demand immediate answers
Away from my databases, no. If you have the engines book by Calumn Douglas you can read specifics there. Pilots did not like the 605 series when introduced. Naturally it became better as time progressed. If it is any consolation I have presented at least 2 very competent leaders and aces killed because of it in this thread alone."Too many" - could you please estimate the rate?
100%...but the Soviet Air Force still suffered high losses.
What?From personal (very rich) experience, the Germans in general love to whine and complain - it is just a consequence of traditional perfectionism.
Thank you, Juha3.Maybe not so simple, IJN lost 7 a/c shot down during its attack on Midway and 24 carrier planes plus some recce floatplanes during the shadowing the TF 17 and the two attacks on the USS Yorktown plus several fighter during the defence of the Kido Butai.
USN lost 41 a/c operationally from June 4th to June 6th, incl 10 F4Fs from the USS Hornet which run out of fuel during the famous attack of the TF 16 on the Kido Butai on 4 June. And lost 11 a/c with the USS Yorktown.
Hello NevadaKThank you, Juha3.
I did simplify the statistics for the sake of the point being made. I appreciate your clarification.
I do not think there is a comprehensive study regarding the Soviet accidents, training and other non-combat losses in WWII.Do you have any numbers for Soviet losses due to enemy action vs operational accidents/losses vs training accidents? It might be interesting to compare them against the Western losses due to similar causes.
Greetings Ernest,
A couple comments:
First, the RAF's decision to bomb at night was directly related to the losses it suffered during daylight raids. You have it backwards, it was harder to bomb during the day. RAF Bomber Command also lacked the type of aircraft and sufficient numbers to wage a meaningful campaign until 1943. This is a decent overview for understanding both RAF and USAAF bombing campaigns:
Second, regarding the Battle of Midway there are two kinds of aircraft losses: aircraft shot down, aircraft lost due to the loss of aircraft carriers. The US lost something like 150 planes in the battle, almost all of them were shot down in air to air combat or AA fire. The Japanese lost something like 230 aircraft, almost all due to the sinking of the carriers. These losses are not the same. Critics of the US strategy at Midway point out that the decision to send US carrier aircraft into combat in a disorganized manner was more likely to end in disaster than success. As the battle played out, the US suffered near total losses until the late arriving dive bombers struck and sank or disabled the first three Japanese carriers. Had the dive bombers missed finding the Japanese, Midway would be looked at as an epic disaster and major error in leadership.
Third, I believe that many of the things you describe like the shortage of training and artillery spotting aircraft are not issues of leadership but due to the circumstances of the war that the USSR and VVS were operating under. In a crisis, you are going to make the thing you need the most. If I'm short of both fighters and training aircraft and the enemy is controlling the combat zone which aircraft will I build first? Shortages of all kinds affected the USSR war effort. There are a ton of posts in this thread about how the USSR needed better aircraft and the lack of quality of existing aircraft. But, where is the time to design, test, and develop these aircraft? Where are there factories that are capable of sophisticated construction for these aircraft? The United States, which did not operate face the pressure of an invading force made several decisions to NOT introduce design changes to aircraft because it would interrupt production for months to retool factories. In some cases, such as the B-24 and B-29, the US simply built a second factory to rebuild new aircraft to maintain production. There is no way the USSR had that kind of capacity during the war.
Fourth, friendly fire incidents happened to everyone throughout the war. Given 1940's technology, close air operations come with such a risk. This is not a sign of incompetence.
The VVS is not the RAF or USAAF. It operated in a much more challenging environment and its pilots exhibited great courage fighting an uphill battle. As I've stated earlier, comparing the VVS to either the RAF or USAAF does the VVS a disservice.
The choice of aircraft by French pilots, you supported this thesis, but you could have honestly refuted it, since you read the book. In the huge VVS, not all ordinary regiments are the same. Nothing interesting.1. The book does contain relevant information on the topic. I see no necessity to quote text in Russian here. The translation is too tiresome.
2. Initially Normandie Group was a squadron (14 Yak-1 in the 204th Bomber Air Division, later - in the 18th GIAP in the same division) as it was mentioned previously.
3. It became a 2-squadron regiment in July, 1943.
4. It was not a typical Soviet regiment - since January, 1944 it had four squadrons.
5. The pilots did not make the decision on the choice of aircraft - it was made before they arrived in the USSR, but the Soviets were ready to provide aircraft received under lend-lease.
They fought as part of the Soviet Air Force and partly determined the quality of combat operations. Many of them participated in combat before. They could quite correctly compare different airplanes.
If you hadn't written the nonsense about the N-N, I wouldn't suggest a source on the topic.
That's a lie. You are not familiar enough with the subject.
You wrote about the N-N, so the book is absolutely relevant to the discussion. Moreover, it is relevant to the topic generally - for example, you can find therein some of the reasons for N-N's ineffective actions in 1943.
You should show how the losses of aircraft and even pilots are related to the quality of the AF.According to the US numbers, The USAAF lost ~57,000 aircraft to all causes:
23,000 to combat
20,000 to operational incidents
14,000 to training and operational (ie ASW patrol, ASAR, etc) accidents while operating from the US homeland
I do not have any numbers for the UK.
For the IJN the post-war debriefs gave ~10,400 aircraft losses due to combat, with ~16,500 operational losses (of which only ~3,000 were training aircraft).
I have never run across authoritative numbers for the total Japanese aircraft losses for the war, but there is a mention in the post-war intel debriefs, during which it was found that the IJN and IJA lost significantly fewer aircrew during training than the US did (by the numbers it was about 1/2 as many per flight hour). I have never run across an explanation for the significant difference, though it may be due to a difference in training methods and schedules (ie where the training took place - perhaps more of the 'advanced' training at the Squadron level?).
I have no authoritative numbers for the IJA losses - either in the ETO/CBI against the Allies, or in China.
NOTE Most of the above info is from the USSBS debrief data.
With the end of the war, it becomes easier to compare projects and aircraft. Not by the writen opinions of individuals, but by the decisions of experts from different countries.Are you under the impression early La-5s were the opponents on the Easter front in the late war based on what you wrote above?
Are you under the impression 1942 (when the early La-5s came online) is late war?
Early La-5s have nothing to do with what Harder experienced/expressed in late 1944. Dont understand why you mesh the two together.
The quality of AF and airfields is related. In the USSR since 1944, fields for airfields were covered with American materials. Training of pilots and personnel is part of the quality of AF. The weather in the Germans' east is Russian. In the west, it is often less suitable for flying, with cloudy and windy days. The Germans, Finns, British and Soviets flew in the Arctic.Off of memory there are a lot of accidents. But not all are due to quality, as many were related to simple misfortune. Ex: planes colliding into each other on the runway, etc. a fair amount of accidents due to weather conditions too.