Japanese aircraft were behind in timing to Allied aircraft.

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Thumpalumpacus said:
You're gonna need a bigger engine!

View attachment 731218
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My understanding is that they did increase power of the engine and that sorted out some of the problems, except stability which got worse due to increased engine torque.

Extending the tail a few feet probably would not have vastly increased weight. They did this on the P-40 and it did not make it much heavier.

EDIT: Interesting to learn from EwenS that the elevator wasn't necessarily really a problem. It seems to be a big debate whether the SBC2C problems were more due to Curtiss or due to the specs. It pretty much doomed the company. To me looking at the aircraft it's obvious that it was too short for it's scale, the rear gunner's position is truncated and with the windscreen off, it's just a big ugly hole in the rear fuselage.

 
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The USAAF A-25 order started production in December 1942, with 1 accepted, last of the 900 accepted in March 1944. Curtiss started rolling out SB2C-1 in September 1942, Switching to the SB2C-1C in May 1943, starting SB2C-3 in December 1943, ending SB2C-1 in March 1944, and switching to SB2C-4 in June/July 1944. By end of 1943 acceptances were 200 SB2C-1, 461 SB2C-1C, 1 SB2C-3, 14 SBW-1, 15 SBW-1B and 586 A-25. So the USAAF had ended up with pushing half the number made, which helps explain why the USN was reluctant to allow foreign orders at the time. After bottoming out at 3 fleet carriers in October 1942 the USN was up to 10 by end 1943, plus 9 light fleet, and they needed modern air groups.

The RAAF dive bomber story, the reality of being one of the lower priority areas in world wide shortage situation rather than politics. Readable online, at Australian Archives web site
Series A11093 control symbol 452/A69, A-25 Shrike performance test, 30 pages, things like the undercarriage being harsh.
Series A705 Control Symbol 9/63/16 disposal of Shrike aircraft, 160 pages

The Shrike order came from the April 1943 mission to the US by Australian Foreign Minister H V Evatt, a supplemental allocation of various aircraft types was granted. The 150 Shrikes under Combined Chiefs of Staff Minute C.C.S. 277/2 and Munitions Assignment Committee (Air) Case no. 200. As of the start of April only 56 Vengeances had arrived in Australia, this increased to 150 by end May. Getting the 10 Shrikes delivered to the RAAF back to the US seems to have required Australian Prime Minister and RAAF Chief of Staff to General MacArthur level correspondence.

RAAF Chiefs of Staff weekly progress reports, aircraft orders
30 July 1943, week ending, 150 A-25 Shrike on order, Shipments expected to commence in August
27 August 1943, week ending, Shipment expected to be completed by December 1943
17 September 1943, week ending, Shipments expected to be completed by December 1943. Due to temporary restrictions on West Coast shipping the aircraft are moving to the East Coast for shipment.
22 October 1943, week ending, 10 Shrike en route, Shipments expected to be completed by January 1944
26 November 1943, week ending, 10 Shrike arrive. The 10 delivered are A25-A-15-CS models. Shipped as uncrated deck cargo on the Port Caroline, adhesive plaster used to protect flaps, joints etc.
10 December 1943, week ending, Shipments being held until clarification of radio equipment.
31 December 1943, week ending, 1 Shrike assembled.
14 January 1944, week ending, Action taken to cancel 142 dive bombers from RAAF allocations, it is understood most will be Shrikes
21 January 1944, week ending, Remainder of Shrike order cancelled.
11 February 1944, week ending, Possibility of returning the Shrikes to US authorities being investigated.
25 February 1944, week ending, 9 Shrike not erected to stay that way, will be returned to USA
8 December 1944, week ending, 4 Shrike to Far East Air Force
15 December 1944, week ending, 1 Shrike to Far East Air Force
26 January 1945, week ending, 5 Shrike to Far East Air Force

So the Shrikes arrived probably after or at least only shortly before the no dive bombers required in SWPA area directive.

The RAAF were originally allocated up to 297 Brewster Bermuda in 1941, from the May 1940 RAF order, but it started production in July 1942, well after the promised schedule of February 1941 and was a failure. Australian Archives A5954 296/1 states as of 5 September 1941 there were 297 on order but given production difficulties switching to the Vultee Vengeance was under consideration, this type was also ordered by the British/French around May 1940 or earlier, production beginning in January 1942.

Brewster Bermuda RAAF Supply and Production Branch reports
19 June 1941 Previous advice was delivery would begin in June, unofficial advice is it will now be August.
31 July 1941 Latest information, production to start in November, by end February 1942 some 134 to be built, 56 to Australia
28 August 1941 Prototype for Britain not completed, production to start early 1942 if prototype satisfactory.
11 September 1941 Vultee Vengeance proposed as Bermuda replacement, projected shipments 7 in October, 6 November, 25 December, 41 January 1942, 57 February, 80 March, 27 April.
18 September 1941 Bermuda projected shipments 2 in October, 3 November, 10 December, 20 January 1942, 30 per month February to April, 35 per month May to July, 13 August
16 October 1941, War Cabinet to consider replacing Bermuda with Vengeance, but it wants to know whether spares and spare engines also available and whether change to 0.303 inch guns are same and would not cause delays.
23 October War Cabinet agreed to replace Bermuda with Vengeance. Air Ministry to be informed to make changes to Vengeance order.
27 November 1941 British diverting 300 of their Vengeance Order to Australia, planned schedule in 1942, 1 in January, 4 in February, 11 in March, 34 in April, 31 in May, 4 in June 57 in July, 50 in August, 26 in September 18 in October, 17 in November and 7 in December, 243 probably on cash payment, balance under Lend Lease
11 December 1941 Vultee only required to test flight 1 in 20 aircraft, proposal is they test flight in Australia as well as supplying field crews to train RAAF maintenance personnel.
19 December 1941, week ending, now 297 Vultee Vengeance on order.

RAAF Chiefs of Staff, weekly progress reports, aircraft on order
10 April 1942, week ending, 370 Vengeance now on order, part of RAAF expansion plan
22 May 1942, week ending, 5 Vengeance reported en route
4 June 1942, Week ending, 5 Vengeance arrive
24 July 1942, week ending, 10 Vengeance arrive. "Ship carrying Vengeances ran aground on reef off Queensland coast, to date 10 Vengeance salvaged and at 3 Aircraft Depot."
9 September 1942, week ending, Vengeance on order cut to 197, RAAF expansion plan is off.
27 November 1942, week ending, 57 aircraft are now at US Modification Centre awaiting change of type of fuel pumps.
4 December 1942, week ending, 200 cases of spares are being reopened at 3 United Nations Depot, as original domestic shipment cases left contents exposed to bad weather conditions. All instruments have been returned to Vultee factory to determine their conditions.
29 January 1943, week ending, order now 366 aircraft, 9 more reported shipped
12 February 1943, week ending, it has been decided to accept delivery of A-31 in lieu of A-35.
26 February 1943, week ending, 9 Vengeance arrive, bringing total arrivals to 19.
30 July 1943, week ending, Order raised to 400, 192 have arrived in Australia.
10 December 1943, week ending, Of 76 vengeance assembled by 1 Aircraft Depot, all are second hand, having 5 to 487 hours on them, some required an additional 662 man hours work.

Week ending 31 March 1944 Instructions have been forwarded to cancel all Vengeance not yet shipped, 305 had arrived in Australia, 37 reported en route, arrivals finished week ending 5 May 1944, with 342 delivered. By mid July 1945 288 had been assembled.

Squadron use,

12 Squadron, Batchelor Northern Territory, 30 October 1942, first Vengeance arrive, 27 March 1943 last Wirraway depart, 2 July 1943 move splits squadron between Cooktown Queensland and Merauke Dutch New Guinea, 7 November 1943 all to Merauke, Made non operational 10 June 1944, last recorded sortie 22 June, a/c ferried away in July.

21 Squadron formed Gawler South Australia 13 September 1943 with Vengeance, to Lowood Queensland 1 December 1943, to Nadzab New Guinea 18 January 1944, to Camden New South Wales 10 April 1944, Vengeance removed in September.

23 Squadron, Lowood Queensland, Vengeance added in June 1943, Wirraway removed in July, Nadzab New Guinea 9 February 1944, Higgins Field Cape York Queensland 22 March 1944, Menangle New South Wales without aircraft, 17 June 1944

24 Squadron, Bankstown New South Wales, Vengeance added on 1 June 1943, 17 June Airacobra removed, 21 June Wirraway removed, detachment to Dobodura New Guinea 30 August 1943, Kiriwina Island New Guinea 22 November, Nadzab New Guinea 16 January 1944, Lowood Queensland and Vengeances removed 8 March 1944.

25 Squadron, Pearce Western Australia, Vengeance added in July 1943, Buffalo and Wirraway removed. 1 January 1945 to Cunderdin Western Australia, Vengeance removed.

So 1 squadron did not leave Western Australia, 1 guarded the Torres Strait and South Dutch New Guinea, 2 arrived in New Guinea mid January (1 had a detachment present September to November 1943 then went to an island north of the western tip of New Guinea before moving back near the front line in January), 1 in early February, Vengeance last combat mission in New Guinea 8 March 1944
 
So one big question there is how good was the Vengeance in RAAF service? Some sources say terrible, hangar queen, useless. Others say it was an effective dive bomber which proved useful in jungle warfare due to it's accuracy.

And why were the 5th AF such jerks to the Aussies? I never got that. Or was it MacArthur?
 
The RNs record in night actions ( or foul weather) is genearly excellent (Hood not so much). Cape Matapan is a text book on how to use radar properly. Admittedly the Japanese would be a much more formidable foe than the Italians but I would take my chances with the RN.
 

I can't wait to explore this...
 

Adding 500 lbs to a plane that was already overweight and underepowered is probably gonna need more ponies under the hood.
 
I agree, it seems reasonable, but it does not necessarily seem to be the case in practice. It basically boils down to a few feet of (pretty light) duralumin skin, some rivets, and extending control wires or hydraulic lines a little. A 12 foot aluminum boat hull weighs about 100 - 150 lbs. That may be closer to what it ended up being, though it would depend on shape etc.

Anyway that is about what 29" length increase added to the P-40.
 
Just having torpedoes that work made for a huge improvement over the USN, but having flashless powder is an absolute must. In WW1 the RN realized that the German Navy was far ahead in night action technology and training; between the wars the RN studied and implemented changes that rectified most of it's night action deficiencies.
 
GrauGeist said:
That's assuming that, (A) the USN had intimate details of all Japanese aircraft designs at the time, and (B) the USN was only going to fight Japan (which was was not the case).
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Pre-War USAAC and USN thinking was that pursuit aircraft would be fine with a couple MGs, with the Bomber interceptors to have a cannon and machine guns.

Similar to the Soviet ideas on armament, to a degree.

If anything, estimate of Japanese aircraft abilities was quite low by the Army/Navy leadship, no matter what info Chennault was sending from China
 
But at the time, the U.S. was considering European adversaries, not Japanese.

Having four .50MGs was heavier than most European fighters in 1939.
 
My thought that an original XF4U-1 done ASAP would have the 1800ish HP single stage R-2800-4 engine, four guns and 175 gallons of fuel, and I believe just an armored seatback, no armorglass at this point

as of October 1940, the XF4U-1 was still having overheating problems with the newer 2000HP R-2800-8 that gave that record setting 405mph flight. Navy Contract stated 350mph minimum.

Is it as good as the production version?

of course not.
But could be in squadron service in late 1941 in small numbers, with better version on the drawing board.
Look at the difference from the P-40C to P-40D lots of work on the fuselage and Wing.
 

Aside from what you write here, there's also the fuselage framing/longerons that gotta be heavy in order to not only extend the fuselage but also counteract the leveraged tail-weight now being five feet further aft.

Look at the interior sides in this photo, and think how much one foot of fuselage might weigh. That's some beefy shit.



You ain't adding a "few feet" of length to any airplane with "(pretty light) duralumin skin, some rivets, and extending control wires or hydraulic lines a little." You will need -- especially in a dive-bomber! -- rugged construction to, keep that big-ass tail on the plane. I'm no technical guy, but you want something pretty rugged back there to keep you from being an oil-slick on your pull-out.

The framing you didn't mention is going to weigh a bit. And this on a plane already corpulent.
 
Both next generation USN dive bombers used the same engine,
SB2A-3 empty weight 9,969 pounds, 47 feet by 39 feet 2 inches, 379 square feet of wing.
SB2C-1 empty weight 10,114 pounds, 49 feet 9 inches by 36 feet 8 inches, 422 square feet of wing.

Using the Lancaster weights below. SB2C, 43 extra square feet of wing, about 224.5 pounds, SB2A 2.5 feet extra fuselage, about 143 pounds, difference 81.5 pounds,
empty weight difference 145 pounds.

Yes Lancasters were not stressed for dive bombing, though I expect the structure to be stronger because of the extra weights involved but expected to fail under smaller G loads than a dive bomber, so that evens things out somewhat, the Lancaster had to keep a tail weighing 951 pounds plus 860 pounds of loaded turet plus 200 pounds of gunner attached, much more than a dive bomber did. To do better find more detailed weight breakdowns of other types. Otherwise consider the weights per units length or area something to at least base ideas on.

1,300 Wing Ribs including engine and fuel tank mounting ribs
1,380 Wing front spar
955 Wing rear spar
101 Spar joints
170 Wing stringers
1,025 Wing skin covering
149 Flaps, centre section
125 Flaps, outer wing
125 Flap operating tubes and links
200 Wing tips
190 Ailerons
130 Wing centre section leading edges
770 Wing sundry fittings, bolts, joints to fuselage, paint, trailing edges, dummy spars, shrouds etc.
150 Access doors for fuel tanks.
6,770 Total Wing structure weight, 5.22 pounds per square foot

497 Fuselage formers
343 Fuselage stringers
721 Fuselage skin covering
980 Fuselage main floors
74 Fuselage walkways
180 Canopy
63 Windows
110 Seats
51 Fuselage former extensions below main floor
58 Flying control guards
170 Cabin heating
490 Bomb doors
233 Fuselage sundry fittings, doors, bolts etc.
3,970 Total fuselage weight, 57.12 pounds per foot.

As for the USAAF versus RAAF, MacArthur was an American Army Chauvinist, Allied Air HQ was officially formed on 30 April 1942, part of a planned combined HQs along the lines SHAEF became, the Australians formed RAAF Command the same day, to Brisbane Queensland 18 July 1942, it was renamed Coastal Command Allied Air Force 23 September 1942 under Allied Air HQ. The twist being the RAAF personnel in Allied were moved to Coastal, leaving Allied HQ a US arrangement, also commanding 5th Air Force and RAAF units in New Guinea. The RAAF retained command of the training and associated maintenance systems and was in charge of the defence of Australia under Allied HQ but had few USAAF units assigned to the task.

In any case there was no doubt who had the ultimate say, given the commanders and the dependence the RAAF had on American supplies. As more areas were bypassed the Australians were more given the task of applying defoliant to make the areas wither on the vine while the US units headed for the Philippines, and so the RAAF ended up more in command in the areas.

On the RAAF side the head of the RAAF Air Vice Marshal Sir G Jones and the head of the operational RAAF Air Vice Marshal W D Bostock ended up in a feud so bad most senior officers were forced to choose sides and it was obvious to the Americans. Bostock was deputy Chief of Staff and when the Chief of Staff position became available in 1942 Jones was appointed above him.
 
The XR-2800-4 was not single stage, at least according to the P&W engine list.
The requirement wanted a 1000 mile range, Not going to happen with 175 gallons of fuel and R-2800hp engine.
The 405mph might have been fudged just a little bit.
Who was timing it? How? what were the wind conditions?
I lived in Conn for over 60 years about 1/2 way between the two airfields in question. over 90% of the time the wind is out of the west or WSW and the flight was to the NE. 48 miles center to center on the airfields.

Part of the problem was the flight testing. The size, speed and weight of the aircraft made it hard to do the standard Navy tests. You have to change the test requirements to accept the XF4U-1, like the spin recovery tests and the max dive speed test. They did change the tests, the F6F had to pass a lower requirement.
You also need to figure out the changing Navy requirements. Navy asked for the 6 guns in the wings and fuselage fuel tank well before the XF4U-1 had completed the tests.

Using the single stage R-2800 ( I call it the bomber engine) for short run of fighters in late 1941 and early 1942 doesn't get you the fighter you want.
While the 1850hp engine gave that power at take off it was only good for 1500hp at 14,000ft in high gear. The R-2800-8 was good for 1800hp at 15,500ft.
In late 1940 look at the F4F and see how little the castrated F4U would really give you. And look at the time line for the F4F production. In Dec 1940 they had 578 on order with 22 delivered to the USN. By the end of Dec 1941 Grumman had built 323 Wildcat/Martlets total with only 112 of them being F4F-3 and F4F-3s, not sure in the F4F-3As are included or
not.
Vought may have been good but getting a new airframe into production and into a service squadron in under a year is asking an awful lot. It took Grumman at least 16 months to go from order (54 planes) to squadron use for the F4F-3. Aug 1939 to Dec 1940.
 
Interesting to get reminded of the woes of such planes as SB2C, F4U, the Brewsters etc. One can draw a parallel between the SB2C and the D4Y, both flew in late 1940, both experienced serious issues (aiui D4Y had flutter problems as well as engine issues typical of the japanese DB copies), and both only entered fleet service in late 1943. Though the D4Y was used as a fast scout as early as mid-1942.

The americans must be thaking their lucky stars for Grumman, if things went as bad with the TBF and F6F, they would have had to still fly F4F-4s (though possibly they would fly the F4U regardless of the poor carrier handling characteristics at the time) and TBDs (if there were any left, OR having to restart production) off the Essexes in 1943!
 
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