How much did Soviet aero-production depend on Lend-Lease?

Just Schmidt said:

I find it intriguing that the P-39 was relatively successful, whithout knowing many figures. I always found the technical specifications on the plane relatively impressive for the date of the design, and therefore wondering why the P-40 seem to have been so much more successful. Apart from on the eastern front. From snippets in this forum (which I usually enjoy when it dosn't becomes a forum about politics instead of aviation), I have the impression that it was both lightened and the engines run on higher settings. I have no idea, however, in what Battles they were used, or which sectors. I am not entirely sure that it's success isn't a hype. Often Stalin is quoted as having specifically asked for this type, but why take Stalins word as gospel in this one instant? He wasn't an aircraft engineer, but indeed it must have been a more impressive plane than fx the Hurricane. Of course the low level fighting played to it's specific strengths. It is likely that lend lease made it possible for the Russians to a greater extent to replace Wood With metal in many of their Aircraft types. However this will have been even more lagging behind that actual arrival of the alloys in question.

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Shortround6 said:

On a very basic, simplistic level lend lease did not save the Soviet Union. They managed that, with the aid of General Winter pretty much on their own (and German mistakes). Unless people can point out specific battles were lend lease equipment (or ammo) made a critical difference (not just showed up) in 1941/early 1942.

On the other hand the Soviet advances of 1944/45 would not have been possible without lend lease. At least not at anywhere near the rate of advance that happened.

How much lend lease contributed to the semi-stalemate of late 42 and 43 is certainly subject to debate.

Sticking strictly with aircraft production it would be very hard to tell without some sort of break down of where a lot of the machine tools went (tank factory or aircraft factory) and what sort of materials went were. 124,052,618 lbs (62,000 short tons) of Aluminum plates, sheets, strips didn't all go to tank or tractor factories
The Russians were not building pre-fabricated aircraft though. A lot of that had to be reworked into parts, as did 366,73S,204 lbs of Aluminum alloys, ingots, slabs, etc.

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Significant numbers of British Churchill and Matilda tanks along with US M3 Lee were shipped to the USSR after becoming obsolete on the African Front. The Churchills, supplied by the arctic convoys, saw action in the siege of St Petersburg and the battle of Kursk.[36][37] while tanks shipped by the Persian route supplied the Caucasian Front. With the USSR giving priority to the defence of Moscow for domestically produced tanks this resulted in 40% of tanks in service on the Caucasian Front being Lend-Lease models.[38]

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According to research by a team of Soviet historians, the Soviet Union lost a staggering 20,500 tanks from June 22 to December 31, 1941. At the end of November 1941, only 670 Soviet tanks were available to defend Moscow—that is, in the recently formed Kalinin, Western, and Southwestern Fronts. Only 205 of these tanks were heavy or medium types, and most of their strength was concentrated in the Western Front, with the Kalinin Front having only two tank battalions (67 tanks) and the Southwestern Front two tank brigades (30 tanks).

Given the disruption to Soviet production and Red Army losses, the Soviet Union was understandably eager to put British armor into action as soon as possible. According to Biriukov's service diary, the first 20 British tanks arrived at the Soviet tank training school in Kazan on October 28, 1941, at which point a further 120 tanks were unloaded at the port of Archangel in northern Russia. Courses on the British tanks for Soviet crews started during November as the first tanks, with British assistance, were being assembled from their in-transit states and undergoing testing by Soviet specialists.

The tanks reached the front lines with extraordinary speed. Extrapolating from available statistics, researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941, and certainly made up a significant proportion of tanks available as reinforcements at this critical point in the fighting. By the end of 1941 Britain had delivered 466 tanks out of the 750 promised.

The British Military Mission to Moscow noted that by December 9, about ninety British tanks had already been in action with Soviet forces. The first of these units to have seen action seems to have been the 138th Independent Tank Battalion (with twenty-one British tanks), which was involved in stemming the advance of German units in the region of the Volga Reservoir to the north of Moscow in late November. In fact the British intercepted German communications indicating that German forces had first come in contact with British tanks on the Eastern front on November 26, 1941.

The exploits of the British-equipped 136th Independent Tank Battalion are perhaps the most widely noted in the archives. It was part of a scratch operational group of the Western Front consisting of the 18th Rifle Brigade, two ski battalions, the 5th and 20th Tank Brigades, and the 140th Independent Tank Battalion. The 136th Independent Tank Battalion was combined with the latter to produce a tank group of only twenty-one tanks, which was to operate with the two ski battalions against German forces advancing to the west of Moscow in early December. Other largely British-equipped tank units in action with the Western Front from early December were the 131st Independent Tank Brigade, which fought to the east of Tula, south of Moscow, and 146th Tank Brigade, in the region of Kriukovo to the immediate west of the Soviet capital.

While the Matilda Mk II and Valentine tanks supplied by the British were certainly inferior to the Soviets' homegrown T-34 and KV-1, it is important to note that Soviet production of the T-34 (and to a lesser extent the KV series), was only just getting seriously underway in 1942, and Soviet production was well below plan targets. And though rapid increases in tank firepower would soon render the 40mm two-pounder main gun of the Matilda and Valentine suitable for use on light tanks only, the armor protection of these British models put them firmly in the heavy and medium categories, respectively. Both were superior to all but the Soviet KV-1 and T-34 in armor, and indeed even their much maligned winter cross-country performance was comparable to most Soviet tanks excluding the KV-1 and T-34.

A steady stream of British-made tanks continued to flow into the Red Army through the spring and summer of 1942. Canada would eventually produce 1,420 Valentines, almost exclusively for delivery to the Soviet Union. By July 1942 the Red Army had 13,500 tanks in service, with more than 16 percent of those imported, and more than half of those British.

Lend-Lease aircraft deliveries were also of significance during the Battle of Moscow. While Soviet pilots praised the maneuverability of the homegrown I-153 Chaika and I-16 Ishak fighters—still in use in significant numbers in late 1941—both types were certainly obsolete and inferior in almost all regards to the British-supplied Hurricane. The Hurricane was rugged and tried and tested, and as useful at that point as many potentially superior Soviet designs such as the LaGG-3 and MiG-3. There were apparently only 263 LaGG-3s in the Soviet inventory by the time of the Moscow counteroffensive, and it was an aircraft with numerous defects. At the end of 1941 there were greater numbers of the MiG-3, but the plane was considered difficult to fly. The Yak-1, arguably the best of the batch, and superior in most regards to the Hurricane, suffered from airframe and engine defects in early war production aircraft.

A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. About 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes.

The Soviet Northern Fleet was also a major and early recipient of British Hurricanes, receiving those flown by No. 151 Wing of the RAF, which operated briefly from Soviet airfields near Murmansk. As early as October 12, 1941, the Soviet 126th Fighter Air Regiment was operating with Tomahawks bought from the United States by Britain. Tomahawks also served in defense of the Doroga Zhizni or "Road of Life" across the ice of Lake Ladoga, which provided the only supply line to the besieged city of Leningrad during the winter of 1941–42. By spring and summer of 1942 the Hurricane had clearly become the principal fighter aircraft of the Northern Fleet's air regiments; in all, 83 out of its 109 fighters were of foreign origin.

British and Commonwealth deliveries to the Soviet Union in late 1941 and early 1942 would not only assist in the Soviet defense of Moscow and subsequent counteroffensive, but also in increasing Soviet production for the next period of the war. Substantial quantities of machine tools and raw materials, such as aluminum and rubber, were supplied to help Soviet industry back on its feet: 312 metal-cutting machine tools were delivered by convoy PQ-12 alone, arriving in March 1942, along with a range of other items for Soviet factories such as machine presses and compressors.

Once again, raw figures do not tell the whole story. Although British shipments amounted to only a few percent of Soviet domestic production of machine tools, the Soviet Union could request specific items which it may not have been able to produce for itself. Additionally, many of the British tools arrived in early 1942, when Soviet tool production was still very low, resulting in a disproportionate impact. The handing over of forty imported machine tools to Aviation Factory No. 150 in July 1942, for example, was the critical factor in enabling the factory to reach projected capacity within two months.

Lend-Lease aid did not "save" the Soviet Union from defeat during the Battle of Moscow. But the speed at which Britain in particular was willing and able to provide aid to the Soviet Union, and at which the Soviet Union was able to put foreign equipment into frontline use, is still an underappreciated part of this story. During the bitter fighting of the winter of 1941–1942, British aid made a crucial difference.

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Just Schmidt said:

I find it intriguing that the P-39 was relatively successful, whithout knowing many figures. I always found the technical specifications on the plane relatively impressive for the date of the design, and therefore wondering why the P-40 seem to have been so much more successful. Apart from on the eastern front. From snippets in this forum (which I usually enjoy when it dosn't becomes a forum about politics instead of aviation), I have the impression that it was both lightened and the engines run on higher settings. I have no idea, however, in what Battles they were used, or which sectors. I am not entirely sure that it's success isn't a hype. Often Stalin is quoted as having specifically asked for this type, but why take Stalins word as gospel in this one instant? He wasn't an aircraft engineer, but indeed it must have been a more impressive plane than fx the Hurricane. Of course the low level fighting played to it's specific strengths. It is likely that lend lease made it possible for the Russians to a greater extent to replace Wood With metal in many of their Aircraft types. However this will have been even more lagging behind that actual arrival of the alloys in question.

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kool kitty89 said:

I haven't seen much mention of Stalin on the matter, more on pilot accounts and more general tactical utility of the P-39.

Compared to contemporary Soviet fighters, the P-39 was fast, well armed, and long ranged (as well as drop tank capable, extending range even further). Speed and climb at low altitude was pushed even further with overboosting and/or WEP use, and the 9.6:1 supercharger ratios of the P-39M, N, and Q moved FTH for WEP up to middle altitudes (just shy of 10,000 ft with ram on the N an Q, slightly lower on the M due to retaining the backfire screens). Soviets also tended to remove or omit the wing guns, both the internal .30s and the later .50 pods used on the P-39Q.

The P-39Q was the most numerous model produced and the one most relevant late-war for the Soviets. In the configurations used, it was likely faster than 109Gs of the same timeframe though perhaps not those equipped with higher powered DB 605AM engines. Roll rate may have been higher too (with the wing guns removed, and elevator stick forces should be lighter but with the P-39's spin problems, it might be daunting to push it to the limits in a turning fight. (level speed, dive, and roll rates would seem more solid advantages)

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