If the RAF had been defeated in the Battle of Britain (4 Viewers)

[Shortround6]

Carried over from the other thread.

First of all, I've got to say - the notion that the Germans allowed the British to retreat from Dunkirque is absurd and really creepy and conspiratorial in it's implications. I don't buy that at all - I'll stop there.

Second, some of the discussion above presumes the English is making substantial air attacks - what I was asking is what would have happened if the Germans had defeated the RAF as it seemed they came close to doing on a couple of occasions.

Yes they still face a severe disadvantage in naval forces but my question is really how effectively could the Royal Navy fight without air power in a narrow channel dominated by German air power? I brought up the Prince of Wales and the Repulse disaster in the Pacific. I'd also point out the dismal results of many convoy battles in the Med, Atlantic, North Sea etc., and that usually included some friendly air support. I'd also point out the relative success of the "Kanalkampf" operations within the English Channel by the Luftwaffe (sinking 35 British merchant ships and 4 destroyers in spite of fairly heavy British air opposition).

The Germans may have had a tiny fighting navy but I'm not convinced all the (French etc.) merchant ships were gone. And they still had the U-boat fleet and mines to help control the Channel if it came down to it. They certainly demonstrated the capability and willingness to win a bloody invasion with air power alone in Crete, defeating 40,000+ troops just with their paratroopers. That might be sufficient to secure a bridgehead.

Still, if the Germans didn't have any torpedo planes functional yet (what about Ju 88s? when did the A-17 come out?) I would say that could make it harder to sink British Capitol ships. Which would have made it an interesting battle!

3rd paragraph. Bringing in the air attacks from 1 to 2 years in the future is skewing things a bit. The Germans in the summer of 1940 were just learning how to attack ships in actual fact, not just training missions. This learning process took a while and is what helped get the later results that you mention. Expecting similar results in the first few weeks of actual operations is a bit much.
Actually the "Kanalkampf" operations may show the opposite of what you think. Sinking slow coastal freighters and fishing boats is one thing. Sinking warships moving at 20kts or better is another (as long as they stop steering in straight lines to improve their own gunnery). The other big point, often ignored by advocates of the German invasion is that hundreds of freighters did get through and some of those sunk were on repeat trips. If you sink a small freighter hauling coal on it's 3rd or 4th trip yes it is a loss, and the British Need every ship/cargo they can get BUT if you sink a British destroyer carrying a "cargo" of eight 21 torpedoes and 1000 rounds of 4.7in ammo on it's 3rd trip to shoot up your invasion fleet you are going to run out of invasion fleet pretty quick.
It was always going to be a war of attrition. Neither side could guarantee safety of it's ships through air power. The British simply had many times the number of ships to loose. The Germans cannot afford to trade the British ship for ship or even two British ships for every German ship.

The German surface navy in the summer of 1940 was almost non existent. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were both in dockyard hands repairing torpedo/mine damage. Only one of of the pocket battleships was operational at this time, one Cruiser of the Blucher class, Two modern light cruisers and the 1926 Emden (being used as a training ship in the Baltic)., number of destroyers varied as bit as repairs were made to ships damaged (or broken down) during the Norwegian campaign. By Sept there may have been eight. That is pretty much it for ships over 1000 tons except for a mine layer or two. Actual German plans for this group of ships was to escort some old passenger liners on a feint towards the North of England to draw off the Home fleet or ships stationed along the east coast. Vary as you see fit but this small group of cruisers/destroyers isn't going to be much more than a speed bump to the Royal Navy.

Subs work both ways and the British subs had been pretty successful in Norway. Trying to use subs in the Channel is another game.

The JU-88A-17 didn't show up until 1942. Slapping torpedoes under the existing JU-88s may not have worked very well, The differences between the A-1 and the A-4 were more powerful engines, a bigger/longer span wing and stronger landing gear. The last two were introduced on the A-5 model which preceded the A-4 as they waited for the more powerful engines to reach production status.
In the Summer of 1940 the luftwaffe was pretty much limited to the HE 59 biplane and the HE-115 for torpedo bombers (both are float planes) and they don't have a lot of either or very many aerial torpedoes either.

All of the french ships may not be gone, just many of the ones in close proximity to the area in question.
We have two scenarios here, the quick and dirty follow the Dunkirk evacuation scheme (late June of 1940?) or the Sept/Oct invasion with 2-3 months to gather boats, barges and ships, not 2-3 weeks.
Not all ships (in fact most) are not suitable for an over the beach invasion. If they draw more than 1 1/2 meters of water forward the men cannot wade ashore (and wading through chest deep sea water in Sept-Oct may not be easy or leave the men in good condition to fight.)
Seizing a suitable harbor is easier said than done, Folkestone for example handled 35,000 troops and 9,000 refugees during the Dunkirk evacuation but Folkestone only had one pier capable of handling large ships.

The Pier was primarily for passengers from cross channel packets and not cargo. The enclosed Harbor behind it is often exposed mud flats at low tide.
The next harbor actually worth anything to the south ( not a pier at an amusement beach) is Portsmouth. Lots of luck seizing that one in coup de main, even in the confusion after Dunkirk.
So it is not just a question of ships, it is ships/craft suitable for the areas you plan to invade or land supplies at.

 

[tomo pauk]

...
The JU-88A-17 didn't show up until 1942. Slapping torpedoes under the existing JU-88s may not have worked very well, The differences between the A-1 and the A-4 were more powerful engines, a bigger/longer span wing and stronger landing gear. The last two were introduced on the A-5 model which preceded the A-4 as they waited for the more powerful engines to reach production status.
In the Summer of 1940 the luftwaffe was pretty much limited to the HE 59 biplane and the HE-115 for torpedo bombers (both are float planes) and they don't have a lot of either or very many aerial torpedoes either.
...

Good post.
Just a nitpick - the A-1 have had two racks rated for 1000 kg each, the one at port side being also rated for a 1800 kg bomb (plus 2 racks for 500 kg, and 2 racks for 250 kg outboard of wings). Obviously, not all of them will be carrying max load in th same time.
Germany was probably lacking more in 'torpedo department' in 1940 (both quality and quantity?), than in aircraft capable carrying them.

 

[Shortround6]

The A-1s (maybe? ), A-2s and A-5s used under wing rockets to take-off in heavy loaded condition.
My sources may be old and outdated But the A-5s had the external racks out board of the engines?
A-1 carried a single 500kg bomb under each wing inboard of the engines but only if the internal bomb bays not full? or used 100kg bombs on these inner stations?


JU-88 is a can of worms
gross weight normal for an A-1 was 10,360kg, A-4 was 12,105kg but 14,000kg max overload.
part of the trouble with the A-4 is the empty weight went up by over 2000kgs so the actual payload increase wasn't that great unless you go into the max overload condition.

Getting an early Ju-88 of the ground with a pair of torpedoes might be possible but you aren't going very far with them.

 

[Glider]

It's also worth remembering that the RN had ships like the R class BB's, the loss of which would have had little impact on the war at sea, but were ideal as no German naval ship would have worried them, however for attacking an invasion fleet they would have been lethal. In a scenario where the attack would have been irrespective of losses they were perfect.
Dive bombers would be the main threat, but the Ju87B only carried a 500lb bomb and these BB's were designed to take knocks so they would probably have done the job and at least reached the invasion force. Also remember that the Luftwaffe were irrelevant at night and an invasion is a 24 hour undertaking

 

[Shortround6]

I believe the Stukas could carry 1100lbs (it meant no bombs under the wing) and could, in certain circumstances, carry a 2200lb bomb. This assumes the 2200lb bombs are available at the airfields where the Stukas are or can be transported there in short order.

This was much more likely in the Sept/Oct scenario, In the June scenario the Luftwaffe would be very lucky to have fuel at the forward airfields in the quantities needed let alone special munitions.

There was one "R" in the Southern Channel, but the Germans didn't even have anything close to an old WW I D class cruiser closer than Germany.

 

[parsifal]

The loss of air superiority would have greatly assisted the Germans in operation sea lion, but in no way would it guarantee success of the operation.

The Germans in the naval operation faced two massive problems. Unsolvable problems really in the context of the forces and capabilities they could draw upon in the late summer 1940.

The first problem was the shortage of escorts. The heavy units at their disposal were all laid up due to battle damage. Vessels like the Schleswig were simply not up to the task of providing effective escort to the invasion fleet. The modern units were either under repair (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Lutzow, Hipper), fitting out for other operations Adm Scheer) or still not commissioned (Bismarck, Eugen)

There were four Light cruisers, but three of them were no longer considered combat worthy. Emden was a training cruiser that had been assigned frontline tasks during the Norwegian campaign but would have struggled in the North Sea. Koln was operational, but in the Sea Lion Plan was assigned to the so called northern force. Both Leipzig and Nuremberg had suffered very heavy damage after being attacked by HM subs, their speed and firepower was very limited and they both had vastly reduced complements aboard.

In the summer there were just two operational DDs in DKM and 8 large sized Torpedo Boats like the Mowe or Jaguar classes.

There were about 24 SBoats and about 40 rboats or Armed tralers and other light craft

Depending on the time frame, the rapid response forces available to the british consisted of the following

Humber (10 hrs)
3 CL: Manchester, Southampton, Birmingham
5 DD: Javelin, Jupiter, Jaguar, Kelvin, Watchman

Lowestoft (5 hrs):
1 TB: Draug (NO),
6MTBs/MGBs

Harwich (3 5 hrs)
6 DD: Malcolm (D16), Venomous, Verity, Wild Swan, Wivern, Worcester
1 SS: H 44
18xMTBs, London (4 5 hrs)
DD: Margaree (RCN) (damaged by bomb splinters 17 Sep)

Sheerness/Chatham (4 hrs)
2 CL: Galatea Aurora
9 DD: Brilliant, Icarus, Impulsive, Intrepid, Campbell (D21), Venetia, Vesper, Vivacious, Walpole
12 DE: Cattistock, Eglinton, Holderness (under repair from mine damage until 22 September), Garth, Hambledon, Quorn, Vanity, Vimiera, Wallace, Westminster, Winchester, Wolsey
3 MTBs

Dover (1 hr)
6 MTBs

There were approximately 350 Fairmile style cutters similar in capability to the German R bootes and Armed trawlers. At Scapa, some 23 hours sailing time there were a further 30-50 DDs

At the beginning of September the Admiralty had disposed sixty-seven (plus six cruisers) for immediate response to an invasion alarm. The first warning of the invasion's sailing would come, it was hoped, from RAF reconnaissance over the assembly ports. But in case – as was likely – the Germans waited until after dark before commencing their 5 day toil across to England, the Royal Navy had a pool of 700 armed patrol craft (requisitioned motor yachts and trawlers) of whom around 200 were on picket duty "off the north coast of France" every night. So, owing to either the air reconnaissance or the trip-wire patrols, there was a high likelihood that the German invasion armadas would have found British destroyers between them and their intended landing-beaches, hiding by day, attacking by night. Even the light weapons aboard these DDs would have been lethal to the invasion barges.

The second component of RN interventions would have been the thirty-four corvettes and sloops, and approximately 40 MTBs, employed on East Coast and Channel convoy routes. Then, within twenty-four hours of the alert, the cruisers and capital units of the Home Fleet would have started to arrive from the far north and west. 165 "MSWs" of the flower class ilk were at hand to maintain swept channels. Finally, many of the thirty-five submarines based in home waters would have headed for the Channel to disrupt the shuttling back and forth of barges required by the German build-up for the next ten days.

The Luftwaffe in all probability could be expected to exact a heavy toll on the RN, but in no way is it reasonable to expect they could prevent the RN from interdicting the narrow seas of the channel. Almost certainly the LW, in gaining air superiority would have itself been heavily wounded. Even on the most successful days of Dunkirk, 6 british and 3 french DDs were lost over a 5 day operation. Other warship losses amounted to 17 armed trawlers, 5 fleet MSWs, 1 sloop, 1 ocean boarding vessel. No MTBs out of 27 committed were lost. 6 Fairmile type Boats out of over 30 committed were lost. Even under the most optimistic of assumptions it is implausible that the LW could do better than it did at Dunkirk, for the simple reason that it would be tired and in a weakened state, and still fighting the RAF in some form.

There was never the slightest chance of DKM successfully completing the cross channel operation.

 

[stona]

"... it is implausible that the LW could do better than it did at Dunkirk, for the simple reason that it would be tired and in a weakened state, and still fighting the RAF in some form."

And that it would be engaging moving targets. Many of the vessels sunk and damaged at and around Dunkirk were stationary when hit.

And the Luftwaffe couldn't operate against the RN at night, whereas the RN could certainly operate against the invasion convoys at night. The transports and some barges and other vessels were expected to shuttle back and forth across the Channel continually to reinforce and resupply the initial landings. Quite apart from the vessels actually making the crossings, there would also be large numbers of invasion vessels loading and unloading (transferring to barges) off the invasion beaches, large, stationary and easily found targets for the RN (and RAF, which. theoretically at least, could bomb by night). There would also be concentrations of vessels loading in the continental invasion ports, which could also be attacked, and more heavily than they were historically, pre-invasion. In late September day and night are about the same length; even allowing for nautical twilight the Luftwaffe can cover the invasion and on going cross-Channel operations for just 14 in every 24 hours. The RN has free rein for the other 10 hours.

I could go on.....

Cheers

Steve

 

[Kevin J]

Carried over from the other thread.



3rd paragraph. Bringing in the air attacks from 1 to 2 years in the future is skewing things a bit. The Germans in the summer of 1940 were just learning how to attack ships in actual fact, not just training missions. This learning process took a while and is what helped get the later results that you mention. Expecting similar results in the first few weeks of actual operations is a bit much.
Actually the "Kanalkampf" operations may show the opposite of what you think. Sinking slow coastal freighters and fishing boats is one thing. Sinking warships moving at 20kts or better is another (as long as they stop steering in straight lines to improve their own gunnery). The other big point, often ignored by advocates of the German invasion is that hundreds of freighters did get through and some of those sunk were on repeat trips. If you sink a small freighter hauling coal on it's 3rd or 4th trip yes it is a loss, and the British Need every ship/cargo they can get BUT if you sink a British destroyer carrying a "cargo" of eight 21 torpedoes and 1000 rounds of 4.7in ammo on it's 3rd trip to shoot up your invasion fleet you are going to run out of invasion fleet pretty quick.
It was always going to be a war of attrition. Neither side could guarantee safety of it's ships through air power. The British simply had many times the number of ships to loose. The Germans cannot afford to trade the British ship for ship or even two British ships for every German ship.

The German surface navy in the summer of 1940 was almost non existent. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were both in dockyard hands repairing torpedo/mine damage. Only one of of the pocket battleships was operational at this time, one Cruiser of the Blucher class, Two modern light cruisers and the 1926 Emden (being used as a training ship in the Baltic)., number of destroyers varied as bit as repairs were made to ships damaged (or broken down) during the Norwegian campaign. By Sept there may have been eight. That is pretty much it for ships over 1000 tons except for a mine layer or two. Actual German plans for this group of ships was to escort some old passenger liners on a feint towards the North of England to draw off the Home fleet or ships stationed along the east coast. Vary as you see fit but this small group of cruisers/destroyers isn't going to be much more than a speed bump to the Royal Navy.

Subs work both ways and the British subs had been pretty successful in Norway. Trying to use subs in the Channel is another game.

The JU-88A-17 didn't show up until 1942. Slapping torpedoes under the existing JU-88s may not have worked very well, The differences between the A-1 and the A-4 were more powerful engines, a bigger/longer span wing and stronger landing gear. The last two were introduced on the A-5 model which preceded the A-4 as they waited for the more powerful engines to reach production status.
In the Summer of 1940 the luftwaffe was pretty much limited to the HE 59 biplane and the HE-115 for torpedo bombers (both are float planes) and they don't have a lot of either or very many aerial torpedoes either.

All of the french ships may not be gone, just many of the ones in close proximity to the area in question.
We have two scenarios here, the quick and dirty follow the Dunkirk evacuation scheme (late June of 1940?) or the Sept/Oct invasion with 2-3 months to gather boats, barges and ships, not 2-3 weeks.
Not all ships (in fact most) are not suitable for an over the beach invasion. If they draw more than 1 1/2 meters of water forward the men cannot wade ashore (and wading through chest deep sea water in Sept-Oct may not be easy or leave the men in good condition to fight.)
Seizing a suitable harbor is easier said than done, Folkestone for example handled 35,000 troops and 9,000 refugees during the Dunkirk evacuation but Folkestone only had one pier capable of handling large ships.
View attachment 529488
The Pier was primarily for passengers from cross channel packets and not cargo. The enclosed Harbor behind it is often exposed mud flats at low tide.
The next harbor actually worth anything to the south ( not a pier at an amusement beach) is Portsmouth. Lots of luck seizing that one in coup de main, even in the confusion after Dunkirk.
So it is not just a question of ships, it is ships/craft suitable for the areas you plan to invade or land supplies at.

If I was going to launch a cross channel invasion to seize a port, I would go for Weymouth which is 77 miles from Cherbourg. It has a gently sloping beach and a harbour.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Uk_dor_portharbour.JPG
The invasion date would have to be in 1941 as by then I would have my two heavy battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest available to sortie out and provide heavy fire support. For fighter cover I would have the Bf 109E-7 and Bf 109F-2, both of which could carry drop tanks. I would have my submarines and U Boat pens in Lorient too. Of course losing the Bismarck in the Atlantic might well scupper my plans, and with the destruction of the dry dock at St Nazaire in March 1942, I couldn't even send Tirpitz down as a substitute.
Plus an airborne assault on the Isle of Wight so that I could 'bottle up' the RN in Portsmouth.

 

[tomo pauk]

The A-1s (maybe? ), A-2s and A-5s used under wing rockets to take-off in heavy loaded condition.
My sources may be old and outdated But the A-5s had the external racks out board of the engines?
A-1 carried a single 500kg bomb under each wing inboard of the engines but only if the internal bomb bays not full? or used 100kg bombs on these inner stations?


JU-88 is a can of worms
gross weight normal for an A-1 was 10,360kg, A-4 was 12,105kg but 14,000kg max overload.
part of the trouble with the A-4 is the empty weight went up by over 2000kgs so the actual payload increase wasn't that great unless you go into the max overload condition.

Getting an early Ju-88 of the ground with a pair of torpedoes might be possible but you aren't going very far with them.

Max take off for Ju 88A-1, per manual dated March 1940, is 12300 kg.
Disposition of bomb racks on Ju 88A-1/A-5, translations in red rectangulars by yours truly:

I believe the Stukas could carry 1100lbs (it meant no bombs under the wing) and could, in certain circumstances, carry a 2200lb bomb. This assumes the 2200lb bombs are available at the airfields where the Stukas are or can be transported there in short order.

This was much more likely in the Sept/Oct scenario, In the June scenario the Luftwaffe would be very lucky to have fuel at the forward airfields in the quantities needed let alone special munitions.

Already the Ju 87R-1, a longer-ranged version of the B-1, with 1000 HP for take off, was rated for 1000 kg bomb, 2x300 L drop tanks and armor, all in the same time.

 

[Glider]

If I was going to launch a cross channel invasion to seize a port, I would go for Weymouth which is 77 miles from Cherbourg. It has a gently sloping beach and a harbour.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Uk_dor_portharbour.JPG
The invasion date would have to be in 1941 as by then I would have my two heavy battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau in Brest available to sortie out and provide heavy fire support. For fighter cover I would have the Bf 109E-7 and Bf 109F-2, both of which could carry drop tanks. I would have my submarines and U Boat pens in Lorient too. Of course losing the Bismarck in the Atlantic might well scupper my plans, and with the destruction of the dry dock at St Nazaire in March 1942, I couldn't even send Tirpitz down as a substitute.
Plus an airborne assault on the Isle of Wight so that I could 'bottle up' the RN in Portsmouth.

By then the RAF will have recovered their numbers, the RN is starting to get better ships, the old R class are still more than good enough to deal with the German Battle cruisers, The night sky belongs to the RAF as the Beaufighter is starting to be produced in numbers, ad the army is getting better equipped all the time

 

[Kevin J]

By then the RAF will have recovered their numbers, the RN is starting to get better ships, the old R class are still more than good enough to deal with the German Battle cruisers, The night sky belongs to the RAF as the Beaufighter is starting to be produced in numbers, ad the army is getting better equipped all the time

My idea is still better than the previous year's suicide option called Operation Sea Lion. The Germans also need a heavy battleship like the Bismarck or Tirpitz to guard the Western Approaches to the English Channel and they don't have one in either 1941 because Bismarck was sunk, or 1942 after the Raid on St Nazaire destroyed the only dry dock on the French Atlantic coast big enough to take Tirpitz for repairs. Also, no Operation Barbarossa in 1941 as you need a re-run of the Battle of Britain, and no Channel Dash in 1942 as you lose your battle cruisers needed for heavy bombardment. I expect Stalin was expecting the Germans to be well bogged down in France for several years

 

[stona]

My idea is still better than the previous year's suicide option called Operation Sea Lion.

May be so! But I think an attempt in 1941 would have been just as suicidal as Sealion would have been.

The problem is that to launch a successful amphibious operation it is vital that the attacker has control of the sea, complete control, 24/7, for the duration of the operation, as the Allies had in 1944. I fail to see how even a win in the BoB could have achieved this for the Germans, the idea that local air superiority over the Channel and even SE England confers such control is a nonsense. The Germans were utterly incapable of controlling the Channel in 1940, 1941, or any other time.

With the benefit of hindsight I cannot see any situation in which the Germans could have launched a successful invasion of Britain. The problem was, and remained, the superiority of the Royal Navy.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

I think he is winding us up.
Some of our British members might want to think about what is right next door to Weymouth.
I had no clue until I Google mapped it.

Need we go into the problems of getting a sizable fleet of invasion ships to Cherbourg.

 

[Kevin J]

I think he is winding us up.
Some of our British members might want to think about what is right next door to Weymouth.
I had no clue until I Google mapped it.

Need we go into the problems of getting a sizable fleet of invasion ships to Cherbourg.

Yes, I assume you are referring to Slapton Sands, but realistically, if you want to launch an invasion similar to Normandy, which incidentally worked, then Weymouth and Slapton Sands is probably your best bet. All you need is total air superiority and a bigger navy. While you're building it, you may as well launch Operation Barbarossa as its going to take a few years to get your navy fit for purpose.

Alternatives to Weymouth and Slapton Sands are:-
1. Southend on Sea. Distance from Antwerp, 161 miles. No port.
2. Clacton and Frinton on Sea. Distance from The Hague, 136 miles. No port.
3. Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Distance from The Hague, 115 miles. Small harbours.
4. Bournemouth and Poole. An interesting choice but a bit too close to our main navy base at Portsmouth. So not my choice. Same distance as Weymouth from Cherbourg. Has a port.
I don't think that any of these would have been feasible options as you can't provide any continuous air cover and don't have a reasonable sized port.

As for places like Dover. Folkestone, Ramsgate, Hastings, the beaches, like Dieppe are stones and pebbles, so your tanks' tracks won't grip.

 

[Glider]

I lived at Southend for 35 years and the tide goes out about a mile, a worse place for a landing would be hard to come by.

On a different tack for those who believe that the Luftwaffe would have it all their own way and the German Navy block the channel with mines, the following may be of interest. I have found out that on September 8th 1940, the Light Cruiser HMS Aurora bombarded the landing barges at Boulogne, which really must have put the wind up anyone thinking of invading

 

[Shortround6]

Yes, I assume you are referring to Slapton Sands, but realistically, if you want to launch an invasion similar to Normandy, which incidentally worked, then Weymouth and Slapton Sands is probably your best bet. All you need is total air superiority and a bigger navy. While you're building it, you may as well launch Operation Barbarossa as its going to take a few years to get your navy fit for purpose.

Alternatives to Weymouth and Slapton Sands are:-
1. Southend on Sea. Distance from Antwerp, 161 miles. No port.
2. Clacton and Frinton on Sea. Distance from The Hague, 136 miles. No port.
3. Yarmouth and Lowestoft. Distance from The Hague, 115 miles. Small harbours.
4. Bournemouth and Poole. An interesting choice but a bit too close to our main navy base at Portsmouth. So not my choice. Same distance as Weymouth from Cherbourg. Has a port.
I don't think that any of these would have been feasible options as you can't provide any continuous air cover and don't have a reasonable sized port.

As for places like Dover. Folkestone, Ramsgate, Hastings, the beaches, like Dieppe are stones and pebbles, so your tanks' tracks won't grip.

I was referring to Portland Harbor/Naval base.

Some sources claim the British had 17 divisions in Sept of 1940, 3 of them armoured divisions (or the equivalent tank regiments were available. How well trained or equipped these divisions were I don't know but the men who came back from Dunkirk had fought the Germans for several weeks doing one of the most difficult operations an army can engage in. A systematic withdrawal in the face of ongoing attacks. At no time did it turn into a rout. Many times the British were forced to retreat because of allied troops on one flank or the other retreating (often without telling the British) making their positions untenable.

A few thousand Germans are not going be able to hang on for very long without constant supply/reinforcements. The Germans were never going to get enough shipping capacity to move with safety, the number of troops and the tonnage of supplies needed.

 

[Glider]

I have also found that

On the 30th September the British Monitor Erebus with two destroyers bombarded Calais.

On the 11th October HMS Revenge, escorted by seven destroyers fired 120 rounds of 15in and 801 rounds of 4.7in at Cherbourg.

The Channel was far from being an area controlled by the German forces

 

[Kevin J]

I lived at Southend for 35 years and the tide goes out about a mile, a worse place for a landing would be hard to come by.

On a different tack for those who believe that the Luftwaffe would have it all their own way and the German Navy block the channel with mines, the following may be of interest. I have found out that on September 8th 1940, the Light Cruiser HMS Aurora bombarded the landing barges at Boulogne, which really must have put the wind up anyone thinking of invading

When and where? I lived in Westcliff from 56 to 74.

 

[Glider]

When and where? I lived in Westcliff from 56 to 74.

I actually lived in Hadleigh from 75 to 77 then Rayleigh until three years ago when I came to Lincolnshire. Small world isn't it and you will know the tides at Southend

 

[Kevin J]

I was referring to Portland Harbor/Naval base.

Some sources claim the British had 17 divisions in Sept of 1940, 3 of them armoured divisions (or the equivalent tank regiments were available. How well trained or equipped these divisions were I don't know but the men who came back from Dunkirk had fought the Germans for several weeks doing one of the most difficult operations an army can engage in. A systematic withdrawal in the face of ongoing attacks. At no time did it turn into a rout. Many times the British were forced to retreat because of allied troops on one flank or the other retreating (often without telling the British) making their positions untenable.

A few thousand Germans are not going be able to hang on for very long without constant supply/reinforcements. The Germans were never going to get enough shipping capacity to move with safety, the number of troops and the tonnage of supplies needed.

That's why I'm arguing for a limited number of landings, on gently sloping beaches away from the main air battle zone. Portland was a sub base so I'm assuming not quite as dangerous as either Portsmouth or Plymouth. You're right, the Germans need a much bigger navy and that never happened.