If the 'Spruce Goose' could fly, how effective would it have been ?

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I'm not sure why there is so much debate as to the possibility of something going wrong while in service. There's been countless mishaps with reliable and proven aircraft that is the result of standard ops...you just can't have perfect conditions 100% of the time, and surely not during a wartime setting.

Yes, there's the chance of floating debris, yes there's a chance of rough seas, yes there's a chance of bad weather, yes there's the chance of attack by enemy aircraft, yes to all of the above.

Let's consider how many aircrews operating traditional (land/carrier based) aircraft (bomber/transport/fighter/observation) were lost due to malfunction, collision, friendly fire poor weather conditions over the duration of the war. We won't factor in enemy encounters. But if one person was lost, that's unacceptable, but in reality, the figure is way far and above that. That is an uncomfortable truth of war.

Of all the flying boats that operated in both theaters and both sides, few were lost to floatsam. One Bv222 was lost when it struck a submerged wreck as it was landing in the Med. Other than that, I don't recall hearing many reports of similiar losses, though that's not to say it didn't happen. But that was not a major issue. More flying boats were lost to enemy attack than anything.

As far as the H-4's flight, I also believe that Hughes did that last run on purpose. He let off some reporters prior to the last taxi, yet some remained aboard and I suspect it was more than coincidence.

And just for the record, there are two Martin Mars left, that actively fly fire bombing missions, the "Hawaii" and the "Caroline" out of Canada.
 
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Hughes was a accomplished pilot, and I am sure could tell by the feel of the controls and speed of the craft that it was about to lift off. I do not buy the story that with him at the controls, this massive aircraft "accidentally" lifted off.
 
The plane rose to 70ft so hardly an oops. but the one mile distance and 1 minute flight time argue for a major problem with the planes flying performance as does his immediate landing and storage for 33 years
 
Greetings One and All: The Spruce Goose was a Joke ! Howard Hughes got behind the simple controls and cranked the engines up. He knew he did not have the POWER to gain altitude. Why this HULK is a Shrine in a museum I don't know. It was said that 747 Engineers came to pay homage to the Flight Controls. Even they were a joke ! Bell Cranks and cables, the same as a Douglas DC-3 or DC-4, there was no break thru on the Spruce Goose. It cost the Tax Payers DEARLY. Hughes knew it would not FLY. No POWER A&P 19949540
 
Greetings One and All: The Spruce Goose was a Joke ! Howard Hughes got behind the simple controls and cranked the engines up. He knew he did not have the POWER to gain altitude. Why this HULK is a Shrine in a museum I don't know. It was said that 747 Engineers came to pay homage to the Flight Controls. Even they were a joke ! Bell Cranks and cables, the same as a Douglas DC-3 or DC-4, there was no break thru on the Spruce Goose. It cost the Tax Payers DEARLY. Hughes knew it would not FLY. No POWER A&P 19949540
Well bobguthrie, I guess you're right...perhaps we should just burn it, scatter it's ashes and be done with the myth?

We can only speculate what went on in Hughes' mind that day, even if he was becoming a bit eccentric at that time, he still was an accomplished aviator and knew exactly what he was doing.

You say the machine had no power, yet the engines were more than capable of lifting that machine out of the water, as the H-4 was not carrying a load other than the crew and guests.

Common sense would dictate that the sheer scale of the aircraft would require a tremendous amount of time and effort to design, build and test by those day's standards. A comparable aircaft would be the B-36, which was saw conception even before the U.S. went to war and because of similiar strategic material supply issues, cost over-runs and design changes, wasn't even flown until 1946. It had similiar controls, a cramped flight deck and only 6 R-4360-53 radials instead of 8 so I suppose the B-36 was a joke to, then?

For comparison, the top photo is the H-4's cockpit, the bottom photo is the B-36...
 

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Greetings One and All: The Spruce Goose was a Joke ! Howard Hughes got behind the simple controls and cranked the engines up. He knew he did not have the POWER to gain altitude. Why this HULK is a Shrine in a museum I don't know. It was said that 747 Engineers came to pay homage to the Flight Controls. Even they were a joke ! Bell Cranks and cables, the same as a Douglas DC-3 or DC-4, there was no break thru on the Spruce Goose. It cost the Tax Payers DEARLY. Hughes knew it would not FLY. No POWER A&P 19949540

And your sources??? I would think the aircraft would have "bell Cranks and cables, the same as a Douglas DC-3 or DC-4" because that was what was being used at the time!!!! It seems that you neglected to mention that some of these aircraft's flight controls were dynamically balanced so I don't see your point.

I also suggest you go back to post 31 were one of out more informed members calculated the H-4's power to weight ratio and wing loading. Its wing loading was LOWER than the PBM, PB2Y and the BV 222. It had a higher power to weight ratio than all three of them, so again, tell us your sources for your claims?!?!?!

BTW - A&P/IA 3023814, GROL R/E, CFII SEL.
 
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a better and safer form of strategic transport were the fast troopships, like the Queen Mary. Very few troops embarked on ships of this type were ever intercepted by U-Boats. The QM shifted something like a million soldiers without a hitch. They were capable of a sustained sea speed of over 27 knots. Nothing could keep up with them over any distance. They were never risked in "hot" combat zones....they were far too valuable for that, but a few more like them would have made force projection a snap
 
a better and safer form of strategic transport were the fast troopships, like the Queen Mary. Very few troops embarked on ships of this type were ever intercepted by U-Boats. The QM shifted something like a million soldiers without a hitch. They were capable of a sustained sea speed of over 27 knots. Nothing could keep up with them over any distance. They were never risked in "hot" combat zones....they were far too valuable for that, but a few more like them would have made force projection a snap

But they were intercepted, no matter how few. The H-4 was supposed to eliminate this risk, but it is evident there were other risks within this concept.
 
I should qualify my post as well. There were in fact quite a few passengrt liners sunk, but none of the so called fast transports, of which Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth were the most well known

Many of the ships lost were lost whilst operating close inshore, in restricted waters, and many were sunk by mines or aircraft. The US President Coolidge was sunk in the South Pacific in in 1942, to a mine I think. The biggest single loss in tonnage terms was the Empress Of Britiain, lost to a U-Boat skippered by the legendary Karl Topp in October 1940 (42000 tons).

The type of ships I was referrig to represented just a handful of ships. The Queen Mary is the most famous that I know of. She never travelled in Convoy....no warship could hope to maintin the speed she could over the Atlantic crossing. She could do it in just over four days. The only other ships capable of this speed of crossing were the QE and the Normandie,and Normandie suffered a fire in 1942 in the port of New York.

These exceptionally fast ships never suffered a loss, though lesser, slower ships of the same type did.

If the Me 323 operations are anything to go by as a comparison to the projected H-4 operations, even if the H-4s were only used in non-combat areas, as a strategic transatlantic carrier, or similar, ther are going to be losses. Typically, allied types were sufferring about 2% losses to non-combat related causes per month. Engines fail, structural failures, that kinda thing. I think it likley the Spruce Goose would have suffered a somewaht higher attrition rate, based on just speculation. These aircraft were big, very big, and with lots of hull stress to worry about.

But for now, lets accept a 2% loss rate as an indicative number at least. If there were twelve of them, as someone suggested, and they were each averaging say two flights per week, thats roughly 9 flights per month. Lets say, on average they move 500 personnel per trip. That means the fleet as a whole will undertake about 100 flights per month, transporting 50000 men in the process. However they would lose 1000 of these men (assuming a 100% loss of personnel for every aircraft lost), thats a pretty heavy casualty rate in my opinion.
 
I should qualify my post as well. There were in fact quite a few passengrt liners sunk, but none of the so called fast transports, of which Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth were the most well known

Many of the ships lost were lost whilst operating close inshore, in restricted waters, and many were sunk by mines or aircraft. The US President Coolidge was sunk in the South Pacific in in 1942, to a mine I think. The biggest single loss in tonnage terms was the Empress Of Britiain, lost to a U-Boat skippered by the legendary Karl Topp in October 1940 (42000 tons).

The type of ships I was referrig to represented just a handful of ships. The Queen Mary is the most famous that I know of. She never travelled in Convoy....no warship could hope to maintin the speed she could over the Atlantic crossing. She could do it in just over four days. The only other ships capable of this speed of crossing were the QE and the Normandie,and Normandie suffered a fire in 1942 in the port of New York.

These exceptionally fast ships never suffered a loss, though lesser, slower ships of the same type did.
All good - but I think this is a whole different subject

If the Me 323 operations are anything to go by as a comparison to the projected H-4 operations, even if the H-4s were only used in non-combat areas, as a strategic transatlantic carrier, or similar, ther are going to be losses. Typically, allied types were sufferring about 2% losses to non-combat related causes per month. Engines fail, structural failures, that kinda thing. I think it likley the Spruce Goose would have suffered a somewaht higher attrition rate, based on just speculation. These aircraft were big, very big, and with lots of hull stress to worry about.
I can agree there, but then again I think that 2% non-combat attrition rate would have been similar for other allied transports of the period
But for now, lets accept a 2% loss rate as an indicative number at least. If there were twelve of them, as someone suggested, and they were each averaging say two flights per week, thats roughly 9 flights per month. Lets say, on average they move 500 personnel per trip. That means the fleet as a whole will undertake about 100 flights per month, transporting 50000 men in the process. However they would lose 1000 of these men (assuming a 100% loss of personnel for every aircraft lost), thats a pretty heavy casualty rate in my opinion.
It is, but then again compare those numbers to the Mars operations that were conducted well into the 1950s. Additionally I think the military in that era would have looked upon loosing 1000 men during transport operations as acceptable losses considering what was lost during some of the major campaigns of the war.
 
a better and safer form of strategic transport were the fast troopships, like the Queen Mary. Very few troops embarked on ships of this type were ever intercepted by U-Boats. The QM shifted something like a million soldiers without a hitch. They were capable of a sustained sea speed of over 27 knots. Nothing could keep up with them over any distance. They were never risked in "hot" combat zones....they were far too valuable for that, but a few more like them would have made force projection a snap

A total non-starter from the "increase" capacity over what we have now point of view. Yes they did good work but with the best intentions and resource shifting it was going to take around 3 years to build one. And it would be at the cost of a large carrier or similar sized ship (or two).

As far as the 2% goes these large aircraft would probably have had select, trained crews. What was the loss rate for the Boeing 314 Clippers, the Short Empire "G" class flying boats, Sikorsky VS-44s and a few others?
Granted a few were lost but none took the full crew/occupants with them and considering some of the these planes flew for 4years or more during WW II with heavy use it doesn't seem to be quite the problem you are making it out to be.
 
What's being discussed here is the use of a very large aircraft in a regular, frequent resupply operation and the Mars was never used for that, nor was it used for carrying hundreds of soldiers.

Check this out:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZB3DPE7tUU

The last two, Hawaii 2 and Phillipine, are going strong as water bombers. They live in my back yard (well, not literally... I'm a couple of miles from their home base on Sproat Lake):

The World's Largest Flying Boats Ever Flown Operationally

They are spectacular to see, whether parked, or in action.

Leif
 
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I seem to recall the C-5 Galaxy program being oversized, overweight, overdue and over budget. And some politicians making the same arguements as I've read here. :lol:
 
I seem to recall the C-5 Galaxy program being oversized, overweight, overdue and over budget. And some politicians making the same arguements as I've read here. :lol:
Yep...and on top of all that, some experts in the industry said it *technically* should not be able to get off the ground... :lol:
 
Further proof that Hughes knew exactly what he was doing. I'm paraphrasing here, but found a old issue last night of Flight Journal where the article's author had spoken with and interviewed one of Hughes' head engineers, his last name was Reeder, first name might have been Paul. MR. Reeder said that Hughes had made 3 taxing runs in the H-4, and on the 4th run, turned the plane into the wind, and asked for flaps in the takeoff position. He then ran the engines to take off position, and had the only reporter who stayed on board call out the air speed until takeoff speed was achieved, and pulled back on the controls sending the H-4 into the air. There was also a mis-calculation in the design of the flaps, and Reeder reminded Hughes of the issue with the flaps, I believe they could not exceed a certain air speed because of a flaw in the flaps maybe. I'll pull the article and get more info from the article. This was all I could pull from memory.
 
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Not exactly related to the H4, but I suspect the Air Force liked the C-97 because they'd had excellent service out of the B-29, and wanted to recoup some of that development money they spent on the things. How many WWII BILLIONS of dollars did they spend on it? 27? More? That's a heckuva lot of money in WWII terms, after all.
In any event, it was a boatload of money, and they needed something more to show for it than two smoking holes in Japan, so they got the B-29, B-50, and C-97s out of it, and probably a couple more I'm forgetting at the moment. And the Guppies and Super Guppy, too, lest we forget.
 
THe Hughes H-K 4 Hercules was not made of spruce. It was made of birch.
Also it never flew as it never got oiut of ground effect. It was a giant WIG or glorified hovercraft..
 

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