Improve That Design: How Aircraft Could Have Been Made Better (Cold-War Edition)

[XBe02Drvr]

So that got me thinking about if it would have been more practical to develop two joint-service planes.

One for Fighter/Intercept, the other for Attack/Bombing?

Forget it. Any plane built to withstand carrier ops will, by definition, be unacceptable to USAF. And vice versa. Secdefs with the horsepower of McNamara are a thing of the past, and the appetite for overflying dead bodies just isn't there these days.

 

[Zipper730]

X XBe02Drvr

Uh, I wasn't talking about a modern day concept: I was talking about a design in that timeframe that was more sensible.

This was the first post in this thread,

1. The existing specification: Basically, the idea would be working within the existing specification, but you could modify or change anything within the boundary of it.

2. A different winner: Sometimes the problem wasn't the design so much as the winner to the contender
3. A more realistic/practical specification: Basically the specifications are made more realistic to allow a practical design to be developed.​

At the most basic level I figure that the basic idea wasn't all that out there. There have been aircraft that were suitable for land/carrier operations: The F-4 was a clear example of one. While it was designed as a naval aircraft, it performed well enough that it could be used by the USAF. It wasn't going to fly as fast down-low as the F-105, but it was generally a better aircraft in terms of PS and discrepancies in performance between the two services largely had to do more with training (and the way the USAF variant was configured) than anything else (and I think later F-4's were fitted with a WSO).

In terms of size, it should be pointed out that the F-111 and A-5 are about the same length.

Regardless, even if the USAF managed to simply develop its own aircraft and the USN developed its own interceptor design: I'm curious if the F-111 could have been improved over its actual design...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Regardless, even if the USAF managed to simply develop its own aircraft and the USN developed its own interceptor design: I'm curious if the F-111 could have been improved over its actual design...

It was. The attempts to navalize the F111 led directly to the F14.
The P12 (USAAC) and F4B4 (USN) were essentially the same aircraft, but not interchangeable due to specialized features.

 

[Zipper730]

X XBe02Drvr

The attempts to navalize the F111 led directly to the F14.

Regardless, they were fundamentally different aircraft despite using the same radar, missile, and engines (the engines were intended to be an interim design only). It wasn't that they were different derivatives of the same basic design frame (a'la the F-111A/B).

I was thinking about the matter of interceptor (USN) and fighter-bomber missions (USAF) and I'm curious if there were any serious interests in a USAF interceptor at the time?

BTW: I'm aware of the YF-12, but the vibe I got was that it's primary function was to divert unwanted attention from the A-12/SR-71 programs with a functional interceptor as being a bonus. I know McNamara had little interest, I'm curious what most of the DoD and the USAF as a whole seemed to think?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Regardless, they were fundamentally different aircraft despite using the same radar, missile, and engines (the engines were intended to be an interim design only). It wasn't that they were different derivatives of the same basic design frame (a'la the F-111A/B).

I was thinking about the matter of interceptor (USN) and fighter-bomber missions (USAF) and I'm curious if there were any serious interests in a USAF interceptor at the time?

There was no way the basic F111 was going to fulfill the Navy's mission without tweaking it into something like the F14. The "flying switchblade's" combination of thrust, weight, and wing area sentenced it to an unacceptable maneuverability deficit, as well as truly marginal behavior getting aboard. Back when all that was going on, I read a quote in Aviation Week and Space Technology from a Navy test pilot that the F111 was "harder to get aboard the boat than a Vigilante". That's a serious accusation, as the Vige was a notorious "Ensign eater". By the time of "the TFX follies" the basic interceptor mission was changing, bombers were becoming faster, more agile, and possibly even escorted, and the shortcomings of the F104 "missile with a man in it" concept were becoming evident. An interceptor might have to take care of itself if it ran into opposition (think Spitfire or MiG21 instead of Me110 or Yak25), something the F111 was never going to do. Despite being sentenced to the same heavy core components, the F14 managed to wring more lift out of its airframe by every imaginable gimmick as well as achieving a reduction in structural weight, thereby gaining a modicum of air combat maneuverability. It still needed the lighter weight, higher thrust F100 engines it was intended for to reach its full potential, which came to pass two decades later, too little, too late.

 

[EwenS]

The early 1960s were an interesting time and one of significantly changing threats requiring a different response.

Few key things to bear in mind:-
Perceived Missile Gap from the late 1950s
Changes to US legislation in 1958 increasing the powers of the Sec of Defense, making McNamara the first to be able to really place his stamp on defence from 1961.
JFK becomes President of the USA in Jan 1961
Cuban missile crisis Oct/Nov 1962 brought threat of nuclear missiles to America's back door
Vietnam War taking up more & more resources.

The USN was moving its part of the nuclear triad from carrier based aircraft to Polaris submarines (the first, USS George Washington commissioned in Dec 1959 with 8 in service by the end of 1961 and 34 by the end of 1965). So the A-5 Vigilante under development since 1954 was becoming superfluous as a nuclear delivery system when it finally entered service in 1961. Only 2 operational and one training squadron ever got the nuclear bomber version. It has been described as the most advanced aircraft of that era when introduced to service. It was then switched to the reconnaissance role with the RA-5C model which served until 1979.

As for the USAF selection of the F4 in 1961, that came about as the AIr Defence Command was looking for a new interceptor. At the time the "new" interceptor was the F-106A which was having its own problems but further acquisitions were being planned. McNamara as the new Defense Secretary in 1961 forced an F-106/F4 flyoff in 1961 (Operation Highspeed) during which the F-4 outperformed the former in just about every way. So as F-106 production was coming to an end anyway the F-4 was selected and why not. But when it appeared in USAF service the aircraft were allocated to Tactical Air Command not Air Defense Command.

But with the emphasis moving from the Soviet manned nuclear bomber to the ballistic missile, interceptor aircraft and the then current AA missiles like Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules and BOMARC began to have less relevance. Instead money was moved to developing ABM systems like Nike-Zeus (not deployed) and Spartan & Sprint.

When it came to the YF-12A, the USAF was sufficiently interested to try to acquire some 93 F-12B production versions but McNamara had the funds redirected to help fund the Vietnam War. As it turned out, the threat that the F-12 was designed to counter (the manned high altitude supersonic bomber) never emerged.

When it came to the development of a new fighter for the USN the limits were firstly weight to allow it to operate from existing ships (they set a landing weight limit of 55,000lb) and the folded dimensions due to limited space on a carrier deck. Meeting the weight limit proved the biggest challenge and one that drove so many changes that the aircraft would have lost commanality with the USAF version so defeating the purpose of the whole exercise.

As regards the second of these points, while an F-111 and an A-5 might be similar in overall length (73ft 6.5in and 76ft 10in respectively), when you fold an A-5 its length reduced to 65ft 6in. The F-111B was designed to be 66ft 9in long overall. By way of comparison the deck edge lifts on a Forrestal class were 63x52ft, the Constellation and subsequent ships 70 (inboard) / 85ft (outboard) x52. Only so much overhang of an aircraft tail beyond the elevator edge could be permitted when moving aircraft between flight deck & hangar.

Add to that that by the mid-1960s the war in Vietnam was demonstrating to everyone that a fighter required to have a much greater degree of manoeuverability than could have been achieved by a developed F-111B. The F-15 can trace its development back to about 1965.

 

[Zipper730]

There was no way the basic F111 was going to fulfill the Navy's mission without tweaking it into something like the F14. The "flying switchblade's" combination of thrust, weight, and wing area sentenced it to an unacceptable maneuverability deficit, as well as truly marginal behavior getting aboard. Back when all that was going on, I read a quote in Aviation Week and Space Technology from a Navy test pilot that the F111 was "harder to get aboard the boat than a Vigilante".

I'd almost swear that most of the problems cited for getting the F-111B aboard a carrier deck were greatly exaggerated because the USN didn't want the plane.

Ultimately, there were some legitimate grievances against the aircraft owing to the fact that

1. The F-111 had poor PS compared to existing fighter planes (namely the F-4 and F-8).
2. Current fighters were trending in the wrong direction when it came to maneuverability: This largely owed to their higher stall-speeds over earlier types. While the F-111's variable-sweep wing theoretically would have actually had a good advantage in this area since it could swivel forward and back: It actually had some substantial limits since...
   • While the aircraft (the F-111A at least) was stressed for 7.33g in most wing positions: When in transit, the g-load dropped to around 4g.
   • I'm not sure how quickly the wings swiveled forward and back: For the F-14A though, this seemed to be around 15-deg/sec so it could go from 20-68 degrees in 3.2 seconds (and it seemed to have little difference in maximum g-load while in transit or locked in a fixed position).
   • The aircraft was underpowered and it wouldn't have had enough acceleration and climb-rate to have done what the F-4's or F-8's could do.
3. The F-4 and F-111B lacked a cannon: With an inability to interrogate enemy IFF systems, visual ID prior to engagement was required in most cases, which resulted in the F-4 being drawn into close-in combat where it would often end-up at a maneuvering disadvantage and placed inside the minimum engagement range for it's missiles. While it was possible to gain separation for a missile shot: The reliability of missiles left a lot to be desired. With guns being relatively time-tested and having no minimum firing range: They wanted future aircraft to mount a cannon and, while the F-111B technically could mount a gunpack in the weapons bay, the plane had various deficiencies in maneuverability which would probably limit the ability to use it.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I'd almost swear that most of the problems cited for getting the F-111B aboard a carrier deck were greatly exaggerated because the USN didn't want the plane.

The chicken or the egg? Perhaps USN didn't want the plane because of the problems getting it aboard a carrier deck?
Underpowered, high wing loading, heavy weight, high approach speed; all negative factors for carrier ops. Most carrier jets have one or two of these issues, but all four in one aircraft is not a good sign.

 

[Zipper730]

The chicken or the egg? Perhaps USN didn't want the plane because of the problems getting it aboard a carrier deck?

You did read the link, right?

The F-111B came in slower than the F-14 by around 10 kts.: The problem with the plane was not really about getting it aboard the deck -- It was that the USN didn't want it, there were maneuvering limits (ironically) owing to its swing-wing design, it was overweight and underpowered, and lacked an internal cannon which turned out to be real useful at the time with missile reliability and the current RoE's.

The USN was moving its part of the nuclear triad from carrier based aircraft to Polaris submarines (the first, USS George Washington commissioned in Dec 1959 with 8 in service by the end of 1961 and 34 by the end of 1965). So the A-5 Vigilante under development since 1954 was becoming superfluous as a nuclear delivery system when it finally entered service in 1961.

There was also the cancellation of the P6M as well.

It has been described as the most advanced aircraft of that era when introduced to service. It was then switched to the reconnaissance role with the RA-5C model which served until 1979.

Interestingly the RA-5C was capable of the nuclear-bombing mission despite being predominantly designed for reconnaissance: While the stores train wasn't effective (they actually carried additional fuel where the bomb was), the aircraft could carry 2 x Mk43 (they could be carried on a pylon under each wing); conventional bombing was also doable as the pylons could allow for 2 x Mk-83 or 2 x Mk-84 to be carried.

As for the USAF selection of the F4 in 1961, that came about as the AIr Defence Command was looking for a new interceptor. At the time the "new" interceptor was the F-106A which was having its own problems but further acquisitions were being planned. McNamara as the new Defense Secretary in 1961 forced an F-106/F4 flyoff in 1961 (Operation Highspeed) during which the F-4 outperformed the former in just about every way.

I'm not so sure if they wanted a new interceptor, or merely more F-106's. If I recall they wanted something like 360 of them. With the aircraft being around $4-5 million a pop (in a time when the purchasing power of a dollar was way higher than now), and McNamara being a classic bean-counter (JFK actually wanted to reduce military expenditures as well, though I'm not sure how often he agreed/disagreed with McNamara).

The fly-off wasn't just about saving money: McNamara figured it'd be better if the USAF and USN used the same aircraft and figured he'd get a two-for-one deal out of this.

1. Get the USN & USAF to use a common aircraft
2. Replace the F-106 and F-105 with the F4H-1

As for the F-4 outperforming the F-106 in every way, I did a little digging into that and it turns out, that's not entirely an accurate representation of the two aircraft.

1. The F-4B* was stripped of all non-essential equipment and was waxed and polished to reduce any excess drag. They may very well have adjusted the fuel-control system a bit to get a little more thrust out of the engine as well.
   • Footnote: The aircraft were given the designation F-110A Spectre because the USAF and USN had different aircraft designation systems at the time. It would appear that the aircraft were basically USN designs that were F-4B's. I'm not sure if/when any modifications to any of the basic airframes during the test-phase (such as the plumper tires and bulged main landing-gear doors).
2. The F-106A was a squadron spare and appeared to have no modifications done to it and, if there were (i.e. no armament carried), they were nowhere near what was done to the F-4 in the test: The earlier F-106A's also had a different wing than the later versions with the airflow-dividers seen on the F-102A's and this would probably have added a little bit of drag over the later designs.

This would have given the F-4 a greater rate of climb, acceleration, top-speed, and range than one in combat-trim and might very well explain how it outperformed the F-106A in the test. I'm not sure if these test results were tilted by orders from the top, or merely one team being a little bit craftier than the other.

There were some areas that did seem to be pretty straight-forward (and probably in agreement by most)

1. F-4B
   • The AN/APQ-72 had a larger outer-detection range and a longer engagement envelope.
   • The Sparrow III had far more range than the Falcons: They might have been seen as either more reliable or at least more likely to destroy a target owing to their larger warhead, proximity fuse, and overall mass.
   • The two-man crew didn't require as much automation as the F-106A: It was still to be fitted with a SAGE Datalink (as was the F-101B).
2. F-106A
   • The MA-1 had more operational modes which gave it more effectiveness in an ECM environment. I'm not sure if the F-4B had any ECCM capability at all, but if it did, it wasn't anything like the F-106's.
   • The IRST was probably more capable and better at discriminating against different wavelengths than the F-4's.
   • The infrared Falcons were probably seen as being more discriminating against heat-sources, and some might have had at least a limited all-aspect capability (probably fully against a supersonic target).
   • The cockpit displays were better quality and offered higher-resolution that would give some advantage.
   • The MB-1/AIR-2 Genie didn't seem to interestingly be cited as being a significant advantage, bizarre as that is.

Regardless, McNamara got his foot in the door, and the aircraft was soon pitted off against the F-105. For the most part the results favored the F-4 over the F-105, particularly in the fighter-department though it could technically carry a heavier bomb-load (it couldn't deliver it as far as fast though).

with the emphasis moving from the Soviet manned nuclear bomber to the ballistic missile, interceptor aircraft and the then current AA missiles like Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules and BOMARC began to have less relevance. Instead money was moved to developing ABM systems like Nike-Zeus (not deployed) and Spartan & Sprint.

ICBM's were the primary threat, but bombers were still seen as having some relevance.

When it came to the YF-12A, the USAF was sufficiently interested to try to acquire some 93 F-12B production versions . . . . As it turned out, the threat that the F-12 was designed to counter (the manned high altitude supersonic bomber) never emerged.

Actually, the F-12 was designed to destroy both high-flying and low-flying threats. That was the benefit of the AN/ASG-18 -- it was pulse-doppler.

When it came to the development of a new fighter for the USN the limits were firstly weight to allow it to operate from existing ships (they set a landing weight limit of 55,000lb) and the folded dimensions due to limited space on a carrier deck.

It was largely a pointless exercise: They'd have been hard-pressed to get a design with their specs to do what they wanted. The F-14 ended up weighing around 68000 lb., but it was quite effective even with its limitations.

As regards the second of these points, while an F-111 and an A-5 might be similar in overall length (73ft 6.5in and 76ft 10in respectively), when you fold an A-5 its length reduced to 65ft 6in.

Could the A-5's radome be folded up?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The F-111B came in slower than the F-14 by around 10 kts.

there were maneuvering limits (ironically) owing to its swing-wing design, it was overweight and underpowered

Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed. A plane with these characteristics is a prime candidate for backside of the power curve issues, which make carrier approaches especially challenging. This is how "ensign eaters" are made. A jet "flying the ball" that gets a little slow will settle "low on the ball". If it has high wingloading, that downward trend will accelerate exponentially, requiring a rapid corrective response, as the sink rate increases the angle of attack. This is where that "overweight and underpowered" bites you in the butt as it will take a large handful of throttle to overcome the downward inertia of all that mass, tending to lead to "throttle jockeying", overcontrolling, and either a waveoff or a ramp strike. The classic model of the Ensign Eater.

 

[SaparotRob]

Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed. A plane with these characteristics is a prime candidate for backside of the power curve issues, which make carrier approaches especially challenging. This is how "ensign eaters" are made. A jet "flying the ball" that gets a little slow will settle "low on the ball". If it has high wingloading, that downward trend will accelerate exponentially, requiring a rapid corrective response, as the sink rate increases the angle of attack. This is where that "overweight and underpowered" bites you in the butt as it will take a large handful of throttle to overcome the downward inertia of all that mass, tending to lead to "throttle jockeying", overcontrolling, and either a waveoff or a ramp strike. The classic model of the Ensign Eater.

I love that kind of talk.

 

[Zipper730]

Combine the maneuvering limits, the overweight and the underpowered, and you've completely negated any advantage offered by the slightly lower approach speed.

Actually, the plane did fine on the carrier-suitability trials: The maneuvering limits and T/W ratio figures described were generally regarded as more a problem for aerial combat rather than simply flying the plane around.

Basically, what started out as largely a lack of a desire to accept a modified USAF plane on principle became justified owing to experiences seen in Vietnam.

While this is going to sound silly (and it's a purely hypothetical): I'm curious if the technology existed to produce an earlier F-14 with technology available in 1961?

 

[ThomasP]

"Douglas F6D Missileer - Wikipedia"

 

[SaparotRob]

"Douglas F6D Missileer - Wikipedia"

Could that plane be the progenitor of the "missile truck " concept? A not very combat capable aircraft staying out of range, lobbing rockets?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

I'm curious if the technology existed to produce an earlier F-14 with technology available in 1961?

A major shortcoming of the F111 was the weight and structural strength limits of the wing sweep system, with its resulting G limits. The F14 utilized design lessons learned from the F111 experience to produce a lighter, stronger structure. I doubt that a "pioneering" F14 would have done as well as the historical one.
It also would have had way less capable avionics and weapons. I saw the largely tube-circuit APQ72 radar in the F4B replaced by the solid state AWG10 in the F4J. Night and day difference.

 

[Zipper730]

A major shortcoming of the F111 was the weight and structural strength limits of the wing sweep system, with its resulting G limits. The F14 utilized design lessons learned from the F111 experience to produce a lighter, stronger structure.

What kind of design lessons were learned, if they're not classified?

It also would have had way less capable avionics and weapons.

No, I mean if the program started in 1961 (I should have clarified that detail): So, service entry would have been around the same time as the F-111.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

You did read the link, right?

The F-111B came in slower than the F-14 by around 10 kts.: The problem with the plane was not really about getting it aboard the deck

A plane with the aforementioned high wingloading, underpowered, slow spoolup issues can be flown impressively by an ace test pilot with a thousand traps under his/her belt, and yet be lethal to a less experienced aviator when flying the ball. The old pro will hit the numbers precisely, start and fly a stable approach with only the tiniest of corrections all the way down. He/she will roll out of the final turn in perfect alignment, on speed, with the proper AoA, and proper power setting and descent rate, all based on experience, so the approach is "on rails", with control response lag "old hat" and adeptly accounted for. The nugget, on the other hand will likely overshoot or undershoot the turn to final, be a little above or below glideslope, and be chasing corrections all the way down to an "in close" waveoff or a bolter. A plane that has a lag in control and throttle responses, and especially one that has a penchant for a rapidly developing sink rate if it gets underspeed, can quickly get our nugget aviator in trouble. These are issues about getting aboard, not "flying the plane around".

 

[XBe02Drvr]

What kind of design lessons were learned, if they're not classified?

I don't know the details, but that was the accepted wisdom back in the day. You've got to consider that a combat capable swing wing was a new concept at the time, the only precedent being the X5, circa 1950, which was mainly a proof of concept exercise. In terms of engineering experience, it was new ground, solutions and practices yet to be established. Despite all the engineering talent thrown at it, a ground breaking advance like a swing wing fighter seldom turns out exactly as projected, and experience will point out the less-than-optimum design choices.

No, I mean if the program started in 1961 (I should have clarified that detail): So, service entry would have been around the same time as the F-111.

So you've got two parallel stab-in-the-dark engineering experiments both based on very limited precedent and experience and likely to make parallel less-than-optimum design choices. Sounds wasteful to me. Without the F111 experience the F14 couldn't have been what it was.

 

[Zipper730]

I don't know the details, but that was the accepted wisdom back in the day. You've got to consider that a combat capable swing wing was a new concept at the time, the only precedent being the X5, circa 1950, which was mainly a proof of concept exercise.

Actually, you forgot the XF10F Jaguar and the fact that those swing-wing designs were different: The rearward sweep of the wing would shift the C/L aft, so the wing-root was actually translating forward to compensate and offset this. I'm not sure how this worked from a standpoint of scale and stuff, but they ultimately did away with it for one reason or another.

The arrangement used on the F-111 had a wing-root/glove section that was larger with the pivots mounted further outwards: While I could be wrong on this, from what I gather, the sweep occurred in such a way that the trailing edge slid into the glove which reduced the amount of lift in the rear section (and for all I know, some of the leading-edge would slide out) and the aircraft's C/L changed comparatively little in the process.

 

[Zipper730]

This post will cover a couple of things

F-101 Voodoo

There's some interesting information here regarding the development times of the F-101 Voodoo.

The first time line here comes from the University of Missouri. The Chief Designer was an alumnus of the university and recounts the development of the F-101.

There's also Joe Baugher's page which seems to indicate specific dates in more detail. I'm normally inclined to rely on the timeline from the guy who actually helped design the
plane, but the timelines do seem to overlap with other information that seems to conform to Joe Baugher's figures

Regardless, three months seems a quick time to have an entire competition for an aircraft design take place: I'm curious if McDonnell could have deviated further from the design to allow something that would be able to maneuver decently at altitude as well as fly supersonic with the intended power-plant (J71 as intended), and if they could have used the J57 off the bat?


A3J/A-5 Vigilante

Holy shit, Batman! That plane just crapped all over us!

Actually, when the concept was explained to me that's basically the thought that came to mind (though I thought it was doing this at high altitude from the outset). Regardless, IIRC, the idea seemed to be based around the idea of shooting the weapon out the back to provide maximum clearance without doing a LABS maneuver: Except the plane's clearly doing a LABS maneuver in the pictures, which makes me wonder what's the point?

I'm curious when the specification changed from high subsonic for low-altitude delivery to supersonic and high altitude bombing and subsonic low-altitude delivery, couldn't they have just changed the payload-train to an internal weapons bay or conformal storage?


P6M Seamaster

One more; An improved P6M

I do remember there being a proposal for a P6M powered by a nuclear reactor: While I'm not a fan of nuclear-powered aircraft for obvious reasons, we were developing them at the time and the USAF were developing at least two nuclear-powered programs

1. WS-125: It was a supersonic high-altitude bomber. WS-110 (the XB-70) and this design were developed in parallel with the idea being that the USAF would select one and run with it. So, of course, they selected both and ran up quite a tab.
2. CAMAL: It was a cruise-missile platform that appeared to largely be subsonic.

From what I recall, neither the WS-110 or WS-125 designs were capable of supersonic performance at low altitude so a P6M with a nuclear-reactor (which I'll just call the P6M-N for brevity) would be presumably lower-cost than either the WS-125 and CAMAL (assuming WS-125 didn't cover both), though I'm not sure how easy it would have been to adopt the P6M-N to be able to carry air-launched cruise or ballistic missiles (consider the missiles can't easily be carried under the wing). It would allow WS-125 (possibly CAMAL) to be cut and leaving the P6M-N in it's place (which would almost certainly be cheaper).

1. USAF develops the XB-70: Has speed for high altitude penetration and carries defensive missile systems
2. USN develops the P6M-N: Can fly at low altitude for days without stopping (I guess you'd need two fully duplicated crews, but...) and take some interesting pathways around air-defenses that wouldn't normally be possible.

The only political issues I could see (other than interservice-rivalry) would be the fact that, in December of 1958, Flight Magazine released an issue that mentioned the USSR was proceeding along with it's nuclear-powered aircraft-program describing a supersonic design (which was actually the Myasischev M-50 or M-52) as well as a larger design as big as 600 metric tons. The M-50/-52 was capable of supersonic flight at altitude, but was almost certainly limited to subsonic speed at low altitude like the B-58 which makes the P6M-N an equal threat particularly if it could carry air-launched cruise or ballistic missiles (though I personally favor ballistic since their greater speed would make them harder to stop).


Anti-Radiation Missiles

Anticipate and develop anti-radar countermeasures and weapons in late 50s, early 60s.

Do you mean anti-radiation missiles, or improved jammers only? I am frankly surprised that the USAF didn't devote more effort to ARM's.

While there was a design called the WS-121B: It seems that it was probably designed to be carried aboard large bombers and the USN's Corvus (which they got cancelled for one reason or another) appeared to be smaller and compact and would allow more aircraft to carry them effectively.


On angled Carrier-decks

Build angled flight decks right away. Being able to launch and land aircraft at the same time is a game changer! I suspect it was not a big deal.

While it's beyond the scope of aircraft, it's interesting to note that the USN's modification of the Antietam did appear to be partially out of a mutual-desire to develop the concept. That said, it would have been interesting if the USS United States had been designed with an angled-deck (its shape wasn't too far off).