If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain

[Kevin J]

I actually lived in Hadleigh from 75 to 77 then Rayleigh until three years ago when I came to Lincolnshire. Small world isn't it and you will know the tides at Southend

I certainly do.

 

[parsifal]

There is no comparison between the experience and resources available to the allies for overlord in 1944 and the experience and resources available to the germans pertaining to amphibious operations at any time. The germans did undertake some amphibious operations in the Baltic in 1941 and 1944 that I know of. The 1941 operations were not even fully opposed by the retreating Soviet forces. The equipment used still centred around ersatz landing craft and barges, but at least the prime movers were the so-called Siebel ferries, which had greater capability compared to the River barges proposed in the 1940 proposed operation. In 1941, the numbers of Siebel ferries were still extremely limited….perhaps sufficient to lift 0.5 divisions. The siebels were still unsuitable for navigation across the open waters of the North Sea.

Amphibious lift capability does not come cheap, as the allies were to find out 1942-4. Building Amphibious capability is directly linked to shipbuilding capacity and steel outputs. It generally takes several years of work to perfect the designs needed to carry out opposed landings. Germany had a very limited shipbuilding capability, with priority given to U-Boat construction. A switch over to amphibious capability would have needed massive re-allocations of steel and dockyard capacity and work force away from the u-boats and over to amphibious transports and supporting surface fleet. That was not going to happen…..probably it would take until at least 1944 before some viable improvement in capability was going to occur. In 1941, German capability would be little different to its 1940 capability, or lack thereof.

In 1940, the Germans were very short of all these things. Their experiences with amphibious warfare was laughably absent, the last successful operations being WWI in the Baltic. It is very difficult to classify Norway as true amphibious operations, since most of the landings were completely unopposed. German ineptitude with opposed landings does come to the fore with their botched assaults of Oslo, and further losses they encountered off Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand. Their inability to pay sufficient attention to follow up re-supply is demonstrated in spades by the near disaster at Narvik. Their continued inability to carry out successful amphibious operations is clearly demonstrated in the failed attempts to take certain Finnish Baltic islands.

Amphibious operations are inherently complicated operations, made more difficult by unsuitable topography. Capturing a defended port by direct assault was beyond the capability of all the belligerents, including the Allies, and rarely attempted. One only has to look at Dieppe to realise that an assault against a defended port like Portland is a complete non starter.

The defences of Portland were formidable, the island being a forward naval base for the RN. It was used during WWII as an advanced assembly point for overlord. The defences for the island dated back to the 1890s, and many were no longer used for that purpose by 1940, though there is no reason they could not be if the need arose.

The following image is an example of the disused defences on the island

 

[Kevin J]

There is no comparison between the experience and resources available to the allies for overlord in 1944 and the experience and resources available to the germans pertaining to amphibious operations at any time. The germans did undertake some amphibious operations in the Baltic in 1941 and 1944 that I know of. The 1941 operations were not even fully opposed by the retreating Soviet forces. The equipment used still centred around ersatz landing craft and barges, but at least the prime movers were the so-called Siebel ferries, which had greater capability compared to the River barges proposed in the 1940 proposed operation. In 1941, the numbers of Siebel ferries were still extremely limited….perhaps sufficient to lift 0.5 divisions. The siebels were still unsuitable for navigation across the open waters of the North Sea.

Amphibious lift capability does not come cheap, as the allies were to find out 1942-4. Building Amphibious capability is directly linked to shipbuilding capacity and steel outputs. It generally takes several years of work to perfect the designs needed to carry out opposed landings. Germany had a very limited shipbuilding capability, with priority given to U-Boat construction. A switch over to amphibious capability would have needed massive re-allocations of steel and dockyard capacity and work force away from the u-boats and over to amphibious transports and supporting surface fleet. That was not going to happen…..probably it would take until at least 1944 before some viable improvement in capability was going to occur. In 1941, German capability would be little different to its 1940 capability, or lack thereof.

In 1940, the Germans were very short of all these things. Their experiences with amphibious warfare was laughably absent, the last successful operations being WWI in the Baltic. It is very difficult to classify Norway as true amphibious operations, since most of the landings were completely unopposed. German ineptitude with opposed landings does come to the fore with their botched assaults of Oslo, and further losses they encountered off Bergen, Trondheim and Kristiansand. Their inability to pay sufficient attention to follow up re-supply is demonstrated in spades by the near disaster at Narvik. Their continued inability to carry out successful amphibious operations is clearly demonstrated in the failed attempts to take certain Finnish Baltic islands.

Amphibious operations are inherently complicated operations, made more difficult by unsuitable topography. Capturing a defended port by direct assault was beyond the capability of all the belligerents, including the Allies, and rarely attempted. One only has to look at Dieppe to realise that an assault against a defended port like Portland is a complete non starter.

The defences of Portland were formidable, the island being a forward naval base for the RN. It was used during WWII as an advanced assembly point for overlord. The defences for the island dated back to the 1890s, and many were no longer used for that purpose by 1940, though there is no reason they could not be if the need arose.

The following image is an example of the disused defences on the island

View attachment 529679

Does anyone actually know what guns we had at Portland in WW2? I've done a search and all I can find is that their 6-in and 9.2 in BL guns were removed after WW1. Then something about the training base there moved in 1940/41 and something about artillery, but what sort, anti-aircraft? Naval? I read somewhere that the Germans used some of their converted barges in the Baltic, possibly 60 of them? The Germans 'ready, maybe, by 1944' seems quite reasonable to me, plenty of time to finish off the Russians, ho, ho! But back to the original topic, if the Germans had defeated Fighter Command in the BoB however long it lasted. Where exactly are they going to successfully land their invasion force because Operation Sea Lion is a suicide mission? If the Germans in 1941 can only transport half a division then that looks like a Dieppe style operation, so you need a decent beach to land on, Weymouth, and a port to take, Portland.
Wikipedia is inconsistent on whether or not there were BL 9.2 guns there in WW2. The photos I've seen show that the guns were exposed to the elements and not enclosed in turrets, so I guess if they would have to be taken out like at Pointe du Hoc. As for heavy cover, both Bismarck and Tirpitz plus the two unfinished German aircraft carriers. So no foray into the Atlantic for Bismarck in 1941, and completion of the carriers. Definitely 1944 earliest.

 

[parsifal]

There were about 16 pieces of heavy artillery in the Dover region alone, capable of reaching all the way to the French coast. German heavy artillery facing these defences was heavier and more modern than the british guns. Nearly 20 pieces were added to six batteries running from Boulogne eastwards towards Calais and beyond. The guns ranged in size from comparatively "light" 8" guns capable of lobbing explosives up to 33 kilometers, to massive 16" radar guided pieces intended for the cancelled H Class BBs. These weapons could hurl one-ton projectiles more than 50 kilometers. Commanded by KM admirals, and crewed by Naval personnel the guns were eventually encased in massive bombproof concrete pillboxes on the coast, integrated into the Festung Europa defences in the Pas De Calais, to Boulogne and Ostend regions. These guns were formidable for defence, but their capability attacking British at sea naval forces was actually fairly disappointing. In four years the Germans managed to sink 4 British ships (including merchant vessels used to dispute the german claims that the channel was closed to British merchant shipping. The British coastal artillery batteries were not any more effective againt fast moving targets as the channel dash in the following year was to show.

So, coastal artillery was ineffective against fast moving naval warships. against barge traffic, it was a completely different story. With a fleet speed of just 2.5 knots, and very dense spacing it would have been virtually impossible for the British CA batteries to miss. Adding to that probem was the fact that many of the barges were towing other barges, which rulled out any zig zag patterns for the entire fleet.....if some barges cant manoeuvre, none of them will be able to do so safely.

 

[Shortround6]

Many of the coastal forts were mere shadows of what they were pre-WWI. But the cost of up-dating them competed with money for ships. Coastal forts may be cheaper than ships but depend on the enemy coming to fort. If he doesn't the money may be considered wasted ( what is unknown is if the enemy would have come if there was no fort/s). Ships can defend many areas but were often not in the right place at the right time.
another consideration was the increases in range from around 1900 (when many 'modern' forts/batteries were built) and the late 20s. the same guns went from 6,000yrds max range to 9,000 to 17,000yds depending on the elevation of the mountings and some even went to well beyond that. fewer guns (and crews) were needed to cover the same area of water off the coast.

Portland appears to have had a pair of 9.2s mounted in Blacknor Fort on the west side of of the Isle of Portland (making them useless for defending Weymouth) overlooking Slapton sands. Slaptons sands itself may be a great beach to land on, it is a lousy beach to get off of, at least the eastern portion (4-6 miles?)

the far end in the phop above

The Isle of Portland is just out of the top of the picture.

The Fleet lagoon from the other end looking towards Portland.

Yes there are a few miles of beach that have solid land behind them and not Lagoon.

 

[Kevin J]

Slapton Sands is in South Devon quite a way from Portland, near to Dartmouth in Devon, its not the same as Chesil Beach.

 

[Shortround6]

You are be quite right, it is just that in the accounts of Exercise Tiger in which hundreds of men were lost mention the guns at Blacknor Fort were not given permission to fire on the German E-boats for fear of causing friendly casualties so I assumed (wrongly) that it was a closer beach. The Convoy of LSTs may have been a number of miles from the beach when the attack occurred

Slapton Beach is still not great beach to get off of.

 

[Milosh]

Operation Tiger diagram, https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/photo/25656/exercise-tiger-diagram

 

[Kevin J]

You are be quite right, it is just that in the accounts of Exercise Tiger in which hundreds of men were lost mention the guns at Blacknor Fort were not given permission to fire on the German E-boats for fear of causing friendly casualties so I assumed (wrongly) that it was a closer beach. The Convoy of LSTs may have been a number of miles from the beach when the attack occurred

Slapton Beach is still not great beach to get off of.

Agreed, lets scrub my idea for a secondary landing there, even I didn't realise it was so far away until I checked. I thought it was the Dorset side of Exmouth and not close to the navy college at Dartmouth. Not only that but our navy base at Plymouth is just round the corner, so definitely another of those suicide missions.

 

[Freebird]

.

There was one "R" in the Southern Channel, but the Germans didn't even have anything close to an old WW I D class cruiser closer than Germany.
View attachment 529538

A point often forgotten - The British actually had 4 battleships in the channel.
In addition to HMS Revenge, there were two French battleships (seized and with RN crew), Paris & Courbet.
There was also HMS Centurion, with main guns removed but with a variety of smaller guns, still functional as a battleship.

 

[Shortround6]

The Centurion performed some varied and interesting missions for what was essentially a target/decoy ship but her actually utility in a real gun battle is highly dubious.

She did manage to claim one Stuka while disguised as the HMS Anson but I am not sure she mounted anything bigger than 20mm AA guns? Or if so more than 1-2 as training weapons?

but this was in 1942?

In 1940 she was still pretty much stripped and all that could be mounted in a hurry would be light AA guns.

This is how she looked in 1933.

 

[Freebird]

The Centurion performed some varied and interesting missions for what was essentially a target/decoy ship but her actually utility in a real gun battle is highly dubious.

She did manage to claim one Stuka while disguised as the HMS Anson but I am not sure she mounted anything bigger than 20mm AA guns? Or if so more than 1-2 as training weapons?

but this was in 1942?

In 1940 she was still pretty much stripped and all that could be mounted in a hurry would be light AA guns.
View attachment 529791
This is how she looked in 1933.

True, though as part of a squadron of 4 obsolete battleships the role would probably be as an additional target to draw air attack away from the other ships. Although not up to modern standards, he hull armour is likely not seriously threatened by 6" or 8" guns. Functional heavy guns wouldn't be needed, so dummy guns could be emplaced.

Certainly if we're talking about a small Kriegsmarine force of a couple CA and a few CL escorting 5 knot riverbarges, the threat of a battleship (even a disarmed one) ramming or swamping the barges would be a significant threat.
Could a Stuka starting a dive at 12,000 feet accurately identify which of the 4 battleships has dummy guns, on a smoke obscured deck? (From all the AA guns)

Here's a picture from 1942, all of the primary gun turrets are fake.

 

[stona]

The RN had no intention of sending heavy units of the Home Fleet anywhere near the English Channel. If Sealion had been launched some of those units might have intercepted the 'Autumn Journey' diversion, which would have gone badly for the Germans.

You don't need heavy units lobbing huge shells at fleets of transports and barges when you have hundreds of destroyers (as many as seventy within 36 hours), mine sweepers, armed trawlers, harbour defence vessels and assorted other armed motorboats etc. which are more than capable of doing the job.

I am reminded of the famous gaming of Sealion at Sandhurst. The RN dispositions at the start of the game had to be altered from those that existed historically. Had the game been based on the actual disposition of the RN forces in September, 1940, then it would have been a damp squib, as it appeared that no organized German forces would have got ashore at all.
In order to bring about fighting on land, and thus give the celebrated players something to do, the RN dispositions were artificially changed to give the invasion force a chance to get ashore. With the 'new' dispositions, the Germans landed at dawn on the 22nd, after which a RN force of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers arrived in the Channel on the morning of the 24th. 65% of the invasion barges were sunk, together with 3 destroyers and 7 S boats, for British losses of two destroyers sunk, four destroyers and two cruisers damaged. Remaining German forces surrendered on 28th.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Freebird]

The RN had no intention of sending heavy units of the Home Fleet anywhere near the English Channel. If Sealion had been launched some of those units might have intercepted the 'Autumn Journey' diversion, which would have gone badly for the Germans.

You don't need heavy units lobbing huge shells at fleets of transports and barges when you have hundreds of destroyers (as many as seventy within 36 hours), mine sweepers, armed trawlers, harbour defence vessels and assorted other armed motorboats etc. which are more than capable of doing the job.

I am reminded of the famous gaming of Sealion at Sandhurst. The RN dispositions at the start of the game had to be altered from those that existed historically. Had the game been based on the actual disposition of the RN forces in September, 1940, then it would have been a damp squib, as it appeared that no organized German forces would have got ashore at all.
In order to bring about fighting on land, and thus give the celebrated players something to do, the RN dispositions were artificially changed to give the invasion force a chance to get ashore. With the 'new' dispositions, the Germans landed at dawn on the 22nd, after which a RN force of 17 cruisers and 57 destroyers arrived in the Channel on the morning of the 24th. 65% of the invasion barges were sunk, together with 3 destroyers and 7 S boats, for British losses of two destroyers sunk, four destroyers and two cruisers damaged. Remaining German forces surrendered on 28th.

Cheers

Steve

Indeed, though the crippling of the KM in Norway may have much to do with that.
Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Lutzow and Leipzig are all out of action with torpedo damage, Graf Spee, Blucher, Karlsruhe & Konigsburg sunk.
AFAIK, that only leaves Hipper and a couple CL's.
Scheer is refitting, and Prince Eugen has only commissioned in Aug '40, so is working up.

Had there been a couple of German Battlecriusers/Pocket Battleships in service, I could possibly see the RN sortie with a couple old BBs to counter the German ships.
Using old and obsolete ships makes sense, rather than risk KGV's or other valuable ships.

 

[Glider]

That said, on the 11th October the RN did use HMS Revenge, escorted by seven destroyers fired 120 rounds of 15in and 801 rounds of 4.7in at Cherbourg. They couldn't have been much more than 15,000 yds from the harbour and well within the range of shore batteries.

I have no doubt that if push came to shove and the RN had to deploy the fleet, the Revenge at leas would have been involved

 

[buffnut453]

I have no doubt that, had the RN sortied against an invasion force, the results would have been highly one-sided. However, that presupposes that, having pushed 11 Group back into 10 and 12 Groups' areas, the Luftwaffe does nothing to attrit the RN before embarking on an invasion.

Looking at this Wikipedia page (yes...I know, but it provides food for thought), aircraft were responsible for sinking more RN ships than any other single cause. Now, admittedly, that tally includes those sunk by Italian and Japanese forces in addition to Germany. However, it's worth noting that most of the losses were small, highly manoeverable and hard-to-hit destroyers, which are exactly the type of vessel needed to disrupt an invasion.

We should also consider that June 1940 marks the start of "The Happy Time" for German U-Boat commanders.

What might it have required for Germany to force some hard decisions on the RN over whether to retain destroyers around the UK to deter an invasion versus sending them out to protect transatlantic convoys? Could a retreat by 11 Group followed by concerted Luftwaffe attacks against the RN have forced the UK into, effectively, a 2-front maritime war with the unpalatable choice between exposing convoys to even greater losses and risking losing vital warships that are stationed around the UK in case of invasion?

I'm not arguing any side here...I'm just trying to nudge the conversation along a little. We all agree that Sealion was largely doomed unless there could be some significant change in the balance of maritime power. I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?

 

[Shortround6]

I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?

Probably not with the airpower of 1940. The German torpedo bombers were pretty much the He 59

and He 115

Use of the He 111 as a torpedo bomber has to wait until 1941.

the Stukas were just learning their trade as far as anti-shipping goes. Same for other bomber types.

I have pointed out before that Crete is not a good scenario to make comparisons from. The Stukas were sometimes operating from an Island only 50 miles from Crete making it rather easy for several missions to flown in one day, the same would be true of any battle in the channel, except the British ships at Crete were 370-380 miles from their resupply point and not 30-70 miles like they would be in the channel. British ships operating in the channel against invaders could fill up their AA magazines every night or every other night and not fight on until all ammo was gone like some ships at Crete. No need to husband fuel or worry too much about break downs either. Not saying the British ships would be invulnerable, just that there would be something of a shift in the dynamics of the situation.

 

[Freebird]

I have no doubt that, had the RN sortied against an invasion force, the results would have been highly one-sided. However, that presupposes that, having pushed 11 Group back into 10 and 12 Groups' areas, the Luftwaffe does nothing to attrit the RN before embarking on an invasion.

Looking at this Wikipedia page (yes...I know, but it provides food for thought), aircraft were responsible for sinking more RN ships than any other single cause. Now, admittedly, that tally includes those sunk by Italian and Japanese forces in addition to Germany. However, it's worth noting that most of the losses were small, highly manoeverable and hard-to-hit destroyers, which are exactly the type of vessel needed to disrupt an invasion.

I'm not arguing any side here...I'm just trying to nudge the conversation along a little. We all agree that Sealion was largely doomed unless there could be some significant change in the balance of maritime power. I'm asking whether Germany could have brought about that change using air power?

One thing to note with these losses, almost all of those lost to Axis air power were immobile (at Dunkirk), ran out of AA ammo (Crete) or were small groups of ships.
The record of large Axis wings attacking a large RN fleet during Pedestal was remarkably innefective, even given the British fleet's limited number of interceptors.

The concentrated AA fire was so intense that even waves of 80 - 120 escorted dive/torpedo bombers only produced a couple of hits.
Given that the targets were often slow unarmed freighters it's even less impressive



Operation Pedestal (From Wiki)

Aug 12 morning

The number of Axis aircraft in the attacks was unprecedented, with 117 Italian and 58 German sorties for only meagre results. Two bombers, a torpedo-bomber and a fighter had been lost for one hit on Victorious and the damage to Deucalion

Aug 12 afternoon

The Axis air forces had flown 180–220 escorted bomber sorties during the day and the Germans claimed that they had damaged an aircraft carrier (Indomitable), a cruiser, a destroyer and a large merchant ship.

Aug 13

Force X was attacked by 35 Ju 88s and 13 Ju 87s, achieving only a near-miss on Kenya for a loss of one Ju 88 and one Stuka. The Regia Aeronautica attacked with 15 bombers and 20 torpedo-bombers for no loss

 

[Glider]

While its true that there would have been a reduction in capability due to the vulnerability of the ships to air attack, but ships in port can be difficult targets. Think of Malta and the effort put into attacking the two German battlecruisers for little result.
It's safe to assume that the AA defences would have been built up to defend the fleet, they already had a high priority for AA guns and radar coverage. For this reason I doubt that it would have made a massive difference as Luftwaffe losses would have been high. The RAF would have been able to influence the air war as until the Luftwaffe had bases in the UK, their 109's still had a limited range and the remaining RAF fighters would be fighting unescorted German bombers

Regarding torpedo's it should be remembered that German Aerial torpedo's were at best average and for most of the war the Germans used Italian versions. In 1940 the Germans wouldn't have had access to many or even any.

 

[parsifal]

Axis aircraft were not the prime reason for RN naval losses. That is flat out incorrect.

Here is a link to the naval history website that provides a ready reference to RN losses

If RFA merchant ships are included, hands down the primary cause of loss are uboats.

British vessels lost at sea in World War 2 - major warships