If Italy is neutral what does its air force look like by Sept 1942

[swampyankee]

I explained my opinion above. It has nothing to do with German officer memoirs. The Germans in the Sahara fought at the end of a long, aggressively torpedoed line of communication. It was a great place for the British and the Americans to learn to fight them. The Kasserine Pass was nothing compared to what everyone else experienced when they first contacted the Germans.

If I am Hitler, I don't care what the Royal Navy does in the Mediterranean. The more stuff they do in the Mediterranean, the better.

For fun, try imagine the conversation that takes place between Franklin Roosevelt and George Marshall, and Stalin, after Lloyd Fredendall commands a US army corps at Stalingrad or Kursk.

Maybe he doesn't care, but the RN most certainly did. So would Raeder and Doenitz. Even Hitler would notice the easier logistics for the UK. USSR, not so much. Of course, Churchill would be unable to make fatuous comments about the "soft underbelly of Europe," not noticing the Alps.

 

[Shortround6]

Plus, since Italy is our topic and is playing merchant to the world, I expect RAF Malayan Command may well be fielding a sizeable force of Italian-made fighters and bombers.

One can also expect the British, not having lost hundreds of Hurricanes, P-40s and Blenheims in the North African campaign, to have sent a number of Squadrons further east of British and American planes. Perhaps the British substitute Italian aircraft as aid to Russia?

 

[SaparotRob]

One can also expect the British, not having lost hundreds of Hurricanes, P-40s and Blenheims in the North African campaign, to have sent a number of Squadrons further east of British and American planes. Perhaps the British substitute Italian aircraft as aid to Russia?

An interesting turn of events.

 

[Shortround6]

Maybe he doesn't care, but the RN most certainly did. So would Raeder and Doenitz. Even Hitler would notice the easier logistics for the UK. USSR, not so much. Of course, Churchill would be unable to make fatuous comments about the "soft underbelly of Europe," not noticing the Alps.

Unless the invader lands well north there was a minor obstacle called the Apennines

Over 9,000ft. Roughly 1/2 way along the length of Italy.

 

[Howard Gibson]

If you have both accurate intel of your opponent and options on what weaponry to field, you don't face your enemy where they are strongest. If they bring swords, you bring spears, if they bring horses, you bring pikes. So, presuming the British are aware of and appreciate the Kido Butai's strength, the RN will not be sending Sea Gladiators and Fulmars to face the Japanese. Instead, once Japan occupies FIC in Sept 1940, Britain will be sending the RN's deadly, Perisher-commanded submarines to Singapore and Hong Kong, against which the IJN has no credible ASW defence. Plus, since Italy is our topic and is playing merchant to the world, I expect RAF Malayan Command may well be fielding a sizeable force of Italian-made fighters and bombers.

Everybody knows that Japanese pilots wore thick, Coke bottle bottom glasses, and they had no clue of how to fly their aircraft.

The Reggiane Re.2000s would have been way better than the Brewster Buffaloes the RAF actually flew. A Buffalo should be okay against Ki.27s. There were not many Ki.43s at the start of the war. The British pilots in the CBI theater were not very good at the start of the war.

Any sort of carrier action means A6M2s versus Sea Gladiators and Fulmars.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Maybe he doesn't care, but the RN most certainly did. So would Raeder and Doenitz. Even Hitler would notice the easier logistics for the UK. USSR, not so much. Of course, Churchill would be unable to make fatuous comments about the "soft underbelly of Europe," not noticing the Alps.

Leaving aside the alt-history of grabbing Middle East oilfield fantasies, simply shutting off Suez would significantly reduce British traffic between the home island and India and Australia -- not even counting sinkings, which would probably increase, but simply from travel time.

If Hitler had been able to convince Franco to support taking Gibraltar, the UK would have been in a fine mess. Even without that -- and without a single German boot on Egyptian soil -- shutting either Gibraltar or Suez by submarine interdiction would have drastic effects on the UK.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Leaving aside the alt-history of grabbing Middle East oilfield fantasies, simply shutting off Suez would significantly reduce British traffic between the home island and India and Australia -- not even counting sinkings, which would probably increase, but simply from travel time.

If Hitler had been able to convince Franco to support taking Gibraltar, the UK would have been in a fine mess. Even without that -- and without a single German boot on Egyptian soil -- shutting either Gibraltar or Suez by submarine interdiction would have drastic effects on the UK.

In the real war, how much stuff reached the Pacific and Australia through the Suez Canal, past Italy? Sailing to Malta was nasty and dangerous. Sailing past it gives the Italians more time to get into mischief. The route around the Cape of Good Hope sounds way safer, even if a bit longer.

I am not an expert on Spain and the Spanish Civil War. Franco negotiated with Germany and Italy on joining the war, and Hitler found him to be difficult. In his book Personality and Power, author Ian Kershaw claims that Franco admired Hitler and Mussolini. I am not so sure. He was grateful. Mussolini wanted to re-establish the Roman Empire. A quick look at a map of the old Roman Empire should make a Spanish nationalist like Franco, nervous. Franco was an experienced soldier who knew that if you show up on a battlefield with inadequate resources, you are getting beat. Were German communications and logistics up to a war in Russia? Franco was a homicidal right-wing dictator, but he was more into stability and order than reckless aggression. Google "franco letter to lbj". You will see that Franco was the the master of the "Please f*ck off" letter. The reasons for Spain staying out of WWII are really obvious, especially to a battle hardened soldier like Franco.

 

[swampyankee]

Unless the invader lands well north there was a minor obstacle called the Apennines
View attachment 821474
Over 9,000ft. Roughly 1/2 way along the length of Italy.

Yeah. Churchill seemed to have a tendency to ignore geography. He didn't do too well in predicting Ottoman performance in Gallipolli, either.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

In the real war, how much stuff reached the Pacific and Australia through the Suez Canal, past Italy? Sailing to Malta was nasty and dangerous. Sailing past it gives the Italians more time to get into mischief. The route around the Cape of Good Hope sounds way safer, even if a bit longer.

I am not an expert on Spain and the Spanish Civil War. Franco negotiated with Germany and Italy on joining the war, and Hitler found him to be difficult. In his book Personality and Power, author Ian Kershaw claims that Franco admired Hitler and Mussolini. I am not so sure. He was grateful. Mussolini wanted to re-establish the Roman Empire. A quick look at a map of the old Roman Empire should make a Spanish nationalist like Franco, nervous. Franco was an experienced soldier who knew that if you show up on a battlefield with inadequate resources, you are getting beat. Were German communications and logistics up to a war in Russia? Franco was a homicidal right-wing dictator, but he was more into stability and order than reckless aggression. Google "franco letter to lbj". You will see that Franco was the the master of the "Please f*ck off" letter. The reasons for Spain staying out of WWII are really obvious, especially to a battle hardened soldier like Franco.

Without a clear Med, Australian foodstuffs would have to go around Good Hope. Another benefit of Suez was the ANZAC and Indian troops fed into North Africa -- admittedly irrelevant if the Italians don't invade Egypt, but at the same time important for operations in Syria against the Vichy French, or stocking up the home islands? Or, if the Italians stay neutral, those troops could build up in the UK and present a danger to the Germans.

Then too there's Persian Gulf oil which, if Suez is cut, will have to do the long haul around Africa, again, depleting tonnage not only from sinkings but also sheer usage, because a tanker can't be in two places at once.

And also, you don't need on pinch both the nostrils in the Med, either end will do a lot of good for the Axis. Gibraltar would be the better option as it deprives the Brits of an Atlantic-facing base. I know Franco was not very interested, and he knew better than anyone how tired Spain was of war, but had he allowed transit of German troops, the Brits may well have been stuffed.

Cutting the Med, with or without Italy's involvement, may have been a better option than trying to cut Atlantic routes, especially when America was more isolationist. By mid-1941, not so much.

 

[EwenS]

Keeping Italy neutral might be harder than it first seems.

1935 Abyssinian Crisis when Italy invades Ethiopia. Heightens the risk of war in the region.

Abyssinia Crisis - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

1936 Italian German Protocol

Italo-German protocol of 23 October 1936 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

7 April 1939 Italian invasion of Albania. That led to deterioration of Greco-Italian diplomatic relations and eventually to war 18 months later.

Italian invasion of Albania - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

13 April 1939, in a panicked response, Britain & France offer security guarantees to Greece & Romania in the event that they should be attacked. It was this agreement that generated the need for Britain to go to the aid of Greece in 1940.

22 May 1939 Italian-German Pact of Steel.

Pact of Steel - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

10 June 1940 Italy declares war on Britain and France. The Med had already been closed to British shipping in May on Admiralty advice due to the likelihood of war with Italy. British Somaliland was invaded 3 Aug 1940, starting the East African Campaign. Egypt was invaded 13 Sept, starting the Western Desert Campaign.

8 Oct 1940 German troops enter Romania and a coup installs a pro-Axis Govt, so replacing a Govt with a neutral stance. This increases the pressure on Greece, opening the prospect of a second front.

Romania in World War II - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

28 Oct 1940 Italy invades Greece. Initial Greek requirement was for weapons & eqpt (that saw the USA prioritise production of 30 F4F-3A for Greece over the USN for example). Britain agreed to send 3 RAF squadrons and send troops to to Crete to allow the release of a division for the main front. Negotiations with a reluctant Metaxis begin over a greater contribution, leading to deployment of British forces on the Greek mainland in early 1941.

https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2013/04.pdf

6 April 1941 Germany invades Yugoslavia and Greece.

So if Italy persists with its aggressive policy towards Albania in Spring 1939 and Britain & France react as historical with the security agreement for Greece, there is every likelihood that Britain gets drawn into a Med war in late 1940 anyway.

Italy on the other hand needs to do much more than simply remain neutral in a war between Germany and Britain & France. It needs to either not invade Albania in the first place, or stop any further dispute with Greece before it gets out of hand. Given the nature of Greco-Italian relations following the break-up of The Ottoman Empire rRom the early 20th Century I think that is a large ask. Issues over running sores like Corfu and the Dodecanese would need to be resolved somehow for that to happen. Otherwise war at some point between the two nations looks inevitable, so raising the prospect of Britain being dragged into it.

The British politics of the time need to be considered. Going to the aid of Greece was also part of Churchill's efforts to influence public, and Govt, opinion in the USA. Plucky Britain, standing alone, going to the aid of another country threatened by the Axis menace.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Yeah. Churchill seemed to have a tendency to ignore geography. He didn't do too well in predicting Ottoman performance in Gallipolli, either.

IIRC, Churchill had never been to Australia, Singapore or Japan. I might be wrong and that he may have passed through as a war correspondent in the early 1900s, but not as Fort Lord of the Admiralty (1911-1915), Exchequer (1924-29) or PM (1940-45). Churchill exclaimed surprise when told of Singapore's defences of lack thereof, when as Exchequer he funded the project. His seemingly willful ignorance (and racial bias?) of Japan's growing strength and ambitions likely saw Britain run straight into war with Japan. Why else would you send two capital ships and four small destroyers to deter the might of Japan. Now, it's not all Churchill, as in the 1930s Australia was desperately trying to build diplomatic and economic ties with Japan and was asking Britain to join their efforts, but was rebuffed by the British PM of the time. Had Britain taken the time to understand Japan things might have been different. If Italy is neutral, perhaps.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Keeping Italy neutral might be harder than it first seems.

1935 Abyssinian Crisis when Italy invades Ethiopia. Heightens the risk of war in the region.

Abyssinia Crisis - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Perhaps our best chance of Italian neutrality in 1939-45 is for Britain and France to go to war and defeat Italy in 1935. But the treaty ending this earlier war had better not be a humiliation or bankrupting of Italy, as that will drive them into Hitler's arms.

 

[EwenS]

Without a clear Med, Australian foodstuffs would have to go around Good Hope. Another benefit of Suez was the ANZAC and Indian troops fed into North Africa -- admittedly irrelevant if the Italians don't invade Egypt, but at the same time important for operations in Syria against the Vichy French, or stocking up the home islands? Or, if the Italians stay neutral, those troops could build up in the UK and present a danger to the Germans.

Then too there's Persian Gulf oil which, if Suez is cut, will have to do the long haul around Africa, again, depleting tonnage not only from sinkings but also sheer usage, because a tanker can't be in two places at once.

In practice it wasn't a problem. All it meant was the mix of sources was changed to draw less from the from the ME and more from the Americas and West Indies. The Abadan refinery owned by Anglo Iranian Oil Company then became the major supplier for the war in the ME and FE.

Supplies for Britain came from the USA, Mexico, Venezuela (British & US refineries), Trinidad (a British colony), Aruba (a Dutch colony with US refineries), Curacao (Dutch)

The oil industry even then was highly internationalised with the USA being the single biggest producer. Trying to fathom out which nation controlled what is complex. "Shell" is a good example. It comprised two companies listed separately, operating in partnership between 1907 and 2006. Royal Dutch Shell controlled extraction & refining. Shell Transport and Trading controlled storage and transport. Combined profits were shared 60/40.

Another wartime change saw less crude oil imported for refining here and more refined product like aviation fuel.

And also, you don't need on pinch both the nostrils in the Med, either end will do a lot of good for the Axis. Gibraltar would be the better option as it deprives the Brits of an Atlantic-facing base. I know Franco was not very interested, and he knew better than anyone how tired Spain was of war, but had he allowed transit of German troops, the Brits may well have been stuffed.

There was a thread on the Axis History site last year discussing what would happen if Franco did agree to join the Axis. Not as simple as it might first appear. There is some interesting material in amongst the 115 posts on the subject, but you need to pick it out from the bad tempered stuff. Things like the difficulies with logistics (rail guages, lack of routes through the Pyrenees, need for food important Spain etc etc.

Cutting the Med, with or without Italy's involvement, may have been a better option than trying to cut Atlantic routes, especially when America was more isolationist. By mid-1941, not so much.

 

[EwenS]

IIRC, Churchill had never been to Australia, Singapore or Japan. I might be wrong and that he may have passed through as a war correspondent in the early 1900s, but not as Fort Lord of the Admiralty (1911-1915), Exchequer (1924-29) or PM (1940-45). Churchill exclaimed surprise when told of Singapore's defences of lack thereof, when as Exchequer he funded the project. His seemingly willful ignorance (and racial bias?) of Japan's growing strength and ambitions likely saw Britain run straight into war with Japan. Why else would you send two capital ships and four small destroyers to deter the might of Japan. Now, it's not all Churchill, as in the 1930s Australia was desperately trying to build diplomatic and economic ties with Japan and was asking Britain to join their efforts, but was rebuffed by the British PM of the time. Had Britain taken the time to understand Japan things might have been different. If Italy is neutral, perhaps.

Force Z at Singapore was much less Churchill and more the Admiralty as part of a change of tack between Aug & Oct 1941. See Boyd "The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters" p296

"The claim that Churchill insisted, against professional advice, on a small inappropriate force in place of a 'balanced fleet' is wrong. The positions taken by Churchill and the Admiralty at these two October meetings were essentially the reverse of those traditionally assigned to them. Churchill wanted a small powerful force to double as high-profile deterrent and raider hunter in the Indian Ocean, a logical evolution of his August argument. It was the Admiralty who wanted a battle-fleet at Singapore operating forward in the South China Sea, obliging Japan to detach a major fleet to cover any southern operation. They pushed this policy, although their fleet would largely comprise slow obsolete vessels, no match for Japanese units. Pound's new position undercut his August argument 'that we could do nothing effective against Japan' without 'a properly balanced fleet' which was 'not achievable until 1942'. Churchill and no doubt others were evidently bemused by the concept of a battle-fleet at Singapore dominated by the aging 'R' class and the unconvincing defence of this proposal from Phillips and Pound. Indeed, it is surprising Churchill did not challenge their position more robustly."

"Force Z is best viewed as the first instalment, or forerunner, of a fleet the Admiralty were now determined to deploy to Singapore anyway between December 1941 and May 1942. Indeed, the Admiralty brief prepared for the First Lord, Alexander, in preparation for his statement to a secret session of the House of Commons on 19 December, stated that Force Z was sent to Singapore 'prior to the concentration of the Eastern Fleet', because ' it was hoped they would act as a deterrent to the Japanese and avert war'."

Boyd continued on p297

"...There is a compelling argument that the major differences over Eastern Fleet composition, destination and role all persisted. Churchill believed Prince of Wales was bound for Cape Town, the compromise destination agreed on 20 October. The Admiralty already intended her to go to Singapore where their new Eastern Fleet was to concentrate. Churchill believed Prince of Wales would spearhead a small deterrent squadron operating from Singapore to support the 'R' class ships protecting vital Indian Ocean communications and trade.The Admiralty, meanwhile, intended to base the 'R' class in Singapore, and ultimately Manila, as the core of a battle-fleet operating north of Singapore against Japanese lines of communication. Churchill had neither understood the Admiralty's new offensive intent, nor the implications arising from their negotiations with the Americans."

 

[Admiral Beez]

What sort of aircraft would the Royal Navy be using off its carriers? Sea Gladiators and Fulmars would be no match for Zeroes.

With the Germans grinded themselves to death in Russia, with the USA onside from Dec 41, and lastly without the efforts needed in the MTO the RN and FAA may see some of their aircraft programs Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Barracuda, Firefly and Firebrand) move ahead at a faster pace. Either way, HMS Furious aside, it won't be Gladiators on the remaining fast fleets, as they cannot fit onto the Ark Royal or Illustrious class lifts. For the PTO, I'd like to see a Skua Mk 2 that's equal to the USN's Dauntless.

 

[Howard Gibson]

With the Germans grinded themselves to death in Russia, with the USA onside from Dec 41, and lastly without the efforts needed in the MTO the RN and FAA may see some of their aircraft programs Sea Hurricane, Seafire, Barracuda, Firefly and Firebrand) move ahead at a faster pace. Either way, HMS Furious aside, it won't be Gladiators on the remaining fast fleets, as they cannot fit onto the Ark Royal or Illustrious class lifts. For the PTO, I'd like to see a Skua Mk 2 that's equal to the USN's Dauntless.

The Skua is remarkably close to the Dauntless in some aspects of performance. The big deficiencies are bomb load and range. I would take the Dauntless' twin .50s over the Skua's four .303s.

In 1941, just about all of the Royal Navy's carrier operations were in the Mediterranean. This put pressure on them to develop more advanced fighter aircraft to counter the monoplanes the Italians were introducing. Much of the logic behind the Fairey Fulmar's was that carriers would operate outside the range of land based aircraft. The truth was taught to them by biplane equipped Italians. If it had been taught by A6M2, B5N and D3A equipped Japanese, they would have lost some carriers.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Skua is remarkably close to the Dauntless in some aspects of performance. The big deficiencies are bomb load and range. I would take the Dauntless' twin .50s over the Skua's four .303s.

I'm going to trigger some teasing here for my Skua fandom, but a squadron of Skuas on each of HMS Formidable and Illustrious off Ceylon in April 1942 were just the ticket to punch holes in Nagumo's poorly-defended Kido Butai. Hermes was too small for the Skua, unless we ditch all her Swordfish - in fact I don't think she ever operated a monoplane carrier aircraft before her loss.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Skua is remarkably close to the Dauntless in some aspects of performance…

Definitely not in aesthetics.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Definitely not in aesthetics.

There's really no comparison on anything. The Dauntless is smaller, faster, flies higher and longer, with heavier guns and more than twice the bombload.

 

[Shortround6]

The Dauntless is smaller, faster, flies higher and longer, with heavier guns and more than twice the bombload.

Once, just once, I would like somebody to come up with the Mission that a Dauntless actually carried the 1 x 726kg bomb + 2 x 147kg bomb load.
What squadron on what date?
Just once.

I like the Dauntless but this bomb load, while listed just about everywhere outside of a Daffy Duck comic book doesn't seem to have much in the way of reality.
By the way. Neither Army or the Navy had a 147KG bomb. They did have a 147kg depth charge.

I am willing to settle for any Mission reports where a Dauntless carried just the 726kg bomb even without any bombs hanging under the wing.