Iowa vs Yamato comparison
- Thread starter delcyros
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GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Yamashiro was hammered by gunfire for over seven minutes by concerted battleship and Cruiser fire.
The few torpedoes at the end were pretty much insignificant...
The few torpedoes at the end were pretty much insignificant...
- Thread starter
- #263
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
torpedoes striking the belt do not leave much traces unless the main belt is poorly attached to the frame, or alternatively, the belt plate itselfe was awefully brittle (certsinly not a problem for Vickers CA). Strikes on the belt did happen frequently with air dropped torpedoes, particularely if the targeted vessel was already in damaged condition.
I am not holding cards here but I do not shrug off comments made by marine forensics like Jurens for no reason. Best one should keep caveates in mind.
I am not holding cards here but I do not shrug off comments made by marine forensics like Jurens for no reason. Best one should keep caveates in mind.
The torpedo hits were before the shelling action started and gave Yamashiro a list to port which slowed her as well as causing the
two rear turret magazines to have to be flooded due to fire threat. There was another hit around the bow but it is not known what that
was. Prior to all that there was also an air attack with Hellcats using rockets and strafing the ship. A bomb from a Helldiver caused hull
damage and the ship listed 15 degrees which necessitated flooding of the bilge on the opposite side to even things up.
By the time the big guns came into play Yamashiro had already lost two turrets and a lot of speed so was by then a sitting duck.
That's the annoying thing when gaming with the big buggers. We really find we are not matching anything close to reality but it is hard
to play using aircraft when they are launched from carriers too far away to be on the board.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
It is true that Yamishiro took damage both from a near miss by a SB2C on 24 October, requiring counter-flooding to correct the list to starboard and by at least one torpedo on 25 October, causing her to slow with a list to port.
That of course limited her ability to bring the fight, but did not stop her.
The historical part came at about 04:00 when she came into range of the battle line of USN Cruisers and Battleships, engaging in history's last battleship on battleship action.
That of course limited her ability to bring the fight, but did not stop her.
The historical part came at about 04:00 when she came into range of the battle line of USN Cruisers and Battleships, engaging in history's last battleship on battleship action.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
From CombinedFleet.com:
The Japanese records state that at 1435 two torpedoes hit the HIEI's starboard side amidships and at the stern.
[Bolding added -- Thump]
The stern is beyond the belt on these ships.
Yamashiro turned away after taking damage from multiple hits and was making according to US records around 14 knots. The ship was able to head away
as the US ships had started to hit their own destroyers and were ordered to cease fire.
From 0407 to 0409 DD's launched multiple torpedoes again at Yamashiro and she sustained three more hits. The last two caused a significant list to port
which soon reached 45 degrees wherein the commander ordered abandon ship. In all Yamashiro took four or more torpedo hits with the last two causing her
to sink.
Either way my post on the two ships sunk by gunfire only was being fussy in that I was meaning no other hits from any other source before, during, or after
the gunfire phase, as in the ships sunk were in no way impeded or damaged by any source other than gunfire.
Overall it also is interesting how the Axis capital ships were not really effective. Japan kept most back for the telling battle that never came, Italy suffered from
a lack of fuel and Germany suffered from a lack of ships. All three navies suffered from either a lack of technology (radar) followed by an inability to match the
advances in technology / methods made by the US and Britain. Germany had started off well with Seetakt radar but was overtaken as the war went on.
- Thread starter
- #268
delcyros
Tech Sergeant
Lack of torpedo hits bears an implicit presumption. Why? Because Lundgren did not visit the wreck when he wrote his 2009 article. I understand he visited the wreck since but no such data was available to him back in 2009, and he was explicit about it. He is also explicit about the fact, that he was allowed access to the video tapes from the 1992 Ballard expedition and that these video tapes were incomplete and only partially covered the ships hull. Now this IS interesting because lack of evidence for torpedo hits could be explained by the lack of systematic visual evidence. Interestingly, no discussion about the ID of the vessel can be found, as it is always presumed to be KIRISHIMA.
The KIRISHIMA battle damage article was primarely a historical exercise, not a marine forensic investigation. Video tapes had evidence for only three (!!!) shell hits. Note that the nice hit count on the profile drawing are not the result of forensic evidence but of recollection of the events from eyewitnesses, such as Lt. Ikeda. In many ways eyewitness acounts can be unreliable or misleading. Only very few hits were caught on the old filmtapes and this is signifcant because with such a small number of hits, You cannot differentiate between 8in HC and 16in AP hits. Giving the range of the action was very small and the angle of fall of the 16"/45 was in between 6 and 10deg, it does not surprise that one has to reckon with primarely water ricochet. However, that beeing said, the wreck of HIEI has been identified meanwhiles and I believe that LUNDGRENs ID was correct but this is not borne out from the old article but rather, due to recent work done with Petrel and ROV on the site with much better resolution and completeness of the survey.
2022 article on KIRISHIMA
The new 2019 expedition to the wreck showed that
A) the ships hull breaks were caused when she was still vertical
B) the bow of the wreck was missing and presumed "obliterated" (torpedo hits?)
C) there was an explosion around B-barbette which severed the watertight integrity from port to starboard
In addition data from NAGATOs wreckage strongly points towards the fact that the turrets did not fall out as the japanese had clamps to keep them in place.
The KIRISHIMA battle damage article was primarely a historical exercise, not a marine forensic investigation. Video tapes had evidence for only three (!!!) shell hits. Note that the nice hit count on the profile drawing are not the result of forensic evidence but of recollection of the events from eyewitnesses, such as Lt. Ikeda. In many ways eyewitness acounts can be unreliable or misleading. Only very few hits were caught on the old filmtapes and this is signifcant because with such a small number of hits, You cannot differentiate between 8in HC and 16in AP hits. Giving the range of the action was very small and the angle of fall of the 16"/45 was in between 6 and 10deg, it does not surprise that one has to reckon with primarely water ricochet. However, that beeing said, the wreck of HIEI has been identified meanwhiles and I believe that LUNDGRENs ID was correct but this is not borne out from the old article but rather, due to recent work done with Petrel and ROV on the site with much better resolution and completeness of the survey.
2022 article on KIRISHIMA
The new 2019 expedition to the wreck showed that
A) the ships hull breaks were caused when she was still vertical
B) the bow of the wreck was missing and presumed "obliterated" (torpedo hits?)
C) there was an explosion around B-barbette which severed the watertight integrity from port to starboard
In addition data from NAGATOs wreckage strongly points towards the fact that the turrets did not fall out as the japanese had clamps to keep them in place.
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Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
My take is that capital ships are hard to put down with gunfire alone (unless you're a British Battlecruiser at Jutland or the Denmark Straight (no offense)) because knocking holes in the thing only lets in air for the most part. What was the old adage? Something about if you want to let air in, bomb them, if you want to let water in, torpedo them, or something like that.
One might argue the Bismarck was destroyed by gunfire and the torps were just icing on the cake, but since she was apparently torpedoed I'll agree that excludes her from the club.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
HMS Glorious.
Only counting stuff that had the big bang bangs on board. Good point though as aircraft carriers quickly became the premier ships of the fleet.
Premier is just to differentiate from capital but carriers became the ships to sink.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I had thought the RN considered them capital ships as well by the time of the war? Oh well, I get your point, that you were referring to armed and armored capital ships being sunk gunfire-only.
Yes. Gun ships for that part but your point is a good one as I think most navies either hadn't realised the potential
of carriers or old schoolers in their old schooners couldn't let go of the big gun ships being the deciders.
Thumpalumpacus
Major
I know I regard carriers of the era generally as as capital ships, but there's plenty of hindsightium in my opinion, so apply salt as needed. I'm pretty sure both the Japanese and Americans did, contemporaneously, and think the RN did as well, but I have read less evidence on their score.
You are correct and as it was the true strength of the carrier wasn't known. It didn't 'sink in' (sorry) for a while but once aircraft with longer ranges
were available the shift in power was undeniable. There was now a true seaborne ability to sink any kind of ship without that ship necessarily being
able to get a shot back except at the aircraft sent. It no longer mattered whether the guns were bigger and had a long range, against a fleet type
carrier it just wasn't going to happen. Musashi and Yamato are examples of this. All that engineering, expense, and the number of crew required
came to little when both were torpedoed and bombed literally to death using relatively cheap alternatives.
I haven't seen a tally of 'warships' disabled or sunk by carrier aircraft but it will be big list compared to the same done by gun ships in WWII
The terms "capital ship" and "aircraft carrier" were defined for the first time in the Washington Treaty 1922.
Capital ship
There were lists of individual ships already in existence, that were considered "capital ships" broken down into those able to be retained and those to be immediately disposed of. This approach avoided the problem of trying to retrospectively define the term for the myriad of designs already in existence. For new construction it meant ships of 10,000 to 35,000 tons carrying guns of less than 16".
Courageous & Glorious don't appear on the lists of "capital ships" even though they had 15" guns, being considered by all parties as "large light cruisers", which is what the RN had referred to them as from their conception in 1915/16. Furious was considered a carrier either by its past or because it was already under conversion to its flat deck configuration when the conference began.
Aircraft carrier
A ship of no more 27,000 tons with no more than 10 guns of between 6" & 8" calibre. Additional provision allowing any signatory to use up to two existing (edit: capital ship built or building) hulls to build carriers up to 33,000 tons. Latter provision led to the Lexington's, Akagi & Kaga.
Articles VII-X
Due to various design efforts in the late 1920s especially by the US (eg flight deck cruisers) and Japan (eg Ryujo) it was further defined in the London Naval Treaty 1930 as:-
"The expression 'aircraft carrier' includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.'
Other restrictions in Articles III, IV & V.
So the navies of the interwar period thought of capital ships and carriers in the context of these definitions. Two separate types. It was the "capital ship" that formed the core of the fleet. It's importance is reflected in the Treaties, in that they are the first type to be addressed and, while the Treaties tried to limit most types of war vessel except the smallest, greater efforts were made to limit capital ships than any other type.
In the 1920s and 1930s carrier aircraft weren't supposed to sink "capital ships". That this was possible only became clear in WW2.
Interwar the RN viewed them as a tool for finding, shadowing the enemy fleet and then directing the fleet's gunnery. The emphasis was on the torpedo to slow down an enemy fleet so that the big guns could sink them. The fighter/dive bomber was to damage the enemy carriers and suppress A.A. batteries on capital ships and supporting vessels.
For the US the principal role was finding the enemy and putting his aircraft carriers out of action before the same happened to them. For that the dive bomber was the principal weapon to tear up a carrier's flight deck and prevent it operating its aircraft. That would allow the capital ships to gain the element of surprise and do their work unhindered. For a period in the early 1930s the USN only had a single TB squadron because it did not favour the torpedo as a weapon.
It is only from 1941/42 that the carrier begins to be seen as the main element of the fleet, starting with the Japanese concentrating their air power in the Kido Butai from April 1941.
Capital ship
There were lists of individual ships already in existence, that were considered "capital ships" broken down into those able to be retained and those to be immediately disposed of. This approach avoided the problem of trying to retrospectively define the term for the myriad of designs already in existence. For new construction it meant ships of 10,000 to 35,000 tons carrying guns of less than 16".
Courageous & Glorious don't appear on the lists of "capital ships" even though they had 15" guns, being considered by all parties as "large light cruisers", which is what the RN had referred to them as from their conception in 1915/16. Furious was considered a carrier either by its past or because it was already under conversion to its flat deck configuration when the conference began.
Aircraft carrier
A ship of no more 27,000 tons with no more than 10 guns of between 6" & 8" calibre. Additional provision allowing any signatory to use up to two existing (edit: capital ship built or building) hulls to build carriers up to 33,000 tons. Latter provision led to the Lexington's, Akagi & Kaga.
Articles VII-X
Due to various design efforts in the late 1920s especially by the US (eg flight deck cruisers) and Japan (eg Ryujo) it was further defined in the London Naval Treaty 1930 as:-
"The expression 'aircraft carrier' includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.'
Other restrictions in Articles III, IV & V.
So the navies of the interwar period thought of capital ships and carriers in the context of these definitions. Two separate types. It was the "capital ship" that formed the core of the fleet. It's importance is reflected in the Treaties, in that they are the first type to be addressed and, while the Treaties tried to limit most types of war vessel except the smallest, greater efforts were made to limit capital ships than any other type.
In the 1920s and 1930s carrier aircraft weren't supposed to sink "capital ships". That this was possible only became clear in WW2.
Interwar the RN viewed them as a tool for finding, shadowing the enemy fleet and then directing the fleet's gunnery. The emphasis was on the torpedo to slow down an enemy fleet so that the big guns could sink them. The fighter/dive bomber was to damage the enemy carriers and suppress A.A. batteries on capital ships and supporting vessels.
For the US the principal role was finding the enemy and putting his aircraft carriers out of action before the same happened to them. For that the dive bomber was the principal weapon to tear up a carrier's flight deck and prevent it operating its aircraft. That would allow the capital ships to gain the element of surprise and do their work unhindered. For a period in the early 1930s the USN only had a single TB squadron because it did not favour the torpedo as a weapon.
It is only from 1941/42 that the carrier begins to be seen as the main element of the fleet, starting with the Japanese concentrating their air power in the Kido Butai from April 1941.
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Peter Gunn
Master Sergeant
Agree with pretty much everything you say
E
EwenS
As an observation, I think it was Shattered Sword that pointed out that despite three CV's of the same class (Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown) being together (for the first and only time) they still bumbled their way through to victory. Perhaps bumbling is a little harsh, but seeing as how the USN carriers hadn't really worked together as a single task force I cut them a lot of slack. Reading how painful it was to get the strikes airborne on June 4 is dizzying, BUT, they pulled it off. Shattered Sword also pointed out that just a year or so later, ANY USN task group would have put down Kido Butai as a matter of course, how things changed in 12-16 months of combat.
In mid 1942, no one could put together a large strike force as quickly or efficiently as KdB, they were the best in the world at it hands down.
By late 1943 the pendulum had completely shifted. By mid 1944 the USN was launching strikes that make KdB's efforts look like bath tub toys. By 1945 I'm pretty sure that if Halsey or Spruance wanted to pound the Japanese homeland with 1,000 plane carrier strikes they were quite capable of doing so, which would be 10 times the plane count KdB put up at Midway.
As an observation, I think it was Shattered Sword that pointed out that despite three CV's of the same class (Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown) being together (for the first and only time) they still bumbled their way through to victory. Perhaps bumbling is a little harsh, but seeing as how the USN carriers hadn't really worked together as a single task force I cut them a lot of slack. Reading how painful it was to get the strikes airborne on June 4 is dizzying, BUT, they pulled it off. Shattered Sword also pointed out that just a year or so later, ANY USN task group would have put down Kido Butai as a matter of course, how things changed in 12-16 months of combat.
In mid 1942, no one could put together a large strike force as quickly or efficiently as KdB, they were the best in the world at it hands down.
By late 1943 the pendulum had completely shifted. By mid 1944 the USN was launching strikes that make KdB's efforts look like bath tub toys. By 1945 I'm pretty sure that if Halsey or Spruance wanted to pound the Japanese homeland with 1,000 plane carrier strikes they were quite capable of doing so, which would be 10 times the plane count KdB put up at Midway.
Shortround6
Major General
Two things were needed to catapult the aircraft carrier to capitol ship rank ( and we should distinguish between large and small carriers, small carriers are not capitol ships)
1, Independent of the carriers, they needed better aircraft.
To pick on the US this was the plane that entered service in 1928 with the USS Saratoga.
2. Numbers of aircraft. The Saratoga and Lexington each carried 36 of these multi-purpose bombers. There were no dive bombers at this time. Fighters were supposed to strafe and use light bombs to aid the attack aircraft.
72 planes were not going to stop the Japanese battle fleet. Damage some of it, slow it down, sink a few ships yes (if lucky). But the battle would be decided by the remaining battleships (in theory). Range was also shorter than later aircraft. A lot depended on which force could get in it's airstrike first.
The USS Ranger didn't show up until 1934.
In 1944 when a US Task force could muster over 400 planes every thing had changed.
1, Independent of the carriers, they needed better aircraft.
To pick on the US this was the plane that entered service in 1928 with the USS Saratoga.
2. Numbers of aircraft. The Saratoga and Lexington each carried 36 of these multi-purpose bombers. There were no dive bombers at this time. Fighters were supposed to strafe and use light bombs to aid the attack aircraft.
72 planes were not going to stop the Japanese battle fleet. Damage some of it, slow it down, sink a few ships yes (if lucky). But the battle would be decided by the remaining battleships (in theory). Range was also shorter than later aircraft. A lot depended on which force could get in it's airstrike first.
The USS Ranger didn't show up until 1934.
In 1944 when a US Task force could muster over 400 planes every thing had changed.
Shortround6
Major General
They tried, it didn't end so well.
Attacks on Kure and the Seto Inland Sea - Wikipedia
They did do an awful lot of damage, however the operation may not have been sustainable.
