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At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,
At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,
I wouldn't make a comparison of a/c in these two battles and certainly would conclude that I'd rather be flying a Hurricane IIB or even a HI than a F2A-3.
Well, Finnish B-239's managed to shoot down a Soviet Hawker Hurricane
The Hurricanes probably fared better against the fighters than anything the Marines had. Against the Zeros, forget about it. This account on Midway is pretty much my understanding on that stage in the war. This is from Lord, Incredible Victory (1967), p102:At Midway the USMC deployed 18 F2A-3s and 6 F4F-3s against the IJN raid. The USMC fighters had ample radar warning and all 24 attacked with a clear altitude advantage. The IJN force numbered 36 fighters, 36 Kates and 36 Vals. In First Team Lundstrom states that the USMC fighters shot down 3 or 4 IJN aircraft (one or two fighters and two attack aircraft) and 3 or 4 more IJN aircraft were lost to AA, for a total of 7 IJN losses. The USMC lost 13 F2A-3s, and 2 F4F-3s with only two F4Fs flyable after the action.
The 16 RAF Hurricane fighters on April 09 faced longer odds and did comparatively better,
If he was "simply blaming the aircraft," or "just blaming the tool," I think I'd be inclined to agree with you.Lord raises a valid point about the ethnic bias applied against Japanese technology in the late-30s and through until late-41. However, simply blaming the aircraft is a naiively simplistic. Poor tactics coupled with a large number of pilots fresh out of training and a squadron organization that was just rebuilding after having been split to form VMF-222...hardly the makings of a robust defensive force. I'm not saying the F2A-3 was a good aircraft - it was too heavy, with manouverability sacrificed for long range (at the USN's behest, I must add) - but just blaming the tool is a workman's cop out.
From Wiki:
The poor performance of the Buffalo at Midway later prompted Finnish Air Force ace Hans Wind to develop new combat tactics for the FAF Brewster, which were later used with remarkable success in 1942 and 1943 against the Soviet Air Force during the Continuation War.[47] Wind's combat tactics, which emphasized diving speed and zoom climbs, were much the same as Claire Chennault's advice for employing the Curtiss P-40B against the A6M Zero in Burma and China.
I'm not saying the F2A-3 was a good aircraft - it was too heavy, with manouverability sacrificed for long range (at the USN's behest, I must add)
Do you have a source for this?
while max capacity did change the normal fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard.
The prototype XF2A-1 and XF2A-2 (same airframe) held only 110 gallons so the US Navy certainly did ask for more fuel/range in the production versions. Reasons for the increase from 160 to 240 gallons are a bit more confused.
Weight tables in 'AHT' show 660lbs (110 gal) as 'normal' fuel load and 1080lbs (180 gal) as overload, which doesn't quite add up. 240 gallons would be 1440lbs of fuel