Jack vs. Tojo - Which was better? Why?

[Shortround6]

Japanese were not taking the advantages of their 2-engined fighters as much as it was the case for the Western types. Neither Ki-45 nor J1N were adopted to carry some meaningful bomb load like it was the case with Bf 110 or P-38.

In some cases the Japanese were 1 to 2 years behind. It took a considerable amount of time to get the Ki-45 sorted out. The Ki-45 was also hindered by it's guns and the distances the JAAF wanted to fly.

Compare the Ki-45 to the Bf 110C. The Ki-45 had two 12.7mm mgs to the 110s four 7.9 guns. Germans did stuff 1000rpg in which was a little excessive. Germans were using the MG/FFM cannon like the ones in the Zero, JAAF didn't have them. They used a heavy 20mm gun that was rather slow firing.
From an aircraft designer point of view they put in close to the weight of armament that the 110 used (perhaps a little light on ammo). The guns chosen were not as effective as wanted but that is the Armies problem. They are the ones providing the guns.
The Ki-45 was finally provided with a pair of 250kg bombs, but the 110 only got to carry a pair of 250kg bombs with the C-4/B version which got DB 601N engines, The C-7 got the pair of 500kg bombs but got a stronger undercarriage. As the engines were upgraded in power the 110F came into service with DB 610Fs. Wing racks were into introduced for small bombs.
with the 110G and the DB 605 engines you could put some big bombs on the 110. Meanwhile the Ki-45 was stuck with same Ha-102 engine it had stared it's service life with in early 1942. granted this was a significate improvement over the 9 cylinder scaled down Mercury engines it started with.

 

[tomo pauk]

Compare the Ki-45 to the Bf 110C. The Ki-45 had two 12.7mm mgs to the 110s four 7.9 guns. Germans did stuff 1000rpg in which was a little excessive. Germans were using the MG/FFM cannon like the ones in the Zero, JAAF didn't have them. They used a heavy 20mm gun that was rather slow firing.
From an aircraft designer point of view they put in close to the weight of armament that the 110 used (perhaps a little light on ammo). The guns chosen were not as effective as wanted but that is the Armies problem. They are the ones providing the guns.

Army was also specifying the guns? The MG FFM was firing at higher MV than the FF or the early Zero's cannons. For resons that I'm not aware, seems like Ki-45 was without drop tanks??
I'd like to point out again to what Zero was doing on one engine, and compare it with what Ki-45 was doing on two engines of comparable power. Army could've specified a Zero-sized fighter instead of a twin, powered by Kinsei or Ha-41( or a tad bigger fighter powered by Kasei), to cover the long-range job while sporting at least 4 HMGs. These engines were in series production in 1941.

The Ki-45 was finally provided with a pair of 250kg bombs, but the 110 only got to carry a pair of 250kg bombs with the C-4/B version which got DB 601N engines, The C-7 got the pair of 500kg bombs but got a stronger undercarriage. As the engines were upgraded in power the 110F came into service with DB 610Fs. Wing racks were into introduced for small bombs.

Petrick and Mankau note up to 2 x 1000 kg bombs already for the 110C-7, and wing drop tanks. The Ki-45 can't compete with the 110 in the payload department.

One wonders whether the Germans and Japanse would've been better of if the Bf 110, Ki-45, Ki-46 and J1N were designed as fast bombers 1st and foremost.

with the 110G and the DB 605 engines you could put some big bombs on the 110. Meanwhile the Ki-45 was stuck with same Ha-102 engine it had stared it's service life with in early 1942. granted this was a significate improvement over the 9 cylinder scaled down Mercury engines it started with.

Japanese bigger and better engines that might've fit on the Ki-45, like Kinsei or Ha-41, were the types sorely needed for the Zeros and Ki-43s.

Since all of this is slowly getting into what-if territory, I guess I'll bump the Japanese what-if thread here.

 

[Shortround6]

Army was also specifying the guns? The MG FFM was firing at higher MV than the FF or the early Zero's cannons. For resons that I'm not aware, seems like Ki-45 was without drop tanks??
I'd like to point out again to what Zero was doing on one engine, and compare it with what Ki-45 was doing on two engines of comparable power. Army could've specified a Zero-sized fighter instead of a twin, powered by Kinsei or Ha-41( or a tad bigger fighter powered by Kasei), to cover the long-range job while sporting at least 4 HMGs. These engines were in series production in 1941.

The Army tells the aircraft maker what guns they want, not the other way around. For some strange reason the Japanese Army and the Navy hardly ever (if ever) agreed on guns.
The type 92 7.7mm machine gun may have been the last time. The Zero's cannon were manufactured in a plant owned by ex navy officers.

The engines used in the Ki-45 were not quite the same power as the as the Zero, subtle but true. The two first Zero prototypes used the Mitsubishi engine that was later used in the Ki-45, but it didn't provide enough power at the time and Mitsubishi had to use the Nakajima engine.

The KI-45 after a long and protracted development (they pretty much redesigned the entire airplane) wound up with 1450 liters of fuel in internal tanks. Max range on internal fuel was 1404 miles (long range cruise was 161mph). An empty equipped 110F weighs more than a fully loaded (but clean) Ki-45. Yes the 100C was a lot lighter. A pair of 200 liter drop tanks are listed but I don't know they showed up (or how often)
The Ki-45 might well have benefited from a change in armament. That modified antitank gun under the belly wasn't doing it any favors in air to air combat. It was almost as powerful as a Hispano but fired a lot slower (rate of fire).

Petrick and Mankau note up to 2 x 1000 kg bombs already for the 110C-7, and wing drop tanks. The Ki-45 can't compete with the 110 in the payload department.

True but the C-7 had the 1270hp engines and a beefed up landing gear to handle the weight.

Japanese bigger and better engines that might've fit on the Ki-45, like Kinsei or Ha-41, were the types sorely needed for the Zeros and Ki-43s.

Very true. But the very nice 1500hp engines don't show up until 1943/44
Ki-96 prototype using some Ki-45 parts.

Japanese Army could not figure out if they wanted a single seater or a two seater and wasted time bouncing back and forth.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

You're right but it's still been well established that those numbers are CLAIMS and the actual kill ratio between the F6F and A6M will never be known as with other aircraft that dominated the Zero

Agreed. I would also add that the 19 to 1 claim to loss ratio includes ALL Japanese aircraft. The F6F certainly didn't shoot down 5100 Zeros.

 

[Shortround6]

The F6F certainly didn't shoot done 5100 Zeros.

It didn't ?????

I am shocked, absolutely shocked I tell you.
The internet is wrong????

 

[Reluctant Poster]

I have to disagree. The US high command weren't fools. They fully expected a war.

To be fair, in 1941 almost everyone on the planet knew war between Japan and the US was imminent, but the expected attack was in the Philippines, not Hawaii. The US even had early warning that an attack was happening but chose to ignore it.

However, even when the US was expecting an attack, thanks to MacArthur, they were not able to adequately defend against the Japanese air raids. MacArthur's micromanagement and poor leadership methods lead to a command chain that was in disarray. They had ignored the radar reports of incoming Japanese strikes and then lost almost all of their air force on the ground. Had MacArthur not been in charge, it's likely they would have held the Philippines for much longer. Perhaps they may have prevented the brutal Japanese occupation? They did have hundreds of aircraft and a numerically larger ground force than the Japanese had.

EDIT: Getting back to the original discussion: Jack vs. Tojo, I did some more reading and the Zero's designer explained why the Japanese favored light-engined aircraft: they were cheaper. There's one big consideration that we haven't been taking into account in this discussion. The Tojo was less expensive to manufacture and develop, compared to the Raiden, which explains the production differences. Based on the evidence, I've got to say that the Tojo's ease of construction (which was incorporated into the Frank) and cheap maintenance is likely what made it a better choice for mass production compared to the Jack. The Jack was just too advanced and too costly to be a reliable field interceptor.

The point is that Pearl Harbor was completely unprepared which was the key to the Japanese success. The brain trust at US high command did a whole lot of nothing to put Pearl Harbor on alert. They did not even put the Philippines on a war footing until after the Pearl harbor raid. As for MacArthur, he knew of the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor before the Japanese had even taken off to attack. He had 9 hours to react in some way.

 

[GrauGeist]

MacArther was stuck between a rock and a hard place.

He was getting orders from the U.S. to mobilize but the President of the Philippines did not want him to for fear if "provoking" the Japanese.

The President had it in his mind that he could negotiate with Tokyo, keeping the Philippines neutral.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

The Wildcat was not bad in the Solomons. As with any plane, it boils down to how technology, tactics, and doctrine interact.

Lundstrom lists the Marine F4Fs claims at 170.5 with an estimated actual score of 61. The USN was overclaiming by a factor of around 2 while the Marines were a little more enthusiastic at closer to 3.
Lundstrom doesn't summarize Marine F4F losses however the USN Publication "

" lists 75 F4Fs lost in air-to-air combat in WWII. The majority of these would have been lost on Guadalcanal as the last Marine F4F combat mission was flown on April 7, 1943. The Marines did lose 2 F4Fs at Midway. It would appear that the again the Zero held a slight advantage although some of the F4F s may have been lost to bombers. From what I have been able the glean the death rate for the Zero pilots was higher. I was going through the individual combat reports in Lundstrom's book but haven't completed the task.

It should be pointed out that the F4Fs on Guadalcanal held a significant home field advantage. The Zeros were land based and were flying long distance missions that no other single engine fighter could accomplish at that time. In this case the Americans had a tremendous advantage in having an airfield to return to in an emergency. Any damaged Zero had a long way to go to get to safety. A badly damaged Zero either ditched or the pilot bailed out. In addition, the American had an excellent early warning systems in the form of the coast watchers as well as radar which negated the F4Fs very poor climb. The home base also helped the F4F with its short endurance.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Lundstrom lists the Marine F4Fs claims at 170.5 with an estimated actual score of 61. The USN was overclaiming by a factor of around 2 while the Marines were a little more enthusiastic at closer to 3.
Lundstrom doesn't summarize Marine F4F losses however the USN Publication "View attachment 696027" lists 75 F4Fs lost in air-to-air combat in WWII. The majority of these would have been lost on Guadalcanal as the last Marine F4F combat mission was flown on April 7, 1943. The Marines did lose 2 F4Fs at Midway. It would appear that the again the Zero held a slight advantage although some of the F4F s may have been lost to bombers. From what I have been able the glean the death rate for the Zero pilots was higher. I was going through the individual combat reports in Lundstrom's book but haven't completed the task.

It should be pointed out that the F4Fs on Guadalcanal held a significant home field advantage. The Zeros were land based and were flying long distance missions that no other single engine fighter could accomplish at that time. In this case the Americans had a tremendous advantage in having an airfield to return to in an emergency. Any damaged Zero had a long way to go to get to safety. A badly damaged Zero either ditched or the pilot bailed out. In addition, the American had an excellent early warning systems in the form of the coast watchers as well as radar which negated the F4Fs very poor climb. The home base also helped the F4F with its short endurance.

Right: how technology, tactics, and doctrine interact.

 

[PAT303]

Agreed. I would also add that the 19 to 1 claim to loss ratio includes ALL Japanese aircraft. The F6F certainly didn't shoot down 5100 Zeros.

I was just making a point about the Japanese Aces being able to mix it with superior aircraft in the Zero, unfortunately they were the only ones..

 

[GregP]

I have to disagree. The US high command weren't fools. They fully expected a war.

To be fair, in 1941 almost everyone on the planet knew war between Japan and the US was imminent, but the expected attack was in the Philippines, not Hawaii. The US even had early warning that an attack was happening but chose to ignore it.

However, even when the US was expecting an attack, thanks to MacArthur, they were not able to adequately defend against the Japanese air raids. MacArthur's micromanagement and poor leadership methods lead to a command chain that was in disarray. They had ignored the radar reports of incoming Japanese strikes and then lost almost all of their air force on the ground. Had MacArthur not been in charge, it's likely they would have held the Philippines for much longer. Perhaps they may have prevented the brutal Japanese occupation? They did have hundreds of aircraft and a numerically larger ground force than the Japanese had.

EDIT: Getting back to the original discussion: Jack vs. Tojo, I did some more reading and the Zero's designer explained why the Japanese favored light-engined aircraft: they were cheaper. There's one big consideration that we haven't been taking into account in this discussion. The Tojo was less expensive to manufacture and develop, compared to the Raiden, which explains the production differences. Based on the evidence, I've got to say that the Tojo's ease of construction (which was incorporated into the Frank) and cheap maintenance is likely what made it a better choice for mass production compared to the Jack. The Jack was just too advanced and too costly to be a reliable field interceptor.

Too advanced and too costly?

Think is was more advanced and more costly than one of the most effective fighters of the war, the P-47, which had a complex turbo-supercharger system and remained one of the most effective fighters produced by anyone during the war?

 

[AerialTorpedoDude69]

Too advanced and too costly?

Think is was more advanced and more costly than one of the most effective fighters of the war, the P-47, which had a complex turbo-supercharger system and remained one of the most effective fighters produced by anyone during the war?

Great point. From the perspective of the strategy that US decision makers pursued, the P-51 offered the Allies a far better cost-to-performance ratio than the P-47, even as remarkable an engineering feat as the P-47 was. I think the P-47 per-mission-loss rate was similar to the Hellcat, which was astoundingly low, but it cost double that of the P-51. I wouldn't put a price on human life so I won't factor in the cost of training a pilot, but if the loss rate was about equal to a P-51, I'd say the P-51 was a more effective aircraft. Would I rather fly a P-51? No way, I'd take the Jug ANY DAY over the 'stang. But in terms of the importance to the war effort, the war planners would probably take the P-51 over the P-47.

And that's probably why there were 2.5 times more Ki-44 aircraft made than the J2M.

 

[Just Schmidt]

The simplest, though not the only, explanation for the greater number og Ki-44's, is that it was earlier, being in production before Pearl Harbour and entering (limited) service shortly after. The J2M was at least a year behind, and then the innovative features caused teething troubles. The Ki-84 and the N1K1-J may be said to be contemporary, so both interceptors had a more all round alternative ready at about the same time. Which one of those that were the most complex I can't say, they both had their share of problems.

As belonging to the navy and army respectively, the relative cost of J2M's and Ki-44's are not directly influenzing which one is recieving priority, but it is indirectly, as their respective alternatives vie for production. Complicating that is that the navy (hoped) it needed fighters able to operate from carriers, otherwise they may have decided to prioritize both the J2M and N1K1-J/2-J higher. The Ki 84 was produced in roughly double the numbers of the Kavanishi fighter.

All that said I think the Ki-44 was better for being out there earlier, though better armament should (and probably could) have been introduced sooner. Had there been less interservice rivalry, we could defenitely have demanded the navy to adopt that design, rather than making their own interceptor. Then, supposing design resources are pooled, one late war replacement would be in order. If reason also dictates that there is no N1K1-J but instead the navy adopts the Ki-84 as land based fighter, we may give the job of designing it to Kavanishi.

While I'm at it, drop the Ki-61 and have Kawasaki fokus on getting the Ki-96/ Ki-102 into production as early as possible, so we can bash them instead of the poor Ki-45. Though with two engines, we should get a better bomber destroyer than the A6M, with more range than the Ki-44, and a neat ground attack option available.

But that would be in a world that, at least to me, makes sense as seen through my retroscope.

 

[tomo pauk]

And that's probably why there were 2.5 times more Ki-44 aircraft made than the J2M.

The simplest, though not the only, explanation for the greater number og Ki-44's, is that it was earlier, being in production before Pearl Harbour and entering (limited) service shortly after. The J2M was at least a year behind, and then the innovative features caused teething troubles.

I agree with Just Schmidt - the Ki-44 was manufactured in much greater quantities because it's production started much earlier vs. how the war was long.
J2M cost to produce was probably lower than of the Ki-84 that used 18 cylinder engine, and certainly lower than the Ki-45 or J1N that were with two engines.

If reason also dictates that there is no N1K1-J but instead the navy adopts the Ki-84 as land based fighter, we may give the job of designing it to Kavanishi.

Kawanishi's contribution to the Japanese war effort was severely diluted through many designs they were shelling out, only to be manufactured in meagre numbers; IJN is to blame IMO. So yes - have them designing a 'proper' fighter by 1941, instead of the flights of fantasy like the bespoke floatplane fighter.

While I'm at it, drop the Ki-61 and have Kawasaki fokus on getting the Ki-96/ Ki-102 into production as early as possible, so we can bash them instead of the poor Ki-45. Though with two engines, we should get a better bomber destroyer than the A6M, with more range than the Ki-44, and a neat ground attack option available.

Ki-61 with an engine from Ki-96/-102 is the Ki-100. Still very rangy, and unlike the twins, it can be manufactured in quantities required to replace the Ki-43. Japan will have an easier time to fuel 1000 Ki-100s than even 600 Ki-96s/-102s.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Too advanced and too costly?

Think is was more advanced and more costly than one of the most effective fighters of the war, the P-47, which had a complex turbo-supercharger system and remained one of the most effective fighters produced by anyone during the war?

The irony of the P-47 is that the role it is most notable for is ground attack in which the turbocharger was an unnecessary expense and in fact added weight. A Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Great point. From the perspective of the strategy that US decision makers pursued, the P-51 offered the Allies a far better cost-to-performance ratio than the P-47, even as remarkable an engineering feat as the P-47 was. I think the P-47 per-mission-loss rate was similar to the Hellcat, which was astoundingly low, but it cost double that of the P-51. I wouldn't put a price on human life so I won't factor in the cost of training a pilot, but if the loss rate was about equal to a P-51, I'd say the P-51 was a more effective aircraft. Would I rather fly a P-51? No way, I'd take the Jug ANY DAY over the 'stang. But in terms of the importance to the war effort, the war planners would probably take the P-51 over the P-47.

And that's probably why there were 2.5 times more Ki-44 aircraft made than the J2M.

War is very much about putting a price on human life. Generals make those kinds of decisions all the time.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Right: how technology, tactics, and doctrine interact.

It would be interesting to speculate on how Midway would turned out if the Japanese had the equivalent of USN radar and fighter direction.

 

[GrauGeist]

Since Imperial Japan was a maritime empire, it makes sense that they would have floatplane fighter designs early on.

The A6M2-N and N1K1 enabled them the ability to station and operate fighters in remote areas, often times just a protected lagoon.

Of course, as the fortunes of war turned against the Empire, floatplane operations were at risk and the need no longer existed, except for the M6A1, which was designed to operate from carrier subs.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

A Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.

Unless you can compare the documented maintenance requirements for both aircraft, that's just a guess

 

[tomo pauk]

The irony of the P-47 is that the role it is most notable for is ground attack in which the turbocharger was an unnecessary expense and in fact added weight. A Corsair optimized for a land-based role would have been less expensive and in view of the much, much lower take off distance would have required less airfield preparation and without the complexity of the turbocharger maintenance would have been simpler.

If we want to change the things based on hindsight, outfitting the proper drop-tanks on the P-47 by mid-1943 would've probably give to the P-47s a far better role in the game of destroying the German military assets than it would've been a case if the Allies field yet another fighter-bomber.