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Thank you, If I am reading it correctly (a very big IF) the 2nd table show that with 965kg of fuel (1270 liters)
the 110C-2 was supposed to fly 1040km at 518kph at 6000 meters altitude using 875PS per engine?
Or 646 miles at 321-322mph at 19,685 ft?
Granted that may very well be a 'yardstick' range and not count warming up, take off and climb to 6000 meters but it rather boggles the mind
".... Could a vote of no-confidence in Churchill's Government have resulted in a more compliant, appeasement-centric Government? I think it's certainly a possibility, and that would achieve Hitler's strategic objective without the need for Operation Sealion and without having to destroy the entirety of the RAF."
That is the $$$ real question. The crowds greeted Mr, Churchill enthusiastically, but .... they also cheered Mr Maisky, the Societ Ambassador... funny thing about crowds.
I agree retreat from forward airfields would have been very political and publicly understood .... but a successful multi U-boat penetration of Scapa Flow with loss of 8 or 10 capital ships would have shaken the British public to the roots, IMO. All participating U boats in the Scapa Flow attack naturally were lost ... but .... the mission was always suicidal.
Before looking at fantasy aircraft or increased range for the Bf 109 one would do well to look at the objectives the Luftwaffe was attempting to achieve, helpfully, if vaguely, laid out for us in a Fuhrer order. One might then ask how exactly the fantasy aircraft and drop tank (or at least auxiliary tank) equipped Bf 109s would have enabled the rest of the Luftwaffe to achieve those objectives.
Cheers
Steve
Those Junkers flaps are also quite prone to icing up in weather. Bluntly, the more you read about German aircraft design the more you realize how overrated their designers are.
...
The Luftwaffe couldn't exceed phase 2 because their aircraft were not competitive. The BF-109E was outclassed by the Spitfire I. In hindsight, the choice to run an inverted engine, motor cannon and structurally optimized landing gear seriously hampered the design. The German tendency towards complex solutions for simple problems (e.g. wing slats, direct injection, electric propeller pitch control) just slowed them down further.
IMO, the Germans would have been much better off if they had licensed the Wright Cyclone like the Russians and dumped all their development efforts into that engine family. All the Luftwaffe's needs could have been met had they had entered the war with the 9 cylinder in service, the 14-cylinder undergoing trials and the 18-cylinder in development. Putting those engines on austere, efficient and easy to build air frames would have given them a highly competitive air force until the jet-age. Of course, there's the risk they'd just make them overweight and needlessly complex like the BMW-801...
According to battleofbritain1940.net, the planned invasion had three phases:
1) Luftwaffe conducts probing attacks on Southern English coast and interdicts English Channel shipping.
2) Destroy the RAF via BF109s clearing the airspace, bombers destroying airfields and Stukas taking out radar.
3) Conduct amphibious landings along breadth of southern English coast.
That was the limited objectives of Directive 16.
As a matter of historical fact the Germans never came close to achieving ANY of those five points.
- The English Air Force must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing.
- Mine-free channels must be cleared.
- The Straits of Dover must be closely sealed off with minefields on both flanks; also the Western entrance to the Channel approximately on the line Alderney-Poitland.
- Strong forces of coastal artillery must command and protect the forward coastal area.
- It is desirable that the English Navy be tied down shortly before the crossing, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean (by the Italians). For this purpose we must attempt even now to damage English home-based naval forces by air and torpedo attack as far as possible.
This was superseded by the far more wide ranging Directive 17 which gave the Luftwaffe a list of tasks it could never have accomplished with the means at its disposal.
1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.
2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.
Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.
3. On the other hand, air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except where some particularly favourable target happens to present itself, where such attacks would lend additional effectiveness to those mentioned in paragraph 2, or where such attacks are necessary for the training of air crews for further operations.
4. The intensified air warfare will be carried out in such a way that the Air Force can at any time be called upon to give adequate support to naval operations against suitable targets. It must also be ready to take part in full force in 'Operation Sea Lion'.
5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.
6. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after 5th August. The exact time is to be decided by the Air Force after the completion of preparations and in the light of the weather.
It was to defeat the entire RAF, it never defeated 11 Group, not just prevent attacks on the invasion operation.
Then there was a list of other objectives never even mentioned in the earlier directive.
It was to destroy the RAF's infrastructure, the British aircraft industry and other parts of the wider armaments industry. It was to enforce a blockade on British ports and destroy food and other supplies, both there and across the country.
Furthermore, in the detailed planning for Sealion, it was to support large scale airborne operations, support the amphibious landings and protect the invasion fleets!
The Allies did all this on D-Day with 12,000 aircraft at the end of a campaign lasting years which had reduced opposition from the Luftwaffe to as close to zero as to make no difference. The Luftwaffe was supposed to do it with a fraction that number of aircraft and in a few weeks.....it's ridiculous. It couldn't be done, and adding drop tanks or allowing a few fantasy aircraft makes no difference to the fundamental equation.
Cheers
Steve
The LW attitude to the chain home RADAR has never been fully explained as far as I have read. It is obvious from their range and position that their field of view overlapped. That being the case the LW had to disable a minimum of two stations and best to make it four to guarantee making the system blind. The chain home system was far from secret, the failure to tackle it or understand its significance is ...well it is strange in hind sight.
My suspicion is that the Luftwaffe had been winning, largely through superior tactics against significantly weaker opponents, they underestimated the technological capabilities of the British and the British ability to get a new technology into a significant operational role. Don't get me wrong: I think the German war planners were largely competent, but competent doesn't mean infallible.Perhaps they didn't quite appreciate how the British air defense system worked at the time, It seems a few British commanders didn't even though they were operating within it.
Early warning is just that, Early Warning. It doesn't fix tactics or poor gunnery or grand tactics (big wings) or a host of other aspects of air defense.
It had recognized the vital function, it was using the Bf 110 to address it. A bit imperfectly to be sure and even more imperfectly when the 110s were ordered to stay close to the bombers.
Unfortunately the speeds/ranges quoted in the Dietmar Herman Book are a at odds with performance figures in William Green's old books, sometimes a little and sometimes a lot. Green did have a number of errors but Herman seems to be a bit selective and doesn't give speed or altitude for a lot of his range figures. There is also the "smell" test. He lists the 110 at 1270 liters of fuel with the fw 187 having 1110 liters, a 14% advantage in fuel for the 110 yet we are to believe the 110 using the same engines can fly only 44% as far? Green lists the range of a 110B-1 as 1070 miles. perhaps this is an error and should be 1070km? Cruise is given by Green as 198mph, an odd speed as it doesn't come out to an even KPH or even a multiple of 5 ( I doubt cruise speeds were given as 318kph)
I would also note that the planes were NOT in equal combat trim. In the chart (on page 68 of the book) the armament is listed as 12 x 20 MG/FF (an obvious typo) and 2 x 7.92 MG 17 (two less than the 110) . Chart is supposed to be for the Fw 187 V4, in other places in the book it is stated that that the 4 machine gun armament was added later and that the V4 and A series aircraft were originally built with two machineguns (in addition to the cannon).
Difference in armament (and drag of the gun ports)
View attachment 474760
Might explain Green's listed speed of 329mph (530kph?) for the A-0.
Specification sheet on page 63 is a bit suspect. Only in that it is calculated and not from tests. I am sure the it is the best information that Herman could get and I am not trying to imply anything about him. I would note that the FW engineers were claiming 13% additional engine "performance" due to exhaust thrust which is more than RR got from a Merlin XX using more boost and at higher altitudes (less back pressure at the exhaust outlets).
[QUOTEFw 187 v5, in 1939 with a DB601 engine installed achieved 635km/h (394mph) at sea level. This is the speed of a Tempest V or P-51D with 150PN fuel at sea level.
nice. except these were not "standard" DB601 engines. They were rated at 1350PS for one minute at sea level. A level of power the DB601 would not see in service until the "E" model and the cooling system would be higher drag on any service aircraft for several years after 1939.
I would note that Green gives the following ranges for a Bf 110C
At max continuous cruise
483 miles at sea level at 262mph.
528 miles at 16,400ft at 304mph.
565 miles at 22,970ft at 301mph
and 680 miles at 217mph at 13,780ft at economical cruising speed. I would note that 680 miles is 1094 km which is not that far off from the 1070 number given for the Jumo powered 110, coincidence or bad translation?
The above numbers show why a range figure without speed and altitude is almost worthless.
I have no doubt the Fw 187 with it's smaller, lower drag airframe could out perform and fly further on the same amount of fuel than the Bf 110, but believing some of the figures in Herman's book takes faith to a new level. Again, he is presenting manufacturers estimates and not actual test data so I am making no accusations against him, plenty of Western Aircraft companies put out some rather bogus figures (390mph XP-39, 360mph single seat Defiant, 370mph Beaufighter and a lot more).
Once again the unicorn that is the Fw 187 prances onto the stage as a world beater, even though relevant data suggests otherwise.
I'm sure steve will give a more complete answer, but it is incorrect to assert that the Germans had no knowledge of radar detection or GCI techniques. They practiced it themselves. What I think came as a surprise was the level of integration and sophistication worked into the RAF early warning system. It was this non-technical aspect to the way information was organised and passed to the people that mattered that the Germans failed to appreciate adequately.j
Within a year the Germans were organising a bigger more sophisticated and more effective system for early warning of their own
We know the fuel tank capacities of the Fw 187.
There is no doubt as to Dietmar Herman's range figures for the Fw 187.
here were get into another bit of confusion. The 109F should have had better range than the 109E since it was faster on the same power?Since the Range of the Me 109E or F is usually given as 410 miles (660km) we can see the 1200km range for the Fw 187 is realistic.
I agree regarding the 1350hp DB601H having a 1 minute rating of 1350hp being not operationally possible in 1939 but even with 1050hp, the same as the Me 109, is speed is not going to fall below that of the 109.
Below page 63 of Dietmar Herman's book you alluded. You can see the two aircraft have equivalent armament with differences trivia. Typo aside on the 12 instead of 2 MGFF 20mm guns.
The Bf 110C range variations isn't really relevant because it was an ineffective escort with rare exception when sent ahead of the bombers to disrupt enemy fighters and when it was effective it was too expensive. Nor is its 20% variation in range with regards to altitude important. The salient imprtant fact on the Fw 187 is that its range should be (worst case) 38% more range or 80% than the Me 109 with the improved tank-age.
The Germans understood what the Chain Home stations were, and had an idea of their capability. What the didn't understand was how they were integrated into a quite sophisticated air defence system.
They had no inkling of how this was organised. If they had there would have been no need even to attack the Chain Home stations, which were difficult targets anyway. They could simply have concentrated all their effort on the Sector Stations, and attacked them repeatedly and relentlessly, as often as weather permitted. It was Sector Control which controlled all the air defence systems, from barrage balloons, to anti-aircraft batteries, to interceptors. The Observer Corps also reported to them rather than Fighter Command's Filter and Operations Room at HQ. Destroy them and everything above them (Group Control and Fighter Command HQ) is irrelevant, and everything below them is blind. Of course, Sector Stations were sometimes attacked as part of overall operations, and, when significantly damaged, was the one thing that really worried Park.
The Luftwaffe was still arguing about the necessity for radios (or should that be wireless) in fighter aircraft when the British were using them to control their interceptions.
Cheers
Steve
I wasn't doubting the range figures of the Fw 187 much, but the range figure given for the Bf 110 is total nonsense, or a major typo.
here were get into another bit of confusion. The 109F should have had better range than the 109E since it was faster on the same power?
Granted not enough to be escort fighter. However the 109F might be a better drag model (power to speed) for estimating performance of the FW 187 with normal DB 601 engines?
This is one area the book doesn't cover. It jumps from the Jumo 210 powered versions through the V5 with the experimental engines (not just cooling system) to the flights of fancy with DB605s and BMW 801s.
Never said it would fall below the 109, just pointing out the lack of data, real or estimated for a service Fw187 using engines (and guns) that were actually in service at the time in question (1930-40)
The difference is not so trivial. I included the picture to show why. The weight of the two extra MG 17s and their ammo is trivial. The extra drag may not be. If you want to estimate the performance of a theoretical FW 187 using DB 601A engines lets start with the closest version to the service aircraft we can, not an under armed prototype, or the estimated speed of such a plane using estimated ram effect and estimated exhaust thrust. Why is there a 15kph difference between the speed in that chart and other figures for the FW187A-0?
The range variations are important to show that the "snapshot" of the FW187s capabilities vs the BF 110 are in error. By how much is in dispute. But if the actual range difference between the two planes is actually close it helps explain the reluctance of the Luftwaffe to shut down a production program in progress and try to convert to a new type of aircraft right before a war.
I would note that FW did a much better job with exhaust thrust than Messerschmitt did even if the 13% figure is a bit high.
View attachment 474863
If you want exhaust thrust to work the gases have to exit the pipes flowing about 180 degrees to the airplanes direction of travel.
The exhaust on the left is just getting out of the cowl, not much else. The exhaust on the right is being deflected so the exhaust goes under the wing rather than flowing into the wing leading edge?
On DB powered 110s the outer exhaust pointed up and over the wing(kept the hot exhaust out of the radiator) while the inner exhausts pointed down and under the wing. Messerschmitt managing to get the exhausts of both engines pretty much inline with the wing.
After-all the Bf 110 was supposed to smash up enemy bombers and the observers other duties were to operate the radio and take navigation fixes.