Ideal Luftwaffe starting 1/1/1936

[tomo pauk]

Distance between Smolensk and Sverdlovsk/Yekatarinburg (located in Urals) is circa 1110 miles, or circa 1700 km. Ie. about the distance between London and Brest-Litovsk, on today's Polish-Belarus border. So any bomber using ww2 technology will be ill able to undertake the task (bar B-29?). From Smolensk to Kuybishev/Samara is 740+ miles (1190 km), comparable with distance between London and Breslau/Wroclaw in today's Poland. This is feasible on ww2 technology, but it's a long shot indeed, demanding impeccable navigational piloting skills. Your, or anybody's escort fighters might not be up to the job on such a distance?
From Rostov to Baku is ~690 miles; the oil facilities should burn easier than machine tools? In case your bombers are damaged, the Turkey might offer a safe place for crash landing?
Sevastpol to Tbilisi, in case you aim for the aircraft factory based there, is 600 miles. Worth a try?

Installing the Jumo 213, especially the two stage engines, it's a thing of distant future. If at all feasible on the Fw-187, due to increased weight vs. DB-601/605? I'd rather have the really powerful engines on the Fw-190/Ta-152. Those two were capable to carry 1000+ L of fuel internally (264+ US gal, ie. like the P-51 with fuselage tank). Should give 700 mile escort radius?
3000 L is 792 US gals (almost twice as the late P-38s), I doubt that such amount of fuel was ever envisioned for the Fw-187? Better bet would be 2000 L internally and 2 big drop tanks?

 

[wiking85]

IIRC the He177A5 could do 2800 miles (not kilometers) with 200kg of bombs.
Heinkel He 177 data

 

[Shortround6]

You also have to consider that the Germans did NOT have unlimited resources and basically every 4 engine bomber is two twins NOT built. Some savings in aircrew. Granted the Germans did not get a lot out of the 1170 or so HE 177s they did build and perhaps switching from coupled engines to 4 separate engines may have improved serviceability and availability. The Germans simply could not build anywhere the size bomber fleets the Allies did. HE 177 production was under 10% of the B-17s built. Throw in the B-24s, and about 15,000 British 4 engine bombers and wither the Germans build 1200 or 2400 isn't going to make a whole lot of difference.

 

[stona]

You also have to consider that the Germans did NOT have unlimited resources and basically every 4 engine bomber is two twins NOT built. Some savings in aircrew.

Suitable air crew for a bomber force is an important consideration. The RAF was able to draw educated young men from the universities of the entire 'Old Commonwealth' and then some.
Nearly one in five was Canadian and there were substantial numbers of Aussies, Kiwis and South Africans as well as many from other nations (Caribbean nations are often shamefully overlooked) combined with those from occupied European nations (Dutch, Poles Czechs, French,Norwegians etc)
It was also able to train them in the relative safety of countries far from the conflict. Such luxuries were not afforded the Luftwaffe.
Cheers
Steve

 

[DonL]

From my technical understanding it was impossible to put more or much more internal fuel to the FW 187.

From Mr. Hermanns Book the Jumo driven FW 187 A0 (11,20m lenght) got 1100Liter, 2 x 245 Liter in wing tanks and 620Liter in a fulsage tank.

At the FW 187 C (DB 605) version the fulsage was lenghten from 11,20m to 12,45m, to my opinion we had also seen this upgrade with the DB 601 and the fulsage tank got 880 Liter and the wing tanks were shortened to the bigger engines to 2 x 210 Liter.

At best will I can't see where the FW 187 could get a significant internal fuel upgrade, perhaps except as a single seat fighter. (100-200Liter?)

To have an a/c with 2000Liter internal fuel is to my opinion to construct a total new a/c but not an a/c which has much in common with the FW 187.

To keep in mind an a/c must have a controllable/good flight characteristics, you can't put fuel randomly anywhere to the a/c and especially as much as possible.

 

[tomo pauk]

IIRC the He177A5 could do 2800 miles (not kilometers) with 200kg of bombs.
Heinkel He 177 data

I've went through some data there, the most believable would be the GL/C-E2 blatt (sheet) for the He-177A-3/R-2, A-5 and A-6. Seems like the A-3/R-2 was good for range, with allowances, for 2030 miles (3270 km) with 2000 kg of bombs. That would give the radius of under 1000 miles, with outward leg being flown at 305 km/h at 1.5 km of altitude. Not a healthiest speed or altitude
On a more realistic setting (415 km/h towards the target, flying at 5 km), it would be a range, with allowances, of 1650 miles (2660 km), or radius of 800 miles.
Calculated (theoretical?; no allowances) range of the A-6 on max continuous power would be 2600 miles (3640 km) when carrying 1000 kg of bombs, altitude of 4 km. Circa 1250 km of radius? Allowances for take off, extra fuel burn to climb to 4 km and 30 min reserve on economical cruise cut that by 10%? That would make a realistic radius of 1100-1150 miles?

Any corrections and additions are welcomed. Original table courtesy alejandro-8.

Seems like the He-177 would be quite en asset to attack Baku oil fields, since no other German aircraft could undertake that job? The good escort fighter would be a necessity.

 

[wiking85]

So the Caucasus and anything West of the Urals is fair game. That leaves Operation Eisenhammer on the table, plus an oil campaign against Baku and other oil producing areas in the USSR. Not only that, but a mining campaign in the Caspian Sea against Soviet shipping, which would interdict both oil transport and imports via Iran from the West.

 

[tomo pauk]

The aircraft factory in Saratov, producing Yak fighters, is mere 410 miles away from Rostov. Stalingrad is circa 200 miles away. Of course, one does not need 4-engined jobs to attack those.
The advent of heavy bomber might put the pressure on Soviets to invest more into high altitude fighters (undermining the Il-2 production?) and installation of heavier firepower on their fighters (cuts performance on 1200 HP fighters). Maybe the Spitfire V gets more use by Soviets?

Now about the guns. The largest caliber installed in the single engined fighters of ww2 might be the NS-45, a 45mm cannon firing a 1+ kg shell at 260-280 rpm and muzzle velocity of 780 m/s. This might be considered something of an overkill for the aircraft carrying it. Even the NS-37 was. So maybe going to the equivalent of the early post war N-37 cannon, ie. 37mm, 400 rpm, 690 m/s? Germans already have the shell, that need to be mated to the smaller casing propellant to create a 'mid-power' round. Or maybe neck-out the MK-101/103 ammo casing, arriving at maybe 35mm, for a 600-700 g shell? The MV need to be at modest value, 650-700 m/s, so the recoil and cannon's weight are not excessive.
Next smaller bracket might be taken by a cannon similar to the Soviet late war and post war 23mm cannons, that were making from 550 to 1200 rpm, depending on the design. Shell weight was 200g, cannons were firing at ~700 m/s and weighted ~40 kg. Germans might neck out the casing of 20 mm Flak to arrive on a comparable cartridge, use of electrically primed ammo will make synchronized fire easier. The resulting cannon might replace and supplant the MG-FF, 3-4 installed in the Fw-190, 1 installed in the Bf-109. Prime armament for night fighters, both in front-firing and oblique installations.
The MG-FF might use the bigger load of the ammo in the drum, like the 90 rounds drum fitted on the outer wing cannons of the Fw-190A-3 and later. Just in case the new cannons take more time than anticipated, develop the belt feed like the Japanese did? Three of these, or two + one 23mm would pack quite a punch from the Bf-109.
All of these cannons are ill suited as turret guns, so something smaller is needed. A 15 mm cannon, but not as big powerful as the MG 151. Something at 20-25 kg, ~800 rpm, 700-750 m/s?

 

[Shortround6]

Ah, no. It is 1400km from Minsk to Kazan which is well short of the Urals. it is about 1000km from Donetsk to Atyrau at the north end of Caspian Sea. Or 1280km from Donetsk to Baku.

How far behind the lines to want your "strategic" bomber bases to keep them from being attacked by the VVS?

This web site makes it real easy to find distances between cities. : Distance.to - Distance calculator worldwide

Please remember that "operational" radius is often around 1/3 of range not 1/2.

Mining operations, to be successful, require placing mines in a shipping channel not just dumped into a large body of water.

 

[wiking85]

There was the pre-war Soviet airbase at Mariupol or even in Crimea for souther operations. Smolensk was viable as an airbase; the German air defense on the Eastern front before Kursk 1943 was pretty solid, so in 1942 they are going to be able to defend a closer to the front airbase pretty readily, given their radar advantage; leading up to and during Kursk the Soviets tried to hit German airfields near the front and got slaughtered in the process. It wasn't until the turn west after Kursk by the Luftwaffe that the Germans lost control of the skies over their airbases in the East.

 

[stona]

Unfortunately, whilst a strategic bombing force would be a lovely thing to have by 1942, I have to inject a dash of reality. For this to be achieved the entire balance of the Luftwaffe would have to have been changed from at least the mid 1930s onwards. This would require a completely different doctrine to that actually employed.
If you have your strategic bombers, do you still have the medium bombers and dive bombers that made such a huge contribution to your early 'Blitzkrieg' successes? The Luftwaffe as it was balanced in 1939/40 was almost the ideal tool, given the technical restraints of the time, to carry out the sort of operations for which it had been designed.
The pot is only so deep and you can't have it all. You might reconfigure your Luftwaffe differently only to fall flat on your face in France, 1940.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

Unfortunately, whilst a strategic bombing force would be a lovely thing to have by 1942, I have to inject a dash of reality. For this to be achieved the entire balance of the Luftwaffe would have to have been changed from at least the mid 1930s onwards. This would require a completely different doctrine to that actually employed.
If you have your strategic bombers, do you still have the medium bombers and dive bombers that made such a huge contribution to your early 'Blitzkrieg' successes? The Luftwaffe as it was balanced in 1939/40 was almost the ideal tool, given the technical restraints of the time, to carry out the sort of operations for which it had been designed.
The pot is only so deep and you can't have it all. You might reconfigure your Luftwaffe differently only to fall flat on your face in France, 1940.
Cheers
Steve

Considering that in the very best case scenario the strategic bombers don't enter production until mid-1941 France in 1940 would not be affected. The He111 acted as strategic/operational bombers in that operation. Do17s and He111s made up the vast majority of bombers in service in 1940 historically, with limited Ju88s in service as only 67 have been produced in 1939 and there were only 5 months worth of serious production by the time of the Battle of France:
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle
Even Ju87 service was limited by the time of France. About 341 Stukas were serviceable by May 10 1940. Of the two dive bombing aircraft in service at the time there were only about 4-500 hundred operational. That was out of a bomber force of over 2000. So historically the dive bombers were about ~22% of the bomber force of single and double engine bombers in France. If we have a strategic bomber force under construction and development, it has no effect on France whatsoever, as the dive bombing Ju87 would still be in service, as it was conceived of pre-Udet and didn't affect strategi doctrine, rather enhanced it, as there was a place for it in the balanced doctrine. Remember that the Ju87 was conceived of as an extra accurate operational/strategic bomber rather than a CAS aircraft. The lack of a dive bombing Ju88 (or rather glide bombing to as steep a degree as the Ju88 wasn't a true 90 degree diver AFAIK due to frame buckling) may make an impact, but considering that it would be available in larger numbers earlier without the dive modifications, I don't think that that would have a significant effect on the events of France.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_88#Operational_history

Some 133 Ju 88s were pressed into the Blitzkrieg, but very high combat losses and accidents forced a quick withdrawal from action to re-train crews to fly this very high-performance aircraft. Some crews were reported to be more scared of the Ju 88 than the enemy, and requested a transfer to an He 111 unit.[29] By this time, major performance deficiencies in the A-1 led to an all-out effort in a major design rework. The outcome was a longer, 20.08 m (65 ft 10 1⁄2 in) wingspan, from extended rounded wing tips that had already been standardised on the A-4 version, that was deemed needed for all A-1s; thus the A-5 was born. Surviving A-1s were modified as quickly as possible, with new wings to A-5 specifications.

All of this is possible before France if the Ju88 was actually in service pre-Poland and these deficiencies remedied before the BoF starts.

 

[Denniss]

He 177 data table:
1st row is with almost full internal fuel and external loads, second row with medium fuel load and third row with max internal fuel. The second/third rows are of aircraft with reduced performance due to attached engine flame dampers.
The calculated(?) ranges obviously miss fuel reserve, it was quite common to have 15-30% more range from reserve fuel (reserved for combat situation requiring higher engine settings)

 

[stona]

Considering that in the very best case scenario the strategic bombers don't enter production until mid-1941 France in 1940 would not be affected. .

This is 'what iffery'. If the Germans decide to develop a strategic bombing force in the 1930 it would require a change in doctrine which would mitigate against the development of the large medium bomber and dive bombing forces. There might be no dive bombers at all!
In your scenario the parallel development of a large four engine bomber force has no impact on the historical development of the Luftwaffe. This seems highly improbable to me. There are only limited resources and you can't have everything. You seem to be simply adding on one of the most resource intensive (in men and materiel as well as the manufacturing base) and expensive elements of any air force (strategic bombers) to the Luftwaffe at no cost to other developments whatsoever.
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

This is 'what iffery'. If the Germans decide to develop a strategic bombing force in the 1930 it would require a change in doctrine which would mitigate against the development of the large medium bomber and dive bombing forces. There might be no dive bombers at all!
In your scenario the parallel development of a large four engine bomber force has no impact on the historical development of the Luftwaffe. This seems highly improbable to me. There are only limited resources and you can't have everything. You seem to be simply adding on one of the most resource intensive (in men and materiel as well as the manufacturing base) and expensive elements of any air force (strategic bombers) to the Luftwaffe at no cost to other developments whatsoever.
Cheers
Steve

No, the Ju87 was entering service before Walter Wever's death and they had a balanced doctrine. Dive bombing had a place in their doctrine, as it was an operational first doctrine. Until the He177 is ready for production, they have no choice but to build up their existing designs of bombers, which means dive bombers for precision operational/strategic bombing against Poland, France, and Czechoslovakia (their planned enemies), while having a medium bomber fleet to conduct level bomber against defended targets where dive bombing would be inappropriate.
I recommend reading this book out the development of LW doctrine:
The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940: James S. Corum: 9780700609628: Amazon.com: Books

Strategic bombing doesn't mitigate dive bombing, as US doctrine demonstrated. Medium bombers fill the operational/strategic role until the heavy bombers are ready, so doctrine is pretty much as per OTL, as CAS was actually pretty low on the LWs priorities in France and Poland. They were developing the He177 throughout this period too, as it had entered testing in 1939 after a major dive bombing redesign under Udet in 1937-38. Major resources were already being spent on the Bomber A project including having the Schwechat factory in Austria built; it sat idle in 1941 when it was supposed to be producing strategic bombers, but the He177 wasn't approved until 1942 historically. Strategic bombing development change very little from the historical timeline other than we avoid the dive bombing development and the coupled engine development, both of which if anything claimed extra resource over the four engine, non-diving version we are suggesting here, as it required major redesigns, which were funded by the RLM, extra materials per bomber due to the strengthening of the airframe, and increased the complexity of the aircraft. That doesn't factor in all the extra testing that historically needed to happen, major redesigns, including the four engine He177B that was built and tested starting in 1943. All the lost prototypes and production versions due to engine fires cost a lot of time and resources too; the hand built prototypes weren't cheap and all the coupled DB601s that were used were expensive, not to mention the design and production costs for those. Discarding the expensive dive requirement, upweighting, coupled engine project, etc. will actually cost less in this scenario than the historical investments into the Bomber A project in 1939-42.

This wasn't a zero sum issue in 1939-42 for the Bomber A due to the fact so many resources were wasted on it to make the dive requirement and coupled engines work that would have been saved otherwise. As it was the LW had a strong balanced doctrine historically anyway and made use of the technology in production when the war started, which means that anything going into the He177 won't matter to the 1939-41 campaigns until the bomber actually enters production. Otherwise all else really remains the same, except for the waste on a lot of projects that we are eliminated here (Me210, DB606, lots of other engine development issues, Ju88 and Do217 dive requirement, etc.). The major change will be a non-diving Ju88 that has a lot less production resources in this scenario due to it retaining its original design spec. It won't be delayed in service, the Do17 will be phased out in 1938 as planned, while the He111 will the be primary bomber in larger numbers thanks to prioritizing it over the Ju88 (which only had 133 units in service by May 1940 historically anyway, so more He111s will be very helpful) and the H-series over the P-series.

In this scenario then we have a stronger LW, as it will have more bombers overall, while having no outdated ones like the Do17. The Ju87 is unaffected, while the one issue that might exist is the Bf110; I'm not sure it should even be built, as a serviceable one wasn't even really ready by the time of the Polish Campaign (in limited numbers) due to the lack of powerful enough engines until the Db601 became available in enough numbers. Eliminating the He111P series would help free up DB601s for fighters, be it the Fw187 or Bf110.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France#Luftwaffe

In 1940, the Luftwaffe was a broadly based force with no constricting central doctrine, other than its resources should be used generally to support national strategy. It was flexible and it was able to carry out both operational, tactical and strategic bombing effectively. Flexibility was the Luftwaffe's strength in 1940. While Allied air forces in 1940 were tied to the support of the army, the Luftwaffe deployed its resources in a more general, operational way. It switched from air superiority missions, to medium-range interdiction, to strategic strikes, to close support duties depending on the need of the ground forces. In fact, far from it being a dedicated Panzer spearhead arm, less than 15 percent of the Luftwaffe was designed for close support of the army in 1939,[74] as this aspect was not its primary mission.[75]

Quoted books:
Buckley, John (1998 ). Air Power in the Age of Total War. UCL Press. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.
Corum, James. 'The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941' in The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan. 1995), pp. 53–76
Corum, James. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1992. ISBN 0-7006-0541-X.
Corum, James. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1997. ISBN 978-0-7006-0836-2

 

[stona]

You've still got to find the resources to develop a strategic bombing capability using a large capacity four engine bomber in the 1930s if you want it to be ready by 1941/2, presumably for operations in the East as it's already too late for meaningful operations against the UK.
This sort of force consumes immense resources and something else will have to be given up.
Where are the raw materials coming from? Where are the aircraft going to be built? Who will build them? Where are the engines coming from? Where are the crews coming from? Where is the fuel coming from? Who will support them in the field and where? etc etc
Cheers
Steve

 

[wiking85]

You've still got to find the resources to develop a strategic bombing capability using a large capacity four engine bomber in the 1930s if you want it to be ready by 1941/2, presumably for operations in the East as it's already too late for meaningful operations against the UK.
This sort of force consumes immense resources and something else will have to be given up.
Where are the raw materials coming from? Where are the aircraft going to be built? Who will build them? Where are the engines coming from? Where are the crews coming from? Where is the fuel coming from? Who will support them in the field and where? etc etc
Cheers
Steve

Again, what is different from the historical situation that needs to be given up? What extra resources are required above and beyond the historical development? All that's happening here is LESS development of the original He177. We can had the demonstrators that were supposed to be ordered for the Do19 and Ju89, of which only some of the examples were completed. If we don't produce the Bf110 then we can give up the early non-service 'practice' versions, which will be more than enough resources for these demonstrators. Otherwise the resources are the same or less than what was spent historically to get the HE177 in production by 1942.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Design_and_development
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Prototypes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel_He_177#Production

Production[edit]

Eight prototypes were completed, followed by 35 pre-production He 177 A-0s (built by Arado and Heinkel) and 130 Arado-built He 177 A-1s. The early aircraft in this batch were used for further trials, and after a brief and unhappy operational debut the remainder were also withdrawn from service. From late 1942 they were replaced by 170 He 177 A-3s and 826 A-5s, both later models having 1.60 meter longer rear fuselages and slightly lengthened engine nacelles for use with the newer DB 610 "power systems".[17]

Production of the He 177 until 30 November 1944
Version EHF [18] HWO [19] ArB [20] Total Production period
Prototypes 8 8
He 177 A-0 15 15 5 35
He 177 A-1 88 42 130 January 1942 – January 1943
He 177 A-3 217 398 615 November 1942 – June 1944
He 177 A-5 71 278 349 December 1943 – August 1944
Total 23 391 723 1,137
Note - One A-0, one A-3, and two A-5 rebuilt as He 177B prototypes from before December 1943 to July 1944.[21]

The resources were already used historically. If we don't waste resources on over production of the Ju88 we can start cutting back on the He111 production to free up early resources for the He177, but the resources were there historically and historically spent starting in 1942. The only issue is moving it up by 6 months.

Heinkel already had a factory ready to go for He177 production by mid-1941, but it sat idle waiting for the go ahead to put the aircraft into production:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel

an additional Heinkel-Süd facility in Schwechat, Austria, after the Anschluss in 1938.

Seeing as we are avoiding the Me210 disaster, there will be plenty of resources not wasted in 1941 that would be available for production of the He177 too. Then there is the historical resources spent on the He177.
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinkel-Werke_Oranienburg
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Heinkel_Flugzeugwerke

 

[stona]

So you would forego part of the He 111, and Ju 88 production. That will have repercussions later.

You'll also ditch the Me 210 and possibly the Bf 110. So the entire zerstorer/heavy fighter concept, so beloved of the RLM goes out the window and only single engine fighters are produced? What happens if your long range bombers need long range escorts?

The He 177 is a red herring. It was a deeply flawed design. As late as early 1942 Walter Blaist (responsible for He 177 engine testing at Rechlin) was still producing long lists of fundamental changes which should be made to this one aspect of the design alone. Two of his recommendations were accepted (moving the oil tank to a less dangerous position and complete redesign of the exhaust system).
Let's not mention the wing!

He 177s were built at Heinkel Rostock and Oranienberg and by Arado at Brandenburg/Neuendorf. I don't know where the Wiki info comes from but having a factory and having it set up to produce a particular type, notably a complex multi engine bomber, are two different things.

Incidentally one four engine bomber does not equate, in terms of materiel or labour, to two twins. Far from it.

Cheers

Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

If I may cut in:
Our fellow member Wiking85 is a firm proponent of the Fw-187 with DB engines, so the twin engined fighter will get built in his time line. The He-177 is just a name for a heavy bomber that, in his time line, has four separate engines and, if I get it right, has no dive bomber's capabilities.

One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.

added: here is the cost of major US combat aircraft. FWIW

 

[wiking85]

So you would forego part of the He 111, and Ju 88 production. That will have repercussions later.

You'll also ditch the Me 210 and possibly the Bf 110. So the entire zerstorer/heavy fighter concept, so beloved of the RLM goes out the window and only single engine fighters are produced? What happens if your long range bombers need long range escorts?

The He 177 is a red herring. It was a deeply flawed design. As late as early 1942 Walter Blaist (responsible for He 177 engine testing at Rechlin) was still producing long lists of fundamental changes which should be made to this one aspect of the design alone. Two of his recommendations were accepted (moving the oil tank to a less dangerous position and complete redesign of the exhaust system).
Let's not mention the wing!

He 177s were built at Heinkel Rostock and Oranienberg and by Arado at Brandenburg/Neuendorf. I don't know where the Wiki info comes from but having a factory and having it set up to produce a particular type, notably a complex multi engine bomber, are two different things.

Incidentally one four engine bomber does not equate, in terms of materiel or labour, to two twins. Far from it.

Cheers

Steve

If I may cut in:
Our fellow member Wiking85 is a firm proponent of the Fw-187 with DB engines, so the twin engined fighter will get built in his time line. The He-177 is just a name for a heavy bomber that, in his time line, has four separate engines and, if I get it right, has no dive bomber's capabilities.

One 4-engined bomber should be more expensive than two 2-engined ones, but should also haul more bombs over same range, while using less crew per bombs carried? Provided, of course, that both 2- and 4-engined designs are armed with guns, like most of ww2 aircraft.

Thanks Tomo, you took the words out of my keyboard.

Basically here is the scheme I'm envisioning:
1936:
-Bomber A with four propellor design
-Keep the Wimmer team together in the TA, and don't promote Udet. Richthofen stays in Development, while Jeschonnek gets sent to Spain (never becoming CoS, but rather replacing Richthofen as head of CAS)
-DB603 stays in development
-Bf110 cancelled (Wever wanted it cancelled along with everyone else in the RLM including Milch, Goering forced it through)
-FW187 green lit
-Ju88 V3 prototype is the basis of the Ju88 (three crew, rear gunner, two bomb hard points externally to carry up to 1 ton bombs); it stays as a level bomber with shallow dive capability (35 degrees)....later upgrade to bigger wings when combat experience proves it necessary (can't jump up development too much with hindsight)

1937:
-Jumo 222 project started on low priority, Jumo 211 remains major priority for Jumo
-no DB606 project; DB remains focused on only two engines DB601 and 603
-keep Ural Bomber prototypes as demonstrators for training and development (10 Do19s, 15 Ju89s as planned)
-keep spec for Hs129
-Beef up pilot training schools

1938:
-start planning for Ostmark engine factory upon annexation of Austria for DB603s
-finance some expansion for Jumo and DB factories (rather than building new ones)
-order Heinkel to make a Jumo 211 based version of He111 (H-series) refuse DB601 (P-series) for bombers
-when He111H is ready in late 1938 (historically when P-series was ready) order it mass produced as the main bomber, giving it priority
-phase out Do17 by end of year and order a level bombing Do217 'heavy' medium bomber with BMW 801 or DB603 engine
-keep Hs123 in production
-order KG100 formed as a full Geschwader rather than Kampfgruppe

1939:
-Ju88 based on V3 prototype should enter production in March, but will have limited resources and will be used as multirole aircraft; should be 1 Geschwader combat ready by September with another 1 forming, have a heavy fighter/strafer version ready in Kampfgruppen strength for France
-Fw187 should enter production by June 1939 and not be available for Poland, but will be ready for Norway and France (3 Geschwader by May 1940)
-upon return of the Condor Legion (March) order a naval bombing unit formed at Geschwader strength based on He111H, should be ready by end of 1939 with experience from Spain, start 2nd Geschwader forming when first is ready
-Ostmark should have completed the basic structures by the end of the year and beginning installing basic infrastructure like the power plant; tooling begins in mid-1940 and will continue through 1941
-Do26 accepted as long range naval recon aircraft, FW200 not accepted; any on hand will be used, but no more built.

By the start of the war there should be a minimum of 1200 or more He111Hs delivered as they are the main airframe in my Luftwaffe. The lack of Bf110 production saves up resources in the meantime. The Do17 and older He111s are phased out and used for training, while any Ju52s at training schools are used for the transport fleet. Ju87 production is the same as OTL.
By April 1940 the Fw187 makes it appearance over Norway with drop tanks with 1 Geschwader, while the remaining two Geschwader are saved for use over France.
The DB603 should be delivered to the He177B testing in its pre-production form, not yet production ready, but fine for testing purposes. The He177 will enter production by July/August 1941 with this engine, which will start mass production in limited quantities at Ostmark in mid-1941.

The He111H is the main bomber until 1941 when the He177 enters production, so starts sapping resources from 111 production. Ju88 remains unaffected; as soon as there are sufficient engines for both the He177 and Do217, the 217 will enter production (1942). In 1942 the Do217 and He177 starts phasing out the He111. By the end of 1943 the He111 is to be mostly phased out of production, with limited production to keep spare parts in circulation for remaining airframes in service.

When Jumo 213 is ready in 1942/3 it will be phased in to replace the 211 and all 211 engined aircraft will adapt to the 213. Also there should be some Do217s using the 213 too. He177 should test out the 213 too.

FW190C should be worked on from 1940-41 and hopefully would be in mass production in 1943. Fw190D should be worked on too. Better versions of the Fw187 are to be worked on, as should the Me109.

Older Do17s should be initially converted to night fighter variants (Do215B), rather than draw resources with continued Do17/215 production. Ju88C/G later on when production is more established.

By 1943 there should be enough high powered engines to boost performance of the Ju88, Do217, and He177, with at least 1750hp for take off. There of course will be work on the two stage supercharger version of Jumo and DB engines.

If Jumo 222 ever becomes viable phase it in in limited numbers for use either with an upgraded Do217 or He177/277. Maybe a Ju188/388.

Jet engines and airframes remain as per historical development.