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The Hurricanes probably fared better against the fighters than anything the Marines had. Against the Zeros, forget about it. This account on Midway is pretty much my understanding on that stage in the war. This is from Lord, Incredible Victory (1967), p102:
"But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference. As the Marine fighters fluttered down to the sea, or staggered back toward Midway, it was clear that the greatest Japanese advantage lay in the Zero itself. The Marine pilots were astonished. Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own. Now here was a fighter that could outclimb, outrun, outmaneuver any plane the U.S. had. If it was also highly vulnerable, they rarely had a good enough shot at it to find out. Even the F4Fs were completely outclassed, and the ancient Buffaloes--as Lieutenant Charles Hughes sadly remarked--"looked like they were tied to a string while the Zeros made passes at them."
Do you have a source for this?
while max capacity did change the normal fuel capacity did not. The old wing tanks contained in the box spar held 160 gallons and could not be made self sealing to the standard the USN wanted. The right tank had two outlets, the higher one was the 'normal' outlet and when used left about 25 gallons in the tank which was accessed by switching to the 'reserve' setting on the fuel tank selector. The left tank had one fuel for the full capacity of the tank. 3 new protected tanks totaling 80 gallons were added. The left tank filler was sealed off and stenciled " Not to be filled except on the special authority of Commanding Officer". Right tank with it's reserve capacity was kept for a 'normal' fuel capacity that stayed the same. Since the box spar and ribs provided the walls, top and bottom of the wing tanks the only weight saving in getting rid of them would have been the fuel filler/s, outlets and drains, and fuel piping to the fuel selector valve. The F2A-3 could be fitted with a CO2 system to purge the wing tanks of gas fumes after the fuel was used for less of a fire hazard.
The prototype XF2A-1 and XF2A-2 (same airframe) held only 110 gallons so the US Navy certainly did ask for more fuel/range in the production versions. Reasons for the increase from 160 to 240 gallons are a bit more confused.
Weight tables in 'AHT' show 660lbs (110 gal) as 'normal' fuel load and 1080lbs (180 gal) as overload, which doesn't quite add up. 240 gallons would be 1440lbs of fuel
If he was "simply blaming the aircraft," or "just blaming the tool," I think I'd be inclined to agree with you.
And the more vitriolic the statement, the more eye-catching it becomes for historians who want to trot out a story. IIRC one of the VMF-221 pilots declared that neither the F2A nor the F4F were suitable for combat against the A6M.
You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.The excerpt you quoted fails to mention tactical employment, those awful Division formations, the inexperience of many USMC fighters etc etc. Lord seemingly doesn't accept that IJNAF fighter pilots were highly skilled. That doesn't leave much room for blame other than pointing at the aircraft itself.
On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.Not to diminish the existence of an ethnic bias but I would expect the magnitude of the difference to be most shocking to the rookies such as Hughes. Armistead's, Humbard's and particularly White's critiques seem a bit more analytic, while Carl doesn't make a comparison. Assuming the reports had been shared with the pilots, I would expect their reaction to the aerial fight was more like, "SOB, those reports on the '0' weren't exaggerating."
On that "ethnic bias," Crow, if you're referring to this, "Like most Americans, they had been taught to think of the Japanese as an imitative people who couldn't do much on their own," let me suggest, that was no ethnic bias, but based on how the Japanese behaved, right down to the Emperor's coat, tails, and top hat. It was a reference to the Westernization. And, I'll agree, once the Americans got going, we handled the Zeros better, our tactics overcoming the shortcomings of our fighter aircraft.
Then we built the Hellcat. Game over...
You're not giving this guy a fair shake. Here's the first sentence of that paragraph, again: "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." He mentioned what you're saying he didn't mention, that's what that first sentence was in reference to, he just covered that.
I guess this is where I say, you're jumping to conclusions; read the book.
Crow, the Americans didn't have a monopoly on ignorance. The Japanese had ignorant ideas, too, of the Americans. Both were as erroneous.Sorry if I wasn't clear. I didn't mean Lord was demonstrating an ethnic bias. From what I have read, Lord was far too generous a man to label a people or culture with a broad brush. I meant that he was describing the mindset of period-contemporary US citizens, who were generally ignorant of the esoteric technological minutiae clearly demonstrating that, as individuals, they could be every bit as creative as people of any other culture.
I sat for many hours with pilots in my Dad's club. How can I verify what they said? Does that mean it didn't happen? Hardly.respect to his book: Incredible Victory. It was the first book I read on the subject and remained one of my favorites for a very long time. I didn't then make the distinction between a well-researched academic treatise and the work of an avocational historian. Lord was exemplar of the latter while I believe Lundstrom to be one of the former. To be fair, this subject is noteworthy for the instances of flawed academic research or first person accounts with which Lord compares VERY favorably. I'd list Morrison, Bates, Tuleja, and Fuchida as examples of seemingly well-researched but seriously flawed histories and, to perhaps, a lesser degree, even Prange. I suspect, not having Lord's book at hand, some of the academics (and probably Fuchida) were sources for Lord's own research on the topic. If you have a copy and can check, I'd like to know.
Obviously just my opinion and own prejudice.
Tomo, on "Incredible Victory," I'm sure you know, that's an opinion by that author. History may bear out your opinion better. Nobody can really say. We all understand the factors that go into the analysis. That's but a start. What weights do we assign to those factors? There's our issue.Further, the sentence from 'Incredible victory' (if I'm reading this right): "But it wasn't deception, skill or even numbers that made the big difference." But is was about skill of the IJA pilots, and skill (or lack of it) also provided for numbers, since piecemeal coming to fray of the US fighters meant that IJA fighters have the local numerical superiority.
My point: most of the books need to be read with respect to the author, but also with clear mind at the side of the reader.
You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.With all due respect to the men who served, most only know what they were told at the time.
The fact that they flew plane XXX in combat does NOT mean that they knew how or why it was designed the way it was. The men who knew that were in the design offices of the aircraft factory and in the purchasing agencies or air ministries.
The men who served are telling their stories to the best of their knowledge, trouble is if some rear area 'bozo' gave them bad information and it was never corrected the fact that the Veteran repeates that information in his story does not make it true. Many P-38 pilots were taught to cruise at high rpm and low boost by the USAAF in direct contradiction of the recommendations of both Lockheed and Allison for example.
Now who knows better what the cruise procedure should have been? The engine maker? the Airplane maker? 20 year old pilot who got bad information but flew in combat until he rotated home/to another unit before the corrections reached him?
Same with a lot of other "facts". Ask any cop about how accurate "eye witnesses" are. Or how well they agree.
The stories of the men who were 'there' are interesting and can shed light on many things but please remember that each man's view point is also shaped by his experiences, training, and exact location in a given action. Very few pilots were in a position to 'see' and entire action and many had trouble keeping track of more than a few planes at a time. Range estimations should also be taken with a very large dose of salt. The ranges given in combat reports are what the pilots "believed" them to be. I don't know about other air forces but when the RAF tested pilots in training (and used ground observers and analyzed gun camera footage they found the average pilot was opening fire about 2-3 times further away than he though he was. Instead of opening fire at 300yds they were shooting at the target sleeves at 500-800 yds. This is without the adrenaline of actual combat and with a gun sight that could be set for range (adjust range scale for expected wingspan of target.)
The men are not intentionally lying. They are telling the story as accurately as they can. Unfortunately it may not be 100% accurate.
You don't look for footnotes in men like those.
You're impeaching the credibility of dead men, not on their sincerity, as you say, but on their perception. These are fact-witnesses who are unavailable to respond. Let's appreciate that. Let's let the totality of the facts, their testimony included, tell us the story.