Iowa vs Yamato comparison

[EwenS]

They tried, it didn't end so well.

Attacks on Kure and the Seto Inland Sea - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They did do an awful lot of damage, however the operation may not have been sustainable.

By summer 1945 US carrier operations were entirely sustainable. With multiple carrier groups, off Okinawa between March and June they were able to rotate those groups to ensure there were at least 2 off the island at any one time. Every 3-4 days a group would pull out to refuel and resupply over a day or two. Fuel, ammunition, replacement aircraft and stores were all able to resupplied at sea in the replenishment areas. Every so often a group would take a week out for a rest at Ulithi.

In mid-June TF38 left Okinawa for Leyte. It sailed for operations off Japan on 1 July. The 3 TGs contained a total of 9 Essex class (with air groups containing c75 Hellcat or Corsair fighters, 15 Avengers and 15 Helldivers), 6 Independence class (c25 Hellcats and 9 Avengers) plus the Bon Homme Richard with a night air group. It operated continuously through to the end of the fighting on 15 Aug, and beyond the eventual surrender ceremony on 2 Sept, increasing in strength around mid-Aug. A map of the operations is below. Note the distances covered by the Fleet during this period.

Intrepid, Antietam, Boxer & the light carrier Cabot all joined the fleet off Japan before the end of Aug. Enterprise, Langley, Bunker Hill and Hornet were also all completing repairs / refits on the West Coast in late Aug / early Sept.

Operation Olympic was scheduled for 1 Nov 1945. Carrier operations in support thereof would have begun a few weeks earlier. Plans called for 5 carrier task groups split between the Fifth and Third Fleets. These would have included 13 Essex, 7 Independence plus Enterprise and Bon Homme Richard as night carriers.

By summer 1945 there were sufficient spare carrier air groups to allow air groups to be replaced as an entity every 6 months.


The TF37 (the BPF) sailed from Sydney on 28 June for Manus and onwards to Japan. They joined TF 38 on 16th July with 4 carriers and c260 aircraft and operated as a fourth TG to that force until 12 Aug. At that point the bulk of TF37 withdrew as previously planned, its logistics support being inadequate to maintain the whole force in Japanese waters any longer. KGV, Indefatigable and some supporting cruisers and destroyers remained as TG38.5 to participate in the final surrender arrangements.

Had the war continued a second BPF carrier task group, forming in Sydney around Indomitable and 3 light fleet carriers, would have participated in operations in the East China Sea in late Aug / early Sept. These ships sailed from Sydney on 15 Aug for Manus and on to reoccupy Hong Kong at the end of the month. For Operation Olympic the BPF would have fielded 2 carrier groups with 4 fleet and 4 light fleet carriers.

When the TF37/38 struck the Yokosuka and Kure areas in late July, the USN retained the major targets for themselves. By that stage the large Japanese ships were sitting ducks. Virtually out of fuel, often only partially manned or partially disarmed. Having said that Japanese flak and fighters continued to claim victims right up until the eventual ceasefire on 15 Aug.

 

[Shortround6]

When the TF37/38 struck the Yokosuka and Kure areas in late July, the USN retained the major targets for themselves. By that stage the large Japanese ships were sitting ducks. Virtually out of fuel, often only partially manned or partially disarmed. Having said that Japanese flak and fighters continued to claim victims right up until the eventual ceasefire on 15 Aug.

According to Wiki (correction welcome) the operations at Kure resulted in 133 aircraft loss and 102 crewmen. The US was probably in a better positioned to rescue ditched/parachuted crew men. Wiki's text is not clear, there may have been few sorties between the July 24th and the 28th when the major operations were conducted.

The big day was July 24 with 1747 sorties. but they don't give sortie totals for the other days or break down losses by the day.

There is a difference between operating as task groups off the coast or even shore bombardment in support of a landing and trying to destroy infrastructure/factories in built up defended areas. Many of the losses suffered July 24-28th were from shore mounted AA guns.

 

[EwenS]

According to Wiki (correction welcome) the operations at Kure resulted in 133 aircraft loss and 102 crewmen. The US was probably in a better positioned to rescue ditched/parachuted crew men. Wiki's text is not clear, there may have been few sorties between the July 24th and the 28th when the major operations were conducted.

The big day was July 24 with 1747 sorties. but they don't give sortie totals for the other days or break down losses by the day.

There is a difference between operating as task groups off the coast or even shore bombardment in support of a landing and trying to destroy infrastructure/factories in built up defended areas. Many of the losses suffered July 24-28th were from shore mounted AA guns.

USN carrier operations in July/Aug are examined in detail in this book which uses more recent research than that of Morison quoted by Wiki.
Amazon product ASIN B07MCDV5X9
View: https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B07MCDV5X9/
24 July - almost 1,400 sorties incl 1,115 strikes against airfields from northern Kyushu to Nagoya and Kure navy base. Plus another 300 from the BPF.
28 July - nearly 2,000.

Those figures from the chapter summaries. Activity is broken down by Task Group and air group in the text but I'm not going through to add them up in detail.

More strikes took place on the 25th before TF37/38 withdrew to refuel and rearm before the next strikes on the 28th.

The main purpose of the carrier strikes in July / Aug 1945 was destruction of the remaining Japanese naval and air power. So the strikes were against ports on both coasts of Japan and airfields throughout the country. Carrier air power was not focussed on factories. Attacking airfields was a particularly dangerous exercise. The Japanese were very clever, setting up dummy aircraft to act as flak traps for the attackers. The shore bombardments did not actually do much damage. They were more about inflicting harm on Japanese civilian morale. An Allied fleet able to bombard the Homeland unimpeded.

Some stats for these operations from Winton's "The Forgotten Fleet". Figures are British (to 12 Aug)/US

Number of carriers - 4/16
Number of strike days - 8/13
Aircraft complement - 255/1,191
Sorties on strike days - 2,615/18,163
Offensive sorties on strike days - 1,595/10,678 (against enemy shipping or over enemy territory)
Enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged - 347/2,408
Tons of enemy shipping sunk or damaged - 356,760/924,000
Offensive sorties per complement aircraft per strike day - 1.39/1.39
EA destroyed or damaged per offensive sortie - 0.21/0.22
Tons of enemy shipping sunk or damaged per offensive sortie - 224/90
Combat losses as percentage of offensive sorties - 2.38/1.61
Operational losses as percentage of offensive sorties - 2.0/0.55

Edit:- Note the weather was bad through most of this period due to it being typhoon season. It resulted in lost strike days, difficulty in locating targets and aircraft finding their way back to carriers, larger movements between target areas than planned to avoid it, relocation of refuelling areas at short notice etc. The atomic strike on Hiroshima also upset the strike schedule with the fleet refuelling instead.

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you, That paints a rather different picture.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I had thought the RN considered them capital ships as well by the time of the war? Oh well, I get your point, that you were referring to armed and armored capital ships being sunk gunfire-only.

Glorius was built like a cruiser not a battle cruiser let alone a battleship.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I would tend to agree, the US 16" round can make a real mess of things, in looking over the damage to SoDak which was hit by both 14 and 8" rounds however. There are some images where it's hard to tell but on the whole, it's pretty easy in the photos (as long as there's a point of reference) to tell the difference.

The Hiei however was hit by several dive bombers with perhaps 1,000lb AP bombs so there's that to contend with. But in the end I thought they identified both Kirishima and Hiei because they could see their nameplates, I could be wrong on that however.

The USN did not use AP bombs at that time

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Yamato fired optically so night or bad weather would be against it.

Time of flight for a shell fired at 32,000 feet is 60 seconds.

10,000 ft is about 13 seconds. Very very roughly.

So you are a moving target hitting a moving target and firing 60 seconds in advance where you think it will be.

So about 1-2% chance of hitting.

10,000 ft is 33-22% chance of hitting.

The Japanese liked diving shells which if hit water would travel a bit before exploding. This would delay detonation. So against thin skinned targets then it may not detonate the shell. But against Iowa that's won't be a problem.

So a closer engagement is suitable for both sides but sauce for the goose....

Date and times of ships construction are a red herring and must be treated with care.

Royal Navy was still commissioning Pre Dreadnoughtd even after Dreadnought herself so one must always take the more wider view.

The RN was commissioning the Lord Nelson class after Dreadnought because they took material from the Lord Nelsons to expedite construct of Dreadnought. They did not order any predreadnoughts after ordering Dreadnought.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Glorius was built like a cruiser not a battle cruiser let alone a battleship.

Yes, I'm aware of that, thanks.

 

[delcyros]

BRETAGNE was also blown up from four major calibre hits. Honorouble mention should go to DUNKERQUE, which through the same action, was also disabled from four 15in hits (critical: two belt penetrating hits), lost all power and slowly settled, so it had to be beached to prevent her from sinking.