ICBM & Bomber Questions

[Zipper730]

I was thinking of something regarding ICBMs. There was a program called MX-774 which was for the ultimate goal of an ICBM with a range of 5000 miles with a 5000 pound payload and a CEP within a mile. While it ultimately became the Atlas, it was all but cancelled in the lead-up to the Korean War, then revived at a later date.

I'm curious how much more quickly it could have been developed if it hadn't been cancelled, and what effect this would have had on bomber development.

michaelmaltby SaparotRob T tyrodtom

 

[tyrodtom]

The final version of the Atlas, the f, took 10 minutes to fuel after the decision to launch was made.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer .
I t could be stored with the kerosene, but the LOX could only be put in when a launch decision was made.
The earlier versions took even longer, they were stored horizontal, and had to be raised to the vertical to launch.
Not a real answer if the Soviets launched a first strike.

How much warning could NORAD give in , say, 1964 ?
If the missile sites were targeted, it's not likely any, or many , could have launched before their launch sites were destroyed.
If they had been developed earlier, would that have changed the time required to launch ?
Even the final version was too slow to launch.
Liquid fueled missiles, as we developed them, were not the answer to a Soviet first strike scenario.

 

[SaparotRob]

I'm not at all familiar with this topic. I'm now aware of a problem I didn't know existed with American deterence.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I'm curious how much more quickly it could have been developed if it hadn't been cancelled, and what effect this would have had on bomber development.

I think it would have been something of a "back burner" project, intended for the distant future, at least until Sputnik in October 1957 lit a fire under the space race. The fine tuned technologies to make an effective ICBM just weren't a priority item until the space race burst upon the scene, as the technology was going into manned aircraft.

How much warning could NORAD give in , say, 1964 ?
If the missile sites were targeted, it's not likely any, or many , could have launched before their launch sites were destroyed.

BMEWS went fully operational (if somewhat porous) in 1964, so roughly 10 to 25 minutes, depending on target and trajectory. That is, if the BMEWS sites weren't taken out first from behind.

The final version of the Atlas, the f, took 10 minutes to fuel after the decision to launch was made.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer .

We had a cluster of Atlas silos dispersed around Plattsburgh AFB, several of them in Vermont. Given the hardness of the sites and their dispersal distances, they would each have to be individually targeted, as even a 50 megaton MOAB couldn't have reliably neutralized them all. The state of the Soviet rocket forces was likely not up to that task in 1964 vs the entire US land based deterrent. And by then US SSBNs were deployed and Redfleet ASW was not anywhere near countering them.

 

[Zipper730]

The final version of the Atlas, the f, took 10 minutes to fuel after the decision to launch was made.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer.

I had a hunch it could be stored with RP-1.

The earlier versions took even longer, they were stored horizontal, and had to be raised to the vertical to launch.

Actually, the first operational Atlas was the Atlas-D, and it was kind of an emergency capability configuration. There were several different configurations built which involved a coffin storage for three missiles with the initially designed guidance system (radio-command for initial phase followed by INS for the remainder of the flight), which was used on the Titan I as well. To avoid redundancy, the same radio-command system was used for all 3 missiles. The design left a lot to be desired as the coffins were probably not adequately hardened but also so close together that they'd probably all get simultaneously taken out.

The Atlas-E/-F used INS only and, lacking the need for radio-command guidance, only had one missile per site (something that greatly reduced the size of the missile combat crew from 12-15 to 5).

How much warning could NORAD give in, say, 1964?

As I understand it, Thule was operational in September of 1960. In October there actually was a close call where one of the four radar-sectors actually picked up dozens of radar-echoes which looked consistent with dozens of ICBM's. They weren't able to ascertain a point of impact for any of the returns, the other radar-sectors showed nothing, and somebody remembered that Nikita Khruschev was at the UN (an unusual time to launch a nuclear attack). Fortunately, it was all caused by the moon (I'm surprised the radar system didn't realize the radar echoes were coming from 240000 miles out) and a stand down was ordered before anything could happen.

If the missile sites were targeted, it's not likely any, or many, could have launched before their launch sites were destroyed.

It would appear that an ICBM would take between 22-35 minutes to reach their targets from the US to USSR or vice-versa. I figure about a third of that time would have expired by the time the radar would have detected the missile, I have no idea how long it'd take for the message to go from NORAD up the chain of command to SAC, the President & NCA to authorize a launch, and then from there you need to transmit orders, have those orders authenticated, then 15 minutes to ready the missiles and send them off.

I'm not sure if they had a system whereby they could ready the crews for launch without issuing the launch command so everything would be ready when the actual launch order was given: That would widen the margins a bit, and they would eventually do this -- it actually happened back in November of 1979. Apparently somebody put a simulation tape in, and somehow put it up on the main display by accident (it displayed a simulated first strike). The missile crews were being readied up for launch and the keys were actually inserted into the switches.

Liquid fueled missiles, as we developed them, were not the answer to a Soviet first strike scenario.

Well, in 1946 there were a number of projects on the drawing boards: One was a missile based on a B-29 (Banshee), there was the Snark, MX-774 (cancelled), and a few others.

As for the liquid propellant, it really depends on what propellant you use: The Titan II used storable propellant.

I think it would have been something of a "back burner" project, intended for the distant future, at least until Sputnik in October 1957 lit a fire under the space race.

I guess we were so caught off guard because we figured the Soviets were so backwards and yet they beat us. They actually were often technically behind us, but they were single-minded in their pursuit.

 

[tyrodtom]

Read up on the Titan II, it depends on your definition of storable propellants.
The two fuels would combust on contact, and both fuels gave off fumes that killed when breathed .
Accident waiting to happen, as it is called, and it did happen.

One accident caused a entire Titan II to exit it's silo thru the closed cover ( that weighed 750 tons) and deposit the warhead outside.
This accident caused by a dropped 8 lb socket, fell 80 feet , and knocked a hole in the fuel tank.
Once the fuel tank emptied beyond a certain point, it wasn't strong enough to support all the tons above it.
When the missile collapsed, the two components got together.
Another version is a Airman was ordered to turn on a exhaust fan, sparks from the electric motor set off the fumes.
I doubt that second version, I started my bodywork career in 1973, exhaust fans in paint booths even then had sealed motors, so as not to set off flammable fumes. Doubtful that a Titan II silo would have any less .

Only the warhead's safeguards prevented a nuclear explosion.

 

[Zipper730]

Read up on the Titan II, it depends on your definition of storable propellants.

They could be stored in the missile for extended periods. While the nitrogen tetroxide boils at 70-degrees (F), the silo was generally kept around 60-degrees, which is a bit chilly for my taste, but within human tolerances (the temperature).

Those compounds weren't safe, however.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One accident caused a entire Titan II to exit it's silo thru the closed cover ( that weighed 750 tons) and deposit the warhead outside.
This accident caused by a dropped 8 lb socket, fell 80 feet , and knocked a hole in the fuel tank.
Once the fuel tank emptied beyond a certain point, it wasn't strong enough to support all the tons above it.
When the missile collapsed, the two components got together.

1979, Arkansas, right?

 

[tyrodtom]

Arkansas, yes. 1980.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Arkansas, yes. 1980.

Thanks. I remember hearing about it at the time, and my wonderment at the fact that an ICBM that could fly thousands of miles in thirty minutes after a sudden launch being scuppered by such a simple manual cause. Of course, this was almost a decade before I joined the AF and learned what FOD can do to high-tech stuff.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I guess we were so caught off guard because we figured the Soviets were so backwards and yet they beat us. They actually were often technically behind us, but they were single-minded in their pursuit.

The Soviets relied, as did we, on the captured Germans from the WWII V2 program to power the missile programs. Our Germans found that the interlocking and supporting processes necessary for their projects were not too difficult to come by, as the US had at least a broad technological base, but also unfortunately lacked a sense of urgency. The Soviet Germans were not so lucky. It took a national crusade to develop the supporting processes and materials, which transpired invisibly to us due to our intelligence ineptitude and a lack of respect for Soviet capabilities.

 

[nuuumannn]

It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer .
I t could be stored with the kerosene, but the LOX could only be put in when a launch decision was made.
The earlier versions took even longer, they were stored horizontal, and had to be raised to the vertical to launch.
Not a real answer if the Soviets launched a first strike.

Yup, interesting missile, the Convair Atlas was designed quite differently to other rockets at the time as standing upright without fuel or some form of gaseous substance on board it could not support its own weight. The rocket had to be kept in a special jig if not fuelled because of this and to maintain its shape, i.e. to stop it collapsing in on itself it had to be pressurised with nitrogen, even during horizontal storage and/or transportation. Part of the problem with the time it took to fuel was because LOx boils off, so it can't be stored in the rocket and the nitrogen had to be purged before fuelling.

This was done for lightness, the likes of von Braun being accused of building rockets like bridges because of the internal structure, but to achieve lightness, which is vitally important because it enables a greater payload weight for a given loaded weight at a given thrust output, Convair designed the Atlas to rely on pressurisation of the fuel tanks for structural load bearing, which meant they required support when not fuelled. The British Blue Streak rocket was the same, and possibly as a result of the ground work done by Convair was a more durable design and was able to be pressure refuelled in shorter time than 10 minutes, the idea being that Britain is a lot closer to the USSR than the USA. Warning time was given at 4 minutes.

 

[Zipper730]

The Soviets relied, as did we, on the captured Germans from the WWII V2 program to power the missile programs. Our Germans found that the interlocking and supporting processes necessary for their projects were not too difficult to come by, as the US had at least a broad technological base, but also unfortunately lacked a sense of urgency.

Why was this? I found the slow development of MX-774 to be unusual and, while there were budgetary shortages: It stands to reason there were some programs that could have been cancelled (There was one proposal that used B-29's as cruise missiles: It seemed a rather unnecessary).

Yup, interesting missile, the Convair Atlas was designed quite differently to other rockets at the time as standing upright without fuel or some form of gaseous substance on board it could not support its own weight.

The idea was actually inspired by a party-balloon. The idea was to avoid the need for multi-stage while still being adequately light, though it came with serious penalties.

This was done for lightness, the likes of von Braun being accused of building rockets like bridges because of the internal structure

I never knew he was accused of that.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Why was this? I found the slow development of MX-774 to be unusual and, while there were budgetary shortages: It stands to reason there were some programs that could have been cancelled (There was one proposal that used B-29's as cruise missiles: It seemed a rather unnecessary).

This was for a number of reasons. By 1945, Americans had had their fill of war and wanted to not worry about military stuff for awhile. It took a while for the seriousness of the Soviet nuclear threat to settle in, and when it did, the response was to advance the technology of manned aircraft and defensive (SAM) missiles. The existence of V2 technology tended to be seen as a novelty rather than a blueprint for a strategic deterrent weapon, and the existence and threat level of the Soviet missile program was unknown until Sputnik burst upon the scene.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

As I understand it, Thule was operational in September of 1960.

Thule was the first BMEWS site to go live with its primary radar, in 1960, but wasn't fully functional with trajectory analysis and target prediction features until about the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. (might have been a factor in NK's decision to negotiate rather than force the issue)The entire network of stations wasn't fully operational until 1964.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

One accident caused a entire Titan II to exit it's silo thru the closed cover ( that weighed 750 tons) and deposit the warhead outside.
This accident caused by a dropped 8 lb socket, fell 80 feet , and knocked a hole in the fuel tank.
Once the fuel tank emptied beyond a certain point, it wasn't strong enough to support all the tons above it.
When the missile collapsed, the two components got together.

1979, Arkansas, right?

Arkansas, yes. 1980.

Damascus, AR, September 18 1980. The Damascus accident is described in elaborate detail in Eric Schlosser's book, "Command and Control", an excellent read which details nuclear weapons development and issues throughout the cold war.

 

[nuuumannn]

The idea was actually inspired by a party-balloon.

Perhaps a more aeronautically minded comparison? The non-rigid airship is known as a pressure ship for that very reason...

I never knew he was accused of that.

I doubt "accused" is the right phrase, I suspect joked about is probably more accurate a description.

 

[Zipper730]

This was for a number of reasons. By 1945, Americans had had their fill of war and wanted to not worry about military stuff for awhile.

That makes sense. That said, there were other missiles under development including cruise and ballistic designs (Hermes was one). There is a part of me that suspects that cruise missiles might have been seen as an easier development because they were closer to aircraft autopilots.

 

[nuuumannn]

There is a part of me that suspects that cruise missiles might have been seen as an easier development because they were closer to aircraft autopilots.

Very much so, you avoid the whole space thing altogether. When these missiles were under development, regular space rockets were not a thing and there was a lot of guesswork around how these things would behave in space and particularly during re-entry, resulting in lots of sounding rockets flying lots of research missions simply because so little was known about this stuff. How was a warhead going to behave as it re-enters the atmosphere? Is it going to break up under the stresses and temps? What of accuracy? what kind of guidance system is going to work to place the rocket final stage where it's supposed to be to release the warhead at the right place and time up that high above the earth's surface?

Cruise missiles by contrast were easy money compared to space rockets. If the Germans could build the Fi 103 in the early 40s (which was in fact a relatively crude design that any country with a reasonably able aircraft industry in the 1940s could have built), then the more sophisticated and technologically advanced post war US industry could build better version ten or so years later.

 

[Zipper730]

Very much so, you avoid the whole space thing altogether. When these missiles were under development, regular space rockets were not a thing and there was a lot of guesswork around how these things would behave in space and particularly during re-entry, resulting in lots of sounding rockets flying lots of research missions simply because so little was known about this stuff. How was a warhead going to behave as it re-enters the atmosphere? Is it going to break up under the stresses and temps? What of accuracy? what kind of guidance system is going to work to place the rocket final stage where it's supposed to be to release the warhead at the right place and time up that high above the earth's surface?

While I know that Von Braun ended up with ABMA, was his knowledge passed along to the USAF & USN right off the bat?