If no Buffaloes, what fighter would go to Malaya?

[Shortround6]

An Australian 2-pdr anti-tank gun of the 2/4th Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, commanded by Sgt Charles Parsons (left), firing on Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go tanks as they try to pass trees felled across the Muar - Parit Sulong road, near Bakri in Malaya, 18 January 1942. Nine tanks were destroyed by two 2-pdrs in this engagement, part of the battle of Muar, which took place around the Gemensah bridge and the Muar River in Johore. It was the last major engagement of the campaign.

There may not have been enough 2pdr guns? or even anti tank rifles?

 

[buffnut453]

View attachment 586080
An Australian 2-pdr anti-tank gun of the 2/4th Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, commanded by Sgt Charles Parsons (left), firing on Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go tanks as they try to pass trees felled across the Muar - Parit Sulong road, near Bakri in Malaya, 18 January 1942. Nine tanks were destroyed by two 2-pdrs in this engagement, part of the battle of Muar, which took place around the Gemensah bridge and the Muar River in Johore. It was the last major engagement of the campaign.

There may not have been enough 2pdr guns? or even anti tank rifles?

Yeah...there was a single battery of anti-tank guns...so, maybe, 10-12 guns total (number is uncertain - a battery should have had 12 guns but the 2/4th Bn was at least 25% under-resourced). Sorry for my earlier mistake. However, there were no anti-tank guns in northern Malaya and many of the Indian soldiers had never even seen a tank before.

The Boys anti-tank rifle was supposed to be standard equipment but I've seen little evidence of their use in Malaya. Certainly, they don't seem to have been widely deployed.

 

[Admiral Beez]

It was NOT clear where Japan was going next. The minutes from Japanese Imperial Conferences which chart the political decisions in the period 1940-41 make it clear that even senior Japanese leaders didn't know whether to attack Russia, make a play for the NEI or just continue pushing forward in China. Those mixed messages were accurately captured in the diplomatic and intelligence assessments in the 2 years prior to December 1941. To say "it was clear where they were going" is applying the retrospectroscope, I'm afraid.

Britain built its largest overseas naval base at Singapore, built nine airfields, deployed thirteen RAF combat squadrons, 140,000 (half of which arrived too late) troops, its latest battleship (until DoY in Nov 1941) and newest aircraft carrier to Malaya. By Sept 1940 the Japanese were amassed just across in FIC and the US/DEI fuel embargo was starving the Japanese of their war making abilities. Perhaps the Japanese were undecided on where to go, but British knew Malaya and DEI was on Japan's to do list. The British failure was not sending enough of the right stuff, in the right time to prepare for the attack they were expecting.

I would agree that the Brits did not expect Burma to be attacked, and only had 45,000 troops from mostly newly raised British Indian regiments in place. If they did I suspect some in Britain and India would have wanted to connect the link the raillines between Calcutta and Burma, shown below. This is very rough terrain so will be pricey, and is only now being strong considered. But won't cost as much as another Singapore base.

 

[swampyankee]

There is of course the Republic XP-41, the non turbo version of the Lancer. That should be available in time.

...and barely, if any, better than the P-36.

 

[Shortround6]

Yeah...there was a single battery of anti-tank guns...so, maybe, 10-12 guns total (number is uncertain - a battery should have had 12 guns but the 2/4th Bn was at least 25% under-resourced). Sorry for my earlier mistake. However, there were no anti-tank guns in northern Malaya and many of the Indian soldiers had never even seen a tank before.

The Boys anti-tank rifle was supposed to be standard equipment but I've seen little evidence of their use in Malaya. Certainly, they don't seem to have been widely deployed.

Well, 12 guns (at best) is about one gun for every 12,000 troops so it is the next thing to no guns as you can get.
I don't know about the artillery, was it in short supply too?
Troops with poor training and inadequate support are not likely to do well.

 

[buffnut453]

Britain built its largest overseas naval base at Singapore, built nine airfields, deployed thirteen RAF combat squadrons, 140,000 (half of which arrived too late) troops, its latest battleship (until DoY in Nov 1941) and newest aircraft carrier to Malaya. By Sept 1940 the Japanese were amassed just across in FIC and the US/DEI fuel embargo was starving the Japanese of their war making abilities. Perhaps the Japanese were undecided on where to go, but British knew Malaya and DEI was on Japan's to do list. The British failure was not sending enough of the right stuff, in the right time to prepare for the attack they were expecting.

Firstly, the Japanese forces were not "amassed" in FIC. The primary attacks on Thailand and Malaya did not originate from FIC. The Japanese invasion force originated from Hainan and sailed directly towards Singora in Thailand and the beaches in northern Malaya.

The IJAAF didn't have any fighters to speak of in FIC until about 5 days before the invasion. They had been preparing airfields but they had no fighters in the theatre until they moved 2 Sentai's worth of Ki-43s, and more of Ki-27s in early December 1941. Essentially, as of mid-November 1941, the British forces in Malaya and Singapore were more than sufficient to tackle an invasion from FIC. Unfortunately, the British vastly underestimated Japan's ability to conduct strategic manoeuvre and there simply wasn't time to respond to the drastic change to the tactical and operational threat picture that took place in less than 2 weeks prior to 8 December 1941.

Again, there was no solid information indicating that Japan would attack and, up until the last minute, the British forces were more than sufficient to repulse the Japanese forces in FIC. Unfortunately, most histories tend to focus on how the British "lost" Singapore without truly recognizing the strategic and operational genius behind the Japanese plan. It was ambitious and audacious, and it wouldn't have taken much more disruption to fail completely (e.g. ammunition was running dangerously low during the final assault on Singapore). However, Yamashita's bluff paid off. The British were simply incapable of confronting the speed and scale of force at the point of contact.

Your identification of a British "failure" not to send the right stuff in the right time is, IMHO, unjustified. The British had the right stuff for the tactical situation in November 1941, and any decision to reinforce Malaya would have been at the expense of an operational theatre. Would any sane military leader take forces away from the Mediterranean, North Africa or the defence of the UK to further reinforce Malaya when the existing forces were sufficient for the threat? The answer has to be a resounding "no".

 

[Admiral Beez]

Would any sane military leader take forces away from the Mediterranean, North Africa or the defence of the UK to further reinforce Malaya when the existing forces were sufficient for the threat? The answer has to be a resounding "no".

The Brits did allocate their latest battleship and aircraft carrier and one of their only two fast battlecruisers to Malaya in October 1941. To do so at the height of the Mediterranean and Atlantic campaigns suggests they thought something was up.

But I agree that the vast majority of reinforcements were sent only after the fighting began.

 

[buffnut453]

The Brits did allocate their latest battleship and aircraft carrier and one of their only two fast battlecruisers to Malaya in October 1941. To do so at the height of the Mediterranean and Atlantic campaigns suggests they thought something was up.

Yes, both London and Singapore knew something was up but they didn't know what. Force Z was intended to be a deterrent force to dissuade Japan from taking offensive action. It arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941. The following day, Admiral Tom Phillips signalled the Admiralty, notifying them of his intent to sail in HMS Repulse to Darwin, Australia. On 4 December, Phillips left Singapore with a couple of staff officers for discussions with the US Navy at Manila.

Bear in mind that this was exactly the timeframe when Japanese aircraft were arriving in FIC. So...with a Japanese invasion fleet already at sea and Japanese aircraft arriving in FIC, Phillips doesn't stay in Singapore to work out how best to employ Force Z to defend the peninsula, rather he heads off for discussions with the US...which isn't even an ally. This suggests there was a lack of recognition of how dire the situation was becoming. Again, they knew something was happening, they just didn't know what, where or when.

Between Jan 3 and Feb 5, 1942 ten convoys arrived at Singapore carrying over 30,000 troops. Had Churchill wanted to, could a Dunkirk evacuation be possible? Send those convoys with empty troopships and it seems doable. The troops need only be shipped to Burma or Calcutta, ideally the latter so to avoid being cut off when Rangoon falls. Though the Australians may want their boys sent home.

I recommend you read "Singapore's Dunkirk". With the loss of Force Z there was no naval force capable of protecting the troopships. Also, it requires foreknowledge that Singapore would fall. As you observe, reinforcements were still arriving into early Feb 1941, little more than 10 days before the surrender.

 

[Jay Flynn]

Squadrons in Burma/India had good luck in Mohawks against Ki-43s.

 

[GrauGeist]

Nothing wrong with the Hawk 75.
The French Mohawk shot down more Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of France than any other French fighter, the Vichy Mohawks contested the USN in the Med, the P-36A stood up against the A6M at Pearl Harbor and they proved their worth in China against Japanese elements - so why would this change in the Malaya campaign?

 

[buffnut453]

Nothing wrong with the Hawk 75.
The French Mohawk shot down more Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of France than any other French fighter, the Vichy Mohawks contested the USN in the Med, the P-36A stood up against the A6M at Pearl Harbor and they proved their worth in China against Japanese elements - so why would this change in the Malaya campaign?

I think the Mohawk would have done at least as well as the Buffalo, and perhaps better. They would still be heavily outnumbered by the Japanese Ki-43 force and would still be a tactical disadvantage due to the lack of early warning and inadequate communication. I suspect the Mohawk would have climbed better than the Buffalo but I'm not sure it would have been sufficient - I doubt even Spitfires could have climbed to the necessary height in the time available. Mohawk performance would still be limited by the inexperience of the pilots.

Finally, 5 Sqn, the first RAF Mohawk unit, only started receiving its aircraft in December 1941, with 146 and 155 Sqns following in the first half of 1942. That's just too late for Malaya/Singapore. Could Mohawk deliveries have been expedited? Possibly. I think it would take some degree of foresight to decide in mid-1941 to send Mohawks to the Far East (not an active war zone) instead of giving them to the South African Air Force for service in East Africa, where they were used on combat operations.

 

[Nodeo-Franvier]

Nothing wrong with the Hawk 75.
The French Mohawk shot down more Luftwaffe aircraft during the Battle of France than any other French fighter, the Vichy Mohawks contested the USN in the Med, the P-36A stood up against the A6M at Pearl Harbor and they proved their worth in China against Japanese elements - so why would this change in the Malaya campaign?

I suspect that even P-36 wouldn't fare so well against Zero and Oscar. Sakai Saturday noted in his autobiography that P-36 is inferior to the Zero in performance.

 

[Jay Flynn]

Again, there are several reports of the Mohawk doing well against the Ki-43 Oscar. We dont have to guess.

 

[Jay Flynn]

And the Mohawks used in India were probably delivered in 1940. Curtiss switched to P-40 production by 1941

 

[buffnut453]

Again, there are several reports of the Mohawk doing well against the Ki-43 Oscar. We dont have to guess.

But at the time of those combats, the Mohawk's operating airfields weren't under almost daily attack. The Mohawk squadrons also weren't constantly retreating due to advancing Japanese ground forces. All those factors would have to be considered in addition to just a 1-vs-1 comparison of the aircraft.

Even if we just selectively choose the 1-vs-1 situation, the tactical conditions of the engagements must be considered. All the engagements where RAF Mohawks successfully shot down Ki-43s were in situations where the Mohawks outnumbered the Ki-43s AND had a height advantage. Compare that against Malaya where the Buffalos seldom, if ever, had a numerical and/or tactical advantage against the Ki-43s. Take the main engagement over Kuala Lumpur where the Buffalos were taking off just as the Ki-43s attacked. A disorganized climb is not the ideal way to engage an enemy force.

Yes, the Mohawk would have done at least as well as the Buffalo in Malaya (assuming they could be provided to that theatre in time for the invasion). However, I very much doubt that there would be a substantive improvement compared to the Buffalo.

 

[buffnut453]

And the Mohawks used in India were probably delivered in 1940. Curtiss switched to P-40 production by 1941

Yes, but there were numerous problems with the H75s that slowed their entry into service.

Firstly, the manuals were all written in French and had to be translated and republished before work could commence to erect and test the aircraft. Similarly, the instruments were all in French and had to be replaced with English-language and Imperial measure replacements. An additional problem was that the throttle controls were "backwards" and had to be redesigned to operate in the same way as other RAF fighters (on French aircraft of the time, full power was applied by pulling the throttle control back towards the pilot). Finally, maintenance required specialist tools that weren't provided to the RAF, so it took time to obtain the right tools or find alternatives.

As if the above weren't sufficient, testing revealed oil supply problems which still hadn't been fully resolved, even after the Mohawks entered service in India.

Add to all of the above the fact that the first H75s were sent for service in the South African Air Force for operational service in East Africa. Given all the above, I'm not sure how easy it would be to accelerate getting the Mohawks to Malaya in sufficient numbers to make a difference...plus the Air Ministry would have to decide to reinforce a non-combat zone (Far East) at the expense of an ongoing conflict zone (East Africa).

 

[Admiral Beez]

Finally, 5 Sqn, the first RAF Mohawk unit, only started receiving its aircraft in December 1941, with 146 and 155 Sqns following in the first half of 1942. That's just too late for Malaya/Singapore.

If only the Japanese had waited perhaps as little as 90 days before beginning the Pacific War. The RAF and USAAC would be stronger in Malaya and Philippines. And, more importantly, Japan would have clearly seen than Germany was stopped dead in the USSR, and that joining this Ally would be nuts.

90 Days was all Japan needed to see that the path they were embarking on was suicidal.

 

[Admiral Beez]

If Brewster did not exist, or if the UK purchasing commission did not believe that Brewster could fill their order, I guess that there are a couple options.

My guess is Gladiators. There were 747 built, of which approximately 100 were converted to Sea Gladiator, 36 shipped to China, and 30 to Finland. I would like 150 to 200 Gladiators plus spares could be found for RAF Malaya.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Nothing a few P-39s couldn't clear up!

 

[Admiral Beez]

Nothing a few P-39s couldn't clear up!

A good option actually. The RAF received several hundred. Send the P-39s with British mods to Malaya instead of Russia.

Of note, nearly every single seat fighter the RAF received from the US was either used in secondary tasks, sent overseas or disposed of through Allies.