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Even if it so it still leaves the Luftwaffe being slowly drawn down both in numbers and in pilot training quality, which latter was always a problem for them well before Barbarossa ever happened. Put crudely, the Soviets could afford an unequal exchange rate.Eastern Front Aircraft Strength and Losses 1941-45
Even with massive numerical advantage and newer fighter types, the exchange rate for the Soviets against the Luftwaffe was not much better in 1943-44, than it was in 1941.
Even if it so it still leaves the Luftwaffe being slowly drawn down both in numbers and in pilot training quality, which latter was always a problem for them well before Barbarossa ever happened. Put crudely, the Soviets could afford an unequal exchange rate.
True, but the question remains why the unequal exchange rate was maintained , if newer Soviet fighters were on par or nearly on par with latest LW fighters? Surely it must also reflect on Soviet pilot quality.
I have difficulties to follow your arguments. According to Caldwell's table behind your link LW lost Sept to Dec 43 3059 day fighters, of which 445 on the Eastern Front (14.5% of the total) and 6487 Jan - May 44 of which 784 on the Eastern Front (12.1 % of the total). So even if the number of LW day fighters lost on the Eastern Front increased 77 % its share of the total LW day fighter losses decreased from 14.5 to 12.1%. Same happened to the total aircraft losses but in lesser extent; from 25.2 % to 23.3 %.Meanwhile Luftwaffe losses doubled from late 1943 to early 1944
They went from losing 3,000 day fighters, (already more than in all other Theaters combined) and 6800 aircraft in 1943
to 6400 day fighters and just under 14,000 aircraft in 1944.
By June - Oct 44' day fighter losses had gone up to 7400
I'd say things are looking pretty bad for the Luftwaffe, and Soviet fighters are in fact, taking a bite.
Indeed it was. But what also not has to be forgotten is that quite a few luftwaffe units rotated to Reich defense wich played into the tactical scheme of the Soviets.The USSR was by far the best tactical air force at the end of the war and while it's easy to denigrate their equipment or training levels, their successes shouldn't be overlooked
I think we could say that the decline in the number of Axis units, fuel, training, and pilots applies to any front. After mid-1944 in the ETO, after Midway in the Pacific, Axis resources are running out across the board.Indeed it was. But what also not has to be forgotten is that quite a few luftwaffe units rotated to Reich defense wich played into the tactical scheme of the Soviets.
And offcourse lack of fuel training new pilots etc.
I have difficulties to follow your arguments. According to Caldwell's table behind your link LW lost Sept to Dec 43 3059 day fighters, of which 445 on the Eastern Front (14.5% of the total) and 6487 Jan - May 44 of which 784 on the Eastern Front (12.1 % of the total). So even if the number of LW day fighters lost on the Eastern Front increased 77 % its share of the total LW day fighter losses decreased from 14.5 to 12.1%. Same happened to the total aircraft losses but in lesser extent; from 25.2 % to 23.3 %.
I have some experience (not as a pilot) with two different Yaks, a Yak-3 and a Yak-9, both of Soviet manufacture, but both now running Allison engines and Hamilton props due to no Klimovs being available to overhaul or any cache of spare parts.In mass production, flight performance was inevitably and severely degraded. Thus, the maximum speed was 30-40 kph lower. The Yak-3 undoubtedly had better performance than its predecessors. But many of their drawbacks were transferred to the Yak-3 unchanged, in particular the ugly radio communications, which had been a headache for the Soviet Air Force throughout the war.
ALL factors need to be considered for a valid comparison, not just flight characteristics.
Yes, but what you meant when You wrote: "They went from losing 3,000 day fighters, (already more than in all other Theaters combined) "What I see is mounting losses, and not in a trivial number. We know that in 1944 the US daylight bombing campaign was getting into full swing, with robust fighter escort. To protect their cities from being blown to bits the Germans were scrambling to put every resource they could into defense. Then of course, Operation Overlord took place and the tactical situation became nearly catastrophic as well. So of course there were more losses in the West in 1944. But clearly they were losing the war in the East as well.
If I correctly understand, these are replicas produced in Novosibirsk in the early 1990s? They have nothing to do with the airplanes produced in 1944 - neither in terms of build quality nor equipment.I have some experience (not as a pilot) with two different Yaks, a Yak-3 and a Yak-9, both of Soviet manufacture, but both now running Allison engines and Hamilton props due to no Klimovs being available to overhaul or any cache of spare parts.
Both fly extremely well and seem robust, but the stick gets a bit heavy as the speed rises. That is typical of all WWII fighters. They seem to have no particularly bad characteristics and the workmanship is good. Both of these were painted here in the U.S.A., but the techniques were nothing special other than being painted indoors and allowed to dry before being shoved outside. Normal paint prep. You know, sand it smooth and clean the surfaces before painting. There is nothing particularly primitive about them. They seem quite serviceable and have been running reliably for years. Of course, these have modern radios.
Both pilots like the yaks and neither pilot likes the Bf 109. Yes, they have time in Bf 109s.
That doesn't say anything about combat absolutes, but it DOES indicate the Yaks are decent airplanes and are relatively well-liked by US warbird pilots who fly them.
That's the best conclusion I've heard in this thread. Soviet pilots in 1941 used obsolete tactics on obsolete airplanes, but they were _on average_ better trained than in 1944. A better aircraft performance in 1944 still didn't make up for that difference. The Soviet aircraft industry narrowed the performance gap, but could not produce such outstanding aircraft (or even equal taking into account ALL the characteristics including the quality of radio communication, resistance to damage from enemy fire, etc.) that the situation with the loss ratio improved dramatically despite the huge Soviet outnumbering.Eastern Front Aircraft Strength and Losses 1941-45
Even with massive numerical advantage and newer fighter types, the exchange rate for the Soviets against the Luftwaffe was not much better in 1943-44, than it was in 1941.
True, but the question remains why the unequal exchange rate was maintained , if newer Soviet fighters were on par or nearly on par with latest LW fighters? Surely it must also reflect on Soviet pilot qu
Even according to your (unreliable, IMO) chart, Soviet fighter losses went down by half between 1942 and 1944.
Not 'my' table, but sources are given in the article.
You don't quite understand correctly.If I correctly understand, these are replicas produced in Novosibirsk in the early 1990s? They have nothing to do with the airplanes produced in 1944 - neither in terms of build quality nor equipment.
I'm not a big fan of overly reductive arguments. For instance, the Soviet Air Force was not all Russian manufactured aircraft and it is misdirected to assume all aircraft employed by the USSR had substandard radios, etc. There are a number of factors that contribute to a higher loss rate throughout the war. The theater of combat in the east is far different than the west. In the west, the air war was largely a static environment with fixed targets such as air fields, factories and transportation center. The allies had the benefit of operating from well established bases with extensive repair and support facilities. The air war was largely carried out in an environment that allowed allied fighters to have the tactical advantage. (German fighters being dedicated to destroying bombers, allied fighters being dedicated to destroying German fighters) Following engagements, Allied fighters had opportunities to further the advantage by attacking support facilities and large numbers of aircraft on the ground. In the east, the air war was conducted in a fluid environment without fixed targets such as airfields, support facilities and so forth. The eastern front was characterized by operations conducted from temporary and often crude airfields with significantly lesser supporting facilities. The fluid environment means that there is very little opportunity to conduct an air superiority campaign as was conducted in the west. The Germans simply relocate, draw back, and restock. (admittedly with fewer and fewer resources). When air combat does occur it also means that the opposing forces have had the ability to regroup and restrengthen. We should also look at the Soviet Air Force on the offensive. The war in the east is not simply fighter vs fighter. The Soviet Union is fielding large numbers of assault aircraft. As we've seen throughout all theaters of the war, these aircraft are more vulnerable and more likely to be lost in combat, especially the Il-2/10 which were vulnerable to opposing fighters as well as fought in environments saturated with AAA. All of these could lead to higher loss rates than in the west.That's the best conclusion I've heard in this thread. Soviet pilots in 1941 used obsolete tactics on obsolete airplanes, but they were _on average_ better trained than in 1944. A better aircraft performance in 1944 still didn't make up for that difference. The Soviet aircraft industry narrowed the performance gap, but could not produce such outstanding aircraft (or even equal taking into account ALL the characteristics including the quality of radio communication, resistance to damage from enemy fire, etc.) that the situation with the loss ratio improved dramatically despite the huge Soviet outnumbering.
I'm not a big fan of overly reductive arguments. For instance, the Soviet Air Force was not all Russian manufactured aircraft and it is misdirected to assume all aircraft employed by the USSR had substandard radios, etc. There are a number of factors that contribute to a higher loss rate throughout the war. The theater of combat in the east is far different than the west. In the west, the air war was largely a static environment with fixed targets such as air fields, factories and transportation center. The allies had the benefit of operating from well established bases with extensive repair and support facilities. The air war was largely carried out in an environment that allowed allied fighters to have the tactical advantage. (German fighters being dedicated to destroying bombers, allied fighters being dedicated to destroying German fighters) Following engagements, Allied fighters had opportunities to further the advantage by attacking support facilities and large numbers of aircraft on the ground. In the east, the air war was conducted in a fluid environment without fixed targets such as airfields, support facilities and so forth. The eastern front was characterized by operations conducted from temporary and often crude airfields with significantly lesser supporting facilities. The fluid environment means that there is very little opportunity to conduct an air superiority campaign as was conducted in the west. The Germans simply relocate, draw back, and restock. (admittedly with fewer and fewer resources). When air combat does occur it also means that the opposing forces have had the ability to regroup and restrengthen. We should also look at the Soviet Air Force on the offensive. The war in the east is not simply fighter vs fighter. The Soviet Union is fielding large numbers of assault aircraft. As we've seen throughout all theaters of the war, these aircraft are more vulnerable and more likely to be lost in combat, especially the Il-2/10 which were vulnerable to opposing fighters as well as fought in environments saturated with AAA. All of these could lead to higher loss rates than in the west.
A couple additional thoughts. German resistance in the east was far more committed and prolonged than in the west and would also contribute to higher casualty and loss rates. Lastly, I know there is a strong desire to discredit USSR statistics, data ands forth, but I found it interesting that wikipedia lists aircraft losses among combatants thusly:
- Soviet Union: Total losses were 17,900 bombers, 23,600 ground attacker, 46,800 fighter aircraft, and 18,100 training, transport and other aircraft; an overall loss of over 106,400 aircraft; 46,100 in combat and 60,300 non-combat. Of which, 18,300 Lend-Lease aircraft were lost. Grigori F. Krivosheev states: "A high percentage of combat aircraft were lost in relation to the number available on 22 June 1941: 442% (total losses) or 216% (combat losses). In the air force over a half of losses were non-combat losses."[4]
- British Empire
- United States: Total losses were nearly 95,000 (21,255 in the Pacific[6]), including 52,951 operational losses (38,418 in Europe and 14,533 in the Pacific).[3]
Link: Equipment losses in World War II - Wikipedia.
As I suspected, these airplanes are not from 1944. The quality of post-war assembly is incomparable to that of wartime ones.You don't quite understand correctly.
The Yak-3 is a new-built fuselage mated to original Yak-3 wings taken from a Yak-11 that had itself been converted to a Yak-11 from from a damages Yak-3. It was damaged in a taxi accident and the original wings were undamaged and saved. Their workmanship is quite reasonable and not very many repairs were needed for "hangar rash" from storage type damage. They were not built badly originally.