fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
Was the Comet turret an internal mantlet it certainly looks external.
January 1936: British army, you run the show
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Was the Comet turret an internal mantlet it certainly looks external.
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Shortround6
Major General
Video of French 75 gun on Renault Ft 17 chassis.
Better than a towed gun (?) but using WW I left overs on small chassis can bring a host of problems.
Better than a towed gun (?) but using WW I left overs on small chassis can bring a host of problems.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
Tony Williams, author of numerous books and articles on small arms and ordnance, posted a speculative article on an alternative gun for British pre-wwii tanks, AN ALTERNATIVE 1930s BRITISH TANK GUN
His basis is a 57mm (6#) gun firing a new 57x307mm round.
His basis is a 57mm (6#) gun firing a new 57x307mm round.
Shortround6
Major General
Getting back to the original premise, what was wrong with the British army in 1936-39 and what was wrong later?
What are important fixes and what are 'nice to have'?
At what levels were some of the deficiencies? Platoon/company level or division/corp level?
Often large differences in effectiveness came with sort of "behind the scenes" changes. As the war went on the communications, even in an Infantry division changed considerably. A 1939/40 division had about 75 radios of which 51 were in the divisional artillery regiment and 42 of those were operated by artillery regiment operators. In late 1944 a division had about 1000 radios. At the beginning of the war other 'signalling' methods included runner/messengers, flags/signal lamps/ signal panels (for aircraft) and of course telephone/telegraph wire. These three categories dropped off as the radio use increase.
In late 1944 any forward observer could call for the fire of any and ALL guns/tubes within range of the target regardless of what units they belonged to. A flexibility enjoyed by no other army. The BEF would need about 10,000 more radios to bring it up to 1944 standard of equipment let alone the changes in doctrine/training. See this site for much more detail: Artillery Communications
In some cases using the Germans as a model may make sense but not everything the Germans did was the best or only way of doing something.
I would also note that while the British army was the first to be motorized/mechanized this merely meant there were no horses. An infantry company in the BEF in France had Four 15cwt trucks. (1680lb/764kg payload) and one 8cwt truck. All the Infantry walked. Of course giving the BEF more vehicles just means the Germans capture more at Dunkirk.
The Best thing you could do for the BEF was build 40-50 LSTs to get them off the beach faster
What are important fixes and what are 'nice to have'?
At what levels were some of the deficiencies? Platoon/company level or division/corp level?
Often large differences in effectiveness came with sort of "behind the scenes" changes. As the war went on the communications, even in an Infantry division changed considerably. A 1939/40 division had about 75 radios of which 51 were in the divisional artillery regiment and 42 of those were operated by artillery regiment operators. In late 1944 a division had about 1000 radios. At the beginning of the war other 'signalling' methods included runner/messengers, flags/signal lamps/ signal panels (for aircraft) and of course telephone/telegraph wire. These three categories dropped off as the radio use increase.
In late 1944 any forward observer could call for the fire of any and ALL guns/tubes within range of the target regardless of what units they belonged to. A flexibility enjoyed by no other army. The BEF would need about 10,000 more radios to bring it up to 1944 standard of equipment let alone the changes in doctrine/training. See this site for much more detail: Artillery Communications
In some cases using the Germans as a model may make sense but not everything the Germans did was the best or only way of doing something.
I would also note that while the British army was the first to be motorized/mechanized this merely meant there were no horses. An infantry company in the BEF in France had Four 15cwt trucks. (1680lb/764kg payload) and one 8cwt truck. All the Infantry walked. Of course giving the BEF more vehicles just means the Germans capture more at Dunkirk.
The Best thing you could do for the BEF was build 40-50 LSTs to get them off the beach faster
Shortround6
Major General
Going back to the tanks, you have the circle of doctrine (tactics) dictating the weapons specified in future tanks and then you had the weapons fitted helping dictate the tactics (doctrine) used in the field.
The British in the 1930s believed in "firing on the move". That is that rapid and accurate firing while moving/advancing would suppress the enemy and give the British an advantage. Without mechanical stabilizers the British tried a scheme of using tank guns that were free in elevation. That is there was no mechanical elevation mechanism, ie hand-wheels/gears. Elevation was controlled by the gunners shoulder against a shoulder piece and his legs/body allowed for a much more rapid and accurate adjustment in elevation as the the tank crossed less than smooth ground. This may very well have been true at slow speeds in tests. However in the real world the ability of the gunners to control elevation in this way was actually pretty limited. It also made no allowance for changes in line (lateral movement) which
It also had the follow on effect of degrading the armaments long range ability. It didn't matter how good the gun/ammo performed at long range (800-1000yds and beyond) as each shot was essentially a "first" shot because the gun/s moved under recoil even if the gun was stationary. Correcting a 1st shot miss wasn't a matter of going up or down a 1/4 turn on a handle for instance but trying to either push the rear end of the gun up or relaxing the leg/body muscles and letting it drop a bit, hardly precise. The firing on the move could also consume a lot of ammo for each hit actually achieved.
Now combine this with the decision to NOT us HE ammo because the 40mm was considered too small in spite of the fact that just about every army that used a 37mm tank gun issued HE ammunition and the British are having a real problem dealing with targets of all types at long range. The MG was supposed to deal with ALL non-armored targets and here we run into another problem. The vast majority of the worlds AT guns and light field guns were partially armored. At least they had nominally bullet proof shields covering the forward arc.
Granted a number of these shields could be pierced at close range by rifle/mg ammo at close range even without using AP ammo but that didn't help at around 800yds and beyond. The gun shields could and did protect at least a few of the crew from long range mg fire.
What this means is that British tankers, when faced with long range AT gun or field gun fire had two or three choices. One, call for artillery support while popping smoke. Given mid/late 30s radio nets this was somewhat iffy even if the tanks were within range of the supporting artillery. It also means a halt/temporary retreat in the advance. Two is attempting to slug it out at long range which is the worst choice and three, advance as fast a possible (charge?) to get close enough for the MG to become effective against the towed guns. Close enough to penetrate the shield or advance to a point to take the guns from the flank and/or close enough to make getting a hit on gun a likely proposition with the main gun AP shot. The last two choices are not very good ones but given the radio communications of the day may be the ONLY options.
Different choices in the design process may have allowed different tactics, which in turn, may have allowed for different choices for future tanks. Throwing out the "firing on the move" tactic early on may lead to improved long range accuracy for both the main gun and the co-ax gun which extends the range the tanks can deal with non-armored targets. Better, more precise elevation control for quicker walking successive shots onto the target. Buying HE ammo from the start would also do wonders for this stand off capability. The 40mm Bofors shell held 65grams of HE. The German 37mm held 25 grams and the US 37mm AT and tank shells held about 38 grams. The 2pdr wouldn't take out field fortifications but it's ability to deal with towed guns (and their towing vehicles, one or two 40mm HE vs how many MG rounds?) would be much enhanced.
The 2pdr solid shot was also a bit lacking in long range performance due to it's shape.
From
as I want to give credit for the picture.
4th round is an APCBC projectile and extended the practical range of the 2pdr by several hundred yds at least.
Again, a better round for long range use and better/ more precise gun mountings might have lead to different tactics.
more later.
The British in the 1930s believed in "firing on the move". That is that rapid and accurate firing while moving/advancing would suppress the enemy and give the British an advantage. Without mechanical stabilizers the British tried a scheme of using tank guns that were free in elevation. That is there was no mechanical elevation mechanism, ie hand-wheels/gears. Elevation was controlled by the gunners shoulder against a shoulder piece and his legs/body allowed for a much more rapid and accurate adjustment in elevation as the the tank crossed less than smooth ground. This may very well have been true at slow speeds in tests. However in the real world the ability of the gunners to control elevation in this way was actually pretty limited. It also made no allowance for changes in line (lateral movement) which
It also had the follow on effect of degrading the armaments long range ability. It didn't matter how good the gun/ammo performed at long range (800-1000yds and beyond) as each shot was essentially a "first" shot because the gun/s moved under recoil even if the gun was stationary. Correcting a 1st shot miss wasn't a matter of going up or down a 1/4 turn on a handle for instance but trying to either push the rear end of the gun up or relaxing the leg/body muscles and letting it drop a bit, hardly precise. The firing on the move could also consume a lot of ammo for each hit actually achieved.
Now combine this with the decision to NOT us HE ammo because the 40mm was considered too small in spite of the fact that just about every army that used a 37mm tank gun issued HE ammunition and the British are having a real problem dealing with targets of all types at long range. The MG was supposed to deal with ALL non-armored targets and here we run into another problem. The vast majority of the worlds AT guns and light field guns were partially armored. At least they had nominally bullet proof shields covering the forward arc.
Granted a number of these shields could be pierced at close range by rifle/mg ammo at close range even without using AP ammo but that didn't help at around 800yds and beyond. The gun shields could and did protect at least a few of the crew from long range mg fire.
What this means is that British tankers, when faced with long range AT gun or field gun fire had two or three choices. One, call for artillery support while popping smoke. Given mid/late 30s radio nets this was somewhat iffy even if the tanks were within range of the supporting artillery. It also means a halt/temporary retreat in the advance. Two is attempting to slug it out at long range which is the worst choice and three, advance as fast a possible (charge?) to get close enough for the MG to become effective against the towed guns. Close enough to penetrate the shield or advance to a point to take the guns from the flank and/or close enough to make getting a hit on gun a likely proposition with the main gun AP shot. The last two choices are not very good ones but given the radio communications of the day may be the ONLY options.
Different choices in the design process may have allowed different tactics, which in turn, may have allowed for different choices for future tanks. Throwing out the "firing on the move" tactic early on may lead to improved long range accuracy for both the main gun and the co-ax gun which extends the range the tanks can deal with non-armored targets. Better, more precise elevation control for quicker walking successive shots onto the target. Buying HE ammo from the start would also do wonders for this stand off capability. The 40mm Bofors shell held 65grams of HE. The German 37mm held 25 grams and the US 37mm AT and tank shells held about 38 grams. The 2pdr wouldn't take out field fortifications but it's ability to deal with towed guns (and their towing vehicles, one or two 40mm HE vs how many MG rounds?) would be much enhanced.
The 2pdr solid shot was also a bit lacking in long range performance due to it's shape.
From
as I want to give credit for the picture.
4th round is an APCBC projectile and extended the practical range of the 2pdr by several hundred yds at least.
Again, a better round for long range use and better/ more precise gun mountings might have lead to different tactics.
more later.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
Shoot Neville Chamberlain.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
In 1936, you'd have to shoot most of the Tories, including Churchill.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
I just figured if we offed him then we would never get the "Peace in our time" crap. But hey, all for whacking the Tories as well.
michaelmaltby
Colonel
"....all for whacking the Tories as well."
Replace with whom? .... specifics, please
Replace with whom? .... specifics, please
michaelmaltby
Colonel
".....In some cases using the Germans as a model may make sense but not everything the Germans did was the best or only way of doing something..."
Post 1918, Germans were taught warfare with much greater attention to fieldcraft, small unit tactics, and leadership up front than any other Western army.
Britain did/does not have a culture of taking their army seriously ... the Royal Navy got the lion's share .... until 1914. And that culture was surely not going to change after the catastrophe of 1914 - 18.
The Germans took their Heer seriously and kept it's culture alive throughout the interwar years .... circumventing Versailles restrictions through secret "deals" with USSR, and U-boat contracts with fellow North Sea States that had been neutral in WW1.
Britain, the Commonwealth and the USA had to learn how to fight. The Russians learned through very costly tactical blunders directed - by phone - from the Kremlin.
But in the end, Czarist military strategy prevailed, and the Red Army began to use the tactics that had prevailed against Napoleon.
If you want to improve your army -- take your army and take war seriously.
(Pray for peace, prepare for war)
IMHO, I think the USA has, overall, a very realistic approach to its defense needs and military .... but, very costly. Only GB has an historical record of spending equivalent $$$ amounts of GDP .... on the Royal Navy.
God knows ... they (USA) has a history of NOT doing that ... it caught them unprepared in the Civil War, 1917, 1939 and Korea.
But as an alternative to the German model, the USA is a ++ role model
Post 1918, Germans were taught warfare with much greater attention to fieldcraft, small unit tactics, and leadership up front than any other Western army.
Britain did/does not have a culture of taking their army seriously ... the Royal Navy got the lion's share .... until 1914. And that culture was surely not going to change after the catastrophe of 1914 - 18.
The Germans took their Heer seriously and kept it's culture alive throughout the interwar years .... circumventing Versailles restrictions through secret "deals" with USSR, and U-boat contracts with fellow North Sea States that had been neutral in WW1.
Britain, the Commonwealth and the USA had to learn how to fight. The Russians learned through very costly tactical blunders directed - by phone - from the Kremlin.
But in the end, Czarist military strategy prevailed, and the Red Army began to use the tactics that had prevailed against Napoleon.
If you want to improve your army -- take your army and take war seriously.
(Pray for peace, prepare for war)
IMHO, I think the USA has, overall, a very realistic approach to its defense needs and military .... but, very costly. Only GB has an historical record of spending equivalent $$$ amounts of GDP .... on the Royal Navy.
God knows ... they (USA) has a history of NOT doing that ... it caught them unprepared in the Civil War, 1917, 1939 and Korea.
But as an alternative to the German model, the USA is a ++ role model
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swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 3,954
- Jun 25, 2013
The Tories were far too worried about the Bolsheviks (whose ideological predecessors were defeated by, for example, Bismarck's implementation of fairly trivial social welfare programs) to worry about somebody whose goals were racially-based slavery, bloody vengeance on the victors of the Great War, and killing off Jews and Gypsies. Heck, opposing those last two may even get you thrown out of the better clubs.
Not that Labour was much more realistic about defense needs in 1936, but they were in opposition.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
I think in general terms, the appeasement of Hitler was a lost cause from the gate, except of course I have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, but the premise of this thread is "what if" based and honestly it would certainly have changed things if Europe as a whole had stood up to Hitler's early moves. He himself was initially amazed that no one did, and then labelled the British and French governments rightly as fools when they continued the appeasement. Pretty good exchange if you ask me, off one or 10 idiots and save literally millions.
Shortround6
Major General
Getting back to the tanks and AT guns. The 2pdr was designed in 1934 in response to requirements posted in 193??? The tank version was approved in Jan 1935 and the AT version not long after. Unfortunately, like many British weapons, it took a long time to go from approval to even limited production. Throwing out the 2pdr in 1936 and trying for something else is really going to leave the British scrambling for effective tanks in large numbers in 1940. Changing ammo and mounts is much easier.
As AT guns go, the British had turned down a simple split trail carriage (like the rest of the world used) back in 1936. Such a carriage, while limiting the traverse to somewhere between 60 and 90 degrees instead of 360 degrees would have been lighter, cheaper, easier to dig in and camouflage.
The A13 tank was one of the best tanks of it's time.
Granted it could use a few improvements
The Covenanter was a step backwards in several respects.
In the quest for "low silhouette" they set turret design back several years. That big, one piece hatch was an abomination. Cutting the commanders view, when closed down, to a single rotating periscope and a vision slit out each side (if he could see past the loader on the right?) instead of improving the cupola on the older tank was a major mistake. The other aspect of "low silhouette" was squashing the hull down between the tracks. The older tanks had vertical space between the top of the tracks/running guards, the wheels had quite a bit of vertical travel and space above the the tracks with vehicle stationary is misleading) that could have been used for sponsons out over the tracks to fit larger hull top and a larger turret ring.
BTW.....IDEAL Crew layout for a tank is driver in the center of hull, equally good (or bad) view to both left and right. Turret crew should be gunner on the right and loader on the left. Loader gets to hold larger rounds with left hand/arm and ram shells into the breech using the right hand/arm (more people being right handed) not a big deal with small round but when you get to the big ones?
Commander should be behind gunner, center of turret means restricting gun recoil and/or limiting space behind the gun for loading. again, not a big deal with small rounds but when you get to the big ones every inch/cm counts. Building tanks without cupolas was a serious mistake. If the commander can't see he either can't fight the tank or has to ride with head exposed. Not bad in a long range gun dual but not very good when operating in close terrain with infantry about. Best way to stop an enemy tank with a rifle??? shoot exposed crewmen.
As AT guns go, the British had turned down a simple split trail carriage (like the rest of the world used) back in 1936. Such a carriage, while limiting the traverse to somewhere between 60 and 90 degrees instead of 360 degrees would have been lighter, cheaper, easier to dig in and camouflage.
The A13 tank was one of the best tanks of it's time.
Granted it could use a few improvements
The Covenanter was a step backwards in several respects.
In the quest for "low silhouette" they set turret design back several years. That big, one piece hatch was an abomination. Cutting the commanders view, when closed down, to a single rotating periscope and a vision slit out each side (if he could see past the loader on the right?) instead of improving the cupola on the older tank was a major mistake. The other aspect of "low silhouette" was squashing the hull down between the tracks. The older tanks had vertical space between the top of the tracks/running guards, the wheels had quite a bit of vertical travel and space above the the tracks with vehicle stationary is misleading) that could have been used for sponsons out over the tracks to fit larger hull top and a larger turret ring.
BTW.....IDEAL Crew layout for a tank is driver in the center of hull, equally good (or bad) view to both left and right. Turret crew should be gunner on the right and loader on the left. Loader gets to hold larger rounds with left hand/arm and ram shells into the breech using the right hand/arm (more people being right handed) not a big deal with small round but when you get to the big ones?
Commander should be behind gunner, center of turret means restricting gun recoil and/or limiting space behind the gun for loading. again, not a big deal with small rounds but when you get to the big ones every inch/cm counts. Building tanks without cupolas was a serious mistake. If the commander can't see he either can't fight the tank or has to ride with head exposed. Not bad in a long range gun dual but not very good when operating in close terrain with infantry about. Best way to stop an enemy tank with a rifle??? shoot exposed crewmen.
Shortround6
Major General
The is a school that believes Chamberlain was a lot more cynical than given credit for. That he didn't really believe Hitler but sold out Czechoslovakia to buy more time for Britain to re-arm. How much truth there is to that I don't know but the British Army and AIr Force were in pretty bad shape in 1938. What was unknown in the west at the time (and is known now) was how much of a paper tiger the Germany army was at the time (1938).
Going to war in 1938 would have meant Gloster Gauntlets fighting He 51s at times.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
Agreed, which seems to be a pattern in history. Fight a war, win, then disarm because of the huge cost of maintaining a military. Then you become a target and around we go again. The cold war largely was an exception to that cycle in the sense the potential for things going hot was much more likely than in pre inter (intra?) war periods. But I would still suspect Chamberlain as he did not come back and immediately push for re-armament and an increase in force size. Instead he seemed to continue the status quo.
Robert Porter
Senior Master Sergeant
Was the lower silhouette the only driving factor in the design? It would not seem to make sense to replace a relatively capable tank with one with so many deficiencies?Getting back to the tanks and AT guns. The 2pdr was designed in 1934 in response to requirements posted in 193??? The tank version was approved in Jan 1935 and the AT version not long after. Unfortunately, like many British weapons, it took a long time to go from approval to even limited production. Throwing out the 2pdr in 1936 and trying for something else is really going to leave the British scrambling for effective tanks in large numbers in 1940. Changing ammo and mounts is much easier.
As AT guns go, the British had turned down a simple split trail carriage (like the rest of the world used) back in 1936. Such a carriage, while limiting the traverse to somewhere between 60 and 90 degrees instead of 360 degrees would have been lighter, cheaper, easier to dig in and camouflage.
The A13 tank was one of the best tanks of it's time.
Granted it could use a few improvements
The Covenanter was a step backwards in several respects.
In the quest for "low silhouette" they set turret design back several years. That big, one piece hatch was an abomination. Cutting the commanders view, when closed down, to a single rotating periscope and a vision slit out each side (if he could see past the loader on the right?) instead of improving the cupola on the older tank was a major mistake. The other aspect of "low silhouette" was squashing the hull down between the tracks. The older tanks had vertical space between the top of the tracks/running guards, the wheels had quite a bit of vertical travel and space above the the tracks with vehicle stationary is misleading) that could have been used for sponsons out over the tracks to fit larger hull top and a larger turret ring.
BTW.....IDEAL Crew layout for a tank is driver in the center of hull, equally good (or bad) view to both left and right. Turret crew should be gunner on the right and loader on the left. Loader gets to hold larger rounds with left hand/arm and ram shells into the breech using the right hand/arm (more people being right handed) not a big deal with small round but when you get to the big ones?
Commander should be behind gunner, center of turret means restricting gun recoil and/or limiting space behind the gun for loading. again, not a big deal with small rounds but when you get to the big ones every inch/cm counts. Building tanks without cupolas was a serious mistake. If the commander can't see he either can't fight the tank or has to ride with head exposed. Not bad in a long range gun dual but not very good when operating in close terrain with infantry about. Best way to stop an enemy tank with a rifle??? shoot exposed crewmen.
Shortround6
Major General
What you say is true but I was referring to the German's sometimes questionable use of close support artillery. Using penny packets of artillery pieces attached to relatively low level units for fast response is a somewhat good idea. It is also an admission that your communications network wasn't as good as desired/needed (but early war no one's was).
Many German SP artillery units were just barely useable (some allied ones had limits too) and often required a lot more support vehicles in a full battery than western nations did to move a similar amount of ammo and/or have a similar command structure.
Much is often made of the Stug but it wasn't a real replacement for the tank. It had a very limited ability to support infantry. While an early Stug carried 44 rounds of cannon ammo (and NO machine gun) AN early MK IV carried about 80 rounds of cannon ammo and 2700 rounds of MG ammo, a late model MK III armed with the short 75 carried around 60 rounds of cannon ammo and over 3400 rounds of MG ammo.
It may have been 30% cheaper (or more?) but if it carried 3/4 of the cannon ammo and could provide either very limited or NO MG support were they really getting value for money?
The late Stugs with long barreled guns were effective mobile AT guns but that isn't the extent of a tanks duties/roles.
Shortround6
Major General
The Covenantor was first ordered (100 tanks) in April of 1939 without a prototype having been built so they were operating of theory rather than experience. To be fair the Cupola on the early A 13s may have been a pretty poor specimen (3 viewing blocks?) but at least it existed and could be improved, it is hard to improve what you don't have, although the Germans did try.
Early Panzer II turret.
Between Poland and France the Germans re-fitted many Panzer IIs and changed production of new Panzer IIs to this type hatch cupola.
A Eight vision blocks. Vision isn't as good as head out side of hatch but much better than the dinky periscope on the early tanks.
It took the British and Americans years to figure out some of the advantages of a good cupola.
The Early A 13s were good in their time and offer a good base to go from. Unfortunately many of the improvements weren't!
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