IJN attacks vs defended islands: Ceylon compared to Midway

[oldcrowcv63]

The Hurricanes probably fared better against the fighters than anything the Marines had. Against the Zeros, forget about it. This account on Midway is pretty much my understanding on that stage in the war. This is from Lord, Incredible Victory (1967), p102:

"But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference. As the Marine fighters fluttered down to the sea, or staggered back toward Midway, it was clear that the greatest Japanese advantage lay in the Zero itself. The Marine pilots were astonished. Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own. Now here was a fighter that could outclimb, outrun, outmaneuver any plane the U.S. had. If it was also highly vulnerable, they rarely had a good enough shot at it to find out. Even the F4Fs were completely outclassed, and the ancient Buffaloes--as Lieutenant Charles Hughes sadly remarked--"looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made passes at them."

Losses appear difficult to assess in both cases but it seems the results in the two instances were fairly similar against both IJN VF and VTB: At Ceylon, IJN reports 3 VF and 2VTB lost (Shores et al.) while at Midway it looks like 2 VF, and perhaps 3 or 4 VTB (2 Hiryu and 1 Soryu) destroyed with one VTB ditching on return to its carrier dues to damage or fuel loss/starvation. (Cressman)

Lundstrom: (for just Hiryu) 3 VTB lost in a2a combat with one ditched in return.

Prange cites 2 VF 3 VTB

Japanese Story cites:

Kaga: 2 VF (1 vs a-2-a 1 vs AA), 1 VB (probably vs AA?)
Akagi: 1 VF (1 vs a2a)
Hiryu: 4 VTB (2 vs a-2-a 2 vs AA), 1 VTB
Soryu: 1 VTB (1 vs a-2-a)

Fuchida lists: 3 VTB, 2 VF 1VB

I'd guess however accurate the type-loss accounting, the numbers are too small in this instance to draw a conclusion. However, The surviving pilots and aircraft might be another measure or performance. In that case, I suspect, based on Shores et al. that more of the RAF a/c survived were fit to fly, although perhaps by a small margin. Seems perhaps 3 or 4 Hurricanes survived the encounter with no or minor damage and might be immediately operational. Careful accounting shows 10 of 16 Hurricanes forced down, with 2 crashed landed at the airfield, but with 14 of the 16 pilots surviving the action. That appears to be the biggest difference in the two actions.

I think by this point, 6 months into the war, with reports on the A6M coming in from action in China, the PI, SE Asia, Coral Sea and particularly Australia, Lord's statement seems just a bit of dramatic hyperbole. Not to diminish the existence of an ethnic bias but I would expect the magnitude of the difference to be most shocking to the rookies such as Hughes. Armistead's, Humbard's and particularly White's critiques seem a bit more analytic, while Carl doesn't make a comparison. Assuming the reports had been shared with the pilots, I would expect their reaction to the aerial fight was more like, "SOB, those reports on the '0' weren't exaggerating."

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Do you have a source for this?

while max capacity did change the normal fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard.

The prototype XF2A-1 and XF2A-2 (same airframe) held only 110 gallons so the US Navy certainly did ask for more fuel/range in the production versions. Reasons for the increase from 160 to 240 gallons are a bit more confused.

Weight tables in 'AHT' show 660lbs (110 gal) as 'normal' fuel load and 1080lbs (180 gal) as overload, which doesn't quite add up. 240 gallons would be 1440lbs of fuel

Short Round, in 1993, before his passing, I spoke to Tom Cheek by telephone about the F2A-3 and he claimed the additional fuel capacity was installed to allow CAP to perform long range radar directed intercepts. I don't have a written source for this other than his words and the anecdote he related that "Rock Happy" naval aviators ashore at PH would joke about using the F2A-3 prodigious range to fly back to the mainland. a distance of about 2,000 miles and probably beyond the range of an F2A-3 even with a full bag unless of course winds were very favorable.

On the other hand, Jim Mass states that CAP pilots reported flying 6 hour duration patrols. But that the advent of radar made the excess range unnecessary which of course seems to conflict with Cheek's rationale to some extent.

 

[buffnut453]

If he was "simply blaming the aircraft," or "just blaming the tool," I think I'd be inclined to agree with you.

The excerpt you quoted fails to mention tactical employment, those awful Division formations, the inexperience of many USMC fighters etc etc. Lord seemingly doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled. That doesn't leave much room for blame other than pointing at the aircraft itself.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Another difference in the two action, is noteworthy by its absence in the Shores postmortem of the RAF action. Apparently, no surviving RAF pilot is, at least as reported by Shores, to have landed and called for the retirement of the Hurricane due to the superiority of the '0'. Of the senior surviving pilots, Armistead and Humbard commented on the superiority of the A6M with over-estimates of its performance, but did not call for the F2A-3's retirement. White similarly complained about the disparity between the F2A's and A6M's performance but also bitterly concluded that the F2A-3 did not belong in combat. Carl of course flew a Wildcat.

 

[buffnut453]

And the more vitriolic the statement, the more eye-catching it becomes for historians who want to trot out a story. IIRC one of the VMF-221 pilots declared that neither the F2A nor the F4F were suitable for combat against the A6M.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

And the more vitriolic the statement, the more eye-catching it becomes for historians who want to trot out a story. IIRC one of the VMF-221 pilots declared that neither the F2A nor the F4F were suitable for combat against the A6M.

Two pilots, Phillips and Musselman, did not fly that day but rather were ground-based witnesses. Their comments implied the performance of both F4F F2A were equally unsuited to combat the A6M. Corry, in an F4F, did comment that the performance of neither USMC fighter could compare to that of the Zero. The "tied-to-a-string" comment was made by Hughes who was also a grounded observer at the time.

 

[RCAFson]

Here's the standard Aircraft Characteristics charts for the F4F-3 and F2A-3:

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F4F-3_Wildcat_(Land)_PD_-_14_August_1942.pdf

http://www.alternatewars.com/SAC/F2A-3_Buffalo_PD_-_1_December_1942.pdf

as I've stated in the past, I have a hard time believing some these performance stats, because testing on actual aircraft showed somewhat lower figures for the F4F-3 and -4.

 

[Shortround6]

Please remember the data cards/sheets are for 59 degrees F at standard air pressure at sea level.

Higher temperatures are going to cause a loss of power in the engine and a loss of lift from the wing. There is a reason that 'hot and high' take-offs are a lot longer than 'standard' or book. Some planes/engines handle it a bit better than others.

This is in addition to whatever 'fudging' may have been going on but fudging isn't going to be too bad as each airplane is flown before delivery and any plane that fails to meet contract speed or climb (by around 3% on some contracts) is either rejected for rework or accepted with a penalty payment taken out of the price of the plane for final accounting of the contract. If too many planes perform poorly the company is selling them below cost.

 

[VBF-13]

The excerpt you quoted fails to mention tactical employment, those awful Division formations, the inexperience of many USMC fighters etc etc. Lord seemingly doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled. That doesn't leave much room for blame other than pointing at the aircraft itself.

You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.

I guess this is where I say, you're jumping to conclusions; read the book.

 

[VBF-13]

Not to diminish the existence of an ethnic bias but I would expect the magnitude of the difference to be most shocking to the rookies such as Hughes. Armistead's, Humbard's and particularly White's critiques seem a bit more analytic, while Carl doesn't make a comparison. Assuming the reports had been shared with the pilots, I would expect their reaction to the aerial fight was more like, "SOB, those reports on the '0' weren't exaggerating."

On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.

Then we built the Hellcat. Game over...

 

[oldcrowcv63]

On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.

Then we built the Hellcat. Game over...

Sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush. I meant that he was describing the mindset of period-contemporary US citizens, who were generally ignorant of the esoteric technological minutiae clearly demonstrating that, as individuals, they could be every bit as creative as people of any other culture.

With respect to his book: Incredible Victory. It was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. Lord was exemplar of the latter while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former. To be fair, this subject is noteworthy for the instances of flawed academic research or first person accounts with which Lord compares VERY favorably. I'd list Morrison, Bates, Tuleja, and Fuchida as examples of seemingly well-researched but seriously flawed histories and, to perhaps, a lesser degree, even Prange. I suspect, not having Lord's book at hand, some of the academics (and probably Fuchida) were sources for Lord's own research on the topic. If you have a copy and can check, I'd like to know.

Obviously just my opinion and own prejudice.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.

I guess this is where I say, you're jumping to conclusions; read the book.

It seems to me that Lord is using a well turned phrase that, to me at least, drastically oversimplifies the reality to make the point that the A6M was a phenomenal fighter airplane for its time that utterly shocked and struck fear in allied pilots at this stage of the war. Writing after the war, he may have felt that the very success of the Hellcat you cite and its antecedent Corsair had obscured that shock in the minds of his readership.

Moreover, it is likely that skill (experience and tactics) and numbers would have brought greater success than enjoyed by the Midway marine pilots as indeed demonstrated at Guadalcanal and during the carrier battles of 1942.

I have the general impression that the pilots least relatively impressed by the appearance of the A6M were those generally more experienced pilots of the USN during the first two carrier battles of the war. Where you see the USN pilots really get up in arms is when they are forced to trade their F4F-3s for poorer performing F4F-4's. Probably seen as a step backward from a disadvantageous position (but perhaps temporarily tolerable) to an even worse intolerable state of affairs.

 

[VBF-13]

Sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush. I meant that he was describing the mindset of period-contemporary US citizens, who were generally ignorant of the esoteric technological minutiae clearly demonstrating that, as individuals, they could be every bit as creative as people of any other culture.

Crow, the Americans didn't have a monopoly on ignorance. The Japanese had ignorant ideas, too, of the Americans. Both were as erroneous.

respect to his book: Incredible Victory. It was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. Lord was exemplar of the latter while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former. To be fair, this subject is noteworthy for the instances of flawed academic research or first person accounts with which Lord compares VERY favorably. I'd list Morrison, Bates, Tuleja, and Fuchida as examples of seemingly well-researched but seriously flawed histories and, to perhaps, a lesser degree, even Prange. I suspect, not having Lord's book at hand, some of the academics (and probably Fuchida) were sources for Lord's own research on the topic. If you have a copy and can check, I'd like to know.

Obviously just my opinion and own prejudice.

I sat for many hours with pilots in my Dad's club. How can I verify what they said? Does that mean it didn't happen? Hardly.

Lord got a lot of his stuff that way, through interviews of survivors. He also did first-hand, extensive research, in both countries. He didn't lean on "academics," like some schmuck. This was a Princeton history scholar, a Yale Law grad, and lawyer. This was a man of high intellectual accomplishment who knew how to fact-check and who wasn't going to say anything he wasn't sure of. Don't hold his style of writing against him. Better still, look him up. This was a David McCullough. You don't look for footnotes in men like those.

 

[tomo pauk]

With respect for the noted authors, all of them can make mistakes. In the acclaimed book 'America's hundred thousand', there is the claim that XP-39 attained 390 mp at 20000 ft, but there is no shred of evidence that supports that. Contrary, the book 'Vee's for victory' provides us with speed graph where such speed would be attained IF the XP-39 is cleaned up after NACA recomendations - and that never happened. But then, the Vee's claim that XP-40Q was outfitted with laminar flow wings - what was not the case.
In many books, even from the US authors, we can read that V-1710 lacked supercharger. R.W. Gruenhagen states that DB-601 'featured a supercharger' - others did not?? Same author: Jumo 213, used in the Fw-190, featured a multi-stage supercharger?? Mr. Green stated that late Bf-109Ks were to have two MG-151s under cowlings?
Further, the sentence from 'Incredible victory' (if I'm reading this right): "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." But is was about skill of the IJA pilots, and skill (or lack of it) also provided for numbers, since piecemeal coming to fray of the US fighters meant that IJA fighters have the local numerical superiority.

My point: most of the books need to be read with respect to the author, but also with clear mind at the side of the reader.

 

[Shortround6]

With all due respect to the men who served, most only know what they were told at the time.

The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries.

The men who served are telling their stories to the best of their knowledge, trouble is if some rear area 'bozo' gave them bad information and it was never corrected the fact that the Veteran repeates that information in his story does not make it true. Many P-38 pilots were taught to cruise at high rpm and low boost by the USAAF in direct contradiction of the recommendations of both Lockheed and Allison for example.

Now who knows better what the cruise procedure should have been? The engine maker? the Airplane maker? 20 year old pilot who got bad information but flew in combat until he rotated home/to another unit before the corrections reached him?

Same with a lot of other "facts". Ask any cop about how accurate "eye witnesses" are. Or how well they agree.

The stories of the men who were 'there' are interesting and can shed light on many things but please remember that each man's view point is also shaped by his experiences, training, and exact location in a given action. Very few pilots were in a position to 'see' and entire action and many had trouble keeping track of more than a few planes at a time. Range estimations should also be taken with a very large dose of salt. The ranges given in combat reports are what the pilots "believed" them to be. I don't know about other air forces but when the RAF tested pilots in training (and used ground observers and analyzed gun camera footage they found the average pilot was opening fire about 2-3 times further away than he though he was. Instead of opening fire at 300yds they were shooting at the target sleeves at 500-800 yds. This is without the adrenaline of actual combat and with a gun sight that could be set for range (adjust range scale for expected wingspan of target.)

The men are not intentionally lying. They are telling the story as accurately as they can. Unfortunately it may not be 100% accurate.

 

[VBF-13]

Further, the sentence from 'Incredible victory' (if I'm reading this right): "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." But is was about skill of the IJA pilots, and skill (or lack of it) also provided for numbers, since piecemeal coming to fray of the US fighters meant that IJA fighters have the local numerical superiority.

My point: most of the books need to be read with respect to the author, but also with clear mind at the side of the reader.

Tomo, on "Incredible Victory," I'm sure you know, that's an opinion by that author. History may bear out your opinion better. Nobody can really say. We all understand the factors that go into the analysis. That's but a start. What weights do we assign to those factors? There's our issue.

To Lord, and his evidence, that aircraft ruled the day. That's all that paragraph, really, was saying.

OK, on your point. You bet. Well said.

 

[VBF-13]

With all due respect to the men who served, most only know what they were told at the time.

The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries.

The men who served are telling their stories to the best of their knowledge, trouble is if some rear area 'bozo' gave them bad information and it was never corrected the fact that the Veteran repeates that information in his story does not make it true. Many P-38 pilots were taught to cruise at high rpm and low boost by the USAAF in direct contradiction of the recommendations of both Lockheed and Allison for example.

Now who knows better what the cruise procedure should have been? The engine maker? the Airplane maker? 20 year old pilot who got bad information but flew in combat until he rotated home/to another unit before the corrections reached him?

Same with a lot of other "facts". Ask any cop about how accurate "eye witnesses" are. Or how well they agree.

The stories of the men who were 'there' are interesting and can shed light on many things but please remember that each man's view point is also shaped by his experiences, training, and exact location in a given action. Very few pilots were in a position to 'see' and entire action and many had trouble keeping track of more than a few planes at a time. Range estimations should also be taken with a very large dose of salt. The ranges given in combat reports are what the pilots "believed" them to be. I don't know about other air forces but when the RAF tested pilots in training (and used ground observers and analyzed gun camera footage they found the average pilot was opening fire about 2-3 times further away than he though he was. Instead of opening fire at 300yds they were shooting at the target sleeves at 500-800 yds. This is without the adrenaline of actual combat and with a gun sight that could be set for range (adjust range scale for expected wingspan of target.)

The men are not intentionally lying. They are telling the story as accurately as they can. Unfortunately it may not be 100% accurate.

You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.

 

[buffnut453]

You don't look for footnotes in men like those.

'Fraid I do. I want to know the source of a statement and its veracity: is it documentary, personal recollection or the author's opinion and does that one piece of evidence jive with all the other corpus of data on the topic. I wish I had a buck for every piece of third-hand misinformation that's been trotted out repeatedly by even highly-respected authors and historians. And please understand I'm not pointing fingers - having been published myself, I understand the changes that can occur between draft and book. Nobody's perfect but, equally, nobody should be beyond question and even accepted knowledge needs to be reviewed when the spotlight of new data or plausible reinterpretation are shone on the subject.

 

[Shortround6]

You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.

Try a little 'experiment'. Go ask a bunch of veterans (from any war, or even peace time service) about the .45 automatic pistol. See what kind of stories you get about it's effectiveness, or about it's accuracy.
Don't confront them, or tell them they are wrong. Just let them talk.

 

[gjs238]

I find it interesting how/why the M1911 pistol was adopted - then "retired" - and now being used again:

From Wikipedia:
American units fighting Moro guerrillas during the Philippine-American War using the then-standard Colt M1892 revolver, in .38 Long Colt, found it to be unsuitable for the rigors of jungle warfare, particularly in terms of stopping power, as the Moros had very high battle morale and frequently used drugs to inhibit the sensation of pain.[10] The U.S. Army briefly reverted to using the M1873 single-action revolver in .45 Colt caliber, which had been standard during the late 19th century; the heavier bullet was found to be more effective against charging tribesmen.[11]