Freebird
Master Sergeant
Were the Swordfish equipped ASV MkIII still able to carry depth charges?
If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain
- Thread starter DogFather
- Start date
Were the Swordfish equipped ASV MkIII still able to carry depth charges?
Weapon load varied depending on the mission, launch platform and the target. Maximum underwing load was ~1500lb while typical load from an escort carrier in light wind might be 3 x 250lb DCs, or 2 x 500lb bombs or 8 x rockets.
Freebird
Master Sergeant
After the mk. III was introduced, I don't imagine there was much of a requirement to carry torpedoes by that point of the war, (Mid-late '42), both the German and Italian surface fleets have ceased to be much of a threat, and U-boats become the primary danger
Partially true. The Swordfish III couldn't carry the Mk24 ASW homing torpedo although this was no problem for the Mk I, or II fitted with ASV II.
Kevin J
Banned
Looks like a suicide mission to me. There is insufficient air cover by Bf 109E's as only the E-7/N has drop tanks. Also there is only 1 paratroop division to seize critical junctions and bridges on the English side. My guess is that you need 6. Looks like a disaster in the making, Dieppe times six. Just think, each beachhead is supported by an average of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 old MTB, 1 new MTB, etc. At Normandy there were 3 paratroop divisions supporting 5 landing beaches which were close to each other. All these landing beaches are widely spread. Finally transit times for the invasion fleets is anything from 10 to 40 hours depending on distance covered and the RAF has Mohawks, Battles, Lysanders and a few Whirlwinds available for ground attack duties against troops with little or no air cover. It would have been a massacre.
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Shortround6
Lieutenant General
At Normandy there was never any real plan to resupply the Paratroops by air. The Plan was to link up with the forces coming in by sea and the vast majority (all?) of the supplies for the airborne troops would be brought over the beaches.
as far a naval support goes;
The Germans (and other continental navies) had steam torpedo boats which were like junior destroyers.
But three 10.5cm guns doesn't bring much to the party either.
The next problem for the Germans is that none of the cruisers or destroyers or the majority of the steam torpedo boats are in the channel ports. They are all in Germany and it is over 300 miles from Emden (closest german port) to Dover giving the British opportunity to prevent them from showing up.
as far a naval support goes;
the MTBs of which you speak may be a confusion. Actual MTBs are somewhat more numerous but are so lightly armed as to be worthless for shore fire.
The Germans (and other continental navies) had steam torpedo boats which were like junior destroyers.
But three 10.5cm guns doesn't bring much to the party either.
The next problem for the Germans is that none of the cruisers or destroyers or the majority of the steam torpedo boats are in the channel ports. They are all in Germany and it is over 300 miles from Emden (closest german port) to Dover giving the British opportunity to prevent them from showing up.
There were no cruisers intended for use in support of the Sealion landings. The 'Autumn Journey' diversion in the North Sea would use all the cruisers and light cruisers available (Admiral Hipper, Emden, Nurnberg and Koln). Even the gunnery training vessel Bremse, originally intended for Sealion was reallocated to the diversion.
Transport Fleet B would be protected by 9 light auxiliary gun boats and the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla, the 2nd and 3rd Patrol Flotillas and the 11th R-Boat Flotilla. The 4th and 16th Minesweeper Flotillas would clear the way.
Transport Fleet C would be protected by the 4th R-Boat Flotilla, 1st, 15th and 32th Minesweeper Flotilla and 7th Patrol Flotilla.
Transport Fleet D would be protected by the 2nd and 18th Minesweeper Flotillas, 2nd R-Boat Flotilla and 15th, 16th and 18th Patrol Flotillas.
Transport Fleet E would be protected by 5 heavy auxiliary gunboats (the only accompanying naval vessels whose medium calibre guns were considered capable of a coastal bombardment) and 3 Patrol Flotillas.
These units were much less impressive than their names suggest. Most were very lightly armed and many 'minesweepers' were in fact motor boats, not what the RN would call a minesweeper or armed trawler. Armament consisted of machine guns and 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.
The Germans may have had a maximum of 7 destroyers available at the beginning of September, if they could get them all serviceable at the same time (Hans Lody, Karl Glaster, Paul Jacobi, Theodor Riedel, Erich Steinbrinck, Friederich Ihn and Friederich Eckholdt). 1 more was due to re-enter service on 21st September ( Richard Beitzen) and another 2 in mid-October (Bruno Heinemann and Hermann Schoemann, too late).
They had 7 of the old Mowe class torpedo boats available, each with three 10.5 cm guns. They also had 10 Type 35 torpedo boats available, but with just one 10.5 cm gun and limited range they were not much use against the dozens of RN destroyers which were likely to appear among the transport fleets.
Three motor torpedo boat flotillas, about 30 boats, were to be deployed at the eastern end of the Channel. These flotillas were made up of the famous S-Boot (E-Boats to the British). As well as their four torpedoes they were armed with 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.
It was not just the destroyers of the RN that the fleets would have to contend. The British had literally hundreds of their own patrol boats, harbour protection vessels, armed trawlers etc. German naval forces in the Channel were outnumbered, out gunned and would have been outfought, all without any major units of the Home Fleet sailing south of the Wash. Unfortunately for the four convoys of the Autumn Journey diversion, some might have suffered an unfortunate fate at the hands of units of that fleet, out in the North Sea.
Cheers
Steve
Transport Fleet B would be protected by 9 light auxiliary gun boats and the 3rd Minesweeper Flotilla, the 2nd and 3rd Patrol Flotillas and the 11th R-Boat Flotilla. The 4th and 16th Minesweeper Flotillas would clear the way.
Transport Fleet C would be protected by the 4th R-Boat Flotilla, 1st, 15th and 32th Minesweeper Flotilla and 7th Patrol Flotilla.
Transport Fleet D would be protected by the 2nd and 18th Minesweeper Flotillas, 2nd R-Boat Flotilla and 15th, 16th and 18th Patrol Flotillas.
Transport Fleet E would be protected by 5 heavy auxiliary gunboats (the only accompanying naval vessels whose medium calibre guns were considered capable of a coastal bombardment) and 3 Patrol Flotillas.
These units were much less impressive than their names suggest. Most were very lightly armed and many 'minesweepers' were in fact motor boats, not what the RN would call a minesweeper or armed trawler. Armament consisted of machine guns and 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.
The Germans may have had a maximum of 7 destroyers available at the beginning of September, if they could get them all serviceable at the same time (Hans Lody, Karl Glaster, Paul Jacobi, Theodor Riedel, Erich Steinbrinck, Friederich Ihn and Friederich Eckholdt). 1 more was due to re-enter service on 21st September ( Richard Beitzen) and another 2 in mid-October (Bruno Heinemann and Hermann Schoemann, too late).
They had 7 of the old Mowe class torpedo boats available, each with three 10.5 cm guns. They also had 10 Type 35 torpedo boats available, but with just one 10.5 cm gun and limited range they were not much use against the dozens of RN destroyers which were likely to appear among the transport fleets.
Three motor torpedo boat flotillas, about 30 boats, were to be deployed at the eastern end of the Channel. These flotillas were made up of the famous S-Boot (E-Boats to the British). As well as their four torpedoes they were armed with 2.0 and 3.7 cm cannon.
It was not just the destroyers of the RN that the fleets would have to contend. The British had literally hundreds of their own patrol boats, harbour protection vessels, armed trawlers etc. German naval forces in the Channel were outnumbered, out gunned and would have been outfought, all without any major units of the Home Fleet sailing south of the Wash. Unfortunately for the four convoys of the Autumn Journey diversion, some might have suffered an unfortunate fate at the hands of units of that fleet, out in the North Sea.
Cheers
Steve
Glider
Major
It's worth noting that the RN moved the Hood, Nelson, Rodney, two cruisers and eight destroyers to Rosyth, specifically to intercept any invasion forces.
You can imagine what they would do to any attempt to invade.
You can imagine what they would do to any attempt to invade.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
This a picture of an "R" boat.
Armament got heavier as the war went on but in 1940 they would have been lucky to have two 20mm automatic guns and one 37mm semi-automatic.
That means the gun ejects the fired cartridge case and waits with open breech until a crewman shoves a new round into the chamber at which point the rim trips a catch and the spring loaded breech block slams shut.
In any case, hardly what one would consider as decent fire support for an amphibious landing
picture of a model
Armament got heavier as the war went on but in 1940 they would have been lucky to have two 20mm automatic guns and one 37mm semi-automatic.
That means the gun ejects the fired cartridge case and waits with open breech until a crewman shoves a new round into the chamber at which point the rim trips a catch and the spring loaded breech block slams shut.
In any case, hardly what one would consider as decent fire support for an amphibious landing
picture of a model
Kevin J
Banned
Okay, lets look at availability of paratroop divisions. In 1940, there is only one, so which of the landing zones are you going to send in the one and only paratroop division too. Only one third of the Bf 109E's are the E-7/N, so these will be needed to support the Lyme Bay and Isle of Wight invasions. The Lyme Bay invasion will be contested by the RN submarines based at Portland and the Isle of Wight invasion will be contested by whatever guns are available either on shore or on ships at Portsmouth. In the case of the former, its going to be a 30 hour run contested by at least MTB's, submarines and air attack, the latter by a 20 hour run in contested by whatever destroyers, MTB's and aircraft the RN has at Portsmouth. Then there are the night attacks which the RAF are sure to launch using either Swordfish, Lysanders, Battles or all three. I doubt that sufficient air cover during the day can be provided by the 200 Bf 109E-7/N's available. I'm sure the RAF will send in daytime attacks by Battles if necessary sacrificing their aircrews. These two attacks will simply be disasters.
The invasion at Ramsgate in the North will be opposed by just about every aircraft the RAF has available from north of the Thames. Even if they do successfully land, no doubt they will be contained on the Isle of Thannet, whose port Ramsgate is, so another disaster.
The invasion at Dover will be contested by marines and anti shipping guns. I predict disaster for that too regardless of what sort of barges or landing ships are employed.
That leaves the East and West Sussex landings, these are probably the only two that stand any chance of success, at a guess, you're looking at a 40 to 60 mile sea crossing. The Brits will have their only fully equipped armoured division waiting for them and since no heavy equipment can be brought across, I wouldn't give them much of a chance. Maybe they get ashore, but will they then be contained and cut off from re-supply. Everything will be thrown at them.
parsifal
Colonel
It wasn't the shortage of paratroop divisions. It was the shortage of transport to move the divisions.
The paratroop division was the 7th airborne division. There were several other independent battalions that were eventually amalgamated in 1942 to form coherent formations like Ramcke. The main punch of the German airborne forces were 22 airlanding division. The genergsjager formations had been found in Norway well suited for rapid deployment by airborne transport, something that would again be used in Crete.
What the airborne corps lacked was enough transport. it had suffered over 120 Ju52s lost over Holland and I think about 60 over Norway. Large numbers of gliders (needed to transport the 22AL div) had been destroyed. In the summer of 1940, the LW could deploy about 300 Ju52s and about 50 DFS 230 gliders.....enough to airlift about 2 regts. the germans knew that their transports always suffered heavy attrition when used in an offensive capacity. Each sortie, you might render unserviceable 50% of the force, of which 10% might be permanent write offs. That's each time you used them.
So, in this scenario, the germans could reasonably lift 0.67 divs in the 1st wave, 0.33 divs in the second wave, and thereafter, say, 0.1 divs per sortie. They needed to transport about 3-6 divs to make a real difference. They could possibly fly 3-5 missions per day....maybe. At that rate, it would take the Germans more than a week to complete their lift. by then the lead elements would be starving and out of ammunition.
The paratroop division was the 7th airborne division. There were several other independent battalions that were eventually amalgamated in 1942 to form coherent formations like Ramcke. The main punch of the German airborne forces were 22 airlanding division. The genergsjager formations had been found in Norway well suited for rapid deployment by airborne transport, something that would again be used in Crete.
What the airborne corps lacked was enough transport. it had suffered over 120 Ju52s lost over Holland and I think about 60 over Norway. Large numbers of gliders (needed to transport the 22AL div) had been destroyed. In the summer of 1940, the LW could deploy about 300 Ju52s and about 50 DFS 230 gliders.....enough to airlift about 2 regts. the germans knew that their transports always suffered heavy attrition when used in an offensive capacity. Each sortie, you might render unserviceable 50% of the force, of which 10% might be permanent write offs. That's each time you used them.
So, in this scenario, the germans could reasonably lift 0.67 divs in the 1st wave, 0.33 divs in the second wave, and thereafter, say, 0.1 divs per sortie. They needed to transport about 3-6 divs to make a real difference. They could possibly fly 3-5 missions per day....maybe. At that rate, it would take the Germans more than a week to complete their lift. by then the lead elements would be starving and out of ammunition.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Those maybe the permanent losses. The damaged or "temporarily" unserviceable could double that amount easily.
Anthony Kay's Putnam book " Junkers Aircraft & Engines" says 573 transports were use against Norway with the majority being JU 52s. 150 Ju 52s were "lost" in Norway.
For the Attack on Holland there were 430 Ju 52s. 2/3rds were supposedly "either never returned or badly damaged". However the next sentence says " "About 100 wer later repaired or used for spare parts".
Your sources may very well differ but there is little doubt that in the early fall of 1940 the German Air transport fleet was a shadow of it's former self.
It took much hard work, new production and repairs of damaged aircraft, to get the JU 52 fleet up to 493 for the Assault in Crete in May of 1941. Many existing aircraft got new engines in the spring of 1941. The French Amoit factory was retooled to build JU 52s and built around 400 during the war (and over 100 after?)
The repair work was done by Fokker in Amsterdam. Aircraft were either recovered or stripped for recovery of parts. The Dutch shot down a total of 231 German aircraft of all types in Holland, according to the book Fokker; Aircraft Builders to the World by Thijs Postma.
Invading Western Europe took a high toll on the German armed forces, much higher than is often realised.
As a side note, from the same book;
"During the occupation the following items were delivered to the Luftwaffe: 26 T.VIIIWs and 26 G.I aircraft (completion only); 702 Bucker Bu 181B Bestmann training aircraft and 66 Arado Ar 196 seaplanes; 348 wings, 616 ailerons and 190 trim-tabs for DFS gliders; 377 sets of skis for Ju 88s (which were all rejected); 66 sets of floats and 200 sets of float undercarriagees for Ju 52s, as well as a number of control surfaces; 60 "utility engines" and 64 oil tanks for Ju 252s. In addition, 685 engine blocks and 60 unfinished engine mounts for the Ju 52 were welded, and 25 Do 24 flying boats went through their final production stage."
On the far side of the world, to the 1940 world, a long ways off, the Japanese were still proceeding with their implementation of the "Co Prosperity Sphere" and the ultimate confrontation with the USA.
Question? after Pearl Harbor would the Third Reich still declare war on the US without regard to goings on on the continent and Great Britain?
Question? after Pearl Harbor would the Third Reich still declare war on the US without regard to goings on on the continent and Great Britain?
parsifal
Colonel
They did
Kevin J
Banned
This Operation Sealion plan reminds me of the time, my MD wanted to lose some business back in the 90's. He asked me to do a design and quote for a goods distribution centre. So anyway, at the end of the week, we have a meeting and he said that he didn't want the business. Told me to double the quote. I was real pissed off for wasting a week, but hey he was paying. Sure enough the client got their own IT people to write the system. So if I look at Operation Sealion and think, well I have one paratroop division, no landing craft, just river barges, why don't I just make a proposal that is so outrageously unworkable that the boss will never go for it.
parsifal
Colonel
Not really. There was an undeclared war at sea being waged between units of the USN and DKM. The US had already seized most of the axis shipping sheltering in the Pan American ports. German assets were being frozen wherever possible, and following certain very unpleasant incidents between US neutral shipping and the kriegsmarin in 1940, as well as the RN control commission activities, had slowed trade between the Axis and the US to a tiny trickle of what it had been in 1940. The Roosevelt administration was already planning to enter the war in a more active role some time in 1942. The German 9and Italian DoWs on the US just simplified the diplomatic equation, it didn't much reduce the timing, not by much at any rate.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,306
- Jun 25, 2013
Considering that Germany's actions in WWI managed to get a far more isolationist president to successfully lobby Congress todeclare war, I think any assumption that a far more aggressive Third Reich would've seen the US sit out the war to be, at best, wishful thinking.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
US ships had already engaged German subs in the Atlantic and a German sub had torpedoed a US destroyer (the USS Reuben James) on Oct 31st 1941.
It was only a matter of time.
It was only a matter of time.
