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I think it would have been something of a "back burner" project, intended for the distant future, at least until Sputnik in October 1957 lit a fire under the space race. The fine tuned technologies to make an effective ICBM just weren't a priority item until the space race burst upon the scene, as the technology was going into manned aircraft.I'm curious how much more quickly it could have been developed if it hadn't been cancelled, and what effect this would have had on bomber development.
BMEWS went fully operational (if somewhat porous) in 1964, so roughly 10 to 25 minutes, depending on target and trajectory. That is, if the BMEWS sites weren't taken out first from behind.How much warning could NORAD give in , say, 1964 ?
If the missile sites were targeted, it's not likely any, or many , could have launched before their launch sites were destroyed.
We had a cluster of Atlas silos dispersed around Plattsburgh AFB, several of them in Vermont. Given the hardness of the sites and their dispersal distances, they would each have to be individually targeted, as even a 50 megaton MOAB couldn't have reliably neutralized them all. The state of the Soviet rocket forces was likely not up to that task in 1964 vs the entire US land based deterrent. And by then US SSBNs were deployed and Redfleet ASW was not anywhere near countering them.The final version of the Atlas, the f, took 10 minutes to fuel after the decision to launch was made.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer .
I had a hunch it could be stored with RP-1.The final version of the Atlas, the f, took 10 minutes to fuel after the decision to launch was made.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer.
Actually, the first operational Atlas was the Atlas-D, and it was kind of an emergency capability configuration. There were several different configurations built which involved a coffin storage for three missiles with the initially designed guidance system (radio-command for initial phase followed by INS for the remainder of the flight), which was used on the Titan I as well. To avoid redundancy, the same radio-command system was used for all 3 missiles. The design left a lot to be desired as the coffins were probably not adequately hardened but also so close together that they'd probably all get simultaneously taken out.The earlier versions took even longer, they were stored horizontal, and had to be raised to the vertical to launch.
As I understand it, Thule was operational in September of 1960. In October there actually was a close call where one of the four radar-sectors actually picked up dozens of radar-echoes which looked consistent with dozens of ICBM's. They weren't able to ascertain a point of impact for any of the returns, the other radar-sectors showed nothing, and somebody remembered that Nikita Khruschev was at the UN (an unusual time to launch a nuclear attack). Fortunately, it was all caused by the moon (I'm surprised the radar system didn't realize the radar echoes were coming from 240000 miles out) and a stand down was ordered before anything could happen.How much warning could NORAD give in, say, 1964?
It would appear that an ICBM would take between 22-35 minutes to reach their targets from the US to USSR or vice-versa. I figure about a third of that time would have expired by the time the radar would have detected the missile, I have no idea how long it'd take for the message to go from NORAD up the chain of command to SAC, the President & NCA to authorize a launch, and then from there you need to transmit orders, have those orders authenticated, then 15 minutes to ready the missiles and send them off.If the missile sites were targeted, it's not likely any, or many, could have launched before their launch sites were destroyed.
Well, in 1946 there were a number of projects on the drawing boards: One was a missile based on a B-29 (Banshee), there was the Snark, MX-774 (cancelled), and a few others.Liquid fueled missiles, as we developed them, were not the answer to a Soviet first strike scenario.
I guess we were so caught off guard because we figured the Soviets were so backwards and yet they beat us. They actually were often technically behind us, but they were single-minded in their pursuit.I think it would have been something of a "back burner" project, intended for the distant future, at least until Sputnik in October 1957 lit a fire under the space race.
They could be stored in the missile for extended periods. While the nitrogen tetroxide boils at 70-degrees (F), the silo was generally kept around 60-degrees, which is a bit chilly for my taste, but within human tolerances (the temperature).Read up on the Titan II, it depends on your definition of storable propellants.
One accident caused a entire Titan II to exit it's silo thru the closed cover ( that weighed 750 tons) and deposit the warhead outside.
This accident caused by a dropped 8 lb socket, fell 80 feet , and knocked a hole in the fuel tank.
Once the fuel tank emptied beyond a certain point, it wasn't strong enough to support all the tons above it.
When the missile collapsed, the two components got together.
Arkansas, yes. 1980.
The Soviets relied, as did we, on the captured Germans from the WWII V2 program to power the missile programs. Our Germans found that the interlocking and supporting processes necessary for their projects were not too difficult to come by, as the US had at least a broad technological base, but also unfortunately lacked a sense of urgency. The Soviet Germans were not so lucky. It took a national crusade to develop the supporting processes and materials, which transpired invisibly to us due to our intelligence ineptitude and a lack of respect for Soviet capabilities.I guess we were so caught off guard because we figured the Soviets were so backwards and yet they beat us. They actually were often technically behind us, but they were single-minded in their pursuit.
It was a liquid fueled missile, kerosene with a liquid oxygen oxidizer .
I t could be stored with the kerosene, but the LOX could only be put in when a launch decision was made.
The earlier versions took even longer, they were stored horizontal, and had to be raised to the vertical to launch.
Not a real answer if the Soviets launched a first strike.
Why was this? I found the slow development of MX-774 to be unusual and, while there were budgetary shortages: It stands to reason there were some programs that could have been cancelled (There was one proposal that used B-29's as cruise missiles: It seemed a rather unnecessary).The Soviets relied, as did we, on the captured Germans from the WWII V2 program to power the missile programs. Our Germans found that the interlocking and supporting processes necessary for their projects were not too difficult to come by, as the US had at least a broad technological base, but also unfortunately lacked a sense of urgency.
The idea was actually inspired by a party-balloon. The idea was to avoid the need for multi-stage while still being adequately light, though it came with serious penalties.Yup, interesting missile, the Convair Atlas was designed quite differently to other rockets at the time as standing upright without fuel or some form of gaseous substance on board it could not support its own weight.
I never knew he was accused of that.This was done for lightness, the likes of von Braun being accused of building rockets like bridges because of the internal structure
This was for a number of reasons. By 1945, Americans had had their fill of war and wanted to not worry about military stuff for awhile. It took a while for the seriousness of the Soviet nuclear threat to settle in, and when it did, the response was to advance the technology of manned aircraft and defensive (SAM) missiles. The existence of V2 technology tended to be seen as a novelty rather than a blueprint for a strategic deterrent weapon, and the existence and threat level of the Soviet missile program was unknown until Sputnik burst upon the scene.Why was this? I found the slow development of MX-774 to be unusual and, while there were budgetary shortages: It stands to reason there were some programs that could have been cancelled (There was one proposal that used B-29's as cruise missiles: It seemed a rather unnecessary).
Thule was the first BMEWS site to go live with its primary radar, in 1960, but wasn't fully functional with trajectory analysis and target prediction features until about the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. (might have been a factor in NK's decision to negotiate rather than force the issue)The entire network of stations wasn't fully operational until 1964.As I understand it, Thule was operational in September of 1960.
One accident caused a entire Titan II to exit it's silo thru the closed cover ( that weighed 750 tons) and deposit the warhead outside.
This accident caused by a dropped 8 lb socket, fell 80 feet , and knocked a hole in the fuel tank.
Once the fuel tank emptied beyond a certain point, it wasn't strong enough to support all the tons above it.
When the missile collapsed, the two components got together.
1979, Arkansas, right?
Damascus, AR, September 18 1980. The Damascus accident is described in elaborate detail in Eric Schlosser's book, "Command and Control", an excellent read which details nuclear weapons development and issues throughout the cold war.Arkansas, yes. 1980.
The idea was actually inspired by a party-balloon.
I never knew he was accused of that.
That makes sense. That said, there were other missiles under development including cruise and ballistic designs (Hermes was one). There is a part of me that suspects that cruise missiles might have been seen as an easier development because they were closer to aircraft autopilots.This was for a number of reasons. By 1945, Americans had had their fill of war and wanted to not worry about military stuff for awhile.
There is a part of me that suspects that cruise missiles might have been seen as an easier development because they were closer to aircraft autopilots.
While I know that Von Braun ended up with ABMA, was his knowledge passed along to the USAF & USN right off the bat?Very much so, you avoid the whole space thing altogether. When these missiles were under development, regular space rockets were not a thing and there was a lot of guesswork around how these things would behave in space and particularly during re-entry, resulting in lots of sounding rockets flying lots of research missions simply because so little was known about this stuff. How was a warhead going to behave as it re-enters the atmosphere? Is it going to break up under the stresses and temps? What of accuracy? what kind of guidance system is going to work to place the rocket final stage where it's supposed to be to release the warhead at the right place and time up that high above the earth's surface?