According to Wiki (correction welcome) the operations at Kure resulted in 133 aircraft loss and 102 crewmen. The US was probably in a better positioned to rescue ditched/parachuted crew men. Wiki's text is not clear, there may have been few sorties between the July 24th and the 28th when the major operations were conducted.
The big day was July 24 with 1747 sorties. but they don't give sortie totals for the other days or break down losses by the day.
There is a difference between operating as task groups off the coast or even shore bombardment in support of a landing and trying to destroy infrastructure/factories in built up defended areas. Many of the losses suffered July 24-28th were from shore mounted AA guns.
USN carrier operations in July/Aug are examined in detail in this book which uses more recent research than that of Morison quoted by Wiki.
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24 July - almost 1,400 sorties incl 1,115 strikes against airfields from northern Kyushu to Nagoya and Kure navy base. Plus another 300 from the BPF.
28 July - nearly 2,000.
Those figures from the chapter summaries. Activity is broken down by Task Group and air group in the text but I'm not going through to add them up in detail.
More strikes took place on the 25th before TF37/38 withdrew to refuel and rearm before the next strikes on the 28th.
The main purpose of the carrier strikes in July / Aug 1945 was destruction of the remaining Japanese naval and air power. So the strikes were against ports on both coasts of Japan and airfields throughout the country. Carrier air power was not focussed on factories. Attacking airfields was a particularly dangerous exercise. The Japanese were very clever, setting up dummy aircraft to act as flak traps for the attackers. The shore bombardments did not actually do much damage. They were more about inflicting harm on Japanese civilian morale. An Allied fleet able to bombard the Homeland unimpeded.
Some stats for these operations from Winton's "The Forgotten Fleet". Figures are British (to 12 Aug)/US
Number of carriers - 4/16
Number of strike days - 8/13
Aircraft complement - 255/1,191
Sorties on strike days - 2,615/18,163
Offensive sorties on strike days - 1,595/10,678 (against enemy shipping or over enemy territory)
Enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged - 347/2,408
Tons of enemy shipping sunk or damaged - 356,760/924,000
Offensive sorties per complement aircraft per strike day - 1.39/1.39
EA destroyed or damaged per offensive sortie - 0.21/0.22
Tons of enemy shipping sunk or damaged per offensive sortie - 224/90
Combat losses as percentage of offensive sorties - 2.38/1.61
Operational losses as percentage of offensive sorties - 2.0/0.55
Edit:- Note the weather was bad through most of this period due to it being typhoon season. It resulted in lost strike days, difficulty in locating targets and aircraft finding their way back to carriers, larger movements between target areas than planned to avoid it, relocation of refuelling areas at short notice etc. The atomic strike on Hiroshima also upset the strike schedule with the fleet refuelling instead.