Improved interwar RAF/RN ASW

[nuuumannn]

Not an option for Britain as it was so close to enemy held shores.

The demise of Britain's many military airships, transferred from the RNAS to the RAF in 1918 was more prosaic, because of accidents involving the destruction of airships and personnel, and because airships are expensive, especially in peacetime when the country is recovering from a devastating war that killed millions and consumed lots'a money. Following the loss of the big rigid airship R.38, built for the US Navy as ZR-2 in 1921, the RAF lost the taste for airship operations and military airships were destroyed and the many sheds and bases around the country were scrapped. During the war, the RNAS had more than 200 non-rigids (around 100 at any given time, though, given replacement of early designs, accidental deflations, losses in service etc), one semi-rigid and a handful of rigids, so it had a huge amount of experience in maritime patrol and sub hunting as well as working with the fleet using wireless to determine the whereabouts of targets. Most of that disappeared, but those who remained in the RAF postwar from that core of experience from the RNAS days went to the flying boat squadrons.

Was an interwar concept of the merchantman converted CVE too outlandish?

Nope, the admiralty had considered the idea during the Great War, but for offensive purposes, launching torpedo carrying aircraft against the High Seas Fleet, but the idea was quashed because with the escalated German U boat offensive in 1917 the need for merchant ships rose beyond a vanity project to sink battleships, regardless of how insightful at the time. After the end of the war the number of hulls the navy had was drastically reduced, the majority of those battleships and battlecruisers built before and a little during the war were scrapped. The thought of converting hulls into carriers was definitely considered, even before the end of the war, the Courgeous Class were earmarked for carrier conversion before the end of the war for the same reason as the cruiser Vindictive (and the Furious on the production line) was converted into a hybrid carrier, that was to provide even greater number of aircraft carrying ships. During the latter year of the war, no less than 29 capital warships carried aircraft, not including seaplane tenders and cruisers with turret platforms. The end of the war resulted in a huge loss of available hulls for aircraft carriage. All the surviving capital ships in the navy during the 20s and 30s carried aircraft though, continuing the trend, if on a little more reduced scale.

All of this was thrown away between the wars and much of it had to be relearned.

Very true. Peacetime is a harsh mistress. The RAF flying boat squadrons spent a lot of time swanning about looking for all the world like HMS Victory doing circuits, but carried out long distance flights around the world, publicly as flag waving measures but operationally to practise long endurance flying. They were still using the same techniques to detect submarines as their Great War predecessors - the RNAS had land based maritime patrol aircraft in the form of the Blackburn Kangaroo, as well as the airships and flying boats. This was using the good old Mark One Eyeball, the idea being to radio/wireless co-ordinates of the submarine to warships nearby, which would speed in to attack, finding the sub with the help of the aircraft circling above having dropped flares and markers and bombs into the water.

The value of aircraft was that the submarines could see them coming and would have to crash dive, which meant they would be foiled in making a torpedo attack. The majority of attacks were made from the surface; as the submarine was faster and could manoeuvre easier on the surface, whereas underwater they were much slower, which restricted their manoeuvring into position, thus making them less accurate underwater. The submarines of the day were very slow underwater, around 4 to 8 kts, which made them a sitting target if spotted. They couldn't stay underwater for that long either. The RNAS didn't have a high submarine kill number during the Great War but the deterrent factor of airships proved valuable because they forced submarines to dive. During the Great War German U boat commanders were told that as soon as an aircraft appeared, to dive to evade them. Airships and aeroplanes could linger for a long time and the risk of firing a torpedo would give away the sub's location, so submarine attacks from underwater were rarely, if ever made after aircraft had been sighted. The risk was too great.

Until the Germans get driven out of the costal areas the mid Atlantic hunting zone is not a a large concern.

Yup, and a big advantage for the British in that early stage of the war was Germany's miserable torpedoes. The British were extremely fortunate for that.

As an aside, the poor Avro Anson doesn't get much love round here, because let's face it, it was obsolescent if not obsolete even by 1939, but the alternative was worse; de Havilland designed a maritime patrol variant of the DH.89 Dragon Rapide to compete for the specification for a land-based general reconnaissance aircraft, which would have been even more antiquated by the war's beginning. The Aussies bought more than 1,000 Anson Mk.Is, the majority used for training, but also maritime patrol. At least the RAF had land-based torpedo aircraft between the wars, in the Hawker Horsely and Vickers Vildebeest for coastal defence.

 

[nuuumannn]

To run with the original reason behind the thread, the maintaining of maritime patrol airships would have been a good start as they would have increased the number of patrol aircraft, which was an important factor in the war against submarines. Airships proved a valuable anti-submarine asset, probably the best use for airships that was concocted back in their heyday, for the reasons I mentioned above regarding the performance of submarines underwater. They could carry heavy wireless equipment, a reasonably large warload, they could stay on station for long times while providing better facilities for their crews than aeroplanes of the day. During the Great War, one RNAS non-rigid remained on patrol for 22 hours, setting a record for British patrol airships at the time.

The reality of anti-submarine warfare at the time was that until sophisticated means of detecting submarines, either by ASDIC or radio location enters mass production and delivery, the techniques used during the Great War remained, with the human eye being the best means of submarine detection. Thankfully, submarine technology and performance didn't change much in that between-the-wars period. The big changes in these things affecting submarines coming during WW2, matched by the advancement of ASW radar and long-range aircraft, as well as the likes of MAD and sniffer equipment. All this changed ASW, but until it becomes widespread, the only real thing that the Brits or anyone else, really, can do is increase the number of platforms that can spot and destroy submarines - more aircraft and more destroyers/frigates/corvettes/sloops etc.

 

[EwenS]

It wasn't until the Americans got into the game that anyone thought about series production of CVEs. I wonder if there were bureaucrats or traditionalists in the RN that blocked the idea between the wars.

From 1922 until 31 Dec 1936 Britain & the USA were limited to a total carrier tonnage of 135,000 tons which both nations used for fleet carriers. There was a loophole, closed in the 1930 London Treaty, that excluded ships under 10,000 tons from the definition of carrier. From 1 Jan 1937 the only limit was in individual ship size. And then money was being spent on more important projects.

The first wartime proposal for what became the RN escort carrier was in early Dec 1940. A very basic carrier able to carry 6 Hurricanes, not ASW aircraft, intended as a successor to the CAM ships. By early Jan 1941 the captured merchantman Hanover / Empire Audacity / Audacity had been allocated and a formal design requirement worked out to include 6 fighters or TSR or TBR, a hangar and a lift. As converted by the end of June, Audacity didn't quite meet the Spec having no hangar or lift.

Plans for more conversions were stymied by a lack of suitable ships. Cargo liners were too valuable as troopships moving personnel around the world. New build was concentrated on slow unsuitable ships.

On 20 Jan 1941 the USN was asked to act as design agent for another 6 ships (BAVG1-6). On 4 Feb the RN found out about the US Long Island design which the USN had been working on in parallel, and the RN agreed that this should become the basis for the ships sought. Work on the first, Archer, began in March before Lend Lease started and she was delivered in Nov 1941. She was followed by the 4 Avengers, one of which, Charger, was released back to the USN later in 1941. The final ship was Tracker built to a modified design with a full hangar and turbine engines, essentially the prototype for the Bogue class.

A request for a further 6 from the USA in July 1941 was turned down, leading to a search for suitable hulls building in Britain. That led to Activity being taken over in Jan 1942 for conversion. In March 1942 proposals were for 2 AMC conversions, which led only to Pretoria Castle, and 2 later 3 fast merchant conversions leading to Nairans, Campania & Vindex.

Over in the US, FDR had proposed a merchant ship conversion for convoy protection in mid-Oct 1940. That coincided with proposals for training and transport carriers from the USN. That led to discussions within the USN in Jan 1941 and the selection of 2 hulls that emerged as Long Island (completed in June 1941) and Archer for the RN. As initially built Long Island had a short flight deck that had to be extended by 77ft from Sept 1941.

USN attention then also turned to large liners with 4 conversions planned (AVG2-5) which were then cancelled on 31 Dec 1941 as the ships were too valuable as troop transports.

It was not until 11 Dec 1941 that the next batch of 24 C-3 hulled AVG were requested by the USN as part of the FY42 shipbuilding programme. Reduced to 20 due to lack of available hulls they were split 10/10 between the USN/RN. Some were already building when the hulls were taken over. They were followed by a further 24 in mid-1942 as part of the FY43 Programme, eventually split 1/23 USN/RN.

The USN then undertook conversions of 4 precious fleet tankers as the Sangamon class during 1942. And this became the basis of the later Commencement Bay class.

It was FDR that was the great promoter of the escort carrier/AVG/CVE. In mid-1942 he responded to a proposal from Henry J Kaiser and a design drawn up by Gibbs & Cox the Naval architects for the construction of 100+ in Kaiser's own yards on the West Coast. That resulted in orders for the 50 Casablanca class, the first laid down in Nov 1942 with the last completing in July 1944. Although some were initially allocated to the RN, all entered service with the USN, the RN getting more C-3 conversions in lieu.

Despite the numbers already on order, CVE construction was continued with the Commencement Bay class. FY44 - 15, FY45 - 8, FY46 - 12 (CVE-105 to -139). The FY46 ships were approved by FDR in March 1945, the only element of that Programme that was approved according to Friedman. Ultimately everything beyond CVE-123 Tinian was cancelled in Aug 1945. CVE-121 & 123 Rabaul & Tinian never served in the USN, being sent straight to reserve on completion to turn up again in a 1970s Dirty Harry movie.

So the initial proposals for series production come from the RN in Jan and then July 1941, but to be built in US yards. It was another 11 months before the USN wanted series production. Without FDR's intervention in mid-1942 withbthe Casablanca class and in subsequent Programmes there might well not have been anything like the same numbers of CVE built.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I really don't see how. The U.S. could use blimps, Piper Cubs and civilian boats for submarine patrols from the safe skies of the U.S. Not an option for Britain as it was so close to enemy held shores. Britain was working on sonar, a new technology and like anything groundbreaking, that takes time and experimentation. There were some interesting developments by Barnes-Wallis. I vaguely remember that he developed a bomb launcher that fired rockets in a figure 8 pattern that became known to the Americans as "Hedgehog". This project had been put aside for a while, I think. Sir Barnes-Wallis had a number of balls in the air. It was very effective compared to dropping depth charges off the stern. Perhaps if it had been brought to light sooner, a more effective ASW program could've been in place sooner.

Barnes Wallis had nothing to do with the Hedgehog. Stewart Blacker and Millis Jefferis.

Stewart Blacker - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Millis Jefferis - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

And the British named it the Hedgehog not the Americans. The Americans would have called it something boring like "Anti Submarine Mortar M1A1"

The Fairlie Mortar seems to have been a missed opportunity

Fairlie Mortar - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Reluctant Poster]

One of things that tends to get overlooked is the importance of training. You can build all the ships and aircraft you want but you need thousands of people who know how to use them and maintain them and that takes time. It doesn't help that immediate needs at the beginning of the war overruled proper training.

 

[EwenS]

One of things that tends to get overlooked is the importance of training. You can build all the ships and aircraft you want but you need thousands of people who know how to use them and maintain them and that takes time. It doesn't help that immediate needs at the beginning of the war overruled proper training.

And so we got HMS Western Isles in 1940 to train ship's crews

Secret Scotland - HMS Western Isles

And its infamous and much feared commanding officer

The Terror of Tobermory

And then the Western Approaches Tactical Unit

Western Approaches Tactical Unit - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Shortround6]

As an aside, the poor Avro Anson doesn't get much love round here, because let's face it, it was obsolescent if not obsolete even by 1939, but the alternative was worse; de Havilland designed a maritime patrol variant of the DH.89 Dragon Rapide to compete for the specification for a land-based general reconnaissance aircraft, which would have been even more antiquated by the war's beginning.

Quite right. The Anson doesn't get much love because it was misused. It was a good trainer, in fact compared to some other training aircraft it was downright stellar.
Botha's anyone? The Anson was NOT trying to kill you while training. The Anson was sheltered for it's crew, trying to learn while flying 3 seat open cockpit biplanes is not he best plan. It had room for gear and/or extra students. It could perform a number of different training missions. It was economical both in cost and fuel burn.

It might have been useful (somewhat) operational aircraft in 1937-38. By 1939 it was too restricted in capability. A plane is not cheap if it can't do the job required.

Getting back to one of my hobby horses the poor Anson didn't even have the two 100lb AS bombs in 1938. They had four 20lb or 40lb GP bombs and a few smoke floats.

The British had used a few 230lb anti sub bombs in WW I, special thin case bombs and even tried a 520lb thin cased bomb on occasion but that line of development went away (or was in the back of cupboard instead of the back burner) after the war.

What was possible was shown by the Blackburn Kangaroo which only equipped one squadron starting in May of 1918. Rarely were more than 8 operational at time but in six months they sighted 12 U-boats, attacked 11 of them and shared in the destruction of one the UC-70. The Kangaroo could carry four 230lb bombs but might have carried a 520lb bomb on occasion.

 

[EwenS]

Story of early sonobuoy development here (codenamed High Tea by Britain)

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA597432.pdf

 

[MikeMeech]

Hi
From 'Seek & Strike' comments on Anglo-American wartime (and pre-war) co-operation:

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

As I said before suitable ships were not as common as some people believe.

lans for more conversions were stymied by a lack of suitable ships. Cargo liners were too valuable as troopships moving personnel around the world. New build was concentrated on slow unsuitable ships.

A 16-18 knot cargo ship only made economic sense for high priority cargos.
Banana (Fruit carriers) were one example of a ship that needed speed to get the goods to market in a timely fashion where speed affected profits.

Propulsion also affected things. Countries that produced coal tended not to build a lot of fast ships. You need more men in the boiler room to shovel more coal for a fast ship.
Oil fired ships used pumps instead of shovels (there were some automatic stokers but they needed tending) Diesel powered ships were making headway in the market but were not yet dominant.

The US series of standardized ships show some of the problems, they were designed to update the US merchant fleet in mid to late 30s and not war replacement shipping until you get to the Liberty ships and Victory ships. The C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 and T-2 were all prewar designs.
The C-1 used 4,000hp engines of Diesel or steam turbines and were good for about 14kts with 4,000hp engines, there were sub classes of each type with some variation. The faster and a bit larger C-3 and C-4 class of 16.5-17kts used 8,500-9900hp engines and help show the problem of selecting older ships for conversion. AS does the Liberty ship used 2500hp for a speed of 11-11.5 knts. Please remember that convoys were usually separated into slow convoys of 7kts and fast convoys of 10 or 11knts. That is cruising speed and not top speed but if you are going to try to select existing merchant ships you are going to need fast freighters or liners and relatively new ones with engines in good condition.

The Pretoria Castle was built with 16,000hp diesels for 18kts for example and form her we learn that............. "Pretoria Castle was Launched in 1938 and completing her in April 1939.[2]​ The Admiralty requisitioned her for the Royal Navy in October 1939, and had her converted into an armed merchant cruiser with eight 6-inch (152 mm) and two 3-inch (76 mm) guns, entering service in November 1939. In this role she served mainly in the South Atlantic."

She was very new, and her diesel engines would make her attractive for cruising in the South Atlantic or Indian or South Pacific on the west coast of South America looking for German Merchant raiders, not ships like the Graf Spee. You need to compete with those needs to turn her into an escort carrier.

I am not saying it cannot be done, but it was not going to be easy to build 6-10 escort carriers on existing hulls in the mid to late 30s and prewar you going to run into the fact that at least the RN tried to standardize on fittings and and auxiliary equipment.

 

[EwenS]

Perhaps I should clarify my comment. It was not an outright absence of suitable fast hulls. There were many shipping lines with fast cargo liners serving routes around the Empire between the wars. It was that there were many competing needs for those fast hulls meaning they were not available for conversion to escort carrier in 1941.

When war broke out 56 ships of varying ages and sizes capable of speeds of 15-22 knots were taken up as AMCs. For various reasons not all would have been suitable as escort carriers but many were. The last of these were finally released for other duties in spring 1944. But only Pretoria Castle became an escort carrier.

By 1941 there was a shortage of suitable ships to move the many tens of thousands of personnel around the world and these AMC hulls began to be released for that purpose and for other purposes (repair & depot ships for example). The MoWT had trouble finding enough ships for the fast Cape bound WS convoys. Such was the shortage that a request had to be made in Sept/Oct 1941 for US assistance to move the 18th Infantry Division to the Middle East (later diverted to Singapore on the outbreak of war with Japan). One hull that had been earmarked as a potential escort carrier, Georgic, was sunk in the Med before that could occur.

Other fast ships were taken up on the slips for other purposes. There was a class of 18 knot fast cargo ships being built for the Glen Line and other shipping companies. 3 of them became the Glen class LSI in 1940. Another became the store ship Breconshire, famous for her runs to Malta. Yet another sister did become an escort carrier. The MV Telemachus became the Activity. Another group of 17 knot ships for the Clan Line became the aircraft transports Athene & Engadine and the midget sub depot ship Bonaventure. All these were diesel engined.

So fast hulls were available and were being built. They were being outnumbered however by the slower 11 knot types which formed the mainstay of the merchant fleet.

 

[GTX]

What books can people recommend on the history of the development of ASW?

 

[MikeMeech]

What books can people recommend on the history of the development of ASW?

Hi
As well as the ones I mentioned in my post #5, among many, there is part 2 of Blair's work 'Hitler's U-Boat War, The Hunted 1942-1945', 'Relentless Pursuit, The story of Capt. F J Walker CB, DSO***, RN U-Boat Hunter and Destroyer' by Commander D E G Wemyss, 'Very Special Intelligence, The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945' by Patrick Beesly, 'Atlantic Escorts, Ships, Weapons & Tactics in World War II' by David K Brown, 'Radar at Sea, The Royal Navy in World War 2' by Derek Howse, and numerous books relating to intelligence, Coastal Command and other aspects, etc. It all depends what you would like to know about.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

What books can people recommend on the history of the development of ASW?

The subject tends to get split depending on the author between surface warfare (ships) and aircraft.
Some do cover both.
D.K. Brown covers the surface ships and weapons in his book "Atlantic Escorts..........."
Aircraft not so much and covering the actual history of events would be a sizeable volume or series.
I am out right now but some of what I have posted is from "Aircraft vs Submarine" by Dr. Alfred Price

 

[nuuumannn]

he Anson doesn't get much love because it was misused. It was a good trainer, in fact compared to some other training aircraft it was downright stellar.
Botha's anyone? The Anson was NOT trying to kill you while training. The Anson was sheltered for it's crew, trying to learn while flying 3 seat open cockpit biplanes is not he best plan. It had room for gear and/or extra students. It could perform a number of different training missions. It was economical both in cost and fuel burn.

It might have been useful (somewhat) operational aircraft in 1937-38. By 1939 it was too restricted in capability. A plane is not cheap if it can't do the job required.

I agree and disagree with this. while the Anson was a good training aircraft with viceless handling characteristics, it might be worth pointing out that anti-submarine warfare had not graduated much beyond the Great War. Even by 1939 and the Sunderland having entered service, the human eye was still the most widely employed detection mechanism aboard aircraft. You state that the Anson was restricted in capability, I say how? It didn't need to carry thousands of pounds of bombs, when smoker markers is all it needs to highlight where a submarine is. A small bomb is all that's needed to cripple a submarine.

As I mentioned, the aerial element was to detect the submarine and radio assistance from a nearby warship. The two worked closely together, this was derived from techniques developed during the Great War. The ship would then speed toward the hopefully crippled submarine, or to at least where the aircraft last spotted it on the surface, and remember we are talking submersibles with a maximum speed underwater of less than 10 knots, so with a circling aircraft overhead having dropped marker flares, and a warship, equipped with ASDIC, the submarine is in for a rough time of it. The Anson's pilot was equipped with a forward firing Browning machine gun, so had a means by which to strafe the enemy submarine.

Let's also not forget that the Anson was built to satisfy a requirement for a General Coastal Reconnaissance Aircraft to specification 18/35, the emphasis being on coastal reconnaissance. It was designed for sea patrol; it wasn't specifically designed to hunt down and kill submarines, it was designed to detect, track and disable submarines until more powerful assets arrived at the scene.

That was the state of the art at the beginning of World War Two. The Anson didn't need to be a P-3 in 1939. It was perfectly capable of doing the job when it entered service and even at the outbreak of war as submarine technology and the means with which to detect and destroy them had not advanced much more than twenty years earlier. It had good visibility from its extensive glazing, it was slow enough to loiter around a slow-moving submarine and it could carry the requisite radio and navigational equipment to let a surface ship know where a possible contact was.

The radio operator's station, with the navigator's desk beyond. Note the extensive glazing. Excuse the modern Dave Clark headsets, the aircraft is airworthy.

Anson interior

The biggest threat to the Anson was enemy aircraft of course, but who in 1936 could have predicted that the Germans were going to have invaded almost all of Western Europe by the end of 1940 and have friendly forces stretching from Spain to the very top of the continent? It was fitted with an unpowered Armstrong Whitworth gun turret fitted with a .303-in MG.

By the way, for the Blackburn Kangaroo to have done that much damage with only eight aircraft in service at any one time in 1918 is quite remarkable.

As is usual, in this thread we are projecting what we know has happened in the past eighty or so years against what was de rigeur back in the late 1930s and by consequence missing the point entirely.

 

[nuuumannn]

What books can people recommend on the history of the development of ASW?

I'm sure the others can recommend lots'a books on the WW2 stuff, but try Business in great waters by John Terraine; a satisfactory breakdown of submarine warfare in WW2

Business in Great Waters

Twice within 25 years Britain was threatened with starvation by the menace of the U-Boat. In this study of submarine warfare, the author ...

www.goodreads.com

for a background into anti-submarine warfare in the Great War, try The British airship at war, 1914-1918 by Patrick Abbott. While it focusses specifically on airships, it analyses anti-submarine techniques in use and is very insightful for such a small package.

The British Airship at War, 1914-18 - Abbott, Patrick: 9780861380732 - AbeBooks

The British Airship at War, 1914-18 by Abbott, Patrick - ISBN 10: 0861380738 - ISBN 13: 9780861380732 - Terence Dalton - 1989 - Hardcover

www.abebooks.co.uk

 

[Shortround6]

it might be worth pointing out that anti-submarine warfare had not graduated much beyond the Great War. Even by 1939 and the Sunderland having entered service, the human eye was still the most widely employed detection mechanism aboard aircraft. You state that the Anson was restricted in capability, I say how? It didn't need to carry thousands of pounds of bombs, when smoker markers is all it needs to highlight where a submarine is. A small bomb is all that's needed to cripple a submarine.

This was the "state of the art" in 1918.

A pair of 250hp engines so speed was a little low.
However.

• Maximum speed: 98 mph (158 km/h, 85 kn) at 6,500 ft (1,981 m)
• Endurance: 8 hours
• Service ceiling: 13,000 ft (4,000 m)
• Rate of climb: 480 ft/min (2.4 m/s)

Armament

• 2× 0.303 in (7.7 mm) Lewis machine gun
• Up to 920 lb (417 kg) of bombs

It was one of these that damaged the UC-70 using a 520lb depth charge. The Destroyer finished it off.

I am certainly not expecting the Anson to be equipped with anything out of the ordinary for it's time, like starlight scopes or centimetric radar.

Everybody was using the MK I eyeball, that was not the point. And the Anson was certainly a better platform to be an observer to bee in that even the British biplane flying boats with the their open cockpit positions.

The Points that the Anson had problems with were.............
1. the insufficient range, Norway had not changed it's location since WW I but aircraft had gotten better than the Kangaroo. The RAF needed a plane that could close off the Scotland-Norway gap. It is about 310 miles from Aberdeen to Stavanger and that is not quite the narrowest point. you do need to be able to stay in sight of Norway for an hour or two. You don't have to have the Germans invade Norway to figure out where most of the German surface raiders and submarines are going to try to make their break outs from.
The British and Americans sure put a lot of effort into the North Sea Mine Barrage in WW I.

2. the crap warload.

. A small bomb is all that's needed to cripple a submarine.

Except it wasn't.
The 100lb AS bomb, which showed up late, displayed a remarkable inability to to cripple a submarine. In fact it displayed a remarkable inability to even inconvenience a submarine let alone cripple one.
Now this is much more a failure of the weapon than the Anson as an aircraft.
The Large America flying boats seemed to have carried a pair of 230lbs bombs on patrol although the max load was 920lb.

It is this judgement that pair of unproven 100lb bombs were an adequate armament for the bulk of the Costal Command aircraft that is the problem.

It is one thing to use "scarecrow" aircraft to make up for a shortage of operational aircraft in wartime.
Intentionally building and flying 'scarecrow' aircraft as your main operational type for several years during peace time is what is mind boggling.

I have repeated this before, in the first 4 months of WW II CC sighted 57 U-boats, they attacked 44 of them and were supposed to have caused damage to eight.
The first assisted kill by an aircraft was by a Sunderland on Jan 30th 1940.
The first "kill" was by a Bomber Command Blenheim doing an armed reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight on March 11th when the Pilot sighted a U-boat and ducked into the clouds to mask his approach. He dove low and released the bombs below the safe height. The plane was armed with four 250lb GB bombs. The plane was hit by fragments but he hit and sank the U-31 which was undertaking sea trials after a refit. The U-boat was in 50 feet of water and was raised, repaired and was later sunk by the HMS Antelope.

On Oct 25th 1940 the U-46 was attacked by three Hudsons, each carrying ten 100lb bombs attacked the U-Boat of the coast of Norway. I don't know if the 3rd Hudson dropped it's bombs but the first two did. The U-46 suffered a direct hit on her stern, the bomb detonated correctly (a number of times they had skipped off the surface of the water) punched a 10 ft hole though the outer plating. However the pressure hull was not leaking and the Captain was able to get his boat back to Germany for repairs.

The Anson was the wrong aircraft for the role. You needed a larger plane with more fuel and a bigger bomb load. You don't need a 4 engine bomber or even a sizable twin.
You do need more than Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah engines and fixed pitch propellers.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Points that the Anson had problems with were.............

That's what Sunderlands were for. No Ansons were based in the northern reaches of Scotland, Sunderlands were, though.

I have repeated this before, in the first 4 months of WW II CC sighted 57 U-boats, they attacked 44 of them and were supposed to have caused damage to eight.
The first assisted kill by an aircraft was by a Sunderland on Jan 30th 1940.
The first "kill" was by a Bomber Command Blenheim doing an armed reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight on March 11th when the Pilot sighted a U-boat and ducked into the clouds to mask his approach. He dove low and released the bombs below the safe height. The plane was armed with four 250lb GB bombs. The plane was hit by fragments but he hit and sank the U-31 which was undertaking sea trials after a refit. The U-boat was in 50 feet of water and was raised, repaired and was later sunk by the HMS Antelope.

Again, you're missing the point. Producing evidence of kills doesn't begin to cover how many encounters with submarines that these aircraft had, it also doesn't account for every time a U boat saw an aircraft and crash dived before the aircraft saw it and could begin an attack. Remember, Mk.1 Eyeball only sees in the direction its looking. In the first couple of years of the war there was no ASW radar equipped maritime patrol aircraft, thus forcing reliance on human observation. You're not understanding the entire value of anti-submarine warfare back then if you think that measuring its effectiveness is solely based on kills.

The Anson was the wrong aircraft for the role. You needed a larger plane with more fuel and a bigger bomb load. You don't need a 4 engine bomber or even a sizable twin.
You do need more than Armstrong Siddeley Cheetah engines and fixed pitch propellers.

Again, wrong! You're not getting the point. It was a reconnaissance machine designed to track submarines and radio their position, submarines that are doing between 5 and 15 knots off the British coast, in 1936. You don't need a big expensive aircraft to do that. It was a coastal recon machine. It doesn't need to be any more powerful with variable pitched propellers, not widely distributed in 1936. Did you notice that it took less than a year for the specification to be issued and the aircraft to enter service? Usually, the British dragged their heels with aircraft development at the time, but not with the Anson, cheap, easy to produce, quick to build. Note that once the war started the Ansons were replaced relatively quickly. Ansons didn't remain in action for long, the British understood their shortcomings, but you go to war with what you've got. How many times does that need repeating, SR? What land-based maritime patrol aircraft was every other air force operating in 1936 when the Anson entered service? Or 1935 when the specification was written? Did they have variable pitch props, were they capable of doing more? A lot happened in that period leading up to the war.

 

[EwenS]

It is not as if the RAF didn't recognise the limitations of the Anson. In 1938 the RAF went looking for a replacement. The result? A June 1938 order for 200 Lockheed Hudson plus another 50 if initial deliveries could be made by 31 Dec 1939. Deliveries by sea began in Feb 1939 with 250 built by Oct and more orders placed.

In May 1939 224 squadron swapped its Ansons for Hudsons. 233 re-equipped between Aug and Oct 1939 followed by 220 in Nov and other squadrons into 1940.

 

[EwenS]

This may be of interest to some of you.

HyperWar: Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II (OEG Report No. 51)

Operations Evaluation Group Report No. 51: 'Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II', by Charles M. Sternhell and Alan M. Thorndike

www.ibiblio.org