How to prepare Luftwaffe for Barbarossa if accurate intel on Soviet forces?

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Trick is, with all these Nazis dead, who takes over?
I only postulated shooting Hitler. Goering (the proposed-to-me shooter) is the necessary Sacrificial Atonement for the German people.
The rest of the NAZI government is still alive and deals with the mess.

Related to the OP, what is the Luftwaffe to do? Build fewer plane types, improve those types, and build more planes!
1: De-emphasize the FW190 (keep it in development until it's DONE) and build more Bf-109 (Fredrich). This will be enough to keep VVS on defensive.
2: If there is sufficient fighter company, the Ju87 will be adequate for ground attack through Barbarossa.
3: We need more Condors. They're transports and recon and ship killers.
4: Bf-109 & Ju87 must be made to work in Finland for attacking lend-lease and to endure the Soviet winter (assuming Peace with the West is impossible).
 
I'd say again: He 177 needs to be cancelled.
"Long range bomber" is not just another name for "4-engined bomber".

Tough to do a long range bomber with two engines of under 2000hp. Possible but tough, especially......................

Germans need to do daylight bombing.

If you are not going to night bomb then the plane better be fast. Germans have crap for defensive gun mounts at this point in the war so they are really up against it.

Fast cruise and long range are really hard to put together (Mosquito aside).

This is why I've suggested the DB-601/605 powered Fw 190: it has more internal fuel than Bf 109, and it can be easily upgraded to carry even more fuel. The BMW 801s were fuel hogs vs. the German (and other people's) V12s. BMW 801 was also less reliable than V12s the Germans had in 1941-mid 1942.



Better than a 109 won't cut it. a lot better than a 109 may not cut it. You need much, much MUCH better than the 109. Missions into much of the Soviet Union could be 600-800 miles one way without even getting close to the Urals. Doubling the internal fuel of the 109 might not be enough. P-51s with rear fuselage tanks carried over 1000 liters of fuel, granted some was burned off before the drop tanks were dropped.

while the progression from a DB 601 powered 190 (or close relative) to a DB 605 powered one isn't much of a problem the problem is what engine/s are you going to use in the long range bombers in 1941/42 if you don't have the big engines they were designed for, or the DB 606 OR the BMW 801?
Trying to power the JU 288 prototypes with BMW 801s didn't work well and trying to power that size airframe with 1200-1400hp engines is certainly not going to end well.

It took the US roughly a year to go from the 5th airframe of any given airplane to the 500th airframe. The Next 500 could be done in 6 months or less. However, once again, the changes cannot to too great or you have several months of diminished production.
 
Tough to do a long range bomber with two engines of under 2000hp. Possible but tough, especially......................

It was done before 1941, 2500+ km range was no problem for He 111 (with bombs hanging out in the breeze) and Wellington I (Pegasus engines)

If you are not going to night bomb then the plane better be fast. Germans have crap for defensive gun mounts at this point in the war so they are really up against it.

Fast cruise and long range are really hard to put together (Mosquito aside).

Bombers need to be escorted. The defensive guns also need upgrade.

Better than a 109 won't cut it. a lot better than a 109 may not cut it. You need much, much MUCH better than the 109. Missions into much of the Soviet Union could be 600-800 miles one way without even getting close to the Urals. Doubling the internal fuel of the 109 might not be enough. P-51s with rear fuselage tanks carried over 1000 liters of fuel, granted some was burned off before the drop tanks were dropped.

Hold your horses, there is no Ural factories in 1941 (bar small factories, that is).
Ideally, the escorting Fw 190 will be powered by DB 601E engine, fuel tankage of 600+ liters, and 2x300L in drop tanks, 2-3 MG 151s (no MGs). The escorting Bf 109 should have 400L+100L of internal fuel and 2x300L drop tanks.

while the progression from a DB 601 powered 190 (or close relative) to a DB 605 powered one isn't much of a problem the problem is what engine/s are you going to use in the long range bombers in 1941/42 if you don't have the big engines they were designed for, or the DB 606 OR the BMW 801?
Trying to power the JU 288 prototypes with BMW 801s didn't work well and trying to power that size airframe with 1200-1400hp engines is certainly not going to end well.

Ju 288 was smaller than He 111. The initial wing on the 288 needs to stays as it is (either at 54 or 59/60 sq m, not 64.7), ditto for fuselage (18.4 or 20m, instead of 22.6m) so the weight and drag don't go overboard.
Initial Ju 288 prototypes that crashed either did so via engine fire, or undercarriage collapse. Yes, the BMW 801 will operate as with Do 217, ie. not allowed for the 3 min Notleistung.
I count the DB 606 as two engines.

It took the US roughly a year to go from the 5th airframe of any given airplane to the 500th airframe. The Next 500 could be done in 6 months or less. However, once again, the changes cannot to too great or you have several months of diminished production.

I don't expect the Ju 288 taking part in the war before 1942.
 
It was done before 1941, 2500+ km range was no problem for He 111 (with bombs hanging out in the breeze) and Wellington I (Pegasus engines)
Bombers need to be escorted. The defensive guns also need upgrade.
Hold your horses, there is no Ural factories in 1941 (bar small factories, that is).

He 111 was a night bomber in the west after the summer of 1940. The Wellington was a night bomber after Dec 1939.
Yes the Germans need a better defensive gun set up than the Stuff they were using in the BoB. The addition of a few more MG 15s wasn't it.
The Germans tried to skip the manned power turret and jump to the remote control power barbette, in part because they wanted a pressure cabin.
A much simplified set up might have been quicker to develop.

However please take another look at soviet industry, Tankograd was located where it was due the existence of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (which had built 100,000 tractors by 1940) and the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant,
Chelyabinsk was about 1500 miles from the Bulgarian border, it is just over 1300 miles from Kiev. The Joint German Soviet Kama tank school was in Kazan from 1922 to 1933.
See Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works - Wikipedia for the steel plant that provided 1/2 the steel for Soviet tanks during WW II. Construction started in 1933.

Flying 1000-1500 miles into soviet airspace with 750-2000kg bomb loads with planes cruising at 300-325kph wasn't going to work very well. If you want to bomb in daylight for accuracy you are going to need much faster bombers than the He 111 and Wellington. Or lots of escorts and lots of defensive guns.

Granted there was an awful lot of industry located closer but the "Ural" bomber was a bad joke.

For an indicator of just how bad a low powered Ju 288 might be compare it to an Early B-26, Similar wing size, similar weights? Early B-26 has only one turret sticking out and pretty pointy tail. Granted it has a fat fuselage but it had 1850hp engines for take-off.
 
The mathematics of daylight bombing were revealed in the Battle of Britain. In the raids on London the Do-17 was used. The raids had an escort ratio of 4 fighters to 1 bomber and still some bombers were lost along with fighters. A Do-17 with 4 escorts has 6 engines, 5 pilots plus two other aircrew dropping 1 ton of bombs. If you put 250kg of bombs on the escorts you have 1000kg of bombs, 4 engines and 4 pilots with a much better chance of getting home, this is what the LW actually did in October 1940.
 
He 111 was a night bomber in the west after the summer of 1940. The Wellington was a night bomber after Dec 1939.
Yes the Germans need a better defensive gun set up than the Stuff they were using in the BoB. The addition of a few more MG 15s wasn't it.
The Germans tried to skip the manned power turret and jump to the remote control power barbette, in part because they wanted a pressure cabin.
A much simplified set up might have been quicker to develop.

Those bombers were put into night bombing job because of good reasons - their owners haven't provided them with suitable escorts. As for the better defensive firepower, I'd go with either twin LMGs or belt-fed MG FFMs. Granted, a good turret with a man inside and 4 LMGs or two MG FFMs is even better.

However please take another look at soviet industry, Tankograd was located where it was due the existence of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (which had built 100,000 tractors by 1940) and the Chelyabinsk Metallurgical Plant,
Chelyabinsk was about 1500 miles from the Bulgarian border, it is just over 1300 miles from Kiev. The Joint German Soviet Kama tank school was in Kazan from 1922 to 1933.
See Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works - Wikipedia for the steel plant that provided 1/2 the steel for Soviet tanks during WW II. Construction started in 1933.

Tankograd became tankograd ('city of tanks') once the factories from Ukraine and Leningrad were evacuated there. Eleven tank- and gun-producing factories were shipped east of Moscow, most of them in the Ural region. link

Flying 1000-1500 miles into soviet airspace with 750-2000kg bomb loads with planes cruising at 300-325kph wasn't going to work very well. If you want to bomb in daylight for accuracy you are going to need much faster bombers than the He 111 and Wellington. Or lots of escorts and lots of defensive guns.

Escorts, predominantly.

Granted there was an awful lot of industry located closer but the "Ural" bomber was a bad joke.

Probably it was.

For an indicator of just how bad a low powered Ju 288 might be compare it to an Early B-26, Similar wing size, similar weights? Early B-26 has only one turret sticking out and pretty pointy tail. Granted it has a fat fuselage but it had 1850hp engines for take-off.

I certainly don't expect that the resulting Ju 288 will be the last word as far as the bombers go, but it should be a bomber that has good payload, an actual bomb bay (both for range and speed), decent defensive firepower, and that is affordable.
 
Tankograd became tankograd ('city of tanks') once the factories from Ukraine and Leningrad were evacuated there. Eleven tank- and gun-producing factories were shipped east of Moscow, most of them in the Ural region. link

Tankograd became Tankograd because there was existing industry of type compatible with tank construction. There was also the nearby steel works. They did not evacuate the arms factories to bare plots of land and build new cities near them, for the most part.

Gorky was about 250 miles east of Moscow. The Germans managed to bomb it a number of times.

Diversion of resources into a long range bomber program (2 engine or 4 engine) is counter productive to the short fierce war the Germans need to win.
Spending large amounts of time and money in 1941 and early 42 for aircraft that will only begin to enter service in late 1942 or 1943 is not what the Germans need. Funding long term projects is hedging their bets, Total cut off is not wise but the Germans could not build a bomber force anywhere near what the British and Americans did. And Again, the British and Americans were operating over shorter distances, much shorter.

Yes, more and improved bombers would have been useful but people are calling for many more bombers and many more fighters to escort them. The Germans need to over run the western factories or get close enough to bomb them (or the railroads) before evacuation.

The germans need more air transport than they had but is also tricky. large numbers of large transports won't save cutoff German units and won't sustain panzer drives. A single Panzer division might need 200-300 tons of supplies per day. A Panzer corp with two panzer divisions and one motor rifle division could need 750 tons or more per day to continue to advance.

More light twins or 4-6 seat cabin aircraft with STOL abilities might have brought in some supplies and evacuated casualties. But might also have cut into trainer production?
 
This map should explain what is going on. The German Army was often so short of oil they had to stop manoeuvring. Sure, they were smart enough to not let themselves run out of fuel at the roadside and had a few loads in reserve but there wasn't enough fuel to continue offensive fighting. You had to wait for the Soviets to attack. With a horse drawn army you can operate maybe 100km from a rail head. With trucks maybe 800km. Hitler wanted the oil at Baku because the Reich's economy and the German military needed it. Halder wanted Moscow because he thought it might lead to a political collapse. The reason the 6th Army died at Stalingrad (now known as Volgograd) is because this is part of the strategy to get the oil in Baku, Grozny etc. That oil would have changed the war. It's either that or mine more coal, make more coal to oil plants or improve their efficiency. Don't know if that was possible, probably not in time. Note prior to operation Barbarossa "Operation Pike" was an allied plan to bomb Baku's oil facilities. (note: fixed spelling on map, thanks Saparotrob).

BakuOil2.JPG
 
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Tankograd became Tankograd because there was existing industry of type compatible with tank construction. There was also the nearby steel works. They did not evacuate the arms factories to bare plots of land and build new cities near them, for the most part.

The tools and structures needed for manufacture of 30-45 ton tanks were still needed, since those adequate for 1-2 ton tractors will not cut it now. We can recall that factories making light tanks (5-12 tons) were still making the offsprings of those in 1944-45, the tools and devices needed for lugging around the hulls, engines and turrets for 30-45 ton tanks don't grow on the trees.
The experienced workers are still needed, those came in thousands from west of Soviet Union. New workers have had from whom to learn, too.

Diversion of resources into a long range bomber program (2 engine or 4 engine) is counter productive to the short fierce war the Germans need to win.
Spending large amounts of time and money in 1941 and early 42 for aircraft that will only begin to enter service in late 1942 or 1943 is not what the Germans need. Funding long term projects is hedging their bets, Total cut off is not wise but the Germans could not build a bomber force anywhere near what the British and Americans did. And Again, the British and Americans were operating over shorter distances, much shorter.

You have scratching my head about the 'total cut off' that I've never suggested.

Yes, more and improved bombers would have been useful but people are calling for many more bombers and many more fighters to escort them. The Germans need to over run the western factories or get close enough to bomb them (or the railroads) before evacuation.

Yes, the evacuation needs to be stopped, either completely or in good deal.

The germans need more air transport than they had but is also tricky. large numbers of large transports won't save cutoff German units and won't sustain panzer drives. A single Panzer division might need 200-300 tons of supplies per day. A Panzer corp with two panzer divisions and one motor rifle division could need 750 tons or more per day to continue to advance.

More light twins or 4-6 seat cabin aircraft with STOL abilities might have brought in some supplies and evacuated casualties. But might also have cut into trainer production?

Intention to use transport aircraft for anything that is not an ad-hoc event (several days, two weeks at most) is not what LW can do, unless Germany produces just transport aircraft and nothing else. Not just because it is way to demanding on the fuel for the huge transport fleet.
Transport aircraft need to be low-tech, construction-wise: steel tube framing, with wood and canvas wrapped around, light alloys only when absolutely needed. My favorite is the Go 244 with BMW 132 engines - does more than Ju 52-3m does, on 1/3rd less engines.
 
The tools and structures needed for manufacture of 30-45 ton tanks were still needed, since those adequate for 1-2 ton tractors will not cut it now.


Chelyabinsk_tractor_factory_1930s.jpg

During the 30s. Stalinetz-60
7_KlS1EQnGYCBp6Az0PLCK58v7uEj-MBXprpokdg89Lhh8IDqM5SDRU_MMJBpAI0SfxSvVhHX6G30OXPShGbdtQrOoGFBTEI.jpg

Much used by the Soviets and Germans as artillery tractors. Replaced in 1937 by a diesel powered version the Stalinetz-65
full.jpg

the S-65 was about 11 tons and the factory built 37,600 between 1937 and 1941.
While perhaps not quite the facility needed for T-34 or KV production it was a much better starting point than a truck factory.
 
Tankograd became Tankograd because there was existing industry of type compatible with tank construction. There was also the nearby steel works. They did not evacuate the arms factories to bare plots of land and build new cities near them, for the most part.

Gorky was about 250 miles east of Moscow. The Germans managed to bomb it a number of times.

Diversion of resources into a long range bomber program (2 engine or 4 engine) is counter productive to the short fierce war the Germans need to win.
Spending large amounts of time and money in 1941 and early 42 for aircraft that will only begin to enter service in late 1942 or 1943 is not what the Germans need. Funding long term projects is hedging their bets, Total cut off is not wise but the Germans could not build a bomber force anywhere near what the British and Americans did. And Again, the British and Americans were operating over shorter distances, much shorter.

Yes, more and improved bombers would have been useful but people are calling for many more bombers and many more fighters to escort them. The Germans need to over run the western factories or get close enough to bomb them (or the railroads) before evacuation.

The Germans need more air transport than they had but is also tricky. large numbers of large transports won't save cut off German units and won't sustain panzer drives. A single Panzer division might need 200-300 tons of supplies per day. A Panzer corp with two panzer divisions and one motor rifle division could need 750 tons or more per day to continue to advance.

More light twins or 4-6 seat cabin aircraft with STOL abilities might have brought in some supplies and evacuated casualties. But might also have cut into trainer production?

This is a good post.

When in service the He 177 was rated as having a combat radius of 1500miles/2400km with 1 ton of bombs and 1200 miles/1900km with 2 tons. There were times during the German advance they were in range of the Ural factories from the more forward areas.

When Ernst Heinkel spoke to the RLM and Luftwaffe in 1939 and he begged them to remove the dive bombing requirement so that the He 177 could be built with 4 evenly distributed engines they told him they couldn't justify the cost of the program without it.

The mentality or reasoning seems to have been that "we can't afford long range bombers because we can't sacrifice tactical dive bombers, so we can only afford the He 177 if it is a precision tactical bomber that can replace other types". Maybe there was another reasoning process, such as a dive bombing requirement against ships.

When it came to 1942 dive bombing was not necessary as Both the StuVi 5B dive bombing sight and Lotfe 7 computing sight gave almost as good accuracy as dive bombing and the He 177 entered service without dive bombing capability but with serious issues.

Below is an example of the Rasputitsa mud. The need to tow vehicles (mainly using half tracks) or tractors of some kind increased anticipated fuel requirements for Barbarossa by a factor of 10 over estimates.

The German army did have 6 wheel drive 3 axel trucks with large low pressure tires that might get through this but never enough. (The US supplied these to the Soviet Army in large numbers, they came out of the US timber industry).

The Opel Blitz A 3 ton truck with 2 axels and 4 wheel drive was the only one they seemed to be able to mass produce but lacked really large tires and capacity.

Given the massive fuel demands of road transport during the Rasputitsa an air lift might have been more fuel efficient.

German mass production of transports aircraft is not adequate to the task.
1 Ju 52, too short ranged, to slow, too fuel inefficient. Has good STOL and is durable. Better than nothing.
2 Fw 200 transport is produced in inadequate numbers (200) and being misused in any case as a maritime reconnaissance bomber.
3 The Ju 290 is also produced in inadequate number (70 or so, from 1943) and is also being misused as a maritime reconnaissance aircraft. It's too late.
4 The Ju 252 has good performance but is cancelled in favour of the underpowered Ju 352 which also ends up in token production and has poor performance.
5 Arado Ar 232. Incredible STOL capability but not produced in significant numbers.
6 He 111 is used as a transport is good and is fast enough to operate in dangerous airspace but lacks volume.
7 Siebel Si 204, about 1200 were produced. They could carry 1650kg and had a range of 1100 miles but seem to have been more of a passenger transport.
8 Gotha Go 244, few produced, vulnerable to anti aircraft fire.

If the He 177 had of worked the Fw 200 and latter Ju 290 become available for transport.

With only the Ju 52 Barbarossa cant work. Without large numbers of 6 wheel drive trucks it probably can't work either.


Wehrmacht_Mercedes_Benz_L3000_Truck (1).jpg
 
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When in service the He 177 was rated as having a combat radius of 1500miles/2400km with 1 ton of bombs and 1200 miles/1900km with 2 tons. There were times during the German advance they were in range of the Ural factories from the more forward areas.

Two major points here. Carrying 1-2 tons of bombs over such distances using 4 engines is rather inefficient ( B-17 is often criticized for only carrying 4-5000lb to Berlin, granted shorter distance) but trying to knock out factories with 1 -2 tons per plane is going to be a long drawn out campaign.
Planning your bomber campaign/missions/procurement on the probability of your ground forces taking thousands of kilometers of enemy territory is pretty iffy planing. US Island hopping in the Pacific is a bit different, also the B-29 was intended to be deployed from China.


When it came to 1942 dive bombing was not necessary as Both the StuVi 5B dive bombing and Lotfe 7 gave almost as good accuracy as dive bombing and the He 177 entered service without dive bombing capability but with serious issues.
The Germans needed too many things to come together at the same time and they often came late. The bomb sights may have been under development for quite some time and bomber procurement planned accordingly. But the good bomb sights and good power turrets come late for the germans, 1942 is too late to START issuing/using such items for the Germans as it takes months if not year to get large numbers in service.


German mass production of transports aircraft is not adequate to the task.
1 Ju 52, too short ranged, to slow, too fuel efficient. Has good STOL and is durable. Better than nothing.
2 Fw 200 transport is produced in inadequate numbers (200) and being misused in any case as a maritime reconnaissance bomber.
3 The Ju 290 is also produced in inadequate number (70 or so) and is also being misused as a maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
4 The Ju 252 has good performance but is cancelled in favour of the underpowered Ju 352 which also ends up in token production and has poor performance.
5 Arado Ar 232. Incredible STOL capability but not produced in significant numbers.
6 He 111 is used as a transport is good and is fast enough to operate in dangerous airspace but lacks volume.
7 Siebel Si 204, about 1200 were produced. They could carry 1650kg and had a range of 1100 miles but seem to have been more of a passenger transport.
8 Gotha Go 244, few produced, vulnerable to anti aircraft fire.

Most, if not all of these come too late, again, starting to equip the air transport units in 1942 is too late. It doesn't matter how wonderful a design is in 1943 if you needed large numbers in 1941 and 1942.
Any plane using BMW 801 engines in 1941 to be a viable transport was in deep trouble.
 
3: We need more Condors. They're transports and recon and ship killers.
What about regular transports? More and earlier Junkers Ju 52, Ju 90, Ju 252, Arado Ar 232, and Messerschmitt Me 323 might have made a difference. In particular, with its aft ramp and greater payload vs. the Ju 52, the Junkers Ju 252 looks useful.

Ju290-3s.jpg
 
Had by Dec 1940 Hitler, the general staff and RLM been fully aware of the size of the Soviet forces and their production capacity once war was declared, how could the Luftwaffe be better prepared for Barbarossa? The RLM and Luftwaffe has six months to sort out a plan.

In my opinion, any "better" plan of RLM and LW makes sense only if the German economy goes on a total war footing immediately, in Dec 1940.
Otherwise, the Luftwaffe machine will run out of steam in winter 1941/42 as in real life, even with better equipment or smarter tactic.
 
Companies like Junkers used no slave labour.

I noticed the Disagree flag, perhaps this might jog your memory.

Taken from A Broad Field - Tempelhof Airport and its history by Prof Dr Andreas Nachama et al (Siftung Topographie des Terrors, Berlin, 2019)

Under the heading Armaments Industry and Forced Labour is the following:

"The workshops of Deutsche Lufthansa AG and the Bremen aircraft manufacturer "Weser" Flugzeugbau GmbH began operations in winter 1939/1940. In 1940, both companies began using foreign workers, mostly forced laborers. Approximately 3,000 of these workers lived in barrack camps on the airfield under degrading conditions. Others were accommodated in shared housing outside the complex. As of January 1941, prisoners of war and Berlin Jews were also forced to work on the airport grounds. The living conditions of the forced laborers were determined by the racist Nazi ideology and varied depending on the prisoners' origins."

"During World War Two, "Weser" Fluzeugbau became one of the most important manufacturers for the Luftwaffe. Its main product was the Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber (Stuka). Of the 5,215 Ju 87s produced in total by Weser, approximately 2,000 were assembled at Tempelhof."

Distortions of history begin in the most incongruous ways.
 
I noticed the Disagree flag, perhaps this might jog your memory.

Taken from A Broad Field - Tempelhof Airport and its history by Prof Dr Andreas Nachama et al (Siftung Topographie des Terrors, Berlin, 2019)

Under the heading Armaments Industry and Forced Labour is the following:

"The workshops of Deutsche Lufthansa AG and the Bremen aircraft manufacturer "Weser" Flugzeugbau GmbH began operations in winter 1939/1940. In 1940, both companies began using foreign workers, mostly forced laborers. Approximately 3,000 of these workers lived in barrack camps on the airfield under degrading conditions. Others were accommodated in shared housing outside the complex. As of January 1941, prisoners of war and Berlin Jews were also forced to work on the airport grounds. The living conditions of the forced laborers were determined by the racist Nazi ideology and varied depending on the prisoners' origins."

"During World War Two, "Weser" Fluzeugbau became one of the most important manufacturers for the Luftwaffe. Its main product was the Junkers Ju 87 dive bomber (Stuka). Of the 5,215 Ju 87s produced in total by Weser, approximately 2,000 were assembled at Tempelhof."

Distortions of history begin in the most incongruous ways.
It seems no one did use slave labour, they were always used by "someone else" that is why Germany had a "labour shortage".
 

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